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The Power of the Unsaid: Philosophic Silence
in Plotinus
Abstract. This thesis examines the theme of secrecy and silence in the philosophy
of Plotinus. This philosopher is known for the innovative use he made of Platonic
and Aristotelean materials in constructing a thought-world which posits a totally
transcendent first principle, the one or the good, from which all other entities are
derived. The Plotinian one is ineffable by its very nature, and Plotinus expounds at
length the claim that it cannot be comprehended, either by speech or thought. The
paradox of a philosopher writing extensive discourses about a reality which is said
to be ineffable is the main topic of this thesis, which seeks to answer the question:
what is Plotinus doing when he tells us that he cannot, or will not, reveal the nature
of the one?
Partial answers to this question have been given in previous scholarship through
study of the philosophic background which led Plotinus to posit such an ineffable
reality, and through analysis of the arguments in which he upholds the doctrine of
the one’s ineffability. Building on this body of work, this thesis gives a more compre-
hensive answer to this question by analysing the tropes of silence and secrecy which
were developed in Middle Platonism, derived especially from Plato’s writings, and
by locating Plotinus in a broader philosophic tradition which interpreted canonical
thinkers as esoteric writers. In this way, the thesis provides a historical context for
Plotinus’ treatment of the ineffable one. Plotinus’ discourse of ineffability is present-
ed not just as a response to purely philosophical issues, but also an enactment of a
tradition of philosophic silence, which determined in part how a Platonist philoso-
pher articulated in written form ideas about concealment and the limits of discourse.
Through a combination of close reading of a number of Plotinian texts and full dis-
cussion of the wider context, this thesis aims to integrate analytical and cultural
approaches to Plotinus’ philosophy. It aims also to bring out the significance of the
theme of philosophical silence for late antique philosophy both as a discipline and
as a socially-embedded part of Græco-Roman civilisation.
Index
List of Abbreviations (see Bibliography for full references) 5
Transliterated Greek Words 5
Introduction 6
Modes of Reading and Writing Philosophical Silence 13
Outline of the Present Work 19
Part I: The Cultural Roots of Philosophic Silence 23
Chapter One: De philosophorum Græcorum silentio mystico: Preliminaries. 24
Written Silence, The Esoteric, and Esoteric Hermeneutics 24
The Intrinsic Difficulty of the Question 32
Chapter Two: The Silent Philosopher 49
Presocratic Roots of Philosophic Silence 55
Philosophic Silence in Classical Athenian Philosophy 70
Philosophic Silence in Plato 73
The Silent Philosopher in Late Antiquity 82
Chapter Three: Perennial Wisdom and Platonist Tradition 95
Philosophic Lineage and Perennial Wisdom in Platonism 97
The Transposition of Religion in Middle Platonism 112
Esoteric Hermeneutics in Middle Platonism 123
Chapter Four: Plotinus and ‘The Ancients’; Tradition, Truth, and Transcendence 135
The Plotinian Idea of Tradition 136
Plotinian Hermeneutics of the Perennial Tradition 148
Part II: The Transcendent Absolute, the Ineffable, and Plotinian Poetics of
3
INDEX 4
Transcendence 157
Chapter Five: The Development of the Transcendent Absolute in the Middle
Platonist Milieu 158
The Rise of the Ineffable Transcendent 159
The Transcendent in Middle Platonist Thought 164
Chapter Six: The Transcendent Absolute and the Ineffability of Reality in
Plotinus 189
The Architecture of the Ineffable in Plotinus 190
Modes of Knowing in Plotinus 209
Chapter Seven: The Poetics of Transcendence in Plotinus 225
Negative Methods in Plotinus 227
‘Speaking Improperly’: Kataphatic Descriptions of the One 237
Indeterminacy and the Open Secret 243
Conclusion 256
Philosophic Silence and Philosophic Openness in Plotinus 262
Appendices 266
Appendix A: Notes on the Classical Roots of Transcendence 266
Appendix B: The Plotinian Idea of Tradition and ‘Platonism’ 269
Appendix C: Esoteric Hermeneutics, Plato, and Aristotle in Plotinus 273
Appendix D: Some Notes on Plotinian Metaphysics 277
Appendix E: Philosophic Silence and Plotinian Religion 282
Appendix F: Modern Theories of Philosophic Silence 288
298
Select Primary Bibliography 298
Secondary Bibliography 301
TRANSLITERATED GREEK WORDS 5
List of Abbreviations (see Bibliography for full references)
CH = Corpus Hermeticum
DK = Diels-Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker
H + S 1 = Henry and Schwyzer, edd., Plotini opera, editio maior (Paris/Brussels
1951-1973)
H + S 2 = Henry and Schwyzer, edd., Plotini opera, editio minor (Oxford 1964-1983)
LSJ = Liddel, Scott, and Jones Greek English Lexicon
NF = Nock and Festugière 1947
NHC = Nag Hammadi Corpus
OLD = Oxford Latin Dictionary
PG = Patrologia Graeca, Migne 1857-66
SVF = Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, Arnim 1905-24
W = Wehrli, Die Schule des Aristoteles: Texte und Kommentar
Transliterated Greek Words
Certain Greek words without a convenient English equivalent are transliterated
throughout the text; their meanings are discussed in the course of the thesis, and
they should be regarded as ‘terms of art’.
• αἴνιγμα = enigma
• αἵρεσις = hairesis
• ἀναγωγή = anagôgê
• ἀpiόφασις = apophasis
• ἀφαίρεσις = aphairesis
• γνῶσις = gnôsis
• δαίμων = daimôn
• διανοῖα = dianoia
• ἐpiιστήμη = epistêmê
• ἔρως = erôs
• κάθαρσις = katharsis
• λογισμός = logismos
• λόγος = logos
• νόησις = noêsis
• νοητόν, νοητά = noêton, noêta
• νοῦς = nous
• ὑpiόστασις = hypostasis, pl. hypostases
Introduction
Plotinus has only one thing to say. . . and yet, he never will say it.1
The present study2 is an inquiry into ‘philosophic silence’ in Plotinus. The line of
inquiry pursued arose from wonder at a seeming paradox in the fact of Plotinus’ hav-
ing written his treatises. Plotinus posits a radical truth available to the philosophic
seeker, a truth that is an ontological transformation as much as it is an epistemo-
logical attainment, but refuses to speak this truth, and denies that it may be spoken.
The ineffable nature of the one or good for Plotinus,3 coupled with what may be
termed its transcendence and immanence at all levels of being and knowing, nat-
urally gives rise to this tension between utterance and silence. Plotinus also saw
himself as an exegete of an esoteric philosophic tradition, with a concern for keeping
certain philosophic matters out of the hands of the vulgar crowd which resulted in
a great reluctance to publish. Yet publish he did, as well as teaching a philosophic
seminar that was open to all comers, and to questions from every quarter. How can
we account for these contradictions?
The most common account of Plotinus’ use of the intensive negative language
known as apophasis, of the rhetorics of silence and secrecy, and of the paradoxes of
1Hadot 1993, 19.
2References to the text of the Enneads are to the editio maior of Henry and Schwyzer (1951-1973), by
Ennead, treatise [chronological number] chapter, and line(s). Any otherwise unattributed references
in this thesis are to the Enneads; for other primary sources I follow the abbreviation conventions of
Liddell and Scott’s revised Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford 1996) and Glare’s Oxford Latin Dictionary
(Oxford 2000). Abbreviations of periodical titles are those of the Année Philologique. Translations are
my own unless noted.
3The one or good, Plotinus’ first hypostasis, often appears as ‘the One’ or ‘the Good’ in translation
and commentary, but, for reasons discussed below (18), this practice tends to distort certain aspects
of Plotinian apophasis, bringing in connotations of ‘God’ where Plotinus often wishes to connote
something entirely indeterminate.
6
INTRODUCTION 7
transcendence and immanence, is that all these techniques are legitimate philosoph-
ical responses to the ineffable first principle of later Platonism. Viewed from the per-
spective of philosophic history of ideas, Plotinian paradox, and indeed what is wide-
ly termed Plotinian ‘mysticism’, arise from Middle and Late Platonist4 hermeneutics
of Platonic premises, and are simply logical.5 It ‘makes sense’ that the good, con-
ceived through exegesis of Plato’s dialogues as ‘beyond being’6 and subject to para-
doxical conditions in its relationship to the manifest world, is beyond normal human
thought and discourse,7 and, while this is a perplexing and problematic aspect of
Plotinian philosophy, it is one which has been addressed with considerable success
in twentieth-century scholarship.8
The further problem which arises from this first, namely the paradox of Ploti-
nus’ extensive writing about this unwritable ‘subject’, is the central impetus for the
present inquiry. We may conclude that it makes sense for Plotinus to define his first
principle as ineffable, based on the premises and arguments found in the Enneads,
and we may even assent to his extensive writings on the subject, on the grounds
that he is attempting to explain the ineffable nature of the one as far as possible. But
Plotinus does not simply define the one with a kind of written silence which aims to
show the absence from the text of the subject of discourse; he also describes it using
4This thesis prefers ‘Late Platonism’ to the almost universal ‘Neoplatonism’. While a strong case can
be made for retaining the use of a term which, while it is somewhat misleading, nevertheless refers
to a well-defined set of thinkers who share certain distinctive characteristics of thought, it is felt that
the ‘Neo-’ of ‘Neoplatonism’ smuggles certain polemics of modern scholarship (to do with modern
readings of Plato opposed to ancient ones) into discussion which it is as well to avoid. Plotinus and
his successors were in many ways closer to Plato than any modern interpreters can hope to be. The
questions of what we as scholars mean by Platonism more fundamentally, and how the Platonist
Plotinus defined himself, are discussed below (269 ff.). For a critical history of the modern term
‘Neoplatonism’, see Gatti 1996, 22-24 ; cf. Zambon 2002, 23-28; Athanassiadi 2006, 23-6.
5See 159 ff. below. This thesis takes ‘Platonist’ to refer to the Græco-Roman philosophical movement
beginning in roughly the first century CE (see 272 below), and ‘Platonic’ to refer only to Plato’s own
work.
6For the good ἐpiέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας in Plato (possible translations include ‘beyond essence’, ‘beyond
being’, and ‘beyond substance’) see especially R. 509B 8-9; Prm. 142A 3-4., and Chapters Five and Six
below. This thesis favours ‘being’ as a translation for οὐσία, but this should be understood as a term
of art, defined more thoroughly at 195 below.
7On the logical considerations of Plotinian transcendence, see Aubenque 1971; Irwin 1989, 199;
Mortley 1986, 108; 153; Sells 1994, 3-4; O’Meara 1998, 146-7; and further below, 159 ff.
8For a review of scholarship until 1971 concentrating on the problem of the one in Plotinus, see
Blumenthal 1987, 550-553.
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rhetorics of secrecy. The Plotinian one is both self-hiding by its very nature, and in
need of concealment from those ‘uninitiated’ in the mysteries of philosophy. Why
should Plotinus desire to defend the highest philosophical achievement, the direct
encounter with the one, with secrecy, if it is by its very nature incommunicable?
Previous scholarship has occasionally touched on this paradox, but no answers
have been forthcoming.9 The present thesis seeks an answer by looking not only
at the logical and strictly philosophical content of Plotinus’ work, but at the broader
cultural context of the norms, style, and culture of Platonism. It posits a set of tropes,
collectively called ‘philosophic silence’, which governed the way in which the high-
est realms of Platonist enquiry were to be discussed, and in what ways they were to
be ‘concealed’.
The question this thesis attempts to answer is this: what is Plotinus doing when
he tells us that he cannot, or will not, tell us something? The answer it gives has not
only philosophical, but social, religious, and literary ramifications, and, in the light
of these, expands our understanding of the question of Plotinian ineffability itself,
asking a question instead about literary and philosophic practice. I am by no means
abandoning the logical side of the question of the ineffable in Late Platonism; rather,
I am seeking to expand our understanding of the late antique project of writing the
ineffable by understanding it qua writing: as the textual expression not only of the
play of ideas and the search for truth through reason, but of the norms of deport-
ment, ideas of philosophy as a way of life and a tradition, and notions of the lived
encounter with higher truths so central to Late Platonist thinking.
‘Cratylan’ Silence. A quick survey of the Classical dilemmas of silence and dis-
course will help to orient the enquiry at the outset. When faced with an ineffable
truth, the philosopher has a limited number of options. The first is simply to keep
silence. This is the solution of Cratylus, who ‘finally decided that speech was not
needful, but simply moved his finger’,10 immortalised in Plato’s dialogue where the
9Pépin 1984, 32 asks this question, leaving it unanswered.
10Arist. Metaph. 1010a12-13.
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claims of language as a tool for the transmission of truth are subjected to an espe-
cially thoroughgoing scrutiny. Plato evidently rejected the Cratylan solution, and
we know of no Platonist thinkers who followed the lead of Cratylus on this mat-
ter; in this they had the example of their master to follow. The Cratylan distrust
of language, however, did not die with its eponymous proponent, and it was es-
pecially prominent in the sceptical Academy which the Platonists were concerned
to refute. The Platonists, by contrast, while agreeing that language is an inferior
tool for the transmission of truth (and even appropriating sceptical arguments with
a view to demonstrating this),11 defuse the basic problem of language by positing
direct modes of knowledge which bypass words and verbally conditioned thinking
altogether, modes of knowing which are themselves in a sense ‘silent’.
While the literal silence of Cratylus was rejected by the Platonists, the evoca-
tion of the refusal to speak became a powerful cultural gesture in the first centuries
CE, appearing in the context of the mysteries philosophically reconceived, or of
Pythagorean initiation and practice, and more generally as a mark of the Platon-
ist sage, whose control of higher knowledge and maintenance of it as the province of
an elite philosopher class was a defining characteristic. Examples survive of ‘silent
philosopher’ stories from late antiquity which shed an interesting light on this image
of the ‘serious philosopher’ or σpiουδαῖος, a kind of gnomological biographic writing
wherein the philosophic protagonist, be it Apollonius of Tyana or ‘Secundus, the
Silent Philosopher’, does enter into an actual state of verbal silence.12 But it is a de-
cidedly non-Cratylan silence which emerges from this literature, silence based in the
signification (or semeiosis) of a higher truth rather than the mere aporia inherent in the
nature of language; a positive, rather than a negative silence. Philostratus attributes
a kind of discursive silence to the ancient Pythagoreans in his Life of Apollonius:
they understood that καὶ τὸ σιωpiᾶν λόγος, to keep silence is also to speak.13
11See Wallis 1987; O’Meara 2000.
12See 88 ff. below.
13Philostratus V.A. I.1[53]
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Aristotle, in the section of the Metaphysics cited above, goes on to mention Craty-
lus’ critique of Heraclitus on the possibility of stepping in the same river twice (fr.
41 Bywater); Cratylus counters that to do so even once is an impossibility (ibid. ll.
13-15). While this critique may be conceived as having been delivered in Cratylus’
early, still vocal days, as presented by Aristotle it constitutes an early example of
what becomes, in the later history of philosophy, a surprisingly common paradox,
that of the silent philosopher who delivers sententiae, one of the important structural
embodiments of hiding and revealing in late antique texts discussed below.
Negative Discourse. A second philosophical option is to restrict discourse to
the purely negative; able only to say what the transcendent truth is not, late an-
tique philosophic and religious writers developed sophisticated negative vocabular-
ies and techniques for outlining (insofar as they deemed it possible) the absence of
what they wished to designate. This is the basic dynamic of ‘apophatic’ language.14
Classical apophasis goes a step further than simple negativity by incorporating para-
dox and self-negation into discourse in order to heighten the ability of writing to con-
vey the radical indeterminacy of the non-subject of discourse, be it the Plotinian one,
the nature of emptiness in Zen tracts, or the radical alterity of the deus absconditus in
many of the theistic currents arising in the first centuries CE.
Plotinus tells us in Treatise 39, for instance, that the one is the origin of all noble
and majestic things, and in another way not their origin (VI.8.8.8-9); that it is wholly
unrelated to anything (13-14) and yet related to everything as the principle of all
(9.6 et passim); that it cannot even be described with the verb ‘to be’, but that this
and all other predications must be stripped away from it (8.15). It is at this second
level of ‘silence’ that we begin to see the outlines of the dilemma created by the
Platonist rejection of Cratylus along with the embracing of the ineffable: the one
for Plotinus is completely unsayable15 (and indeed even the ‘lower’ hypostases of
14See especially Chapter Seven below.
15Language can only say what the one is not (V.3[49]14.6-7), and it itself remains unsayable
(VI.9[9]4.11-12, quoting the Seventh Platonic Epistle 341c5) and unpredicable (III.7[45]2.6-7). See
Chapter Six below.
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the Plotinian universe are ‘very difficult to say’16), but the task of discourse requires
that the philosopher continually make the attempt.17 Moreover, while this attempt
is never successful in the task of expressing the ineffable, it is by no means seen as
vain discourse; it is part of an active philosophic process which ‘drives’ the Plotinian
seeker toward the ineffable one.18
Plotinus makes complex use of many different types of apophatic and negative
language, and part of what follows will consist in a detailed analysis of how, exactly,
he employs different types of negation as part of his philosophic pedagogy. Some-
times Plotinus simply recognises that analogical or equivocal use of normal language
is inadequate but not false in discussing the one, and that, since it cannot be named,
‘one’ is a satisfactory and normal way of speaking of it (e.g. VI.9[9]5.31-2 & ff.). More
characteristically, however, he tends to emphasise precisely the tensions inherent in
such an unsatisfactory arrangement; the ‘one’ and ‘good’ are both in some way false
appellations.19
It will be argued below that one of the key differences between Plotinus and his
Middle Platonist and Neopythagorean predecessors is that Plotinus seems, based on
the extant evidence, to have taken most seriously the task of unsaying the ineffa-
ble; he is committed to the internal logic of transcendence and his writing grapples
with it in a uniquely sustained way. At the same time, apophasis, simple nega-
tion or the negation of negation, does not account fully for what Plotinus is doing
in his discourse of the one, as he himself recognises; Plotinus maintains in several
places in the Enneads that apophatic negations themselves remain at the level of lo-
gismos or dianoia, the level of human thought from which all true knowledge of the
one is excluded by its nature.20 Apophasis can point out the need for the aspiring
16VI.9[9]3.1-3.
17VI.9[9]4.11-16.
18The one is unsayable and unwriteable but when we speak and write we ‘impel toward it’
(VI.9[9]4.11-16: λέγομεν καὶ γράφομεν piέμpiοντες εἰς αὐτό).
19II.9[33]1.1-8; V.5[32]6.26-30; VI.7[38]38.4-9; VI.9[9]5.29-34. Cf. Bussanich 1996, 41.
20See VI.9[9]9.51; VI.7[38]34.3; VI.9[9]7.15 and 20; cf. Hadot 1986b, 247. The details of Plotinian
anthropology and the theory of knowledge within which these concepts play themselves out are
discussed below, 210 ff.
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philosopher to transcend discursive thought, and outline the edges of the discursive
thought-world, but it cannot itself cross over into that which lies ‘beyond’.21
Plotinian Poetics of Transcendence. This thesis argues that Plotinus is doing
something more complex with his philosophic writing than either simple silence or
simple negativity will allow, a third philosophic option which incorporates but goes
beyond both the silence of Cratylus and the negative silence of the theologians. I
will make strong claims for Plotinian poetics as an intrinsic and powerful element in
Plotinian philosophy, and will attempt to elucidate the way in which Plotinus’ use
of written silence is in fact intended as a practical, performative philosophic method
in Plotinus’ pedagogic writing. What is meant by ‘poetics’ here is an approach to
literary creation which emphasises the performative power of text; in this case, the
ability of written philosophy to change its reader. One of the assumptions of this
thesis is that philosophical content cannot be stripped of its literary context, and
one of its aims is to show how the literary character of Plotinus’ philosophy is an
integral part of the account which Plotinus gives, and is essential to understanding
that account fully. ‘Poetics’ is to be understood as referring, not to the narrow genre
of writing poetry, but to any theory and practice of writing qua writing which takes
into account the status of writing itself: its epistemological possibilities including
truth-claims, its ability or otherwise to evoke things-in-themselves, and of course,
taken in a Late Platonist context, its ontological claims. On the philosophic level,
then, a primary aim of this thesis is an analysis of Plotinian writing in context. More
specifically, a certain speech-act is being investigated, namely the positing of a truth
and the simultaneous denial that it may, or can, be spoken of.
This thesis argues that this simple dialectical device, the revealing of a hiding or
the hiding of a revealing, lies at the heart of a complex philosophic topos, elements of
which developed in the first centuries CE both among Platonist and Neopythagore-
an philosophers and among more demotic Platonising religious movements, and
which first came to its full flowering with Plotinus, referred to in what follows as
21See VI.9[9]9.51; VI.7[38]34.3; VI.9[9]7.15 & 20.
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‘philosophic silence’. A full account of philosophic silence, however, must consider
evidence beyond the realm of philosophic concepts. The growth of this topos will
be traced in the development of several interrelated trends: on the conceptual level,
in the rise of the transcendent absolute and of a conception of certain aspects of re-
ality which are truly ineffable; on the social level, in the changing face of Platonist
elitism transformed by the new challenges of late antique ideological struggles for
control of the truth; on the literary or rhetorical level, in the Platonists’ new methods
of reading Plato and of constructing a broader wisdom tradition within the cultures
of the past wherein the absolute truth is contained and transmitted by a specially
sanctioned, or even divinely ordained, chain of transmission, to be accessed only by
the philosophic elite. Having established a historical model for these developments
within philosophy, this thesis will investigate Plotinus’ place within these traditions
of written silence, and will outline his poetics of unsaying in a way that is both his-
torically contextualised and which allows us access, as readers of the Enneads, to a
greater understanding of what Plotinus was doing when he employed techniques of
secrecy and silence in his pursuit of literary access to true knowledge about reality.
Modes of Reading and Writing Philosophical Silence
To begin by illustrating some of the dynamics of these literary techniques, we
may pose a preliminary question to an example of Enneadic text, a quotation from
the early Plotinian Treatise 9, On the Good or the One.22 This treatise is a sustained
discussion of the highest level of hyper-ontology in Plotinus’ world-view, the one
or good, and of the soul’s means of access to this hypostasis, and shows the degree
to which Plotinus’ discourse is already immersed in the methods of philosophic si-
lence from quite early on in his career as a writer. A single sentence will serve as a
condensed example of some of the themes and methodologies which Plotinus uses
in unsaying the truth and revealing its hiding. This passage comes near the end of
the treatise; having discussed from several perspectives the ways in which the one is
22The Enneads have titles which come down from antiquity, which were chosen by Porphyry, Plotinus’
student and editor (Porph. Plot. 4). On Porphyry’s edition of Plotinus’ works, see H + S 1, Vol. 1 ix-x.
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unnameable, indescribable by normal predicates,23 and unapproachable by normal
cognitive means,24 Plotinus tells his reader:
This is the intention of the command given in the mysteries here
below not to disclose to the uninitiated; since the Good is not dis-
closable, it prohibits the declaration of the divine to another who
has not also himself had the good fortune to see.25
As has been noted, Plotinus’ philosophical discussions of the one and of the soul’s
relation to the one are usually approached through analysis of his dialectic method-
ology, and it is worthwhile by way of contrast to begin by looking at the way Ploti-
nus is using culture in this text. Plotinus is reading the ancient injunction to silence
associated with ‘the mysteries here below’, an injunction to secrecy in the interests
of cultic exclusivity, as concealing a philosophical doctrine of ineffability. We may
note, firstly, that Plotinus is applying a method of philosophic reading to a cultur-
al institution which is itself extra-textual; this co-option of religion in the service of
philosophy is an important dynamic in Platonist thought which will be discussed
below.26 We note further that this ‘reading’ of the mysteries is itself hidden from
the ‘uninitiated’, that, is, from anyone untrained in the particular hermeneutic of
Platonist exegesis which discovers (or constructs) the hidden meaning. A second
hermeneutic level of secrecy is thus layered below the first, manifest one, attributing
to the true philosophy which is able to discover such hidden meanings the status of
initiation and the privileged knowledge of the μύστης.27
23VI.9[9]5.31 ff; 6.55-7.
24This treatise is a rich source for Plotinus’ circumscription of normal knowledge through creative
metaphor; the one can be seen by nous (VI.9[9]3.22-27), and as it were touched (οἷον ἐφάψασθαι καὶ
θιγεῖν [4.27; cf. 7.3-5]), but yet cannot be given even the predicates ‘ἐκείνου’ or ‘ὄντος’, discourse
instead ‘running around’ it in attempts to explain what it has undergone in its proximity (49-55), nor
can it be experienced by way either of normal knowledge (epistêmê) nor even of noêsis, but only by a
presence superior to knowledge (κατὰ piαρουσίαν έpiιστήμης κρείττονα [4.1-4]).
25VI.9[9]11.1 ff: Τοῦτο δὴ ἐθέλον δηλοῦν τὸ τῶν μυστηρίων τῶνδε ἐpiίταγμα, τὸ μὴ ἐκφέρειν εἰς μὴ
μεμυημένους, ὡς οὐκ ἔκφορον ἐκεῖνο ὄν, ἀpiεῖpiε δηλοῦν piρὸς ἄλλον τὸ θεῖον, ὅτῳ μὴ καὶ αὐτῷ ἰδεῖν
εὐτύχηται. Armstrong’s translation (2003).
26Chapter Three, esp. 112 ff.
27The equation of philosophy with the mysteries, and of philosophical paideia with initiation, is
widespread among Platonists; some reassessment of its significance to philosophy is outlined 115
ff. below.
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This reading of tradition is part of a larger programme which Plotinus embraces,
and in some respects pushes forward, of re-reading not only Plato, ‘Pythagoras’,
and Aristotle through late-antique eyes, but also Hellenic religion, Homer, and oth-
er texts and traditions of the Hellenic past, and constructing from these materials
a perennial tradition with claims to absolute authority and privileged access to the
truth. Plotinus’ well-known claim to be merely an expounder of ancient wisdom
rather than an original thinker amounts to the location of a type of absolute philo-
sophical authority in a non-existent, or silent, textual tradition, but one which is para-
doxically subjected to the hermeneutic rigours of Late Platonist exegesis.28 This pro-
cess in Plotinus embraces the type of re-reading of the ancient mysteries as ageless
philosophical wisdom seen above, as well as allegorical interpretation of traditional
myths, and of Homer and other poets, as repositories of inspired but hidden truths
of theology, and, most interestingly, the reading of Plato and other philosophers as
though they too were writing with a hidden subtext in precisely the same way. My
discussion will bring out a technical hermeneutic vocabulary for reading the unwrit-
ten tradition both within and outside the the canonical texts of Platonist philosophy.
It will also problematise to some degree the easy identification of Plotinus as a ‘Neo-
platonist’, or even a self-styled ‘Platonist’, arguing that Plotinus defined himself sim-
ply as a ‘right philosopher’, an interpreter of a chain of perennial wisdom of which
Plato constituted a single link.29
Hiding the Secret, Revealing the Hiding. It is characteristic of the discourse of
secrecy and revealing employed in this kind of exegesis of the ancient mysteries that,
considered logically, it contains an inherent self-contradiction: Plotinus here betrays
the ‘intention of the command given in the mysteries’ even as he reveals its true
meaning. In declaring the true nature of the injunction to silence of the mysteries,
Plotinus is himself profaning them. Moreover, Plotinus is revealing the mysteries
28What I call Plotinus’ ‘perennialism’ is discussed 136 ff. below.
29See 269 ff. below.
MODES OF READING AND WRITING PHILOSOPHICAL SILENCE 16
in a written text, a Platonic bête noire when the arcana of philosophy are under dis-
cussion; the traditional Platonic privileging of orality over the written word in philo-
sophical teaching constitutes a paradoxical dynamic underlying all Plotinian writing
which seeks to uncover the absolute truths of philosophy.30 The theme of ‘the secret
revealed’ takes many forms in Platonist esotericism, and will appear again and again
in the discussion that follows. At the same time, the ‘revelation’ is often simulta-
neously a hiding: Plotinus can reveal the true meaning of the injunction, but he is
prevented from disobeying the injunction by the good’s essential incommunicability.
The Self-Hiding Secret. In this sense, the secret of the mystery is a self-hiding
secret, and Plotinus can only point to the fact of this hiding, not to the hidden itself.31
The parallel here between the inaccessibility of the good, its self-hiding nature which
is only accessible to the serious philosopher if at all, and the inaccessible nature of
the true meaning of the mystery injunction, also to be unearthed only by the adept,
is striking. I discuss below ways in which the ‘self-hiding’ secret of the transcendent
added a new dimension to philosophic silence not to be found before the second
century CE, and which we see seriously explored for the first time in Plotinus’ works.
The juxtaposition of the rhetoric of hiding and the revelation of the secret is also of
note; we will find again and again in our history of Platonist philosophic silence
the revelation of a secret not indeed hidden but actually flagged by the rhetorics of
secrecy and silence. Investigation of Plotinian poetics reveals many such parallels
between text and the nature of reality as conceived in the text.
Secrecy as Silence, Silence as Secrecy. Further consideration of the passage re-
veals an exegetical sleight of hand: the traditional law of non-disclosure of the mys-
teries is smoothly transferred to an indication of the philosophical truth of a Plotini-
an claim, viz. the ineffability of the one. In other words, the prohibition of disclosure
becomes the impossibility of disclosure, secrecy becoming silence; again, Plotinus is
telling a secret while simultaneously withdrawing it. We find in this passage an
30As discussed 78 ff. below.
31Cf. Pépin 1984, 32.
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interplay of two modes of what might be called written silence: writing the prohibi-
tion of disclosure and writing the impossibility of disclosure. This interplay, which
Plotinus and the later Platonists employ extensively, is fostered by ambiguities in
the Greek vocabulary of silence itself: the mysteries were traditionally ἀpiόρρητα or
ἄρρητα, ‘unsayable’, i.e., ‘not to be spoken of’, words which in the course of time and
with the rise of the idea of the ineffable in post-Hellenistic philosophy and religion,
came more and more to signify ‘unsayable’ in an absolute sense, that is, ‘impossible
to reveal’.32 As I argue below, however, these terms never lost their original signifi-
cation, and always suggested secrecy as well as ineffability. A key aspect of philo-
sophic silence is thus the interplay, or interference, between the concepts of secrecy
and silence.
The Indeterminacy of Ineffability and Philosophic Register. As will be shown
below, there are many loci in Plotinus and his Middle Platonist predecessors where
neither meaning can be entirely accurate; the term ‘unsayable’ hovers between the
two meanings, and signifies neither in a full or absolute sense. Apophatic language is
characterised by a tension between predication and its impossibility brought about,
in its simplest form, through an immediate and systematic gainsaying of any pred-
icative statement. The rhetorical alternation and interference between the two modes
of ‘cannot speak’ and ‘must not speak’ seen in the passage cited above result in
further, deeper layers of indeterminacy in Plotinian language.33 Plotinus incorpo-
rates an indeterminacy of ‘register’ into his treatment of the ineffable, blending the
32Cf. Casel 1919, 6; Pépin 1984, 32-35; Brisson 1987, 96-97. There is an inherent potential for ambiguity
in the use of the Greek alpha privative, whereby an adjective so modified may have either an emphatic
or a totalising meaning, an ambiguity which would also be exploited by the apophatic discourse of
later Platonists (See Arist. Metaph. 1023a1: ἄτμητον may mean ‘difficult to cut’ or ‘impossible to
cut’, quoted and discussed at Mortley 1986, 8-10). The Greek vocabulary of silence is extensive, and
not limited to alpha privative negations; as Mortley has shown in great detail (1986), such words as
σιγή and σιωpiάω take on positive meanings and come to be characterised as kinds of λόγος in the
post-Hellenistic period.
33The term ἀpiόφασις, in ‘a coincidence worthy of note’ (Mortley 1986, 429) is itself ambiguous, having
in fact two radically opposed meanings; it may be derived from ἀpiοφήμι to mean, on the simplest
level, ‘negation, denial’, and from ἀpiοφαίνομαι to mean ‘statement, affirmation’.
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concerns of philosophy with those of religion while refusing ever to set foot firm-
ly on either side of the fence.34 Similarly, he sometimes switches register from the
the dispassionate discussion of concepts to the first-person language of the personal
encounter with higher metaphysical entities, often with a disconcerting abruptness
which leaves the boundaries between the two modes of discourse blurred, and the
nature of the ineffable reality under discussion further removed from any concrete
concept which the reader might form.35 Armstrong’s translation serves to illustrate
how difficult it is to maintain this suspension of register in interpretation. Simply
by capitalising ‘the Good’, it evokes a theistic mindset foreign to, or at least irre-
ducibly uncertain in, the original text.36 Plotinus is telling us here that ‘the good is
not disclosable’, but ‘the Good’ is already disclosing something of the translator’s
prejudice, and adding an element of determinacy which the author strives to avoid.
The Paradox of Writing the Ineffable. A final seeming paradox may be extract-
ed from our passage, one which returns our reading to the initial question which
sparked this inquiry, the status of the Enneads themselves as written works. The
impossibility of disclosure of the good through language to anyone who has not al-
ready seen it himself37 is a challenge to the very enterprise of philosophic writing. It
would seem that writing about the one or good cannot, according to Plotinus, serve
as an exposition of its nature,38 nor can it be of use to such as ‘have seen’, whose
knowledge will be, by definition, perfect and self-confirming.39 It is left to the reader
34These two categories of ‘religion’ and ‘philosophy’ are modern, and it would be more correct to say
that, for Plotinus, concerns which to modern philosophers are bracketed as ‘religious’ or ‘theological’
are for him central to philosophy proper; it is however clear that these concerns were not considered
strictly philosophical by all philosophers in Plotinus’ day, and that his project, and those of the Mid-
dle Platonists whose work he draws on, were concerned with an appropriation of the sacred to the
philosophical; cf. Van Nuffelen 2011, 7-10, and see 112 ff. below.
35See Chapter Seven.
36Armstrong 2003 passim. Cf. Sells 1994, 11 and the comments of Hadot cited p. 40 below.
37The one or good may not be said or thought, but it may (sometimes) be seen and touched, a shift in
vocabulary which plays an important part in the poetic articulation of silence in the Plotinian corpus,
and in fact emerges as one of the ways in which Plotinus creates a change in the philosophic register
mentioned above. See Chapter Seven below.
38Although, as has been discussed, certain negative statements about the one can be expounded in
a fairly normal, discursive way, the truth-value of even these statements is called into question by
Plotinus’ apophatic refusal to predicate the good.
39Technically speaking, there can never be knowledge of the one. The identification with or partic-
ipation in nous, however, which is the highest form of what we might call ‘knowledge’, and which
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to determine why Plotinus undertakes such a project at all. This problem has largely
been ignored in interpretation; after all, Plotinus clearly felt it worthwhile to write
his treatises, and who are we to take him to task for this? Nevertheless, the ques-
tion remains a cogent and significant one, and one which we sometimes see Plotinus
pondering in the Enneads themselves.
Outline of the Present Work
It is hoped that the foregoing discussion will have highlighted some of the ways
in which philosophical culture, rather than philosophy simpliciter, determined the
ways in which Plotinus chose to write about the ineffable. Again, the situation of
philosophical silence in Plotinus is not to be found either in the pure history of ideas,
solely as a working out of the rise of the transcendent in post-Hellenistic thought,
nor in terms of a sociological reductionism which characterises all speech-acts in-
volving revealing and disclosure, and hence the privileging of knowledge, simply as
exercises of power. A full account of Plotinian silence should incorporate both the
philosophical and the social spheres.
Plotinus was not writing in a cultural vacuum: there was a tradition of silentium
philosophorum40 in which he both participated and took a defining role, and which
determined part of what it was to philosophise rightly in his day and time. A his-
torical account of the rise of the discursive elements in the early centuries CE which
contributed to the full flowering of philosophic silence from the third century is a
desideratum only partly met by current scholarship, and is essential for a full ac-
count of Plotinian written silence, as well as casting light on the tropes of philosophic
silence which constituted a defining element of all later Platonist writing. Part One
of this thesis will thus establish the theoretical parameters of philosophic silence and
draw up a historical model of its development leading up to Plotinus’ time, and the
comes closest to realisation of the one through contemplation, is by definition perfect, timeless, and
complete, and its highest ‘part’ is capable of self-transcendence and an ineffable attainment of the one
(as discussed in Chapter Six).
40The term is from Casel 1919, the first large-scale study of philosophic silence, which remains the
only full attempt at a historical survey of the kinds of written silence dealt with in this thesis (partial
exceptions include Mortley 1986 and Montiglio 2000, both of which provide a more theoretically-
nuanced approach than Casel, but which are more narrow in their scope).
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thesis as a whole will contextualise the Enneads in terms of this tradition. Chapter
One begins by outlining the interpretive difficulties which the recondite nature of
the subject presents. I then outline my own approach and set the stage for Chapters
Two to Four.
These chapters conduct a basic historical analysis of the rise of elements of philo-
sophic silence. Chapter Two examines the pre-Classical and Classical sources which
were later developed by Platonists into a tradition of esoteric philosophy, and ex-
amines the figure of the ‘silent philosopher’ as he appears in late antique accounts.
Chapter Three examines the development in the first centuries CE of the ideas of
tradition and of esoteric transmission which informed the writings of such thinkers
as Alcinoüs, Numenius, Celsus, Maximus of Tyre, and Plutarch. It charts the de-
velopment of concepts of a philosophia perennis among Platonists, a simultaneously
culturally-embedded and transcendent truth which serves, in later Platonism, as the
historical location of the hidden, ineffable truth of philosophy, and the concurrent
development of a Platonist hermeneutic which read Plato as the propounder of a
hidden, dogmatic message. Chapter Four turns to Plotinus, showing the develop-
ment of these same ‘traditional’ materials in the Enneads. Not surprisingly, it emerges
that Plotinus, like all philosophers, was writing within a tradition and, like all great
philosophers, bending the tradition’s contours and lexicon toward a set of needs
which were his own.
In Part II the discussion turns to the theoretical side of the philosophy of tran-
scendence. Chapter Five examines the rise of the transcendent absolute in Middle
Platonism, concentrating on theories of the limits of discourse and of esoteric and
other indirect modes of expression as envisioned by these philosophers. This chapter
considers Middle Platonism as a broad cultural movement incorporating the Platon-
ising religious movements of the first centuries CE as well as philosophy proper (and
several gradations between these two, somewhat artificial, extremes), and examines
the concurrent rise of strong tropes of transcendence, silence, and ineffability in these
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movements. Chapter Six again turns to Plotinus, analysing his stance on the prob-
lems of transcendence, which he treats with an unprecedented depth and rigor that
draws on both his philosophical and religious predecessors. This chapter will use
the preceding discussions to cast light on the metaphysical situation of Plotinian dis-
course, particularly the problematic status of nous and noêsis as regards truth-claims,
and the anthropology which situates the human agent within the Plotinian world.
Taken together, Chapters Five and Six describe the conceptual space within which
Plotinus is writing and address the problems of the nature of writing, both for the
writer and for the reader as philosophical agents, the ability of discursive thought to
attain to and transmit true knowledge, and the theoretical potential for philosophic
writing to surpass the limits of the discursive.
Chapter Seven is a detailed analysis of Plotinus’ strategies of writing with regard
to the limits of discourse, conducting a close reading of an exemplary passage and
setting it in dialogue with other passages from the Enneads. It begins with inves-
tigations of Plotinian techniques of aphairesis and apophasis, and shows, through
case-studies from the Enneads, the way in which these techniques, with their func-
tion of ‘stripping away’ false ideas (indeed, all ideas) about reality and of unsaying
the partially-true statements of ontology (that is, all statements), are used as tools
of written philosophy. After the first section delineating the self-imposed limits of
discourse in Plotinus, the second investigates the ways in which Plotinus transcends
(or transgresses against) these limits in his writing. A third section makes some pro-
posals as to how Plotinus is using the unsaid and unsayable in his work as a whole
in the service of his philosophy of transcendence, while also considering the social
aspects of his philosophic silence.
Finally, the Conclusion draws together the cultural and social themes of Part One
with the theoretical discussions of Part Two, delineating a model of philosophic si-
lence in Plotinus which incorporates both aspects of philosophy in a single discur-
sive topos. Several appendices expand on points of interest which lie outside the
main arguments of this thesis. Footnotes throughout the thesis direct the reader
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to these excursuses, which are designed to be helpful and enriching, rather than
essential, to the main text.
Part I: The Cultural Roots of Philosophic
Silence
Chapter One: De philosophorum Græcorum silentio mystico:
Preliminaries.
῾Ο ἄναξ οὗ τὸ μαντεῖόν ἐστι τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς, οὔτε λέγει οὔτε κρύpiτει
ἀλλὰ σημαίνει.41
Written Silence, The Esoteric, and Esoteric Hermeneutics
Having invoked a wide range of themes, tropes, and hermeneutic strategies, it is
time to define certain terms of art. This thesis discusses a diverse set of discursive
phenomena under the rubric of ‘philosophic silence’, including ‘esotericism’, ‘the
esoteric’, and ‘esoteric hermeneutics’, each of which terms is to be understood in a
very specific sense. Definitions are thus needed at the outset.
‘Philosophic Silence’. ‘Philosophic silence’ was an aspect of antique philosoph-
ic culture, particularly of Platonist philosophic culture, which governed the way in
which the absolute truths of philosophy were discussed. Philosophic silence is the
name I give to the set of theoretical ideas about the dissemination of the highest
truths, norms of deportment, and traditional tropes of secrecy and silence which
comprised a tradition of written hiding and revealing which had its fullest flowering
in Plotinus and his successors. This thesis will discuss all of these aspects, construct-
ing a historical model of some complexity, but analysis of Platonist discourse reveals
a fairly simple speech act at the heart of philosophic silence.
I define this basic marker of philosophic silence as ‘a speech act which combines
rhetorics of hiding and revealing when dealing with the philosophic truth event’.42
41Heraclit. fr. 93 DK.
42The speech act is defined by Searle 1969. Philosophic silence as I define it here has much in common
with the idea of ‘the esoteric’ theorised in the work of Stuckrad as an element of discourse within reli-
gions which makes claims to ‘”real” or absolute knowledge and the means of making this knowledge
24
WRITTEN SILENCE, THE ESOTERIC, AND ESOTERIC HERMENEUTICS 25
By ‘truth event’ is meant the (often notional or postponed) revelation to the reader
of the truth under discussion. Philosophic silence thus incorporates both the saying
of silence (for example, where an author indicates that he cannot say the subject of
discourse, because it is ineffable) and the saying of secrecy (for example, where the
author indicates that he has more that he might say, but that he cannot or will not for
reasons of philosophic privileging of knowledge), and often conflates the two. We
have seen, in a single Plotinian quotation (cited p. 14 above), the invocation of sacred
mysteries, the invocation of secret meanings hidden within them, and the statement
of ineffability, all of which partake of the rhetorics of secrecy and silence in distinct
ways. Philosophic silence may also incorporate the ‘revelation’ of a ‘secret’ (such as
the exegesis of a passage read esoterically (see below)), an act which also employs
the rhetorics of hiding and revealing, in this case in a reversed dynamic.
It may seem tendentious to refer to a spoken and written practice as ‘silence’, but
the term is chosen with the aim of emphasising the unspoken, unwritten elements
of such texts. When Plotinus tells us that the one is not the one, he is pointing to
a reality which his text cannot encompass; he is, in fact, remaining silent on the
subject of what the one is. When he tells us that the one can be called the one for
the purposes of discourse, but that it is not truly ‘the one’, he is alluding to a reality
which his words do not comprehend. He is, in effect, emphasising his own silence
on the matter. But the emphasis itself is what makes philosophic silence different
from simple silence. Through philosophic silence, authors reveal a concealment,
and through that revelation conceal that which they purport to reveal.
While my definition of philosophic silence is a discursive one, based in a kind
of speech-act, we are chiefly concerned with its cultural manifestations, which take
complex forms. Post-Hellenistic philosophers, particularly Platonist philosophers,
operated under standards of deportment, and their works were subject to many
available’. . . but which discusses this knowledge using ‘the rhetoric of a hidden truth’ (Von Stuckrad
2000, 9-10). I have chosen to avoid using the term ‘the esoteric’ in this sense mainly because the more
everyday meaning of this term is essential for the discussion which follows, and there is no conve-
nient word with which to replace it. The reader is nonetheless referred to the work of Von Stuckrad
and other scholars of the esoteric (especially Lamberton 1995; Urban 1998, 235 ff.; Burns 2004, 21-23)
for insights into what I term ‘philosophic silence’.
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expectations regarding what they might say and might not say. This complex of
unwritten rules and expectations included the social side of philosophic silence. Pla-
tonists did not simply make speech-acts of hiding and revealing: they referred to
esoteric traditions, valued a model of philosophic gravitas characterised in part by a
certain taciturnity (ἐχεμυθία), theorised and enforced notions of philosophic elitism,
discussed ineffable realities, and engaged in numerous other concrete actions of
philosophic silence. Taken together, these philosophic acts comprise the tropes of
philosophic silence.
This is not to say that Platonists were expected genuinely to keep secrets; on
the contrary, it is rare indeed to find a Platonist invocation of the rhetorics of secre-
cy and concealment which does not in fact involve the revelation of the purported
secret. Rather, it is to say that Platonists followed a normative practice of philosoph-
ic silence. The exercise of rhetorics of secrecy and silence were part and parcel of
their literary style, and could also influence their behaviour. They were expected to
exercise philosophic reserve and to maintain elitist standards in the distribution of
knowledge; philosophic silence was the way in which they signified that they were
doing so. These practices of rhetorical hiding and revealing thus have significance
for our understanding of the constructions of social power in antique society, espe-
cially in the late antique period, when opposed factions arose with competing claims
to ‘secret wisdom’.
Secrecy and ‘Secret Knowledge’. Secrecy in this thesis should be understood
in a broad sociological sense drawing on the theory of Georg Simmel: it is not
merely the concealment of a given item of information (although it may take that
form), but rather the exercise of social exclusion through privileging of knowledge.43
This thesis views secrecy as an act, which may bring with it what Pierre Bordieu
has called ‘symbolic capital’, concrete social power arising from a perceived, non-
concrete power wielded by the possessor of the ‘secret’.44 As Guy Stroumsa has
43Simmel 1950, 330-44 is the classic sociological account of secrecy, understood as the act of public
concealment; ibid. 332-3 discusses the ‘fascination of secrecy’, whereby these acts gain their power.
44Bourdieu 2000 outlines the theory of symbolic capital.
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observed, ‘There is no better way to publicize a text than to prohibit its publica-
tion, strongly limit its readership, or insist that it reveals deep and heavily guarded
secrets.’45 Less obvious advantages can accrue as well; the Conclusion of this the-
sis will discuss philosophic silence in relation to the acquisition of patronage and
influence in late antique society.
We see public secrecy in texts on the fringes of Platonism, such as the Hieroi Logoi,
pseudo-Pythagorean texts whose very name indicates that they contain ‘mysteries’,
or the opening of the Gnostic Apocryphon of John, which announces that the text is
a mystery and a secret. Indeed, every apocryphon, by virtue of its title, is present-
ed as ‘secret knowledge’.46 This thesis will use this term to refer to any text which
announces that it is a secret. One may thus exercise secrecy without possessing an
actual secret. A book or author may present ‘secret knowledge’ by means of adver-
tising it as such, in which case the ‘secret’ character of the knowledge is created by
the act of revealing it; ‘secret knowledge’ is in fact a type of open text which em-
phasises its importance, and creates a sense of elite solidarity between author and
reader, by labelling itself as esoteric.47
Secrecy as it is conceived here also has a perhaps unexpected application: state-
ments of an ineffable reality are in fact acts of secrecy. Scholarship on Platonism
tends to approach such statements solely from the doctrinal or logical standpoint;
this thesis will also approach them as acts of secrecy, especially as regards Plotinus’
accounts of the ineffable contact with the one beyond being.
The ‘Esoteric’ and ‘Esotericism’. The term ‘esoteric’ in this thesis is to be under-
stood in the most basic sense: ‘meant only for the initiated.’48 It might thus refer to
a written work (such as the esoteric corpus of Aristotle) which is kept from general
circulation (although the Aristotelean esoteric corpus was in fact freely circulated, at
least after a certain time, a point to which we shall return). Alternately, it may refer
45Stroumsa 1996a, 155.
46Tardieu 1984, 239 suggests ‘book of secrets’ as a translation.
47Chapters Three and Four give examples of this from the history of Platonism.
48The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English (Oxford 1990), s.v.
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to a doctrine or doctrines whose form - be it a riddle, an allegory, or another oblique
and obscure form of discourse, such as any number of Pythagorean ‘secret’ doctrines
expressed as ‘symbols’ - is understood as hiding it in plain sight.49
This latter meaning refers to the more common phenomenon in the history of
Platonism: the number of texts which we know of from antiquity which were gen-
uinely esoteric in the sense of the Aristotelean corpus is minute, while examples of
statements read as expressing a hidden meaning are legion. ‘Esotericism’, for the
purposes of this thesis, is thus not taken simply to mean the exercise of secrecy with
regard to that which is esoteric; I use it to refer to the more specialised practice of
hiding the esoteric materials ‘in plain sight’. The Classical example of esotericism as
I understand it is that with which Plato and Pythagoras became synonymous; they
were thought to have sought to hide certain of their doctrines from the masses at
large, but this led them not to conceal them utterly, but rather to publish them in
such a way that only an elect few could understand the true message.50 Esotericism
is thus a subset of secrecy, with the difference that the esoteric applies specifically to
items of doctrine or other conceptual materials; secrecy, by contrast, might be exer-
cised with regard to a ritual or a sacred object, for instance, which is to be kept from
general view.
Aristotle would not be a practitioner of esotericism by my definition, unless we
consider that the eventual release of his esoteric works to the general public was
part of a strategy of hiding on his part (as Plutarch believed).51 Plato, as read by
the ‘Tübingenschule’, on the other hand, would be an esoteric author; the modern
debate over Plato’s esotericism I refer to as the ‘Esotericist Debate’, and ‘Esoteric’,
capitalised thus, will always refer specifically to this modern controversy.52 This
definition of esotericism also fits the writing methodology outlined by the modern
theorist of public secrecy Leo Strauss, which, however, he calls ‘exoteric writing’ to
49The Pythagorean ‘symbol’ is discussed 127 below.
50The origins and development of the esoteric Plato and the esoteric Pythagoras are discussed in the
following chapter.
51See 86 below.
52On the Tübingenschule and this debate, see Appendix F, 288 ff.
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emphasise its public character, its quality of ‘hiding in plain sight’.53
The terms ‘esoteric’ and ‘esotericism’ thus imply a statement of intent on the part
of an author: in using these terms as I understand them, one attributes to a given
thinker or thinkers a desire to hide certain doctrines. This thesis, however, will not
claim that any author was an esotericist. What it will do is study the ways in which the
Middle Platonists and Plotinus read their philosophic predecessors as though they had
been esotericists.
‘Esoteric Hermeneutics’. The process of reading or interpreting an author as an
esotericist, and the author’s text as esoteric, I call ‘esoteric hermeneutics’ or ‘esoteric
reading’. By means of this type of reading, a work may be interrogated for levels of
meaning or doctrines which are not strictly present in the text, under the assumption
that they were intentionally hidden as a subtext by the author. It is reading ‘for
esotericism’. We, as readers, only discover the esoteric reading of an author, for
example Plotinus’ reading of Plato’s dialogues as texts encoding hidden meanings,
through the author’s writing about that reading; in other words, esoteric reading is
posterior to esoteric writing. Plotinus’ hermeneutics of Plato’s dialogues as sources of
an absolute truth hidden in enigmas appears to us not in Plato’s text, but in Plotinus’.
One of the key characteristics of a truly esoteric subtext is that it cannot be proven
to exist in the text. The use of a cypher or other demonstrable interpretive key on an
author’s part, or a programmatic statement by the author to the effect that his work
was expressed esoterically, would of course minimise this difficulty, but we never
seem to find such signposts in the authors read by the Platonists as esoteric authors.54
Instead, vague hints, irony, myths, and contradictions are read as signposts pointing
to an esoteric subtext, and by this means entire cultural corpora can be subsumed
into a single esoteric tradition, as Chapters Three and Four discuss in detail in the
case of Platonism.
53Strauss’ theory is summarised Appendix F, 293.
54We do seem to find such programmatic statements in Patristic writers - for example, the Stromateis
of Clement of Alexandria (see Appendix F, 294); such demonstrable esotericism does exist historically,
but I have been unable to find it in the Platonist tradition, except for the problematic case of the Second
Platonic Epistle, discussed 77 below.
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Philosophic Silence and the Esoteric. Philosophic silence is an overarching trope,
and the various permutations of the esoteric are related, but more focused, concepts.
Esoteric reading becomes part of philosophic silence when it is written; for example,
Plutarch is exercising philosophic silence when he finds Platonist doctrines hidden
within the myths and rituals of ancient sages and explains his exegesis of them in
On Isis and Osiris. Since we cannot know if these sages meant to hide such doctrines
in their myths - in other words, if they were esotericists - the only access we have
to their esotericism is through Plutarch’s writing of his esoteric reading. A given
instance of esotericism, as I define it, may or may not have had a genuine historical
occurrence - Plato may well have meant to hide secret doctrines within his dialogues
- but this fact is generally not susceptible to proof. What is available to our scrutiny is
the written act of interpretation which reads an author as esoteric. In other words, for
all practical purposes esotericism is created by esoteric hermeneutics. This creation
is one aspect of philosophic silence.
Apophatic Discourse. I use the terms ‘apophasis’ and ‘apophatic language’ not
to indicate solely the rather narrow genre of apophatic writing which arose in late
antiquity, the via negativa of the Christian theologians and the systematic, serial nega-
tions found in Platonist authors like Proclus.55 Rather, I understand it in an extended
sense, as ‘any spoken or written act which attempts to deny predicability through
mutually-negating statements’.
We may begin to define the basic apophatic ‘unit’ as a statement a, whether pos-
itive or negative, which is immediately contradicted, partially or wholly, by a fol-
lowing statement b, with the result that neither a nor b is true, although both may be
not strictly false. In discourse about a supreme principle, god, or other (non)entity
conceived of in terms of its differing from a and b by surpassing both a and b, the
negation will have an elative force; that which is neither a nor b must be higher than,
55See Proclus’ systematic discussion In Parm. VI 1072.14-1077.15. On this genre see Bréhier 1938; Rist
1964a; Whittaker 1969a; Whittaker 1971; Armstrong 1973; Mortley 1975; Trouillard 1976, 307-315; Katz
1978; Mortley 1982; Mortley 1986; Derrida 1987; Sells 1994; Lamberton 1995; Dillon 1996; Bussanich
1997; Turner 2007, 70-72.
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beyond, or otherwise superior to both a and b;56 however, I do not wish to limit the
term apophasis to the well-known via negativa or ‘negative theology’, as there are
points at which Plotinus employs apophatic language in quite the opposite sense, to
describe matter.57
In Chapter Seven I argue that we should read Plotinian apophasis intertextually;
i.e., that a statement in one treatise, for example that the one is an object of intellec-
tion (νοητόν), should be understood in parallel with statements in other treatises that
deny this status to the one, the result being that the reader should not conceive of the
one as predicable in the sense of being either a νοητόν or not a νοητόν. Apophasis as
I understand it is a literary technique which turns predications against each other in
order to create an indeterminate result, a ‘neither-nor’ situation with regard to any
possible statement.
In this I am not confining apophasis to its formalised manifestations in later an-
tiquity. Mortley notes that ‘Plotinus’ own understanding of the via negativa is quite
restricted. He does little more than abstract, or imaginatively remove concepts. The
Athenian school on the other hand develops the via negativa within the full range
of the logic of negation, and it has much broader ramifications’.58 This argument is
somewhat anachronistic; the via negativa as Mortley understands it here, is precise-
ly the serial, formalised style of negation which arose after Plotinus; we should not
expect Plotinus to have an understanding of it, since it had not been invented in his
time. But, as I argue in Chapter Seven, Plotinus’ more subtle apophatic discourse ac-
tually exceeds in ambition and scope the more dry and rigorous negative formulae
56Cf. Turner 2007, 70 n. 36: ‘The via negativa is implemented by negative predications followed by
an adversative elative clause: either triple negation, ‘it is neither X nor Y nor Z, but it is something
superior’ or double, antithetical negation, ‘it is neither X nor non-X, but it is something superior’ or
just a single negation, ‘it is not X but it is superior to X.’ The ‘but’ clause is always positive and elative,
referring to ‘something else’ above, beyond, superior to the previously negated predications. Thus
negation of all alternatives on one level of thought launches the mind upward to a new, more eminent
level of insight.’
57Plotinus may be said to employ apophatic language when describing matter, which occupies the
lowest rung in his hierarchy of being (e.g. II.4[12], On Matter); this is apophasis, but definitely not
‘negative theology’. Trouillard sees ‘negative theology’ as an integral, defining feature of Neopla-
tonism (Trouillard 1976, 307), but his excellent insights on the uses of apophatic language suffer
somewhat from his use of this imprecise term.
58Mortley 1986, II, 19; cf. 27.
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of Proclus and Damascius.
The Intrinsic Difficulty of the Question
A historical approach should solve more problems than it raises, and so, before
exploring the parameters of the discourse of philosophic silence, I would like to
touch on three major problems of interpretation which face all readers of Late Pla-
tonist philosophy interested in the way the texts they read exclude them, the readers,
from the subject of discourse. These are problems stemming from the peculiar nature
of speech acts and hermeneutic frameworks which are based in secrecy and silence,
and I will outline a theoretical approach to these types of discourse which can help
to negotiate these problems.
Let us return to the Classical topos of mystery initiation used by Plotinus in the
quotation cited on page 14 above to elicit an illustration of these three main prob-
lems. The mysteries offer salvific knowledge to the seeker; on the other hand, the
non-initiate is rigorously excluded.59 Both parts of this dichotomy are essential to
the mysteries as an institution. It is noteworthy that the idea of the inviolate na-
ture of the mysteries was to survive well into the late antique period, despite the
well-known historical facts that, for example, Alcibiades and his companions had
been accused in Classical Athens of revealing the mysteries,60 the widespread story
that Aeschylus had ‘accidentally’ revealed the mysteries in a play,61 or the antique
literary sources which ‘reveal’ the content of the Eleusinian ceremony.62 The first im-
portant point to emphasise here is that a rhetoric of silence need not imply a genuine
secret, or at least not the secret which it ostensibly hides,63 and that silence, viewed
59See Casel 1919, 6-13; Burkert 1983, 248-254.
60Th. 6.28.1; Plut. Alc. 19-22; cf. Casel 1919, 9.
61Testimonia of various versions of the story collected at Radt 1985, Tragicorum græcorum Fragmenta
III, 63 ff. Bremmer 1995, 72; cf. Burkert 1983, 252; Scarpi 1987, 32-3.
62E.g. Hippol. Haer. 5.8.39, where the Eleusinian ‘secrets’ are revealed. Cf. Casel 1919, 11-13. The
curious story that Numenius revealed the mysteries through an act of esoteric reading is discussed
122 below.
63Whether the actual contents of the mystic rites were secret in antiquity (argued by e.g. Mylonas
1961, 224-229, 287-8; Pépin 1984, 18-23) or not (argued by e.g. Bremmer 1995, 72-75; Martin 1995),
the proverbial and proverbially-inviolable mystique of silence which surrounded the mysteries was
immune to being ‘revealed’. Gregory Nazianzus (Orat. 27 5, 21-28) shows awareness of the rhetorical
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from a social perspective, can serve not as a form of exclusion but as a positive mark
of belonging. The initiand’s silence indicates his special status,64 and the secrecy of
the mysteries in antiquity seems in fact to have served as a form of publicity.65 The
situation of the proverbially inviolate, yet in reality well reported, mystery secrets
is reminiscent of the Platonic lecture ‘On the Good’, which was widely reported in
antiquity, but nevertheless remained a rhetorical locus of secrecy for Platonism.66 A
second point follows on the first, namely that secrecy, in the rhetorical form of ad-
vertised silence, is in itself significant, regardless of what it purportedly conceals; it
was the Eleusinian secrecy which mattered in antiquity, not the ‘secret’.67
Aristotle tells us that the Eleusinian initiation was not a secret proposition to be
learnt so much as an ‘experience’;68 the precise meaning of piάθειν here is contested,
but it is safe to say that Aristotle is referring to the Eleusinian ritual itself, as opposed
to the acquisition of propositional knowledge.69 Regardless of Aristotle’s intended
meaning, however, this passage may well be the locus classicus for what became the
very different idea of the mysteries’ essential incommunicability which arose in the
first centuries CE. We have already seen this idea exploited in a philosophical register
by Plotinus, involving both theological concepts of the school tradition and ideas of
radical ineffability which we have every reason to believe were absent from the Clas-
sical Eleusinian mysteries.70 In the Plotinian reading, as we have seen, the Eleusini-
an law of secrecy is a philosophic secret, pointing to the ineffability and self-hiding
function of mystic silence when he exhorts the Christian community to secrecy concerning their re-
ligion, so as not to fall short of that of the initiate ‘idolaters’; inasmuch as they ‘bow to daimones and
vile fables’; the pagans have no true secret of any value in Gregory’s eyes, yet he wishes to emulate
their practice of secrecy and silence.
64Cf. Scarpi 1987, 32; Martin 1995, 112.
65Cf. Stroumsa 1996a, 3: ‘. . . the most characteristic trait of mystery is the fact that it is announced
everywhere.’
66See below, 79 ff.
67Cf. Stroumsa and Kippenberg 1995, xvi: ‘Though the secrecy may originally have been merely a
standard initiatory feature, it came to possess an absolute value, to the point of becoming the essence
of Eleusis, independent of its initiatory rites.’
68Aristotle draws a distinction between mathein, the normal acquisition of knowledge, and pathein,
usually translated as ‘experience’: καθάpiερ Α᾿ριστοτέλης ἀξιοῖ τοὺς τελουμένους οὐ μαθεῖν τι δεῖν ἀλλὰ
piαθεῖν καὶ διατεθῆναι, δηλονότι γεγομένους ἐpiιτηδείους (Synes. Dio 10.48a = De philosophia fr. 15 Ross);
but see 44 below.
69As e.g. Mortley 1986, I, 114; Armstrong 1990a, 83; cf. Bremmer 1995, 72.
70Cf. Casel 1919, 13.
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character of the the one beyond being.
The first interpretational difficulty addressed below is the problem of reading a
text which claims, like the mysteries as read by the Platonists, to contain truths that
are self-hiding, unreadable, ungraspable, or ineffable to the ‘uninitiated’. The peren-
nial philosophic wisdom outlined in Chapters Three and Four, as the Middle Platon-
ists and Plotinus read it, was such a tradition in some respects. The second problem
I wish to address is that of interpreting apophatic language and other literary tech-
niques with which certain Middle Platonists and Plotinus attempt to approach this
self-hiding wisdom or truth. Apophatic discussions are, in a sense, the practical
concomitant to the concept of a self-hiding truth; like the purported wisdom of the
mysteries, truth remains inviolate no matter how often it is ‘revealed’. Apophatic
negations are at least partly a response to a predicament arising within philosophi-
cal dialectic, the problem of logical ‘unsayability’; but they tend to change the rules
of discourse in ways that may take it out of the purview of what is normally con-
sidered philosophic dialectic. This is a problem for the truth-claims of philosophic
statements, and should be addressed at the outset. The final problem I would like to
outline is that of interpreting experience, which becomes especially important when
approaching authors for whom, unlike for Aristotle, experience was a potential locus
for encountering an ineffable and transcendent reality, the ritual pathos of the myster-
ies, which must be kept secret, translated into the ineffable encounter of ‘mysticism’,
which keeps itself secret. Plotinus is perhaps the classic example of such an author
in the Greek corpus, and some measure must be taken of the ability of scholarship
to access the experiential realms evoked in the Enneads.
The Self-hiding Claims of Platonist Wisdom. Plato was an author who hid be-
hind complex literary masks. His decision to avoid both the philosophical prose
style which had arisen as a serious medium for systematic exposition in such au-
thors as Democritus and Anaxagoras, as well as the visionary poetic approach of
Parmenides and Empedocles, choosing instead to invent a novel form of philosoph-
ical dramaturgy (while incorporating the aims and many of the techniques of both
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the Presocratic poets and the more ‘systematic’ philosophers) serves in itself to ‘hide’
the author.71 Plato’s techniques stand in stark contrast to the relatively straightfor-
ward expository writings of contemporaries like Isocrates and Xenophon, in that he
refuses to ‘lay his cards on the table’. We may add to this the fact that Plato’s Socrates
is both a literary construct and a historical figure, one known personally to many of
the members of Plato’s contemporary audience but who also serves to some degree
as a Platonic mouthpiece. Taking this persona into account, as well as the aporetic
character of much in the dialogues and their deployment of ‘Socratic’ irony, we may
well agree with the Seventh Platonic Epistle (regardless of its authorship), that Plato
never wrote his true doctrine down, and never would.72
The (perhaps irreducible) disagreement of modern interpreters over what Pla-
to meant is a testament to this literary situation: all the really burning questions of
Platonic scholarship, such as that of Plato’s doctrine (or absence thereof), the chrono-
logical order of the dialogues, and the extent and nature of Socratic irony, are made
more intractable by Plato’s literary choice to write drama and to hide behind mul-
tiple personae, and by his written disparagements of writing as means of conveying
truth.73 All these facts of Platonic text might lead, and have led, readers to posit
a circumspect approach on Plato’s part, or even kind of ‘coded language’ with re-
gard to expressing the higher truths of philosophy. Indeed, the elitist Platonic secre-
cy posited by Casel, that Plato sermone tecto utitur, ut res sublimiores et divinas profa-
nis occultet,74 is an idea which has held wide currency from antiquity until modern
times.75
71On the problem of the Platonic ‘voice’, see Scolnicov 2002 passim. Cf. Ausland 2002, 69-71 for a
strong statement of the fictional character of all Platonic writing (even the Epistles). Plato himself
appears only once in the dialogues, at Phd. 59b, where it is mentioned that he had not been present
at Socrates’ final interview with his companions on account of an illness. His sole appearance is thus
an absence.
72Ep. VII 341c-344d.
73To the Seventh Epistle passage cited above may be adduced Phaedr. 274b-277a; Prt. 329a; 347e; and
(the probably spurious) Ep. II 312d7-e1. See 78 ff. below.
74Casel 1919, 37; cf. 36-40.
75E.g. Numen. fr. 23; D. L. III 63; Sallust. De de. et mun. III 4.11-15; Augustine Contra Ac. 3.37-43;
Giambattista Vico, Autobiography (1963, 139); Taylor 1804, Vol. 3 p. 3; Strauss 1988; Krämer 1959, 25
ff., 401, 457; Burkert 1972, 19-20). Needless to say, the exact parameters of what Plato’s esotericism
meant are drawn differently by each of these authors; the constant element is the idea of writing more
platonico (Leo Suavius, Theophrasti Paracelsi. . . compendium 170, quoted at Walker 1975, 102) which
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The late antique Platonists went further than this. Plato’s Socrates, for them,
sometimes simply disappears; it is a startling fact that, throughout the Enneads,
Socrates appears by name fewer than ten times, and not in propria persona but as
the traditional cypher for ‘Everyman’.76 Plato is taken as a dogmatic philosopher,
and the question is no longer whether or not Plato had any established teachings at
all (as it had been during the sceptical Academic period, and has again become in
some modern scholarship) but rather what, exactly those teachings had been. The
aporetic dialogues are read not as a call to deep-seated doubt about all supposed
first principles but as a set of attacks aimed at specific false doctrines (the criteria of
truth and falsehood, again, being a point of argument among Platonists).
And yet it is precisely in the Late Platonism of Plotinus and his successors that
the cautions of the Second and Seventh Platonic Epistles against reading a doctrine
into the dialogues becomes a canonical hermeneutic principle, but one which reads
Plato’s statements of secrecy not as outright denials of having written the truth, but
as evidence that he hid the truth. In other words, these cautions were themselves
esoteric statements, signs to the initiated reader of a subtext to be found in the dia-
logues. Whatever the historical intent of Plato may have been, the Platonic written
attack on writing becomes, for the later Platonists, a strong motif of written silence,
whose paradoxical character is embraced and exploited.77 This tendency to read Pla-
to as a secretive author begins to appear in the Middle Platonists, and with Plotinus
and subsequent Platonists it takes on a powerful new character.
The rise of the ‘silent Plato’ is discussed in the following chapter; for the moment,
however, it is enough to point out that the reading of Plato outlined here leads to
serious interpretive difficulties for modern readers. We are faced with what has
been called the ‘double-bind of secrecy’: ‘If one “knows”, one cannot speak, and if
one speaks, one must not really know’.78 This rhetorical situation leads inevitably
contains a subtext available only to the privileged reader.
76Noted by Szlezák 1979, 44. Plato’s name appears more than five times as often, and his works are
cited without explicit reference to their author hundreds of times (see the index fontium in H + S 1, vol.
III, 448-457).
77Cf. Rappe 2000, 122.
78Urban 1998, 209.
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to internal paradoxes such as those to be found in the Plotinian passage cited above,
where the true wisdom (in this case hidden ‘within’ the mystery tradition) cannot,
on the one hand, be revealed to those who do not know it already, and need not, on
the other, be revealed to those who do, since they are initiates. In the Late Platonist
tradition of reading Plato, a form of reading often compared to mystic initiation,79
the reader is often confronted with the seeming impossibility of discovering what the
author is talking about. The secret is, by definition, unavailable to such outsiders as
modern Classical scholars. And finally, this mode of reading is applied by Plotinus
not only to Plato, but to a larger textual and non-textual tradition, as we have seen in
the case of Plotinus’ ‘reading’ the mysteries of Hellenic antiquity as repositories of
hidden philosophic wisdom. Not only Plato, but ‘the ancients’ (οἱ piαλαιοί) and their
pre-philosophic counterparts, the ancient sages (οἱ σοφοί), expressed their truths in
terms of secrecy and ineffability; the very difficulty, often, in determining which
‘ancients’ an author such as Plotinus is referring to adds another level to the layers
of secrecy constructed around the transmission of truth.
Apophatic Discourse and Rational Cognition. The second difficulty I wish to
discuss is the problem of interpreting apophatic language, and extreme negativity
more generally. The term ‘apophasis’ is derived from the Greek ἀpiό + φημι: “un-
saying”. It is generally applied to a specific set of literary techniques arising during
the first centuries CE, as writers of the period began to grapple with the problem of
expressing the paradoxical nature of the transcendent absolute which their world-
views demanded.80 The history of the development of the concept in philosophy
of a hypostasis or entity which is ineffable in the formal, logical sense, since it tran-
scends all the predications which can be applied to it by limited human reason, will
be sketched out very briefly below.81 Of present concern is the mode of speaking or
79See 115 below.
80The problem of expressing paradox and of the limitations of language vis à vis reality is at least as
old as Parmenides (see Mortley 1986, vol. I, 7 et passim), but the particular literary mode under discus-
sion here seems to have developed concurrently with the rise of ‘strong’ conceptions of transcendence
(see 161 ff. below; cf. Sells 1994, 3-4; 20-21).
81See Chapters Three and Four.
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writing which philosophers of a Platonist and Neopythagorean bent developed in
order to speak of this unspeakable absolute. Aware to varying degrees of the kind
of paradox underlying the previous sentence, these thinkers realised that, while no
positive statement concerning the absolute could be formally true, negative state-
ments had a better chance at truth-giving and might even help to inculcate some
valid knowledge, if not of the transcendent itself, at least of its parameters. The way
a blank portion on a map tells nothing of the nature of the terrain it covers but allows
a viewer to locate it with regard to the surrounding terrain, and to say with certitude
which places it is not is perhaps a useful metaphor for this undertaking.82
Returning for the moment to the examples quoted from Ennead VI.8 on page on
page 10 above, we find a relatively straightforward specimen of the genre: the one is
the origin of all noble and majestic things, and yet not their origin (8.8-9); it is wholly
unrelated to anything (13-14) and yet related to everything as the principle of all (9.6
& ff.). True apophasis, to differentiate it from simple negation of the common type
“b states that a is false or otherwise contradicts a, therefore a is false”, must result
in a situation of non-predication or indeterminacy. True apophatic language, as I
understand it in this thesis, having made predicative statement a (“The one is the
source of all good and noble things”) must gainsay this statement with b (“The one
is not their origin”) in such a way that neither a nor b is finally true or false; the
meaning event remains suspended between predicative options, and this tension is
never resolved.83 A further characteristic of apophatic language is that it may be
endlessly iterated: a is contradicted by b, which is then in turn contradicted by c and
d, theoretically ad infinitum; the chain of indeterminacy never comes to rest, and so
need never end.
Apophasis may also be applied more directly to the act of speaking itself; Au-
gustine of Hippo, having discussed the contradictions inherent in his doctrine of the
82Cf. Trouillard 1976, 308; Mortley 1986, I, 110: ‘Just as that which is absent in a painting can some-
times be more significant than that which is represented, so words came to be seen as directing
attention to something which they themselves fail to capture.’
83Cf. Sells 1994, whose discussion of the structures of apophatic language in Plotinus and others is
important for the present discussion.
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Trinity, asks,
Have I said or uttered anything worthy of God? Far from it, I feel
that I have done nothing other than wished to speak, and if never-
theless I have spoken, I did not want to say this [which I said]. How
do I know this, except inasmuch as God is ineffable? But whatever
was said by me would not have been said, if he were ineffable. And
for this reason God is not to be called even ineffable (ne ineffabilis
quidem dicendus est deus), since, when this is said, something is said.
And some kind of contradiction in terms (pugna verborum) arises,
since if that is ineffable which cannot be said, it is not ineffable since
it can be said to be ineffable. This contradiction in terms would be
better allayed by attending to silence than through speech.84
Here, as often, the apophatic denial of speech contains a direct appeal to the silence
which it itself breaks. Plotinus also sometimes suggests, in written form, that it
would have been better to have kept silence (e.g. VI.8[39]11.1 ff.), or alludes to a
state of silence which transcends his text, but which his text cannot express. He also
applies apophatic methods to his own discourse in a more subtle, but equally para-
doxical way as we see here in Augustine; his text sometimes unsays not only the
ineffable one, but also the very act of saying the one.85
Some of the difficulties for the scholar in approaching the philosophic use of
apophasis, extreme negativity, and related techniques for the expressing and ‘dis-
expressing’ of the transcendent are readily apparent. The first difficulty has already
arisen in the previous sentence, namely the fact that the word ‘transcendent’ is a
conventional predicate, although it signifies ‘something’ which is not. Despite such
tricks as coining words like ‘disexpressing’, the liberal employment of scare quotes,
or refusing the common capitalisation of ‘the One’ as implying a theism which is ab-
sent from Plotinus’ characterisation of that hypostasis, discourse, or at least scholarly
discourse, cannot escape the trap of predication imposed by language and discursive
thinking. While these tricks do serve a purpose in acting as markers which remind
the reader that something other than the ordinary type of subject is under discussion,
84August. De doct. Christ. I, 6. This passage perhaps echoes Enn. V.3[49]14.16-19: ἀλλά τι κρεῖττον
τούτου, ὃ λέγομεν «ὄν», ἀλλὰ καὶ piλέον καὶ μεῖζον ἢ λεγόμενον, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸς κρείττων λόγου καὶ νοῦ
καὶ αἰσθήσεως, piαρασχὼν ταῦτα, οὐκ αὐτὸς ὢν ταῦτα.
85This methodology is addressed in a close reading of a section from Treatise 32 in Chapter Seven
below.
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and are similar to some techniques used by late antique philosophers themselves,86
they do not themselves constitute apophatic technique in the full sense in which this
thesis understands the term.
Michael Sells has characterised apophatic language as a refusal of predication
expressed through literary means; it is not confined only to the denial of specific at-
tributes to its ‘subject’, but is concerned with denying the subject itself.87 We have
seen this in Plotinus’ stripping the one even of the appellation ‘one’. As Pierre Hadot
remarks,88 the apophatic approach to transcendence should preclude its common
characterisation as ‘negative theology’, since theology treats of ‘God’ and apophasis
characteristically treats of no determined referent. While an author who employs
apophatic language may have a generally ‘theistic’ approach, as do the writers of
certain Hermetica, and some of the authors usually called ‘Gnostics’,89 true apopha-
sis will always constitute a deconstruction of theism. Many readers of such theistic
apophatic writers have taken the easy way out and simply posited a formally un-
knowable God as it were hiding behind the ‘God’ of the theologians, but to do so
is to betray the indeterminacy upon which apophatic writing insists;90 indeed, lat-
er Platonists like Iamblichus and Damascius, who posited an as-it-were even more
transcendent one beyond the already-transcendent first principle of Plotinus, might
86See for example the top heavy ὑpiεραpiόφασις by which Proclus indicates negation which aims at
surpassing normal thought and language (Proc. In Parm. VII 1172.27), the ultimate unknowing,
ὑpiεράγνοια, with which Damascius indicates that we cannot know the ineffable (since ‘unknowable’
is a term which is itself simply the opposite of knowable, thus conceptually commensurate to it, and
so inadequate; Dam. Pr. I, 25, 13-21), or the hyperinflation of language whereby the Pseudo-Dionysius
adds ὑpiερ- to every adjective within reach.
87‘The result is an open-ended dynamic that strains against its own reifications and ontologies - a
language of disontology.’ Sells 1994, 7.
88Hadot 1981, 185.
89For problems of terminology in discussing Gnosticism, see below, n. 672.
90Cf. Sells 1994, 12 and n. 27.
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be seen as similarly missing the point of Plotinus’ apophatic discourse.91 Sells’ state-
ment that ‘The commentator on apophatic language finds himself struggling with
the same difficulties that haunt the original text’92 should be taken as the first axiom
of critical reading of apophasis. Sells theorises an ‘apophatic pact’ between writer
and reader, whereby the usual grammatical and logical relations of statements are
temporarily suspended in reading apophatic material, much as readers of poetry
accept syntactical ambiguities and other anomalies foreign to prose.93
But it is not enough to characterise apophatic discourse; for a complete account
of the silentium philosophorum in an author like Plotinus, this discourse should be
rendered susceptible to philosophic analysis (that is, we must be able to evaluate the
truth claims of an apophatic statement). The problem for scholarship, as Sells rightly
indicates, is a classic dilemma: on the one hand, a simple repetition of the negations
used by an author has no explanatory value, and on the other, to translate apophat-
ic statements into kataphatic (conventionally descriptive) language risks losing the
meaning-event created by the apophatic elocution.94 Apophatic language keeps its
referent undefined at all costs; a scholarly account of it should in theory attempt in
some way to do the same.
Two further difficulties may be added. Firstly, conventional statements may
themselves have a technical apophatic character, often unbeknownst to their authors
or audience: innocuous-seeming statements such as “I can’t even tell you what a day
I’ve had. It was indescribably awful”, taken in their performative context, actually
91Damascius posits a further one beyond the one, characterised as utterly ineffable (piάντη ἄρρητος),
a doctrine which he attributes to Iamblichus in that author’s lost Chaldæan Theology (Pr. II.1). ‘The
Ineffable’ (τὸ ἀpiόρρητον) thus becomes a kind of official title for this first reality. This procedure of
course leads to a perhaps unintended reification of the principle in question since, as we have seen,
to name the ineffable is to betray its ineffability. Plotinus’ more subtle and fluid approach to the first
principle may thus be seen as a more satisfactory method for dealing with the ineffable in a literary
context than this later approach. On the ‘totally ineffable’ first principle in Iamblichus, see Dillon
1973, 29-33; in Damascius, see Dillon 1996; Ahbel-Rappe 2010, xix-xx.
92Sells 1994, 8. Cf. Derrida 1992, 83; Armstrong 1973, 184: “If one does not find doing negative
theology a fairly agonizing business, one is not really doing negative theology at all.”
93Sells 1994, 17.
94Sells 1994, 16. See ibid. 15-19 for a good discussion of the problem as a whole.
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serve to transmit meaning through the act of denying the possibility of transmit-
ting it.95 The problem of meaning in statements of secrecy is thus more intransi-
gent, because more ubiquitous, than if it were simply a question of a literary genre
of apophasis with its own particular conventions. Secondly, the wider problem of
meaning in language, at the centre of so much modern philosophy, demands an-
swers to questions about the basic status of language; if all signs are defined only in
terms of other signs, and never finally referable to the things themselves which they
purport to designate, language itself becomes an apophatic web of shifting mean-
ings that never come to rest.96 A further aspect of this problem is that, just as St.
Augustine turns the apophatic movement of negation against his own apophatic
statements about the Trinity, so any description of apophatic language ‘itself’ is itself
a betrayal of the interior logic of apophasis; even the description of the ineffable is, by
its own tendency, ineffable.97
The Problem of a Model of ‘Mysticism’ and of Theorizing the Interior. In
attempting to understand the historical context of Plotinus’ language of transcen-
dence, interpreters inevitably encounter the stumbling-block of ‘mysticism’. Dodds
identifies the assumption, ‘That the Neoplatonists, being “mystics”, were necessar-
ily incomprehensible to the plain man or even to the plain philosopher,’ as one of
the primary errors besetting scholarship of late Platonism.98 But when the histor-
ical precedents for positing a transcendent absolute are tabulated, the influence of
religious ideas explored, and all other possible contextual and ideological concerns
dealt with, readers of Plotinus may still feel themselves at an impasse: Plotinus’ writ-
ing of the silence beyond the end of logos, his literary exploration of the edges of the
95Cf. Smart 1978, 18. There is an obvious difference in referent (or non-referent) between such state-
ments and the concerns of theologians; nevertheless the similarity on the level of speech-act between
such everyday apophaticisms and works of Classical apophasis is significant, as discussed 225 below.
96See Trouillard 1976, 311; Wolfson 2005, xiv for reading as an apophatic act. The important essay of
Derrida (1987, English translation 1992) on apophatic theological texts is an essential exploration of
the results of applying such an understanding of language in general directly to apophatic language.
On the ‘apophatic turn’ in some modern philosophy, see Franke 2005. With reference to late Platonism
specifically, see Gersh 2007; Franke 2008; Appendix F, 295.
97Cf. Derrida 1992, 5-6.
98Dodds 1928, 129.
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field of discursive thinking, always falls short of saying the unsayable goal of his
philosophy, and many interpreters see this goal as embodied in, and perhaps aris-
ing from, ineffable experiences which the philosopher underwent.99 Porphyry tells
us that Plotinus not only attained noêsis, the union with perfect, timeless thought
which bridges the gap between normal thinking and the radical unthinkable which
is the one or good, but four times passed beyond this state into contact with the one,
not in theory, but in ‘unspeakable (or ineffable) reality’ (ἐν ἐνεργείᾳ ἀρρήτῳ).100
Understandably, modern interpreters have often set aside the idea of an expe-
riential side to Plotinus’ philosophical project, a ‘mysticism’ which is inaccessible
to rational analysis because it is based in experiences which cannot be put into
words. There are a number of implicit assumptions in this approach which require
unpacking. The first is the relatively modern assumption that there exists some-
thing called ‘mysticism’ conceived as an experiential, transcultural constant which
various mystics of different cultural backgrounds share; this idea has come under
serious criticism on two main counts.
Firstly, it has been forcefully argued that this idea of mysticism is in fact the
product of outmoded comparative ideal types which have been severely questioned
in religious studies,101 and further that these ideal types are partly the product of
Christian and post-Christian discourse and thus inappropriate for the critical inter-
pretation of non-Christian traditions.102 Secondly, it has been argued that this idea
of mysticism posits ‘experience’ in a scientifically untenable way. A reified, cross-
cultural mysticism based in the idea that all mystical experience is essentially the
99See Hadot 2001, 134. The idea that the Plotinian philosophy of transcendence arose (at least in part)
from Plotinus’ transcendental experiences has been assumed to be the case by many interpreters;
it was put forward as a strong claim by Geffcken (Geffcken 1929, 47-50); see below, n. 109, for its
survival in a qualified form in more modern scholarship.
100Plot. 23 16-18.
101See Bussanich 1997; Mazur 2010, 7-8.
102Cf. Keller 1978, 75-76; Proudfoot 1985, 185; Mazur 2003, 30-31; Mazur 2010, 9-10. Hadot traces
this modern sense of ‘mysticism’, that of ‘une connaisance expérimentale de Dieu qui se réalise par
un embrassement d’amour unitif’, to the De theologia mystica lectiones sex of Jean Gerson, the 14th-
15th century French theologian (Hadot 1986a, 274). Proudfoot traces a similar idea of mysticism to
Schleiermacher and subsequent developments in Western religious thinking (Proudfoot 1985, 2-40).
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same, with individual mystics’ reports differing only because of their particular so-
cial and ideological conditions, has been a powerful interpretive idea in nineteenth-
and twentieth-century study of religions and philosophy,103 but evidence shows
that, on the contrary, mystics do in fact disagree fundamentally as to the nature of
their experiences, while the existence of a primordial experience preceding sociolin-
guistic conditioning has been severely questioned.104 Lastly, on the logical level,
apophatic literature describes no subject to be experienced; if every experience is
an experience of something, whether of an affect, an object, or something else, then
the moment of apophatic ‘union’ which is the classic locus for ‘mystical experience’,
cannot a priori be an experience.105 Finally, whether or not such experience does ex-
ist, it is not difficult to argue that it is inaccessible, by definition, to analysis, and
thus an inappropriate subject of study in the humanities. The existence of mystical
states of consciousness is a valid and fascinating subject of inquiry, but humanis-
tic scholarship is concerned with describing the description rather than positing an
unknowable origin for it.106
Plotinian scholars within Classics have also rightly argued that the terms ‘mys-
tic’, ‘mystical’, and their cognates are anachronistic in the Plotinian context.107 Ploti-
nus himself uses the term μυστικῶς only once, in a context clearly denoting its usual
significance in antiquity, namely the concept of a hidden meaning or an initiatory
secret.108 These arguments leave the heuristic category of mysticism in need of a
new name, since the Greek equivalent of the term was current in Plotinus’ time with
a wholly different meaning, but otherwise intact. Others have argued that, rather
than being a mystic, Plotinus was in fact a competent rationalist philosopher, or that
103E.g. Stace 1961, 18. See bibliography at Katz 1978, 67, n. 5; see further Wasserstrom 1999, 239-
241; Mazur 2010, 9, n. 29. The concept of ‘experience’ as it is understood today is itself an idea with
a modern pedigree (see Gadamer 1981, 56-66 for a genealogy of the German term Erlebnis, which
appears only from 1870 onward; Proudfoot 1985, 2-40).
104Katz argues rather forcefully that ‘There are NO pure [i.e. unmediated] experiences’ (Katz 1978,
26; see 25-46; see criticism at Mazur 2010, 8, n. 24); cf. Proudfoot 1977, 344; Janowitz 2002, xv-xvii.
105Cf. Sells 1994, 214-5.
106Cf. Katz 1978, 51; Proudfoot 1985, 41.
107E.g. Hadot 1986a, 3-6.
108III.6[1]19.26; see Sleeman and Pollet 1980 s.v. Cf. Arist. EN 3.1.1111a; Strabo X 467C. See Casel
1919, 6; Hadot 1986b, 236-238.
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he was both a mystic and a competent rationalist philosopher, the two things not be-
ing mutually exclusive.109 The first argument, based on anachronism, points to the
reasons one might wish to do away with the term ‘mysticism’ altogether in the study
of Platonism, and the problems of definition noted above support a claim that, at the
very least, the term should not be used without a strong working definition. But
setting aside these problems, the Plotinian appeal to the ineffable remains, as does
the historical fact that, at least in the eyes of Porphyry, this ineffable has its referent
in indescribable cognitive states undergone by the philosopher,110 and an ineffable
cognitive state is by definition not susceptible to analysis.111
Problems and Solutions. We may now interrogate these interpretive difficulties
in terms of philosophic silence as it has been outlined above. In any discussion of es-
oteric traditions, the double-bind of secrecy mentioned above applies: if one knows
the secret, it is by definition not the secret. In discussing the Platonist esoteric tradi-
tions,112 my approach does not seek to uncover the content of the self-hiding wisdom
of the philosophic tradition as read by the Platonists; I do not even posit such a con-
tent.113 Plato and the ideas to which he gave life have provided particularly fertile
soil in which all manner of widely-divergent crops of knowledge and thought have
grown, and history has shown, since the eclipse of the sceptical Academy and the
rise of Platonism in its stead, that a strongly esoteric practice of reading this tradi-
tion seems to have grown especially well. This thesis is not attempting the process of
‘uncovering’ practised by the Tübingenschule, nor primarily the genealogical play of
109E.g. Rist 1967b, 213-230; Bussanich 1997 passim, esp. 5300, who wish to classify which type of
mystic Plotinus was, according to various taxonomies of religious experience. Trouillard makes the
‘Origine mystique de toute la vie de l’esprit’ a defining characteristic of Neoplatonism (1976, 307),
and the ‘mystic state’ the origin of this same spiritual life in Plotinian philosophy (1961, 433).
110‘Cognitive states’ here is used in preference to ‘experiences’, not because it is any less anachronis-
tic or un-Plotinian, but for want of an English alternative. The discussion of Plotinian anthropolo-
gy in Chapter Six comes to grips with the difficulties inherent in speaking about Plotinian states of
consciousness.
111Katz 1978, 54-6.
112That is to say, the esoteric traditions constructed by the Platonists.
113Cf. Urban 1998, 235 ff. on the inaccessibility of ‘esoteric wisdom’ to scholars.
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ideas found in the work of Raoul Mortley and others;114 in investigating the territo-
ry, not of the accidentally hidden truth but of the ineffable absolute, these modes of
access are closed. This thesis repositions the enquiry so as to ask, not what is being
hidden, but what is the hiding? What are its characteristics, and what is its power as
a performative act in a philosophical context?
This repositioning is not an abandonment of either historical or philosophic en-
quiry. As will be shown, the significance of Plotinian esoteric reading lies not in
finding that which is (perpetually) to be revealed, but in reading and thinking the
unending process of revelation. In other words, this thesis proposes not to uncover
any secrets, but to study secrecy in action, and to analyse the functions to which it
is put by Platonism generally, and Plotinus specifically. In social terms, the practice
of secrecy sheds important light on the engagement of Platonism with other tradi-
tions, both philosophic and religious, especially as regards Platonist attempts to lay
claim to the absolute truth and to privileged status as pre-eminent philosophers. In
terms of Plotinus’ project, I will show how the philosopher’s transformation of the
established tropes of Platonist philosophic silence represent a new kind of secrecy,
namely the self-hiding secret of the ineffable, and how Plotinus uses this secret as the
motor for a powerful discourse of philosophic contemplation and transformation.
The unending postponement of the revelation of the highest truth in the Enneads
mirrors, and is perhaps meant to foster, the movement of consciousness beyond its
own limits and toward the ineffable absolute. Chapter Seven in particular argues
that Plotinus seeks paradoxically to reveal something of the nature of the ineffable
one by using established tropes of hiding and revealing in new ways adapted to his
strong philosophy of transcendence and ineffability.
Turning to the ‘secrets’ of Platonism, this thesis does not enter into the Esotericist
debate. Instead, it analyses the process by which the Middle Platonists and Ploti-
nus constructed their philosophic tradition, and read it as an esoteric tradition. The
114On the former, see Appendix F, 288 ff. Mortley’s work, including articles (1972; 1975; 1982; 1992)
and a major, two-volume treatment (1986), constitutes the most thorough scholarly investigation
of the philosophical reasons which led some Hellenic thinkers to privilege silence as ‘a superior
epistemological weapon to utterance’ (Mortley 1986, I, 108).
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process of Plotinian exegesis of Plato has still not been done full justice in modern in-
terpretation,115 and his construction of a larger tradition in which Plato plays only a
part, and which Plotinus treats as an equally valid source of philosophical wisdom to
Plato, has been largely ignored in scholarship.116 The exploration of esoteric reading
in Plotinus which follows will do something to address this lack through elucidat-
ing the ways that hidden and secret wisdom are constructed within the canonical
text (whether a written text or, sometimes, a notional ‘text’) and then unfolded in-
to the light of day, although often in a context of rhetorical hiding. Sometimes these
enigmas of the ancients are discursive philosophical formations; at other times, fasci-
natingly, they take the form of revelations of ineffability, of silences within secrets, as
we have seen in Plotinus’ ‘revelation’ of the true meaning of the mysteries’ command
of silence.
In terms of dealing with apophatic language, the approach to philosophic silence
followed in this thesis has several advantages. Apophatic writing (and the linked
technique of conceptual aphairesis, the stripping-away of mental concepts which
Plotinus pursues with sometimes relentless energy) concentrates the attention of the
reader not on the content of discourse, but on that which it does not contain, focus-
ing discourse on the limitations of discourse. It is a self-conscious attempt at self-
transcendent writing.117 As such, it has of course theoretical underpinnings in the
ideas of language, of the self, and of truth in terms of which its practitioner under-
stands it; for Plotinus, for example, negations are in one sense a strictly-discursive
matter which cannot attain to noêsis insofar as they are couched in linguistic, and
thus multiple, terms.118 At the same time, all philosophic argumentation, for Ploti-
nus, may be conceived as an important early stage in a grand project of anagôgê, the
115This is due not to any lack of excellent appreciations (such as Eon 1970; Charrue 1978; Hadot
1987b; Dillon 1992), but to the depth and rhetorical complexity of Plato, and of Plotinus’ reading of
Plato.
116Important exceptions are Eon 1970, Lamberton 1989, Boys-Stones 2001, and Van Nuffelen 2011, all
of which feature prominently in Chapters Three and Four.
117This understanding has been pioneered by Sara Rappe (2000).
118See below. The limitations of knowledge and discourse in Plotinus are addressed in Chapters Six
and Seven.
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leading-up of the seeker toward the higher cognition through presence which is non-
discursive thought and that which lies beyond it.119 This thesis will attempt to give
a clear account of these theoretical considerations, and to use them as a jumping-off
point for investigation of the performative aspects of apophasis and aphairesis. The
intention is to delineate the ‘apophatic pact’120 between writer and reader, insofar as
possible, without betraying it.
This approach avoids positing ‘mysticism’, the hidden reification which lies be-
hind much modern interpretation of apophatic discourse. The assumptions which
inform this category as it is generally used, while seeming to hold out the promise of
a thought-world which is itself ineffable (the world of ‘mystical experience’), in fact
smuggle an essentialised, predicable concept into the silent space which apophatic
language perpetually circles. This thesis will try, and fail, to avoid substituting other
concepts for mysticism; the ‘ineffable absolute’ mentioned on the previous page is al-
ready such a betrayal. What I hope to explore, however, are the degrees of apophat-
ic intensity and indeterminacy of predicate by which Plotinus continually pushes
against this necessary betrayal. By staying at the level of rhetoric or discourse, the
level to which, Plotinus tells us, the way of negative language is confined by its di-
vided nature, our analysis stays true to Plotinus’ theories of the nature of discourse,
while hopefully elucidating at least the profound difficulties of Plotinian apophasis.
The silence beyond discourse is never defined, but its contours, or the way a philo-
sophic reader positions himself toward it, are shaped by the discourse which leads
up to it; it is this positioning which is a proper subject for investigation, and which
constitutes the activity of philosophic silence in Plotinus.
119E.g. I.3[20]1.6; V.1[10]1.24; IV.8[31]1. See further below, 244.
120See above, p. 41.
Chapter Two: The Silent Philosopher
Πολλὴν ἐpiιμέλειαν piοεῖσθε piερὶ τοῦ μὴ λέγειν ἃ μὴ δεῖ. piαντελῶς γὰρ
ἀpiαιδεύτου τινος ἐστι τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι σιωpiᾶν.121
Before turning to the focused thematic discussions which make up the bulk of
this thesis, a more synoptic discussion may be helpful to flesh out the historical re-
alities to which the theoretical considerations outlined in the the previous chapter
refer. This discussion will bring out in concrete terms some of the ways in which
philosophic silence was envisaged and practised in Plotinus’ intellectual milieu of
the third century CE.
Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus gives us our only detailed account of Plotinus’ day
to day life and teaching methods.122 It contains several important passages with
a strong bearing on philosophic silence; all are problematic, and all constitute in-
stances of philosophic silence on Porphyry’s part. These Porphyrian passages pro-
vide a useful thematic entry into the general cultural milieu of philosophic silence
in the third century CE. Having discussed these passages, this chapter will delve
back in time to early antiquity and the Classical period to investigate the roots of
these themes and tropes of silence in early philosophy and mystery cult, and then
return to the late antique period for a comparative discussion of other depictions of
philosophic silence from the same era. Lastly, Porphyry’s descriptions will be re-
assessed in the light of the intervening discussion, and our basic working model of
philosophic silence will be fleshed out considerably.
The first passage occurs near the beginning of Porphyry’s account. It narrates
121Apollonius of Tyana, ap. Stob. I 681, 13.
122On Porphyry’s biography of Plotinus, see generally Brisson et al. 1992; Edwards 2000, 1-53 gives
an English translation with useful notes and an index nominum (143-7).
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that an oath was taken by three leading students of Ammonius Saccas,123 including
Plotinus, not to reveal their teacher’s doctrines.
An agreement had been entered into by Erennius and by Origen
and by Plotinus not to reveal any of Ammonius’ doctrines, doctrines
which he had explained to them in his lectures. Plotinus too kept to
the agreement; he did teach some of those who came forward, but
he kept secret the doctrines which stemmed from Ammonius. Eren-
nius was the first to break the agreement, and when Erennius had
taken the first step Origen followed. However, he wrote nothing ex-
cept the treatise On Daimones and, under Gallienus, That the King is
the Only Maker. For a long time Plotinus continued to write nothing,
while drawing on his studies with Ammonius for the courses of lec-
tures that he gave. And that was how he continued for the course of
ten years, teaching some people, but writing nothing.124
There has been some controversy over the construal of this text; are we to understand
that Plotinus took an oath to keep Ammonius’ doctrines secret, and then broke it
when he saw that his colleagues had already done so and there was no further reason
for silence? Or, as O’Brien argues, should Plotinus’ direct participation in this oath
be seen as a later interpolation, and his adherence to it for a time a kind of informal
agreement to go along with the oath sworn by his colleagues?125
These are interesting questions, but a close reading of the passage shows that
strict logical congruency is lacking in Porphyry’s account; it simply cannot be made
to yield a consistent factual message.126 References to secrecy and silence in Platonist
writing are often a signal that we should look for rhetorical concerns rather than
logical ones, and so it is in this case, as I argue below.
123We know almost nothing for certain about this philosopher (see Dodds 1960b). Porphyry tells
us that Plotinus met him in Alexandria after much fruitless searching for a philosophic teacher and,
upon hearing Ammonius’ discourse, said ‘This is the man I sought!’ and thereafter pursued his
studies under Ammonius (Plot. 3, ll. 13-15).
124Porph. Plot. 3 24-35. Translation O’Brien 1994, 131-2. O’Brien brackets ‘and Plotinus’ in the first
line as a gloss (ibid. 123-5), an amendment which is not essential to the present discussion. On this
passage see O’Brien 1992; Cherlonneix 1992; O’Brien 1994.
125O’Brien 1994, 118-121 discusses the principle scholarly interpretations of this passage.
126Plotinus at first ‘kept secret the doctrines that stemmed from Ammonius’; then, without any segué,
we learn that he ‘continued to write nothing, while drawing on his studies with Ammonius’. The
locus of secrecy has silently been moved from an absolute silence to silence with regard to written
works. O’Brien 1994 notes many of these contradictions but, again, seeks to find an answer to the
problem of what Porphyry means without reference to the rhetorics of philosophic silence employed
in this passage. I argue below that what concerns Porphyry here is the attribution to Plotinus of
known themes of philosophic silence: the trope of ‘the secret revealed’, and the trope of privileged
orality and the rhetorical denigration of the written word.
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But first, certain questions should be raised about Porphyry’s text. Why, in the
first place, should a group of philosophic students undertake to keep their master’s
doctrines a secret? And then, why, assuming the existence of such a secret, should
the writing down of Ammonius’ doctrines, specifically, break the oath? There are
clearly assumptions at work here about what kind of philosophic information is to
be transmitted and how the transmission is to be carried out.
A second passage with bearing on these questions appears in the next section of
the Life. Having arrived in Rome and set up his philosophic school, Plotinus had
for some time conducted his seminars without writing any treatises. At some point,
however, he gave in to pressure and began to write:
Now, Plotinus had been prevailed upon to write down occasional
debates from the first year of Gallienus’ reign, and in the tenth year
of that reign, when I, Porphyry, came to know him, he had written
twenty-one books, which however he gave out to few, keeping them
back [from the public]. For the circulation [of these texts] was not at
all indiscriminate, nor was he easy in his mind about it, nor was it a
straightforward and simple matter; rather, it was carried out after a
complete vetting of the recipients.127
Why should Plotinus have been reluctant to put the results of his seminars in writ-
ten form, and why, when ‘prevailed upon’ to do so, did he distribute them uneasily
(οὐδὲ εὐσυνειδήτως), a phrase which might also be translated ‘with a bad conscience’?
Taking these two passages together, it is clear that the question of privilege in philo-
sophic knowledge is bound up with the question of indiscriminate publication in
Porphyry’s (and, presumably, Plotinus’) estimation.
I would like to cite a further section from Porphyry, this time bearing on quite a
different aspect of philosophic esotericism. Plotinus’ philosophic group celebrated
festivals in honour of Plato and Socrates, as was the general philosophic custom.128
Porphyry read out a poem at the festival of Plato, and records his auditors’ reactions:
When I read a poem at the festival of Plato entitled ‘The Sacred Mar-
riage’, one of those present said ‘Porphyry is raving’, on account of
127Porph. Plot. 4, 9-16. Cf. Plot. 18, 20-24 on the persuasion used by Porphyry and Amelius to induce
Plotinus to write.
128Plot. 2, 41. On this practice see Plut. Quaest. conv. 717b.
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the many things said in a veiled manner (μυστικῶς) and in the esoter-
ic language of divine possession (μετ’ ἐνθουσιασμοῦ ἐpiικεκρυμμένως).
But Plotinus said in the hearing of all: ‘You have shown yourself at
once a poet, a philosopher, and a hierophant (ἔδειξας ὁμοῦ καὶ τὸν
piοιητὴν καὶ τὸν φιλόσοφον καὶ τὸν ἱεροφάντην).’129
What does Porphyry mean here by μυστικῶς? The most basic meaning of this term
is ‘pertaining to mystery cult’, but it had long come to to indicate ‘concerned with
or pertaining to secrecy’.130 Porphyry’s poem, then, contained wording which hint-
ed at a meaning, or a secret, not made explicit, perhaps with some reference to the
dichotomy of initiated and uninitiated. As for ἐpiικεκρυμμένως, it is difficult to find
a better translation than ‘esoterically’: the term denotes intentional concealment.131
In conjunction with μετ’ ἐνθουσιασμοῦ, it is probably meant to evoke the obscurity of
oracles or other inspired speech, familiar to the Greek imagination. The trope of ob-
scure, inspired speech implied truth (since its inspiration was thought to be divine),
but also a certain difficulty in accessing that truth: oracles were obscure and required
interpreters (hierophants, to whom Plotinus compares Porphyry in this passage),
and well-known to be fraught with difficulty, often revealing their true meaning too
late to be of any use, or sometimes, by warning the recipient of a threatening doom,
bringing that very doom about.132
Here we have another register of philosophic esotericism. The incident surround-
ing Porphyry’s poem does not present themes of guarding knowledge from unsuper-
vised or careless distribution; instead, it presents a public declaration of the hidden
knowledge, but expressed in such a way that it remains hidden. In fact, it is a claim
to esotericism on Porphyry’s part, a rare claim for a Platonist, since they are much
more given to finding esotericism in the works of ‘the ancients’ and to styling them-
selves as ‘exegetes’ than to claiming esoteric expression on their own part.133 This
129Plot. 15, 1-6.
130See 56 ff. below.
131LSJ translates ‘mysteriously’, and gives no other occurrences of this word. But see s.v. ἐpiικρύpiτω.
132The oracle which misled Croesus in Herodotus (I.55) is a well-known example of the former, and
the oracle which led Oedipus to kill his father and marry his mother (S. O.T. 791-3) of the latter.
Plutarch thought that oracles were obscure because the gods themselves wished to speak esoterically,
an interesting permutation of Platonist theory of esoteric expression discussed n. 347 below.
133Plotinus, for example, never claims to be an esoteric writer, but rather declares the ‘openness’ of
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message is ‘hidden in plain sight’, since the less astute, unnamed audience-member
expresses a total lack of appreciation for it, while the perceptive Plotinus sees its true
value and, it is implied, its inner meanings. Such a model of exposition intentionally
avoids philosophic ἀκριβεῖα; it expresses through hiding, rather than through exege-
sis or explanation. But why would a philosopher have recourse to themes from the
mystery cults, ‘oracular’ language, or other tropes of secrecy derived from religion?
This is perhaps the question implied by the unnamed detractor of Porphyry, who
may represent a more sober strain of Platonist thinking. Plotinus’ answer, that one
could be ‘at once a poet, a philosopher, and an expounder of sacred matters’, shows
an understanding of philosophic practice wherein themes of the esoteric drawn from
religion provide a suitable element of exposition.
The final Porphyrian passage for discussion has been alluded to in the Introduc-
tion. This is Porphyry’s claim that Plotinus attained to the state of union with the
one ‘in ineffable actuality’.
And so, often strongly spurred on by this spiritual light (δαιμονίῳ
φωτὶ) toward the first and transcendent god in his thoughts, and
according to the ways of ascent taught in Plato’s Symposium, that
god appeared which has neither shape nor Form, but is established
above nous and the entire noetic [reality]. And I, Porphyry, declare
that I once drew near and was united (ἑνωθῆναι) to it, in my sixty-
eighth year.134 So the goal appeared to Plotinus, being not far re-
moved. For his end and goal was to become one with and to draw
near to the god which is above all things. And it happened four
times, when I was in his presence, that he [attained to] this goal, not
only in potentia, but in ineffable actuality. 135
An important difference between Middle Platonism and Plotinus’ philosophy is that,
for the latter and for his successors, not only educational and cultural criteria deter-
mine philosophic eminence, but also states of internal power. Porphyry describes a
type of inward attention exercised by Plotinus, linked to ascetic practices: ‘He was
present both to himself and to others, and he never relaxed this self-directed atten-
tion except in sleep; and this he reduced by taking little food - often he ate not even
his exposition (discussed Chapter Four).
134Or ‘I, Porphyry, now in my sixty-eighth year, &c.’
135Plot. 23 7-18.
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a piece of bread - and by his constant turning (ἐpiιστοφή) toward his intellect.’136 A
little further on, Porphyry reiterates this mental discipline: ‘He never relaxed the in-
tensity [of his attention] toward the intellect.’137 Plotinus is depicted as engaged in a
strict philosophic regime, resulting in an almost constant connection to nous, and an
occasional breakthrough to the highest reality. Porphyry also attacks certain Gnos-
tics in Plotinus’ group for ‘deceiving themselves and others by claiming that Plato
had not penetrated to the depths of noetic being’; clearly, the claim to such states of
inner power could be contested, and to do so was an important part of philosophic
disputation.138
The significance of this will appear later, but we may note for the moment how
the depiction of states of internal power such as these brings an element of the un-
sayable into philosophic achievement. Plotinus’ inner achievements cannot be anal-
ysed, unless by their fruits in the sphere of dialectic, and the highest achievement,
union with the one, cannot be addressed even there, being ineffable. Late Platonist
philosophic silence elevates such ‘silent’ states of inner achievement to the highest
importance in philosophic practice, and thus removes the culmination of philosophy
from the sphere of discourse.
These four passages from Porphyry are all instances of philosophic silence; in
each case, a statement or act implies the existence of a secret, while rhetorically
denying access to the secret. Note, again, that this is not a case of the actual preser-
vation of a secret in the strict and logically obvious sense: in the case of Ammonius’
teachings, it is implied that all three thinkers broke the oath of secrecy, and we have
every reason to believe that one result of this betrayal, to the lasting good of pos-
terity, was the Enneads. Plotinus’ initially hesitant and careful publication gave way
to an open and prolific distribution of his texts throughout the Roman intellectual
world;139 nor should we ignore the apparent irony that it was Porphyry himself who
136Ibid. 8 19-23.
137Ibid. 9 17-18.
138Ibid. 16.1–10.
139There was at least one other edition of Plotinus’ works in circulation (by Plotinus’ student Eu-
stochius; see Armstrong 2003, I, ix), and a request for copies by Longinus (Plot. 19) seems to indicate
that they could be had for the asking by someone considered by Plotinus to be not a true philosopher,
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was responsible for editing and publishing Plotinus’ works as a corpus.
As for Porphyry’s esoteric poem, it is an example of how the open secret, the
self-hiding esoteric, could operate, or be seen to operate, in a very concrete social
fashion. The purported secret meanings are not the significant point of the anecdote,
or not the only significant point; what is important, and what Porphyry himself em-
phasises in a rather self-aggrandising fashion, is the status conferred by Plotinus’
recognition of the true, hidden worth of his poem. Just as initiation conferred a cer-
tain status on the initiand, so esoteric interpretation, drawing on the same powerful
tropes of belonging and exclusion, conferred a kind of solidarity and social capital.
But the presence of the secret had to be stated ‘in the hearing of all’ for this to occur;
as always, the revealing of the hiding constitutes the key dynamic of the esoteric.
The final passage may seem an odd one out, ostensibly dealing as it does with a pri-
vate - indeed, silent - inner state of the philosopher. But the mere fact of Porphyry’s
reportage shows beautifully the way that such inner accomplishments could trans-
late into symbolic capital, as Porphyry’s mention, ‘in passing’, of his own, similar
achievement indicates.140 Plotinus’ status as possessor of the supreme philosoph-
ic achievement is being emphasised here, and its ineffability acts precisely as does
the theme of mystic silence - to heighten the importance of the achievement, and to
elevate it and keep it out of the reach of the uninitiated.
Presocratic Roots of Philosophic Silence
We have posed several questions: What concerns of privileged knowledge lie
behind the oath of secrecy and its betrayal? Why would Plotinus seek strictly to con-
trol the publication of his works? Why would a Platonist author such as Porphyry
choose to express himself in public in an intentionally obscure or secretive manner?
Porphyry’s biography itself asks none of these questions; the answers are assumed
but merely a cultivated man (ibid. 14 18-20). While Eustochius’ and Porphyry’s editions were pub-
lished after Plotinus’ death, Longinus’ request suggests an active copying tradition during Plotinus’
lifetime (but after 268; see Edwards 2000, 33 n. 189). It is at any rate certain that Plotinus’ works
circulated far and wide after his death; they were known to Augustine in western Africa and as far
east as Syria, whence they entered into the Islamic world (see Adamson 2002).
140On Porphyry’s self-aggrandisement in the Life, see Edwards 2000, xxxvi and n. 1018 below.
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to be self-evident to his readers. The following sections will examine the background
behind this assumption and try to make them evident to modern readers, by provid-
ing the framework for a model of philosophic silence in the third century Platonist
milieu. Three sections follow, examining the most important thematic and philo-
sophical loci for Platonist philosophic silence: the mystery cults, the traditions of si-
lence stemming from the Italian Presocratics (especially those surrounding Pythago-
ras and his school), and the works of Plato himself, after which the discussion will
return to the late antique silent philosopher.
The Mysteries. The mystery cults, especially the cult at Eleusis, provided the
most ancient and enduring topos of silence to the Hellenic mind throughout antiquity
and even into the Christian period.141 The subject of ancient mystery religion is
vast,142 and little more can be done here than mention a few of the most salient
points and note the specific vocabulary associated with the mysteries; the adoption
and transformation of mystery themes and terms by Platonism are discussed in some
detail in the following chapter.
The mysteries were ‘. . . initiation rituals of a voluntary, personal, and secret char-
acter that aimed at a change of mind through experience of the sacred.’143 To this
phenomenological description, however, should be added the more concrete fact
that the mysteries aimed at a change of status through the act of initiation.144 A
chief distinguishing social feature of mysteries, and of the Hellenic and Roman θία-
σοι/collegia which shared much of their terminology, structure, and style,145 was that
141See the excellent comments of Pépin 1984, 25 ff. Cf. still Casel 1919, 1-2 et passim. Burkert 1987, 4:
The mysteries of Eleusis were the local cult of Athens, and much of their iconic significance probably
stems from the literary prestige of that city. Casel’s thesis, that philosophorum silentium e mysteriis
originem ducere (1919, 1-2 et passim), has much to recommend it if understood on the level of imagery
and rhetoric; however, philosophy also developed its own concerns of secrecy and silence quite apart
from those derived from the mystic materials which they appropriated, as discussed in Part Two of
this thesis.
142Metzger 1984 is a huge bibliography. Burkert 1983 and 1987 are excellent studies. Of importance
to the question of mystic silence and its appropriation by philosophy are Casel 1919, 1-6; Burkert
1983, 248-54. The Latin equivalents of mystic terminology given below often first appear later than
the Classical period under discussion, but are included for the sake of completeness; on this Latin
terminology see Graf 2003, 4.
143Burkert 1987, 11.
144See n. 146 below.
145See Burkert 1987, 32; Martin 1995, 102-3.
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they constituted an aspect of formal religion outside the public sphere. Their ba-
sic structure was one of exclusion and inclusion, by contrast to the public rituals
of ancient Greece and Rome. The key to this dynamic was the status conferred by
initiation, most often referred to by the verb μυεῖν (to initiate, Lat. initiare) and its
cognates, whence the μυστήρια got their name.146 The popular etymology of μυεῖν as
deriving from μύειν (’to shut the eyes or lips’) - thus invoking silence in the very ori-
gin of the term for initiation - may be genuine or may be fanciful.147 In either case, it
indicates a popular perception that initiation was intimately connected with silence.
There might be multiple grades of initiation, and ‘greater’ and ‘lesser’ myster-
ies, institutions which created further hierarchy within the cult itself.148 An essential
precursor to initiation in the Eleusinian mysteries, which came to have an impor-
tant interpretive life in Platonism, was purification (καθαρμός, κάθαρσις), a ritual act
which set the aspiring initiand apart from his or her everyday life and from society
as a whole. The initiatory meaning of μυεῖν was also expressed by the more gener-
al verb τελεῖν (to complete, perfect, celebrate, initiate), and its cognates τελετή (rite),
τελεστής (initiator), etc.149 Mystic rituals were also known as ὄργια, ‘secret rites’.
Some mysteries, including those of Eleusis, featured a cultic centre;150 the telestêri-
on, access to which was prohibited to non-initiates when certain rites were under-
way, was one of the more important images associated in later philosophic adap-
tations with the higher secrets of philosophy.151 Mysteries generally had a central
146On the Latin term initiare see Graf 2003, 7-8, who analyses scholarly and popular interpretations
of initiation; the most useful definition is that of a ‘ritual change in status’ (Young 1965; see Burkert
1987, 8).
147Burkert 1987, 8, n. 36; cf. Montiglio 2000, 25-7.
148See Clinton 2003.
149On this term, see Burkert 1987, 9, with n. 40. It need not refer to mysteries, but often does; the verb
τελεῖν with a god’s name in the dative means ‘to initiate into the mysteries of that god’.
150There were many smaller ‘private’ religious groups from at least Classical times, which resembled
clubs or associations; these may have met in private homes, and were not necessarily associated with
a cultic centre, although they did share many characteristics with the mysteries, including secrecy
and initiation practices (see Martin 1995). These collegia, however, did not influence the terminology
or themes of mystic silence in the way that the more high-profile, iconic mysteries such as Eleusis did,
with the exception of the widespread Bacchic or Dionysian mysteries, whose metaphorical adoption
by Plato is discussed below.
151The image of the sanctuary in Plotinus is discussed at 248 below. The discussions in Entretiens
Hardt XXXVII are a good overview of the ancient Greek sanctuary generally.
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mythological narrative, often called the hieros logos, usually a story of the god or
gods of the cult.152 This account was surrounded by an aura of secrecy, but was not
necessarily known only to a select group.153
As we have seen, it was forbidden to reveal the mysteries, a prohibition backed
up by the threat of divine punishments and, in many cities, by serious legal sanc-
tions;154 to do so was most commonly expressed by the verb ἐκφέρειν (Lat. enun-
tiare).155 But it is also unclear that there were ‘secrets’ to be revealed, in the sense of
secret doctrines or teachings; more likely, a ritual enactment of some kind was the cli-
mactic revelation of the initiation process, along with the display of sacred objects.156
This ‘revelation’ was known as ἐpiοpiτεία, a term which came to be a shorthand for
the highest stage of initiation at Eleusis, and then generally; the verb θεάομαι is also
very prominent in this context, and the secret objects seen are often called θεάματα,
while the initiand is the θεατής, terms which reoccur denoting the ineffable visionary
‘objects’ of intellection and the encounter with the one in later Platonism.157
This terminology has been stressed because it functioned to signal to an ancient
reader or listener that the well-known topoi of the mysteries were being invoked;
after Plato’s adaptation of mystery themes, these terms became especially important
for the philosophic reader, whose appreciation of their meaning would be largely
influenced by Plato’s powerful adaptation of them, discussed below.
Foremost among the themes invoked by the use of this terminology, as has al-
ready been discussed, was that of the notionally inviolable secret, the ἄρρητον or
ἀpiόρρητον, which took the form, in practice, of silence.158 This silence is presented
152Burkert 1987, 70-88. See further 67 below.
153See n. 63 above.
154See Casel 1919, 6-11; Scarpi 1987, 32-3.
155On this term see Casel 1919, 7, 61, 86, 128; Pépin 1984, 31-2 gives many examples of its use both in
the mysteries and in Platonism and Christian writers.
156Mortley 1986, Vol. I, 113-15. This does not of course rule out genuine secret teachings, or knowl-
edge in the form of passwords, etc.; there is some evidence for these, but it is clear that these were
not universals in the mystery cults, while secrecy was. We might speculate that the term ἐκφέρειν
had a literalistic origin in the idea of actually taking the sacred objects out of the sacred precinct, thus
analogous to sacrilegia.
157See Pépin 1984, 30, n. 56.
158See Casel 1919, 6; Montiglio 2000, 37-8.
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as literally inviolable in the Homeric Hymn to Demeter: Demeter teaches mysteries to
mankind, ‘awful mysteries which no one may in any way transgress or pry into or
utter, for deep awe of the gods checks the voice.’159 Silence constituted the act by
which the social categories of initiate and profane were constructed and maintained.
As a theme, the silence of the mysteries would be the single most important borrow-
ing from traditional religion by philosophy. When other mystic terms and tropes
such as initiation, purification, or revelation occur in philosophic texts, we should
thus be aware that they served above all to call to the mind of the educated Classical
reader a background context of inviolable silence. These terms were taken up by
philosophy quite early on,160 and came eventually to take on a secondary meaning
of ‘formally ineffable’, though never losing the original implication of secrecy, an
important point returned to below. The question of when this evolution in meaning
occurred cannot be answered with precision, but Chapter Three points to a likely
development in Middle Platonism.
Elements of Philosophic Silence in Early Philosophy. Philosophy, almost as
soon as it was first conceived and given a name, was defined in terms not only of
the search for truth, but of privileged access to truth. As Jean Pépin and others
have shown, philosophy was from its very beginnings a genre concerned with the
privileging of knowledge, and various types of philosophic elitism were widespread
from the earliest works of the philosophic tradition.161 This section will sketch out
the most important influences from early philosophy on the later Platonist culture of
silence.
159Ll. 478-9, trans. Evelyn-White 1936. Cf. Strabo 10.3.9. See Collins 1999, 19.
160See Casel 1919, 6; Montiglio 2000, 37, n. 162 for early appearances of these terms; Xenophon (HG
6.3.6) seems to be the earliest quasi-philosophical appearance of ἄρρητος.
161Pépin 1984; cf. Brisson 1987. Also important in this connection are Casel 1919; Szlezák 1977;
Lamberton 1995; Stroumsa 1996a. Cf. Armstrong 1990a, 96-99, who emphasises the ‘openness’ of
Hellenic philosophy as a genre, while positing ‘philosophic diffidence’ as an accepted behavioural
norm. This thesis’ concentration on secrecy and silence should not be seen as denying the explorations
of free discourse by ancient philosophers, but rather as qualifying them in specific ways.
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Presocratic Philosophic Silence. Certain elements of the culture of Platonist philo-
sophic silence can be traced back to Presocratic philosophy. The early Italian philoso-
phers, Pythagoras, Parmenides and Empedocles, were engaged in an active trans-
formation of initiatory and purificatory themes from the traditional mystery cults.
Around the same time, the literary movement responsible for the ‘Orphic’ poems
arose, in which there are also signs of a re-interpreting of mystery materials in a
philosophic way. Considerations of space make it impossible to enter into the com-
plex relations between the Orphic movements, Pythagoreanism, Empedocles, and
Parmenides, and of all of these to traditional cult; the evidence is fragmentary, and
widely divergent interpretations are possible.162 The briefest of summaries follows,
confined strictly to the manifest uses of themes and terminology from the mysteries
in the poems of ‘Orpheus’, Empedocles and Parmenides, as well as a note on the
different concerns of concealment found in Heraclitus. The locus classicus of early
philosophic silence is of course that for which the Pythagoreans were, already in
Plato’s day, synonymous, and Pythagorean silence is treated in a separate section.
‘Orphic’ Secrecy. We know from the Derveni papyrus what had long been con-
jectured; that a movement existed as early as the fifth century BCE163 engaged in a
new kind of textual exegesis on a corpus of hexameter works known as the Orphic
poems.164 The character of the movements known as ‘Orphic’ is obscure; a num-
ber of poems attributed to Orpheus were in circulation in antiquity,165 and there is
scattered but strong evidence of an Orphic ‘movement’ with links to mystery cult.166
162Approaches to these philosophers from Classics have tended to emphasise their ‘philosophic’ con-
tent, and it is common to find an entire book on the Parmenidean fragments with only the slightest
reference to mystery or ritual practice (e.g. Palmer 2009). At the other extreme, Kingsley (1995, 1999)
has argued that philosophy must, in the case of Pythagoras and the Eleatics, be understood as es-
sentially involving magical rituals and similar practices. The truth of the matter may lie somewhere
between these two extremes.
163The Derveni papyrus dates from the latter part of the fourth century, but the commentary it
contains is thought to be about a century older (West 1983, 75, 77; Lamberton 1995, 149).
164See West 1983. On the importance of this interpretive tradition for Platonism, see Lamberton 1995,
149-50; Rappe 2000, 143.
165See above all West 1983.
166Burkert 1982, 1-2; Rappe 2000, 148. We possess several items - the Olbia funerary plates, the
Derveni papyrus (which was found half-incinerated in an ancient funeral pyre, probably indicating a
ritual immolation as part of a funerary rite; see Kouremenos et al. 2006, 3-4), and an ancient graffito
referring to orphikoi - which indicate that there was a community known as ‘Orphics’ and that they did
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What can be said for certain is that the movements which used the name Orpheus
were diverse.167 In speaking of Orphism, this thesis refers specifically to the Orphic
poems and the interpretive traditions based on them. Orphism, for our purposes,
was a literary movement or, more likely, movements, and its salient characteristic
was a transformation of traditional mystery culture in a new, literary context, and
one which sometimes (as in the case of the Derveni document) also incorporated
elements of the new philosophic movements.
The Orphic poems are not well preserved, but it is clear that they had formal con-
nections with the mythical narratives associated with mystery traditions. As such,
they were expressed in terms of secret knowledge, with the difference that, as far as
we can tell, they were circulated in a literary form that the mystery narrations most-
ly avoided. Our knowledge of the secrecy associated with these works is fleshed
out by the works of later writers, especially Platonist philosophers, but care must be
used in interpreting this evidence, as these authors read ‘Orpheus’ as a theologian-
poet of great antiquity and authority, and they had long since grown accustomed to
associating the mysteries with the literary expression of philosophy.168
The partial destruction of the Derveni papyrus, not an Orphic poem but an alle-
gorical interpretation of an Orphic poem,169 may indicate an actual concern with a
ritualised secrecy. But the Nachleben of this mode in Platonism - the written work
which calls for secrecy, or even for its own destruction - was something entirely dif-
ferent, a form of written silence rather than a secret mode of writing. We can no
longer tell to what degree the initiatory language of the Orphic poems genuinely
reflected a ritual context, or to what degree it might already have been a literary
re-reading of the mysteries as philosophic or proto-philosophic wisdom; however,
practise special rites. References to ὀρφεοτελεσταί/οἱ τὰ ὀρφικὰ μυστήρια τελοῦντες, Orphic initiators,
support connecting this movement with initiatory τελεταί more broadly (Burkert 1982, 4). Plato refers
to itinerant ὀρφεοτελεσταί, and to ‘books of Musaeus and Orpheus’ (R. 364b-365a). It is difficult,
however, to specify beyond these bare facts (see Burkert 1982 passim).
167Linforth 1973 does the essential work of separating out the various cultural strands associated
with the name of Orpheus in antiquity; see summary at Burkert 1982, 3-4.
168On Orpheus the theologian, see 104 below. On philosophic education and reading as mysteries,
see 115 ff.
169All references are to the edition of Kouremenos et al. 2006.
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the importance of this tradition for the present discussion is its later use by Plato
and Platonism, as a source for themes of mystic silence, which will become evident
in what follows. We should note in passing, however, that the Derveni document
show the early existence of a tradition of reading these poems as containing a sub-
text of philosophic meaning; the Late Platonist claims that Orpheus should be read
as a theologic teacher in a philosophic style are thus not Platonist invention.
Parmenides. Parmenides was perhaps the most important Presocratic philoso-
pher for Platonism. The proem of Parmenides’ philosophic poem depicts the philoso-
pher travelling to the underworld along a ‘way’ (ὁδός) called the ‘way of the know-
ing man’ (εἰδὼς φώς); the ‘way’, along with the title of the first main section of the po-
em, The Way of Truth, recalls inscriptions on an Orphic funerary lamella,170 while the
specific wording of the ‘knowing man’ recalls terminology familiar from the initiato-
ry tradition.171 The entire episode seems to be patterned on the mythical narrations
common to both the mysteries and to the Orphic tradition, with Parmenides’ initia-
tory journey doubling as his ‘initiation’ into philosophic wisdom, which is taught to
him by a mysterious goddess. The goddess greets Parmenides:
Welcome, O youth, arriving at our dwelling as consort of immortal
charioteers and mares which carry you; no ill fate sent you forth to
travel on this way, which is far removed indeed from the step of
men, but right and justice. You must be informed of everything,
both of the unmoved heart of persuasive reality and of the beliefs of
mortals, which comprise no genuine conviction.172
Parmenides expresses the process of acquiring philosophic wisdom as a process of
initiation at the hands of a goddess. The discussion will return to this framing of
philosophic knowledge as initiatory knowledge.
Empedocles. The work of Empedocles, who, like Parmenides, came to be seen as a
forerunner or traditional authority by a majority of Platonists, has considerable bear-
ing on Platonist philosophic silence. The poem or poems of Empedocles173 survive
170See summary of evidence at Palmer 2009, 58.
171See Burkert 1969, 5; Palmer 2009, 57-8.
172B 1.24-30 DK, trans. Coxon 1986.
173On the one-poem hypothesis, see most recently Trépanier 2004, 1 ff. Obbink 1993, 56-8 summarises
the evidence.
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only in fragments, but several of these invoke themes of mystic silence in a context
where the philosophic doctrines of the author are themselves the secrets. We might
speculate that Empedocles’ work thus represents an early example of the philosoph-
ic published secret, expressed in the thematic register of the mysteries. Speculation
aside, however, we do possess several solid indications that Empedocles’ work, like
that of Parmenides before him (and possibly influenced thereby) invoked mystic
secrecy.
We have two titles attributed to Empedocles, On Nature and Purifications. The lat-
ter title recalls the change of status undergone by the hopeful initiand at the begin-
ning of the initiation process. Empedocles held that those who attained to wisdom
were of a divine nature, and their souls were freed from the cycle of incarnations,174
an idea which would seem to be an appropriation to philosophy of the traditional
mystery cult theme of a special status for the initiated in the hereafter.175 His work
thus shared the eschatological themes common in many mystery teachings.
It also invoked the topos of mystic silence, and in a unique way. An invocation of
the Muse attributed to On Nature calls not only for divine inspiration for the philoso-
pher’s song, a request familiar from epic and lyric tradition, but for the goddess’ aid
in maintaining mystic secrecy:
But turn from my tongue, o gods, the madness of these men, and
from hallowed lips let a pure stream flow. And I entreat you, vir-
gin Muse, white-armed, of long memory, send that which it is right
and fitting for mortals to hear (ὧν θέμις ἐστὶν ἐφημερίοισιν ἀκούειν,
/ piέμpiε), driving the well-reined chariot from the place of rever-
ence.176
Empedocles’ request for divine assistance, not only in composing his verses, but
in concealing what ought to be concealed of the matters he wishes to discuss, is a
notable use of the theme of mystic silence: the author prays that his work might be
successful not only in communication, but in concealment.
174Clem. Al. Misc. IV 23.150; V 14.122.
175Cf. Pl. Phd. 69c3-d2.
176B3 ll. 4-8 DK.
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Another fragment of Empedocles is preserved in a Platonist context which illus-
trates the way the earlier philosopher was read as a paragon of an esoteric mode of
teaching in the later culture of Platonist philosophic silence. One of the characters in
Plutarch’s work of philosophic table-talk, the Convivial Disputations, is himself called
Empedocles. Under discussion are various Pythagorean symbola (on which see p. 69
below) and their esoteric meanings. Plutarch’s Empedocles begins with a rhetorical
flourish of respect for the secrecy surrounding the Pythagorean ἄρρητον, but assures
his comrades that what he is about to recount is not a secret.177 He then proceeds to
discuss the avoidance of fish attributed to the Pythagoreans:
Tyndares the Lacedæmonian said the reason for this was the honour
which they accorded to keeping silence (ἐχεμυθίας), and they called
fish ‘ἔλλοpiας’, since their voice was ‘shut up’ (εἰλλομένην). And my
namesake [Empedocles] counselled Pausanias after the Pythagorean
manner concerning doctrines, to ‘Cover them up within your silent
breast’ (στεγάσαι φρενὸς ἔλλοpiος εἴσω).178
Whatever the original context of this fragment in Empedocles, its adaptation by
Plutarch into a ‘Pythagorean’ admonition of secrecy is clear here.
Heraclitus. Not all Presocratics were engaged with the mysteries in this construc-
tive way; Heraclitus was sharply critical of traditional religious observances.179 But
Heraclitus was seen by many Platonists as a philosophic forerunner, or even an early
member of their school of thought,180 and is an important Presocratic source for two
key Platonist ideas of esoteric interpretation. The first is the locus classicus for the
idea of the arcana naturæ: Heraclitus’ extremely influential observation that ‘Nature
loves to hide’ influenced the ways in which the Platonists (and many other thinkers
throughout history) conceived of esoteric discourse.181
Also important is the Heraclitean ‘riddle’ (αἴνιγμα). Heraclitus’ riddling tendency
177728 D 4-6.
178Plut. Quaest. conv. 728 E 6-11, quoting Emped. fr. B5 DK.
179E.g. fr. 14.
180On Heraclitus in the tradition as envisaged by Plotinus, see 138 below.
181Fr. B123 DK. This statement is cited by Plotinus, and had a very interesting Nachleben in later
Platonism as well (see n. 398 below). On the arcana naturæ in ancient Greek thought, see Pépin 1984,
28-30; Stroumsa 1996a, 93.
PRESOCRATIC ROOTS OF PHILOSOPHIC SILENCE 65
is well-known, and the use of riddling language can be seen as a form of privileg-
ing of knowledge; Heraclitus expresses no great respect for the intelligence of the
common man,182 and his enigmatic style may have been, at least in part, a method-
ology of public secrecy aimed at protecting his doctrines from the misunderstanding
they were certain to encounter if bruited about. In the case of riddles, knowledge
is withheld from those unworthy or unable to receive it, not by literal silence, but
by hiding in plain sight but out of reach, not unlike Porphyry’s ‘mystic’ poem cit-
ed above. Chapters Three and Four discuss the transformation of the riddle into
a hermeneutic tool in Middle Platonist and Plotinian interpretation of traditional
materials. Heraclitus’ elitist stance was also probably absorbed into the culture of
philosophic elitism which arose in Platonism, discussed below.
Pythagorean Silence. The Presocratic thinkers discussed above have been given
the most summary of treatments, but Pythagoras and his school demand consid-
erably more attention. They are the source par excellence for themes of silence and
philosophic secrecy;183 indeed, the Pythagoreans were synonymous with the prac-
tice of silence from quite an early date.184 We suffer from a dearth of solid, early
evidence for the Pythagorean way of life,185 but, whatever its historical relation to
cultic practice, we find it associated with terminology from traditional mystery cults,
and many of the themes of Pythagorean silence are structurally similar to those as-
sociated with mysteries.186 It is a plausible conjecture, if not susceptible to proof,
182Frr. B.1, 17, 29, 34, 49, 56, 57, 108, and 121 DK, cited and discussed at Casel 1919, 35.
183On Pythagorean silence and secrecy generally, see Casel 1919, 29-35; Burkert 1972, 178 ff., 219 ff.;
Brisson 1987, 88-101; Bremmer 1995, 63-70.
184Pythagorean silence is taken as proverbial by Isocrates (Busiris 29) and the comic poets Alexis and
Dicæarchus, (both ap. Porph. V.P. 10). See Burkert 1972, 178-9. Aristotle, in a fragment transmitted by
Iamblichus, states that the famous doctrine that there are three types of rational beings - gods, men,
and Pythagoras - was among their ‘very secret’ (τοῖς piανὺ ἀpiορρήτοις) doctrines (Ar. fr. 192 Rose =
Iamb V.P. 31). Aristoxenus, writing around the same time, also states that Pythagoras had esoteric
doctrines (μὴ εἶναι piρὸς piάντας piάντα ῥητά: fr. 43 W = D.L. VIII 15).
185On problems with the sources see Burkert 1972, 97-109; cf. Dillon and Hershbell 1991, 16. Philip
1966, esp. 140-7 argues that, in light of the lack of evidence, the idea of a Pythagorean brotherhood
with a characteristic βίος should be dated to the late Hellenistic period.
186Burkert argues that the social practices of the early Pythagoreans did in fact have close parallels
with the mysteries on many levels, and that ties with mystery cults should not be ruled out (1972, 155,
159, 178 ff.; cf. Bremmer 1995, 69). The famous Pythagorean prohibitions, such as that against eating
beans, have many parallels, in their early attestations, with similar or identical prohibitions current
in mystery ritual contexts (ibid. 177-8). On the structural parallels between Pythagorean and mystic
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that Plato’s later emphasis on the control of philosophical knowledge arose from his
interest in, and connection with, Pythagorean circles in Italy and Sicily in his later
life.187 Testimony to Pythagoreanism from the Classical period mentions ἄρρητα,188
a term which still maintained its unambiguous meaning of ‘secret’ or ‘for an initiat-
ed group’ in the specific context of religious secrets.189 We find the typical mystery
themes of divine or human punishment for breaking the commandment of secre-
cy190 in some accounts as well.191 In the writings of Platonists and Neopythagorean
thinkers this mystic secrecy is re-imagined as philosophic silence, sometimes based
in philosophic elitism whereby certain doctrines are inappropriate for the ears of
the many,192 and sometimes based in the transcendent, ineffable nature of the first
principle, according to which secrecy and silence are simultaneously evoked.193
Pythagorean secrecy is regularly broken and made subject to philosophical reve-
lation. Aristotle was concerned to state Pythagorean doctrines in the most straight-
forward way possible, and in at least one passage he reveals a doctrine that he specif-
ically states to be ἄρρητον.194 This is typical of Aristotle’s approach to the works of
earlier thinkers, whose thought he values to the degree in which they foreshadow
his own thought; but the proverbial Pythagorean silence is also broken by the late
Platonists, who saw Pythagoras as one of the greatest philosophic sages in history,
if not the single greatest.195 The trope of ‘the secret revealed’ is nowhere more ap-
parent than in the Pythagorean works of Porphyry and Iamblichus, which reveal
silence, see Montiglio 2000, 27-8.
187As argued by Morrison 1958.
188Arist. fr. 192 = Iam. V.P. 31; Aristox. fr. 43 W = D.L. 8.15: μὴ εἶναι piρὸς piάντα ῥητά. See Burkert
1972, 177-9.
189See 58 above.
190See n. 154.
191Burkert 1982, 18. The story of Hippasos of Metapontum, who was drowned by the gods for reveal-
ing Pythagorean secrets, namely the mathematical principle of incommensurability (see Fritz 1945),
is a good example of this theme played out in the history of philosophy (Iamb. V.P. 247; see Fritz 1945,
260; Burkert 1972, 207, 459; Brisson 1987, 92, n. 27).
192E.g. Ph. Quod omnis prob. lib. sit 2 ff.
193We have the testimony of Plutarch (Numa 22, Quaest. Conv. 728 D 4-6 cited above), Iamblichus (V.P.
252), and Nichomachus of Gerasa (ap. Porph. V.P. 57) on Pythagorean doctrines which are ἄρρητα. As
discussed in Chapters Five and Six, this term had come to incorporate a new meaning of ‘ineffable’
by the second century CE.
194Cited n. 184 above.
195Pythagoras’ place in Platonist constructions of philosophic tradition is discussed 110 ff. below.
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Pythagorean ‘secrets’ at every turn.196 Again, we should be alerted to the practice
of written silence in these instances, and its concern with acts of hiding and reveal-
ing, rather than seeking ‘secrets’ or being baffled by the Platonists’ apparent lack of
respect for Pythagorean esotericism.
Several themes of silence associated with the Pythagorean mystique are impor-
tant to the Platonist culture of philosophical silence, and have specific relevance for
Plotinus and the way he conceives the tradition to which he belongs and its means
of transmission. The first is the long-standing association of Pythagoras with an eso-
teric oral teaching.197 This theme of orality is especially interesting because, like the
trope of Platonist orality discussed below, it was maintained and propagated pre-
cisely by a written body of work; there arose a huge literature of pseudopythagorean
works (see n. 637), among which the Pythagorean texts known as hieroi logoi, whose
very name implies a secret unsuitable for the uninitiated, present a particularly
striking example of public secrecy.
We first find the term hieros logos in Herodotus and other early sources as an
arcanum associated with private cult,198 but it appears in the post-Hellenistic period
as a pseudepigraphic genre of Neopythagorean writing,199 and as such functions as
a concrete example of the ‘secret revealed’ trope: writing an hieros logos for public
consumption embodies a contradiction between the ostensible nature of secrecy -
that of the occlusion of knowledge - and its rhetorical nature - that of revealing the
existence of a secret.200 The prevailing association of Pythagorean teaching with
orality adds a further level of rhetorical secrecy, and a further logical contradiction,
196Cf. Casel 1919, 53: Tot vero locis de silentio Pythagoreorum garruli illi scriptores verba faciunt, ut paene
nauseam moveant.
197Pythagorean orality: Aristox. Fr. 43 W = D.L. VIII.15; Dicaearchus Fr. 33 W = Porph. V.P. 19;
Plut. Alex. 1.4/Moralia 328a; Iamb. V.P. 199. See Brisson 1987, 90-91. There are conflicting traditions
as to whether Pythagoras wrote anything at all: Diogenes Laertius thinks he did, but reports that
there were those who denied it (8.6 ff; cf. 1.16). Plotinus refers to writings of Pythagoras, which he
considers obscure (see 140 below).
198Hdt. 2.61 ff: Herodotus mentions the hieros logos of Ephesus, and quite properly refuses to divulge
it; cf. 5.83.3 ἄρρητοι ἱροργίαι; 6.135.2 ἄρρητα ἱρά. See Heinrichs 2003, 236-7; 239 n. 113; Burkert 1972,
179 n. 97; 219-20.
199See n. 637 below; Thesleff 1965, 163-8; O’Meara 1989, 20, with n. 43.
200Cf. Burkert 1972, 219: ‘. . . a book with such a title is a priori apocryphal’.
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to the fact of these texts.
The second key Pythagorean theme for Platonist philosophic silence is the relat-
ed idea of the hierarchical student body, with inner and outer circles of disciples.
Pythagoras is said in many sources to have delivered his inner doctrines orally, and
only to an initiated group of students; there is some confusion or disagreement in
Classical sources as to which of the two groups of students, acousmatics and mathe-
matics, were the inner and outer circles, but the former are more generally thought
to be the initiated elite,201 and their name may be seen as emphasising the orality of
the secret teaching,202 but, alternately, they were ‘hearers’ because they had not yet
earned the right to speak, while the mathematics were the inner circle who engaged
with the teachings in earnest.203
The account of an initiatory period of silence undergone by Pythagorean aspi-
rants204 is another very important theme developed in later ideas of philosophic
esotericism. It furnishes the locus classicus for the idea of the literally silent philoso-
pher: the Pythagorean novitiate is said to have involved a five-year period of silence,
followed by admission to the deeper philosophic mysteries of the sect.205
The division of Pythagorean students into inner and outer members, in parallel
with the well-known trope of greater and lesser mysteries, is an important theme
for Platonist conceptions of philosophic education, and will be discussed further
later. In the image of the hierarchical philosophic community, whose probationary
members observe literal silence, we have a trope which would be echoed in the later
development of Platonist philosophic silence. In the tradition in Platonist biograph-
ical writing from late antiquity, exemplified by Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus, Marinus’
Life of Proclus,206 and Damascius’ Life of Isidore,207 we see a concern with establishing
201See Casel 1919, 32; Burkert 1972, 166-108. See e.g. Clem. Strom. V.59 for the mathematikoi as the
inner circle.
202Brisson 1987, 91; Martin 1995, 111.
203As in Aristotle’s lost On the Pythagoreans; see Burkert 1972, 192-217.
204E.g Lucianus Vit. Auct. ll. 41-2; Iamb. V.P. 68, 72, 94 &c; D.L. 8.10.22. See Casel 1919, 32; Martin
1995, 111.
205See Casel 1919, 53-66 for a list of ancient sources for the Pythagorean silent novitiate.
206Edwards 2000, 58-115 provides an English translation with useful notes.
207See Athanassiadi 1999b.
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a hierarchy among the students of the philosopher in question which I think owes
something to the graded Pythagorean student body.
The Pythagorean ‘symbol’ (σύμβολον) should also be mentioned here, although it
is more fully discussed in the following chapter. Originally, symbola seem to have
been ‘passwords’ granted to initiands as signs of their special status;208 as such
the term is found associated with the mysteries, in Orphic literature, and in the
early Pythagorean milieu.209 What began as ‘words of power’ in a sense familiar
to students of religion and magic, however, were reinterpreted by later thinkers;
the Pythagorean symbolon becomes, in Platonist interpretation, a form of discourse
which takes the outward form of a gnomic statement, cultic prohibition, or ‘proto-
scientific’ teaching, but which hides, in compressed and esoteric form, an inner
philosophic meaning, such as the Pythagorean prohibition of eating fish, noted above.210
Nineteenth-century scholarship tended to read such an esoteric discourse back
into the earlier phases of Pythagorean culture,211 but it now seems that this is a later
hermeneutic strategy applied to early Pythagorean materials, by which they were
read esoterically as containing hidden wisdom, often of a Platonist type, an inter-
pretive evolution in which we can see the origin of the modern concept of ‘symbol-
ism’. To take one example, Plotinus finds his doctrine of the one’s ineffability, con-
sequent on its radical simplicity, hidden in the Pythagorean figure of Apollo, whose
name, etymologised as alpha privativus + pollôn, was used by the Pythagoreans to in-
dicate esoterically (συμβολικῶς piρὸς ἀλλήλους) the one’s total lack of multiplicity.212
Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans thus provide, for Plotinus, a locus for situating an
esoteric hermeneutic method.
208Aristox. 43 W = D.L. 8.15. Burkert 1972, 175-6; Coulter 1976, 61; Brisson 1987, 93.
209Mysteries of Eleusis: Clem. Al. Protr. II 21, 2. Orphic tradition: Fr. B.23 DK. Pythagoreans:
Aristoxenus Fr. 43 W = D.L. 8.15. For a list of testimonia, see DK I 462-6.
210Plut. Quaest. conv. VIII 7.1-4 features more Pythagorean symbola. See especially Brisson 1987, 93.
Casel 1919, 53-66 cites numerous late antique sources for the Pythagorean ‘symbol’.
211E.g. Casel 1919, 33-4; 59, following Hölk 1894.
212V.5[32]6.27-28, cited in extenso 226 below.
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Philosophic Silence in Classical Athenian Philosophy
New concerns of concealment arose in Plato and the generations following him;
particularly striking is the culture of philosophic elitism which began to crystallise in
this period. Plato’s complex engagement with ideas of privileged knowledge is well
known. It is also well known that Aristotle had ‘esoteric’ and ‘exoteric’ writings, the
former for a controlled circulation and the latter intended for open distribution.213
Indeed, the term exoterikos, which naturally implies the later-attested esoterikos, first
appears in the context of this hierarchical Aristotelean corpus.214 Diogenes Laertius
preserves a letter of Epicurus in which he explains his ideas about the gods, which,
he emphasises, differ greatly from those of the common man.215 The opinion, preva-
lent in all the major schools of philosophy which arose in the Classical period, that
the lover of truth was superior to the common mass of men, is a basic premise upon
which more developed theories of philosophical elitism were built. As we shall see,
Plato played a key role in promulgating the idea of philosophic superiority, and also
of the concomitant need to maintain at least discretion, if not outright secrecy, when
discussing the higher realms of truth.
Aristophanes’ satirical portrait in the Clouds gives us an informative glimpse into
popular perceptions of philosophic practice in the Athens of Plato’s time: Aristo-
phanes’ Socrates spends his days investigating the things beneath the earth and in
the heavens in a φροντιστήριον, a ‘place of deep thinking’. Initiation to the φρον-
τιστήριον is for sale, and its teachings enable one to speak the language of con-men
and hair-splitting pedants.216
An early scene in the play addresses all the main issues of what would become
the topos of philosophic silence. Answering the door to the φροντιστήριον, one of its
students states that it maintains a strict policy of secrecy regarding its researches, and
213See Ross 1948, II, 408-10; Poster 1997. Plutarch’s treatment of this Aristotelean esotericism is
discussed 86 below.
214The term ἐξοτερικός occurs eight times in the Aristotelean corpus (cited at Boas 1953, 78-80);
ἐσοτερικός is first attested in Galen (ibid. 78).
215D.L. 10.123.
216Ll. 260-261. Cf. ll. 316-18; 437-56.
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that no outsiders may learn what goes on within its walls.217 The student then pro-
ceeds immediately to break this rule with a flourish of rhetorical secrecy, saying, ‘I
will tell you, but you must regard these things as mysteries’, and enumerates several
absurd researches carried out by Socrates.218 This satire must reflect a perception of
preciousness on the part of philosophers when it came to guarding their wisdom,
as well as a certain scepticism regarding the value of what they professed to hide.
Note that Aristophanes is mocking precisely the act of publically announcing a con-
cealment, without necessarily concealing anything. We will never know what his
reaction might have been to the more extreme manifestations of this activity which
developed in late antique Platonism.
Ideas of Privileged Knowledge in Classical Philosophy. These considerations
of secrecy in Classical Athenian philosophy should not imply that it abounded in
secret doctrines, but rather that philosophers were concerned not only with investi-
gating truth, but in controlling access to it, and in being seen to control access to it.219
The concern is one of elitism, not one of secrecy in the basic sense of the term, but in
the sociological sense outlined in the Introduction, as an act of exclusion leading to
the acquisition of social capital.
But this is not to say that the philosophers themselves saw their elitist discourse
in this way. The preponderant evidence suggests that early philosophic secrecy was
mainly conceived of in one of two ways. The first main trope of secrecy in the Clas-
sical period, often expressed in the sources as silence, is most associated with the
Pythagorean brotherhoods and the Presocratic poetic philosophers discussed above:
217L. 140.
218L. 143. The entire episode takes place at ll. 133-220.
219Boas 1953 is concerned to refute the claim that secret philosophical doctrines existed at this early
period, and his arguments generally make sense; however, he is deaf to the more subtle forms which
privileging of knowledge, as a social force, takes. In discussion of passages in Diogenes Laertius
where Plato (III, 63) and Epicurus (X, 5) are said to support the publication of esoteric works with
hidden meanings, Boas remarks: ‘Why anyone should take pleasure in the publication of his secrets
is unexplained, as is the paradox of the secrets’ being published’ (ibid. 88). The explanation lies in the
power of secrecy as an act.
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this is the silence of the mysteries, which expressed an initiated/uninitiated dichoto-
my, transposed onto philosophy. This mystic silence was also adopted and trans-
formed by Plato and his successors, a conceptual and thematic evolution discussed
in Chapters Three and Four.
But a different kind of philosophic reserve is propounded by Plato, Aristotle, and
later philosophers, most often conceived of as necessary because of the need to keep
certain truths out of the hands of those who might misunderstand or abuse them,
a concern we perhaps see already in Heraclitus. In this case, we have evidence for
two subsidiary conceptions. The first is the pædagogical concern that the reception
of a philosophic truth by a student whose education had not attained the proper
level of ripeness could actually interfere with his education or give rise to false ideas
and misunderstandings; the Aristotelean exoteric and esoteric corpora seem to have
been organised along these lines.220 The second is the more urgent concern that ‘the
masses’ would meet true philosophic doctrines with mockery or even violence.
Both of these issues are present in certain Platonic passages, discussed below.
The so-called Tübingen school of Platonic interpretation has attempted to attribute
a coherent pædogogic policy to Plato based on these materials, whereby his esoteric
writing was pursued due to his belief that philosophic students must progress to-
ward higher truths in a step-by-step manner.221 This thesis is interested in the later
reception of these Platonic materials rather than in Plato’s ‘programme’, and makes
no claims regarding the modern ‘Esotericist debate’. But there can be no doubt that
the Platonic passages singled out by the Tübingen school as evidence for a Platonic
educational programme served as loci for themes of philosophic silence in antique
Platonism. It is also beyond doubt that they were put to use by later Platonism
to construct a theory of Platonic pedagogy quite similar to that constructed by the
Tübingen scholars, although with important differences.222
220Plut. Alex. 7.5, 668ab, discussed 86 below; Gel. 20.5.1-6. See Poster 1997. This motif of privileged
knowledge is especially important in Plato, as discussed in the following section.
221On the Esoteric readings of the Tübingenschule, see Appendix F, 288 ff. The Platonic passages in
question are surveyed below.
222See 292.
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The possibility that Classical philosophers might have been circumspect in their
teaching out of concerns for their personal safety seems to make sense: the fate of
Socrates was a clear warning that teachers of strange notions, especially notions
about the gods, who deviated too far from certain cultural norms could meet with a
drastic reaction. However, our evidence for philosophic silence pursued for reasons
of safety in the Classical period dates for the most part from the first centuries CE,
and may have been read back into Classical antiquity by later authors.223 The idea
of secrecy or silence in the interests of safety plays a relatively minor role in Platonist
thought; it becomes relevant in the later centuries of the late antique period, when
philosophers such as Proclus were actually under constraints as to how openly they
could teach their pagan doctrines for fear of Christian persecution;224 but this period
falls outside the scope of this thesis.
Philosophic Silence in Plato
As discussed above (p. 35), the baffling, playful Platonic corpus has provided fer-
tile ground for theorists of philosophic secrecy down the centuries until the present
day. The modern debate over ‘Platonic Esotericism’ has filled volumes.225 Plato’s
uses of the rhetorics of secrecy and silence are essential for the development of the
culture of philosophic silence in Platonism, but a detailed treatment of them would
demand an entire chapter, if not a whole monograph. For reasons of space, I have
compromised by summarising the main themes of secrecy and silence as they ap-
pear in Plato, with a view to indicating their importance for Platonism and Ploti-
nus, while referring the reader to the extensive literature on Plato’s ‘esotericism’ and
related subjects.
223See 84 below. Van Nuffelen 2011, 74 n. 5 collects references to Plato’s having hidden the truth
specifically out of fear of persecution, none of which date earlier than the second century CE, with
the exception of a comment in Josephus (1st cen. CE) that Plato hid his true doctrine for fear of
persecution by the mob (Ap. 2. 224-5). Plato’s Protagoras claims that ancient poets were in reality
sophists, but hid their true doctrines for fear of arousing hostility (Prt. 316d-e), which may have been
a locus classicus for the idea, or perhaps even have reflected genuine concerns on Plato’s part; this,
however, is speculation.
224See Lamberton 1995, 146.
225See Appendix F, 288 ff.
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The key themes of privileged knowledge in Plato can be summarised as: philo-
sophic elitism, the (notional) privileging of oral teaching over written philosophic
works, the idea of an ‘unwritten doctrine’, and the equation of philosophy with the
mysteries. It should again be emphasised that the ongoing debates over Plato’s in-
tentions vis à vis esotericism fall outside the concerns of this thesis; the Platonic ma-
terials under discussion are important here not in terms of Plato’s intentions, but of
the use to which they were put by his interpreters. This being the case, little account
is taken of dialogic context in what follows, since the Late Platonists themselves took
little account of the dialogue form as it is understood today.
Philosophic Elitism in Plato. There are many Platonic passages, beginning from
the middle dialogues,226 which posit an intensive, step-by-step training as a prereq-
uisite for the philosophic life. The Republic outlines a course of training requiring
decades of the most serious concentration and devotion, and other dialogues em-
phasise the need for the fullest engagement in philosophic practice.227 Plato depicts
philosophy as a way of life that sets the philosopher apart from the mass of mankind
through an intensive education. An influential passage in the Laws (XII 968c-e) states
that certain matters are not secret (ἀpiόρρητον), but are only to be approached once the
pupil has reached the proper philosophic development and not before (ἀpiρόρρητον).
It was impossible that the many should be philosophic.228 Here is the serious side of
the φροντιστήριον satirised by Aristophanes.
Plato’s idea of philosophers as an elite group, set apart from the mainstream of
humanity, set the tone for Platonism. Platonist ethics would always be those of a
minority that believes it must remain a minority; we find no attempts to encourage
226On the dating of the dialogues I follow Kahn 2002.
227R. VII.536b-540c, 539a-d. Cf. Prm. 136d-e. Ep. II. 314a5-7, 313c-d and Ep. VII 342a ff. are discussed
below.
228Pl. R. 494a: φιλόσοφον...piλῆθος ἀδύνατον εἶναι. Cf. Ep. VII 343e-344a, Ep. II 314a1-5.
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the masses to embrace Platonist truth.229 Platonist polemics against Christianity em-
phasise the populist elements of the latter; one of the many problems with this new
religion was that it preached salvation for even the most uncultivated, unphilosoph-
ic riff-raff, putting them on an equal footing with the Hellenic philosopher without
any need for the hard work of discovering the truth.230
Philosophic elitism is the best rubric under which to discuss Plato’s more prob-
lematic references to privileged knowledge. Three passages are especially important
in this regard; while scholarship may never agree on what Plato means in these
passages, they clearly refer to tropes of secrecy or privileged knowledge which go
beyond simple elitism, and enter into the rhetorical territory of philosophic silence.
The first is a passage in the Theætetus (152c), where Socrates chidingly suggests
that the sophist Protagoras might have secret doctrines, expressed through enigmas
and so hidden from the masses (by which he here means himself and his friends).
This is the single overt reference to esoteric philosophical doctrines in the dialogues,
in the full sense of the term outlined above.231 To most modern readers, its playful
tone militates against interpreting it as indicating that Plato himself used enigmas to
hide his true doctrines, but this was precisely how Platonists read Plato.232 Here as
elsewhere, Socrates’ irony came to be read as signalling a hidden subtext.
Secondly, the ‘philosophic digression’ of the Seventh Platonic Epistle contains a
key passage for later philosophic silence; it may not have been known in its entirety
to the Middle Platonists, but it provides a very important model for Plotinus and
his successors.233 In the course of attacking writings then in circulation on certain
229Certain Platonists over the centuries toyed with the idea of reforming politics along Platonic lines;
see above all O’Meara 2003. Porphyry tells us that Plotinus was nearly able to put into practice the
foundation of a city to be run ‘according to the laws of Plato’ (Plot. 12; on this incident, see bibliogra-
phy at Brisson et al. 1982, 121-2); one wonders where he would have found volunteers for the lower
castes of his city, whom the philosophic elite, presumably himself and his associates, would direct.
The political-religious-philosophical programme outlined by George Gemistos Plethon in fifteenth-
century Byzantium is a stunningly ambitious return to this dream of a Platonic polity, set in the late
medieval world; it also calls for a strict caste system based on philosophic virtues and education. See
Alexandre’s edition of Plethon’s Book of Laws (1982).
230Plotinus’s critique of the Gnostics reflects this very concern; see 146 ff.
231On p. 27.
232See 148 ff. below.
233Out of an enormous literature on the authenticity or otherwise of the Seventh Epistle, the list of
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unnamed matters of high philosophic import, Plato says that he has never written
on this subject, nor will he ever do so.
For it is not at all speakable (ῥητόν γὰρ οὐδαμῶς) like other subjects
of study, but from much working together on the matter itself and
living in company, suddenly a light, as it were leaping from fire,
kindles in the soul, and (thenceforth) grows on its own.234
Three aspects of this passage are important in terms of philosophic silence. First-
ly, the passage can be considered alongside the more down-to-earth descriptions of
philosophic education mentioned above, as a further segregation of the philosopher
from the mass of men on the basis of a special access to knowledge.
Secondly, it introduces the idea that the highest knowledge of philosophy cannot
be put into words. We may doubt that Plato (or ‘Plato’) means to describe an ineffable
form of knowledge or experience here, but it is clear that this is how he was read by
Plotinus.235 This passage is a Platonic locus classicus for the idea of a knowledge that
is by definition incommunicable, an idea of the utmost importance for Plotinus and
his successors, who found just such a knowledge in the encounter with the ineffable
first principle.236
Thirdly, since Plato says that he has not written and will not write anything con-
cerning these elevated matters, this passage would seem to mean that Plato’s dia-
logues would not be a suitable place in which to search for truths about the higher
matters of philosophy. It is however quite common in esoteric hermeneutics, both
religious and philosophic, to read a denial as an esoteric affirmation; as we will see,
this statement of Plato’s could be read not only as an indication that the highest
important arguments for and against at Gaiser 1980, n. 50 may serve as a representative selection.
The epistle’s authenticity does not seem to have been called into doubt by any antique Platonist, so
this debate is not relevant to the present discussion. However, the issue is complicated by the fact
that the ‘philosophic digression’ may have been inserted by a later hand. Tarrant (1983) has argued,
significantly for Chapter Four of this thesis, that the ‘philosophical digression’ of the Seventh Epistle
does not appear in the Middle Platonists, indicating, albeit through an argumentum e silentio, that they
did not have it in their editions of Plato; this means that they lacked one of the most striking Platonic
passages for the esoteric nature of philosophic knowledge. Plotinus clearly did possess this passage,
however, as he quotes it repeatedly (at VI.9[9]4.11-12; V.3[49]17.29; II.6[1]1.43-44.).
234341c4-d1.
235E.g. VI.9[9]4.11-12; V.3[49]17.29; II.6[1]1.43-44.
236The encounter with the one cannot accurately be described as ‘knowledge’, but it occupies the
highest point on a scale of types of knowledge, and so may be referred to as such for convenience;
these questions of terminology are discussed in Chapters Five and Six.
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truths were ineffable, but also, and simultaneously, as an indication that the truth was
to be sought hidden within the dialogues.
The Second Epistle seems to be a forgery patterned on the Seventh,237 and con-
tains similar themes of secrecy, but expands them in ways that the Seventh Epistle
does not, resulting in loci classici for two themes of secrecy unique in the Platon-
ic corpus.238 Like the Seventh Epistle, it describes a long process of philosophic
training, which again results in a sublime final result, in this case compared to the
refining of gold rather than to illumination (314a5-7), and states that the author will
never write a treatise on the mysterious ‘nature of the first [principle]’ (314c1-4; τοῦ
piρώτου φύσεως: 312d7), since the information, if written down, could fall into the
wrong hands (314b7-c1). So far we are in territory familiar from the Seventh Epistle.
But then the author states that he will reveal his doctrine in the form of an enigma
(312d7-8), and the well-known, cryptic passage describing the ‘King of All’ and two
subsidiary entities follows (312d7-313a6).
Here the Platonic voice is actively attributing to itself the use of ‘enigma’, a mode
of expression attributed in the dialogues, as we have seen, only to other philoso-
phers, or to mysterious ‘ancients’. This is, indeed, the only passage in the Platonic
corpus where the authorial voice unmistakably says: ‘Here is the truth of the mat-
ter, which, however, I am hiding because it is a secret doctrine.’ I refer to this basic
proposition as the theme of ‘the secret hidden in plain sight’. It sheds light on the in-
cident of Porphyry’s esoteric poem, and its importance will appear again and again
in the discussions of hiding and revealing which follow.
The second key passage, appearing at the end of the Epistle, is deceptively sim-
ple. Having bid his correspondent farewell, ‘Plato’ commands him to reread the
Epistle multiple times, and then to burn it (314c4-6). The paradoxes for written phi-
losophy here are manifest: if the letter should have been burnt, the Platonists have
237Unlike the Seventh Platonic Epistle, hardly any scholars argue for the authenticity of the Second.
Bluck 1960 reviews the main lines of argument against the authenticity of the Second Epistle, dis-
counting many, but still concluding that the epistle is a forgery. Rist 1965a argues for neopythagorean
influence on the Second Epistle. Again, the issue for Platonism is not the authenticity of the Epistle,
but the use to which it was put by Platonists, who did not doubt its Platonic authorship.
238See discussion at Lamberton 1995, 141.
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no business reading it, though read it they do. If such matters should not be written
about except under the strictest secrecy, then the Platonists have no business pub-
lishing their texts. This passage is the Platonic locus classicus of the text which calls
for its own destruction, a theme I will refer to as ‘the call to destroy the text’. As
I will argue below, this theme should be understood as informing not only the oc-
casional rhetorical flourish in Platonism to the effect that ‘it would be better not to
write this’ (always of course followed by the writing in question), but also the neg-
ative discourse of Late Platonism, which describes the ineffable first principle, only
immediately to deny its describability.
Privileged Orality and the Unwritten Doctrines of Plato. Related to the theme
of privileged knowledge in Plato is the valorisation of oral teaching and, in some
passages, disparagement of the written word. The second and seventh Platonic let-
ters, and several dialogues from the middle period onward, notably the Phædrus,239
express the idea that the written word is an inferior medium for transmitting philo-
sophical truth. Reasons given include the fact that, once published, the written word
is out of the writer’s control, and open to misuse or misconstrual by the unphilo-
sophic ‘many’,240 and that the essential process of dialectical reasoning which con-
stitutes the elite philosophic education can only be experienced through actual, face
to face disputations.241 We also have the passage cited from the Seventh Epistle,
which states simply that certain matters of philosophy are ‘not speakable’, which,
in its context, can be read as indicating that written form, for whatever reason, is
unsuitable for expressing these matters.
These passages, if taken literally and understood, as the Platonists seem to have
understood them, as representing aspects of a single viewpoint on Plato’s part, present
a problem that recurs throughout the history of Platonism. Plato of course wrote an
immense number of philosophical works; in this the Platonists followed him. The
obvious question is: Why did he and they do so? Several answers have been given to
239272d-277a.
240Ep. II 314b7-c1.
241Phdr. 276a-277a, Lg. XII 968c-e, to which may be adduced the passages cited above on the direct
teacher-student relationship and its importance for Platonic education.
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this question in Plato’s case, but judging an author’s intentions is always a perilous
undertaking, and I prefer to address the question from the point of view of textual
performativity.
It is interesting to consider the problem of the unwritten doctrines of Plato in this
context. We have good evidence that Plato had certain teachings which were ἄγραφα,
‘unwritten’, a term found in Aristotle which probably simply means ‘not discussed
in the dialogues’.242 This need not mean that they were ‘unwritable’ - i.e. either se-
cret or ineffable - but due to the nature of the Greek alpha privative adjective, ἄγραφα
could naturally be construed as ‘unwritable’ as well as ‘unwritten’,243 and probably
was understood in this way by later Platonists. It is quite understandable that they
should suppose the unwritten doctrines to be in some way secret, or available to
only a select audience, in light of the Platonic materials discussed thus far.
Through the testimony of Aristoxenus, the question of the unwritten doctrines
has become inseparable from the question of the Platonic lecture ‘On the Good’.244
This lecture, Aristoxenus tells us, was recounted by his teacher Aristotle, who used
to describe the audience’s bafflement when, expecting to hear something pertaining
to normal human goods (wealth, health, strength, etc.), they were instead regaled
with ‘mathematics, numbers, geometry, astronomy and, finally, that the good is one’
(φανείησαν οἱ λόγοι piερὶ μαθημάτων καὶ ἀριθμῶν καὶ γεωμετρίας καὶ ἀστρολογίας καὶ τὸ
piέρας ὅτι ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ἕν).245 The anomalous fact that this lecture, which was closely
associated in antiquity with the idea of the unwritten doctrines, should have been
242Ar. Phys. 209b14-15 refers to ‘so-called unwritten doctrines’ of Plato (τοῖς λεγομένοις ἀγράφοις
δόγμασιν); Metaph. A6 (987b20-29) does not refer to unwritten doctrines as such, but discusses the
indefinite dyad and other matters not present in the dialogues; Aristox. Harm. Elem. 39-40. Krämer
1959, 641 assembles an extensive list of ancient sources referring to the ἄγραφα δόγματα, many of
which, however, are late antique reports of earlier works that do not survive, which complicates
the evidence (cf. Vlastos 1981, 380 ff.). The interpretation of what is meant by ἄγραφα δόγματα is a
contentious issue, discussed further below.
243See n. 32 above.
244For a basic biography on the topic of ‘On the Good’ see Gaiser 1980, 35-37. For a summary of
major interpretive issues, see Vlastos 1981, 379-398; see further the essays collected in Méthexis 1993
(Vol. 6). The basic testimony for the lecture ‘On the Good’ comes from Aristotle, particularly from
the fragments of Περὶ τἀγαθοῦ , and, notably, from Aristoxenus (Harm. 39-40). See Vlastos 1963, 640
ff. for discussion of the complicated further primary evidence.
245Aristox. Harm. 39 ll. 8-15 On the Plato’s identification of the good and the one in his oral teachings,
cf. Arist. Metaph. 1091b13-15, and see further 192 below.
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a public affair, rather than an orally-delivered initiatory teaching, is very difficult to
explain for anyone seeking to construct a consistent rationale of esotericism out of
the Platonic evidence. Fascinatingly, however, this fact seems not to have bothered
the Platonists, for whom the lecture, and the unwritten doctrines as a whole, be-
came loci of rhetorical silence: Alcinoüs testifies that Plato ‘certainly only imparted
his views on the good to a very small, select group of associates’,246 in total con-
tradiction to the historical facts. Likewise, the ἄγραφα δόγματα would become ‘secret
doctrines’, although the very fact that Platonists knew them and were able to include
them in their philosophical speculations indicates that they were nothing of the sort:
they were, in fact, widely reported in a number of literary sources, including Aristo-
tle. This story of the transmission of ‘secrets’ is an illustrative example of the way in
which ‘secret knowledge’ becomes secret by virtue of its having been labelled as se-
cret, and surrounded with the aura of secrecy; actual concealment may be involved,
but it is equally possible for such knowledge to be bruited about for anyone to see
or read.
Perhaps too much effort has been spent attempting to figure out a consistent ra-
tionale for Plato’s public lecture on the good which, as the passages cited above
suggest, would be better suited for a carefully vetted and prepared audience. It is a
thankless task. However, the idea of a secret oral doctrine, and of the lecture On the
Good, enveloped as they became in later interpretation by rhetorics of hiding and re-
vealing, is of the utmost importance in the history of ideas. It is a curious hermeneu-
tic fact that neither the datum of Plato’s unwritten doctrines, nor the acceptance of
his statements that he did not write down his true doctrines on certain matters, pre-
vents either the ancient Platonists or the modern Tübingen ‘Esoterics’ from finding
these very doctrines hidden in the dialogues. In other words, Plato’s statements in the
Seventh and Second Epistles - that certain matters of his philosophy are not present
in his written works - are read, not as programmatic statements that mean what they
say, but as coded indications that these doctrines had to be sought beneath the sur-
face of the dialogues. Similarly, the well reported public lecture On the Good, which
246Did. 27.179.37-9, trans. Dillon.
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was open to the public and which transmitted identifiable doctrines, such as the
identification of the good with the one and the ‘indefinite dyad’, remains a locus
of notional secrecy in Platonism, in a manner perhaps comparable to the theme of
secrecy associated with the mysteries, but with even less historical evidence for a
doctrinal secret at the heart of the matter.
What the interpretive history of the lecture and the idea of the unwritten doc-
trines contributed to Platonism was an image of Plato busily writing, while keeping
his true, deepest doctrines in reserve for oral instruction. This image may be thought
to have influenced Plotinus in the affair of the secrets of Ammonius related by Por-
phyry, cited on page 49 above; Porphyry depicts Plotinus as fully prepared to trans-
mit Ammonius’ doctrines orally to selected students, whilst avoiding writing them
down, a close thematic parallel to this idealised Platonic practice. Alternately, it may
be that these Platonic tropes influenced Porphyry’s account, depicting Plotinus in
accordance with Classical tropes of philosophic silence.
The Mysteries in Plato. Lastly, Plato makes extended use of imagery, language,
and themes drawn from the mysteries and the Orphic poems, which, we recall, were
themselves adaptations or evolutions of mystery culture. The uses put to the mys-
teries by Plato are manifold, and include some of the most beautiful and influential
passages in the dialogues. Here, particularly, reasons of space make it impossible to
do the subject justice, but the key relevant points regarding philosophic silence can
be made.247
The first is that Plato is very inclined to attribute doctrines, mystic, Orphic, Pythagore-
an, and otherwise, to unnamed ‘ancient’ sources.248 Often taking the form of myths,
these references to ancient wisdom set a precedent followed by many Platonists of
complementing their arguments and proofs with authoritative statements from un-
named sages of the past. It is not always possible to identify the sources for Plato’s
accounts of ancient wisdom, but they often demonstrably refer to the mysteries, and
247 A considerable amount of research has gone into the use Plato makes of these materials. See above
all Riedweg 1987; also Casel 1919, 35-40; Burkert 1983, 250 ff.; Kingsley 1995, 74-148.
248Ep. VII 335a2: τοῖς piαλαιοῖς καὶ ἱεροῖς λόγοις; Phd. 69c3, cf. 63c6, 67c5-6, 70c5-6; Crat. 402b-c; Phlb.
66c; Laws 715e; and see following note.
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are sometimes read as explications of doctrines expressed esoterically; that is, Plato
will find a philosophic doctrine in an ‘ancient account’, be it a transformed Orphic
cosmology or a mystic institution, but hidden within that account or institution by
means of an enigma or other form of secrecy.249 This type of interpretation was de-
veloped in Middle Platonism, and became an important universal methodology in
Late Platonism, as discussed in the following two chapters.
Secondly, Plato constructs metaphors whereby philosophy is equated with mys-
tic initiation.250 Socrates’ long central narrative in the Phædrus,251 the ‘Mysteries
of Diotima’ in the Symposium,252 and numerous evocations of Bacchic and Orphic
themes of initiation (as well as Orphic cosmology) in the Phædo253 set a precedent for
readings of philosophy as a mystery, and the mysteries as a form of esoteric philos-
ophy. These readings are found in Middle Platonism and were, by Plotinus’ time,
stock themes. This conflation of philosophy and mystery had several consequences,
but the most important one for the present discussion was the importation of the
tropes of mystic silence into the practice of philosophy. Plato’s ideas on the privi-
leging of knowledge, when combined with the rhetorical secrecy at the core of the
culture of the mysteries, gave birth to a complex institution of rhetorical silence that
we find informing Platonist writing in the late antique period at many levels.
The Silent Philosopher in Late Antiquity
Our discussion now moves forward more than half a millennium, to the second
and third centuries CE, as we return to the questions asked at the beginning of this
249E.g. Phd. 62b2-6: ὁ...ἐν ἀpiορρήτοις λεγόμενος...λόγος, a reference to the doctrine that the soul is
imprisoned in the body as a punishment; cf. Crat. 400c, where the same theory is specifically attested
as ‘Orphic’. Phd. 69c3-d2: the founders of the mysteries actually used enigma to hide a philosophic
truth (τῷ ὄντι piάλαι αἰνίττεσθαι) in their saying that the uninitiated will lie in the mud in the hereafter.
250Tht. 156a1, and the passages cited below.
251Phdr. 246a-257b makes extensive use of mystic themes, especially of initiation, foreshadowed at
234d6-8, 244e3.
252201d-212a; cf. 218b5-7, where Alcibiades paraphrases a well-known Orphic verse on the exclu-
sion of the uninitiated. See Casel 1919, 29. The ‘Mysteries of Diotima’ probably reflect an Orphic
cosmology (see Rappe 2000, 149-157).
253Philosophy as Bacchic mystery: Phd. 69c3-d2; cf. Smp. 618b3-4. Philosophic virtues as purifica-
tions: Phd. 69c1; see also n. 249 above. The cosmological myth near the end of the Phædo (107d-114c)
may represent an adaptation of Orphic and Pythagorean materials (see Kingsley 1995, 79-111).
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chapter: What concerns of privileged knowledge lie behind the oath of secrecy and
its betrayal by Plotinus and his fellow students of Ammonius? Why would Plotinus
seek strictly to control the publication of his works? And why would Porphyry
choose to express himself in public in an intentionally obscure or secretive manner?
The background outlined in the previous sections will have made the answers
to these questions clearer. In order further to clarify how late antique Platonism
understood these early materials, it will be interesting to examine two broad devel-
opments in late antique thinking, especially relevant to Platonism. The first of these
is the rise of the image of Plato as the quintessentially esoteric author, and the sec-
ond is the popular understanding of the Pythagorean as an iconic representation of
philosophic silence.
The Rise of the Silent Plato. It is unclear exactly when the idea of the esoter-
ic Plato, understood in the full sense discussed above, arose.254 However, to the
Platonists (with some possible early exceptions) Plato was an author who had se-
cret teachings. Moreover - and this is the point - he hid these teachings within his
published works; in other words, the Platonists read the dialogues and epistles as
esoteric writings with multiple hermeneutic levels. We cannot assume that all Mid-
dle Platonists took such a view of Plato (see 101 below), but it is certainly the reading
of the majority of surviving authors, and the idea of Plato as an esoteric writer, from
the early second century CE, was the normal opinion, not only among Platonists,
but even in the more widespread culture of the empire.255 Numenius of Apamea
(fl. c. 150 CE) and Plutarch of Chaironea (c. 46–120 CE) are our best surviving ex-
amples of the esoteric reading of Plato among Middle Platonists, and a brief review
254As discussed in Appendix F, 290 ff., our earliest solid evidence for the idea of Plato as a writer
with a secret doctrine dates to the imperial period, but there are some indications for a date perhaps
as early as the Hellenistic period. There is, however, a stubborn lack of solid evidence from the
Classical period that Plato was seen as having secret doctrines.
255See 35 above. Origen (184/5–253/4), wishing to show that the apostles were intentionally silent on
certain matters, says that they ‘knew better than Plato which truths should be written and how they
should be written, what must not under any circumstances be written for the multitude, what must
be spoken, and what was not of that nature’ (Cels. VI.6, translation Stroumsa 1996a, 34). Clement of
Alexandria (c.150–c. 215) believed that all the Classical schools of philosophy, ‘not just the Pythagore-
ans and Plato’, hid many of their doctrines (Strom. V.9[5]58.1). In both cases, Plato has become
synonymous with a style of writing designed both to hide and to reveal.
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of how each author portrays Plato’s esotericism will help to understand how Plato’s
philosophic silence came to be understood in late antiquity.
We are fortunate to possess a text of Numenius giving Plato’s reasons for hid-
ing his true doctrine, the only extant fragment of a lost work entitled Περὶ τῶν piαρὰ
Πλάτωνι ἀpiορρήτων, which we might translate as On Plato’s Secret Doctrines.256 The
death sentence of Socrates, according to Numenius, was what led Plato to write an
esoteric discourse, since open expression of the truth had lead the unlettered mob to
take drastic action against the unwary sage. In Numenius’ interpretation, it was the
truth about traditional religion which was at stake: Plato’s Euthyphro is a personi-
fication of the Athenians, embodying their boorish superstitions. This literary mask
allowed Plato safely to criticise the traditional religion of the Athenians without risk-
ing their ire. Plato thus practised secrecy for safety, a concern which, as we have seen,
seems not to have animated thinkers of the Classical period to any great extent. He
published his secret doctrines in plain sight, but hidden behind a dramatic fiction.
A further passage gives us some perspective on how Numenius thought Plato
practised this art of esoteric writing. In fragment 25, from the work On the Acade-
my’s Abandonment of Plato,257 Numenius tells us that Socrates had been mistakenly
thought by his contemporaries to speak haphazardly and to promulgate no settled
doctrine, but was in fact ‘setting forth three gods and philosophizing about them
in the rhythms appropriate to each.’258 Plato followed his master in this method of
exposition:
Plato was a Pythagorean (he knew that Socrates dispensed these
same teachings from no other source but that one [i.e., Pythagoras],
and that he [Socrates] had spoken in full awareness of this); in this
way, therefore, he too bound things together, yet neither in a cus-
tomary nor an obvious manner. And after arranging each detail in
256Fr. 23. Petty 2011, 37 translates the title as Concerning the Esoterica of Plato. On this fragment see
Lamberton 1989, 76; Stroumsa 1996a, 18; Athanassiadi 2006, 97-8; Van Nuffelen 2011, 73-5.
257On this work see 131 below.
258Fr. 25 ll. 41-3. The meaning here seems to be that Socrates spoke of each of these three gods (who
are of course Numenius’ three primary intellects, and doubtless refer back to the Second Platonic
Epistle (see 77 above)) using a different mode of discourse appropriate to each. Compare the picture
of Plato’s methods drawn by Diogenes Laertius: ‘Plato has employed varied terminology (ὀνόμασι
κέχρηται piοικίλοις) in order not to make his writing easily intelligible to the ignorant’ (63.1.1-2).
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the way he considered most suitable, and concealing himself in be-
tween clarity and obscurity (ἐpiικρυψάμενος ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ δῆλα εἶναι καὶ
μῆ δῆλα), he wrote securely.
The attitude of Numenius to Plato’s esoteric writing is thus quite similar to the ‘art of
writing’ posited by Leo Strauss, whereby an author who wishes to express uncom-
fortable truths hides them in plain sight using subtle clues which alert the philosoph-
ic reader to the true subtext, but leaving the masses either baffled or content with the
decoy message that the text seems at first glance to promulgate.259 This theory of
writing is controversial in terms of its usefulness as a critical tool, but it supplies a
helpful model for the kind of esoteric writing Numenius wishes to indicate here.
Turning to Plutarch, we find a different approach to Plato’s perceived esotericism.
In a discussion of different theories of first principles in On Isis and Osiris, Plutarch
tells us that
Plato in many places ‘disguises himself’ (οἷον ἐpiηλυγαζόμενος) and,
using veiled language (piαρακαλυpiτόμενος), calls one of his opposed
principles ‘sameness’ and the other ‘otherness’. But in the Laws,
being then more mature, he does not use enigmas or symbols (οὐ
δι’ αἰνιγμῶν οὐδὲ συμβολικῶς), but states using ordinary terminology
(κυρίοις ὀνόμασιν) that the cosmos is not moved by a single soul, but
perhaps by two, or at least no fewer than this. Of these two, one is
the worker of good, and the other is its opposite, and the maker of
opposites.260
Plato, then, used veiled language in some of his works, but in his later period spoke
plainly. Note how Plutarch, wishing to find in Plato a dualist cosmology and able
to find such a doctrine in the Laws without too much difficulty, reads the Laws as a
straightforward work, but reads earlier Platonic writings, in which greater interpre-
tive pains are needed to descry such a cosmology, as written esoterically. Reading
Plato as an esotericist enables Plutarch to find his dualist doctrine in Plato as a whole.
This is an early example of philosophic ‘harmonisation’ carried out by means of eso-
teric reading, an exegetic manoeuvre which became very common in later Platonism,
as the following chapters show.
259On Strauss’s theory of esoteric, or more properly exoteric, writing, see Appendix F, 293.
260De Is. 370e9-f5. See on this passage Casel 1919, 93. ‘Sameness’ and ‘otherness’ refer to Pl. Tim. 35a.
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Unlike Numenius, Plutarch is not suggesting any reasons for Plato’s esotericism;
it is simply taken as a given. But the fact that Plutarch feels no need to specify a mo-
tive or otherwise justify his claims is a sign that Plato’s name was already associated
with esoteric writing in Plutarch’s late first-century milieu. Plutarch is also going
beyond Numenius by positing a genuine esoteric hermeneutic which constitutes ‘a
general theory of meaning in literary texts’.261 Plato is not merely writing ‘between
clarity and obscurity’; he is most definitely hiding his meaning in such a way that
only the members of the philosophic elite will be able to recover it. As discussed
in the following chapters, these esoteric hermeneutics shaped the way in which Pla-
tonists envisioned not only Plato, but the larger philosophic tradition to which they
belonged. This passage, then, is an excellent early example of a kind of reading
which would become a normal interpretive strategy in the arsenal of Platonist exe-
gesis: the uncovering of hidden meanings lying behind Plato’s ‘veiled language’. It
is our best early example of the fully-fledged Platonist reading of Plato as writing
more Platonico, that is, esoterically.
Another passage from Plutarch sheds light on the different, but related, idea of
the esoteric Aristotle. As discussed further in the following chapter, esoteric read-
ing was one of the primary ways in which Platonists ‘harmonised’ the disparate
sources from which they constructed their tradition, and the harmonisation of Aris-
totle with Plato became an important issue from Middle Platonism onward. Plutarch
preserves, in his Life of Alexander, remnants of a fascinating pseudepigraphic corre-
spondence between Alexander the Great and his teacher Aristotle, which shows that
Aristotle had begun to be seen as an esoteric author in some circles from at least the
first century BCE.262
We learn from Plutarch that Alexander had learned both the open teachings of
Aristotle - the ethical and political materials - but also ‘the secret and deeper teach-
ings (τῶν ἀpiορρήτων καὶ βαθυτέρων διδασκαλιῶν), which men call by the special terms
261Lamberton 1989, 76, n. 98.
262On the dating of these letters see Pépin 1984, 28, who speculates that they are influenced by
Neopythagorean literary secrecy.
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“acroamatic” and “epoptic”, and used not to reveal (οὐκ ἐξέφερον) to the many.’263
Note the mystic terminology, which not only equates the teachings with mystic se-
crets, as ἀpiόρρητα, but also equates learning them with the act of ἐpiοpiτεία and reveal-
ing them with the criminal act of ἐκφέρειν, an example of the reading of philosophy
as mystery discussed in the following chapter. Plutarch goes on to cite a letter from
Alexander to Aristotle: Alexander berates his teacher because he has heard that he
has published his acroamatic works, which makes them common coin, and thus de-
values them in Alexander’s eyes.264 Aristotle responds, however, that he has ‘both
published them and not published them’, since his physical teachings are of no use
as teaching materials, being written only as memoranda for those who had already
received the full course of education.265
This passage is interesting in a number of respects. Aristotle’s physical doctrines
are presented as self-hiding secrets based specifically on the educational trope of Pla-
tonist elitism discussed above: ‘the many’ might read them, but they would be able
to make nothing from what they read, not having the requisite philosophic training.
Philosophic elitism could thus be conceived of as a reason for concealment, or a rea-
son for dispensing with concealment, since the openly expressed secret does away
with the need for it. But these same teachings are hedged about with the motifs of
revelation and silence. This is a good early example of the motifs of secrecy and
silence being applied to the self-hiding secret, where one would have thought that
they would be superfluous; we have already seen this combination in Plotinus, and
shall see it again below. Aristotle was in possession of ‘secret knowledge’, and the
conventions of philosophic silence demanded that it be treated as such, in this case
with terms drawn from the mysteries; the fact that the secret is a self-hiding one is
not directly relevant to this rhetorical fact, but in fact adds a complementary aspect
of secrecy to the knowledge.
263Plut. Alex. 7.5, 668ab. On this passage see Boas 1953, 80; Pépin 1984, 27-8. On the epoptic division
of philosophy according to Plutarch, see further n. 397.
264Ibid. 7-8.
265Ibid. 8-9.
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Perhaps most fascinatingly, Alexander, as quoted by Plutarch, seems to recognise
the power dynamics inherent in secret knowledge (perhaps because he is a politi-
cian). He fears that the knowledge might fall into the wrong hands, not for any of
the reasons discussed above, but simply because Aristotle might devalue the knowl-
edge if it were bruited about. He asks: ‘In what will we excel over others, if these
doctrines are learned by all?’ Aristotle’s reply is described as ‘placating his love
of honours’ (τὴν φιλοτιμίαν αὐτοῦ piαραμυθοῦμενος). This awareness that the power of
‘secret knowledge’ may inhere in the secrecy, rather than the knowledge, is a striking
one in a Platonist philosopher.
The ‘Pythagorean’ Philosopher in Late Antiquity. We turn now to the image
of the silent Pythagorean in late antiquity. In the third and fourth centuries CE a
number of depictions of ‘Pythagorean’ philosophers appear in which ‘Pythagore-
an’ is synonymous both with literal silence and with an extended concept of silence
which is actually a superior form of discourse. Philostratus’ third-century biogra-
phy of Apollonius of Tyana is a fascinating example.266 In this work Apollonius is
described as a Pythagorean philosopher.267
Philostratus explains his view of the ancient Pythagorean communities at the
beginning of his book:
Silence was imposed on them concerning divine things; for they
heard many divine and secret matters (piολλὰ γὰρ θεῖά τε καὶ ἀpiόρρητα
ἤκουον), but it was difficult to control [this information] for anyone
who had not first learned that to be silent is also to speak (ὅτι καὶ τὸ
σιωpiᾶν λόγος).268
Apollonius, as depicted by Philostratus, is not concerned with doctrinal niceties, but
with the concrete representation of philosophical power.269 His wisdom allows him
to perform miracles such as raising the dead, appearing in two places at the same
time, and casting out of demons;270 he does not seek to teach philosophy, but to
266On this work see Dzielska 1986; Flinterman 1995. On Apollonius’ silences, see Casel 1919, 66-7.
267Apollonius may have written a Pythagorean doxography, a biography of Pythagoras, or a single
work combining elements of both (see Flinterman 1995, 77-8).
268V.A. I.1[53] Cf. VI.2[19]
269See Smith 1987.
270V.A. IV.1[21]0: bilocation, casting out of demons; IV.45: raising a girl from the dead.
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exercise power through his mastery of it. Sometimes Apollonius’ gestures of philo-
sophic power take the form of a spoken silence. His doctrinal statements have the
flavour of commonplaces drawn from late antique anthologies,271 but his silences
are intended to speak volumes.
Philostratus’ Apollonius is asked why such a noble thinker and skilled speak-
er as himself has not written any book; he responds: ‘Because I have not yet been
silent.’272 He then proceeds to maintain strict silence for a five-year period, a kind of
latter-day Pythagorean initiation but without the Pythagorean brotherhood.273 Dur-
ing this period of silence he is far from ‘silent’; he roams the land dispensing wisdom
and setting right the affairs of men. Philostratus tells us that he is able to quell civ-
il disturbances caused by hooligans through sheer silent gravitas (I.15), and relates
one incident (I.15.17 ad fin.) where Apollonius finds the citizens of a town starving
because of grain hoarding by profiteers, and manages to arrange that the governor
be properly chastened, the population fed, and the guilty parties publically rebuked,
all by means of hand gestures, silent facial indications, and, in the case of the prof-
iteers, by the expedient of writing down his judgement on a tablet and having the
governor read it out to the assembled populace. The theme of silence as discourse is
here given a narrative form.
Apollonius’ mastery of silence is also a form of wisdom. When Apollonius first
meets his right-hand man Damis, the latter offers to serve as his interpreter on their
travels throughout the barbarian lands. But Apollonius declines this service, stating
that he understands all the languages of mankind, although he has never learned
them. When Damis is awed at this show of wisdom, Apollonius says: ‘Do not won-
der if I know all the tongues of men, for I even know the secrets of men’s silences’
(οἰδα γὰρ δὴ καὶ ὅσα σιωpiῶσιν ἄνθρωpiοι).274 Silence is understood as a superior form
of discourse to language.
271Cf. Smith 1987, 70-1.
272V.A. I.14.4-5.
273V.A. I.14.18. Pythagoras is not mentioned in this context, and this incident, as well as a passage at
I.16.31, seems to represent a garbled echo of the tradition of the Pythagorean five-year silent novitiate.
274I.19.19-21.
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Another philosopher whose silence is depicted as discourse is ‘Secundus, the
Silent Philosopher’, whose exploits are recorded in an anonymous account dating
probably from the latter half of the second century.275 This work begins: ‘Secun-
dus was a philosopher. This man cultivated wisdom all his days and observed si-
lence religiously, having chosen the Pythagorean way of life.’ There seems to be
not the slightest trace of Pythagorean themes or doctrine present in this work: to
be Pythagorean means, for the author, simply to be a philosopher who does not
speak.276
Whoever the historical Secundus may have been,277 in this text he serves as a kind
of symbol of silence as wisdom. The story runs thus: Secundus becomes famous for
his wisdom and his absolute devotion to silence. The emperor Hadrian decides to
test his devotion, and, having summoned him, puts Secundus through various tests
to attempt to persuade him to speak, and then to force him on pain of death. To
no avail: a tribune whom Hadrian tasks with making Secundus speak replies that,
‘You might persuade lions and leopards and other beasts to speak with a human
voice before you persuade an unwilling philosopher.’278 When all his efforts prove
ineffectual, the philosopher remaining true to his vow of silence even unto death, the
emperor summons him back, admits that he is indeed a wise man, and puts a series
of questions to him. These questions, dealing with stock doxographical themes such
as ‘What is man?’ and ‘What is intellect?’, are answered by Secundus in the manner
we have already seen used by Apollonius, by writing the answers on a tablet.
Here, then, we have a depiction of philosophic silence in its most literal form,
but, just as with the kinds of written silence found in Platonism, the fact of silence
does not deter discourse. In fact, it is Secundus’ stubborn silence that allows there
275Perry 1964 is an edition and translation of this interesting work, from which I cite the translations;
on the text and dating see ibid. 1-10.
276Cf. Thorndyke 1923, I, 258; Perry 1964, 7-8. Perry suggests (9-10, citing Porph. V.P. 370, Iamb. V.P.
81-82) that the question and answer section of the work, with its τί ἐστι· format, may reflect traditional
Pythagorean tropes. This may be, but the doctrines contained in Secundus’ sententiae clearly owe
more to florilegia than to any specific philosophical tradition.
277Perry 1964, 2-4 argues that a historical Secundus existed, although there are no certain attestations
to him besides this text.
278Perry 1964, 72. Translation mine.
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to be any discourse at all, since Hadrian had instructed his headsman to kill him
if he uttered a word. It is worth noting a few points here. No reason whatever is
given for Secundus’ silence; I take this to indicate that, in the second century, the
idea that a philosopher might choose absolute silence was familiar enough to the
general reading public, probably through popular traditions about Pythagoreanism,
that no explanation was thought necessary. Philosophic silence, in its most literal
form, had attained to the status of a well-known trope. Apollonius’ gnomic silences
are similarly signs that this was the case; while Philostratus does nod to the tradition
of Pythagorean esotericism at the beginning of his book, no further context is given
for Apollonius’ silence.
The instances of spoken silence discussed above evoke not simple philosophic
elitism, but a wisdom granting true power; in the case of Apollonius, miraculous
abilities. The power of philosophic silence is also expressed, in both biographies, as
social power: this is clearly demonstrated by Secundus’ triumphant encounter with
Hadrian, and by Apollonius’ ability to stem riots and civil disturbances through
the power of his philosophic silence. Apollonius’ story actually raises the stakes of
political influence; where Secundus demonstrates his superiority to the power of a
single emperor, Apollonius is shown running rings around two emperors, as well as
sundry lesser potentates;279 in these cases he does not exercise literal silence, but it is
his privileged knowledge and spiritual power which allow him to deal with worldly
power from such an unassailable position of strength.
I would like tentatively to suggest that the symbol of the philosopher whose in-
accessible wisdom makes him the superior to emperors is a narrative echo of an
idea of wisdom actually current in Late Platonism. In late antiquity intense strug-
gles were taking place for intellectual power, and the idea of privileged knowledge
of the Platonist specialist was a major weapon in these struggles; these biographical
279Apollonius shows a suave philosophic indifference to the emperor Nero (V.A. 4.42-4), and, thrown
into captivity by the emperor Domitian whom he has defied, he is fully prepared to deliver an oration
on the excellence of philosophers (and their superiority to mere emperors) to Domitian (8.7), but
instead transports himself miraculously out of captivity (8.8). This undelivered oration is perhaps not
an example of philosophic silence, but its presence in Philostratus’ Life shows the same preference of
rhetoric to logic that often characterises the genre. See Edwards 2000, xxii.
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narratives of silent philosophers, I will argue below, are narrative expressions of a
cultural dynamic which sought increasingly to locate the power of the philosophic
specialist not in the open discourse of disputation and philosophic discourse, but in
the closed realm of the secret and the ineffable.
Toward a Model of Plotinus as Silent Philosopher. It is not yet the place to
present a full analysis of Platonist philosophic silence in the late antique period, but
a certain picture of a culture of privileged knowledge should already be coalescing.
Let us return to the Porphyrian passages cited at the beginning of the present chap-
ter. The oath of Plotinus’ fellow students not to reveal their teacher’s doctrines was
presented, we recall, mainly as a matter of not publishing them in written form. This
incident, like Plotinus’ own reluctance to publish, make perfect sense as products
of a culture of Platonist philosophic silence, where the themes of privileged orality
and philosophic elitism informed basic assumptions about the transmission of priv-
ileged knowledge. These assumptions would explain the mind-set behind Plotinus’
actions: as a philosopher seeking to follow the standards of deportment inherited
from the traditional materials surveyed above, we should expect Plotinus to regard
written philosophy as potentially a dangerous broadcasting of knowledge.
These background assumptions will also have underlied Porphyry’s inclusion of
these episodes in his biography. As the ‘Pythagorean’ examples cited above show,
literal philosophic silence could be depicted as an enactment of philosophic virtue.
I would argue that Porphyry’s depiction of Plotinus as epitomising the specifically
Platonist virtues of philosophic silence - distrust of publication, emphasis on oral
instruction, and a general reluctance to disseminate certain doctrines - is a compa-
rable instance of biographic practice. In both cases, a proper concern with hiding
the highest wisdom is depicted as an important philosophic quality, and of course
implies that the philosopher in question has ‘secret knowledge’ which others do not
possess, but which is worth possessing.
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What has troubled scholars about these stories in Porphyry is the fact that Plot-
inus broke both the oath and his own early determination not to publish,280 but
Porphyry does not seem to find this at all problematic. This should not trouble us
either, if we see these accounts of Porphyry’s in their context. In all the early in-
stances of rhetorical hiding discussed in this chapter, it is difficult to find a single
case where the notional secret under discussion was actually kept secret: from the
invocations of mystic silence in Parmenides and Empedocles to the many discourses
flagged by Plato as ancient secrets, these acts of verbal hiding tend to lead directly to
revelation of the ‘secret’ - indeed, they prepare the reader for the reception of ‘secret
knowledge’, with the increased sense of privilege and power that this brings.281 If
we consider the whole background culture of Platonist written silence, along with
its attendant tropes, before approaching this biographical material, Porphyry’s pre-
sentation of Plotinus’ actions signifies what it was intended to signify: not only that
Plotinus exercised due care in his distribution of knowledge, but that the knowledge
he possessed - the doctrines of Ammonius - was ‘secret knowledge’. Porphyry is
flagging Plotinus’ wisdom as precisely the kind of secret knowledge that appears
fleetingly in the Seventh and Second Platonic Epistles, or hidden within the sym-
bola of the Pythagorean tradition. Plotinus’ acts of concealment and revelation as
depicted by Porphyry are narrative examples of Platonist philosophic silence.
The incident of Porphyry’s ‘mystic’ poem also falls into place when understood
against the backdrop of philosophic silence. Plotinus’ appreciative response to the
esoteric presentation of Porphyry makes sense in light of the Platonic precedent for
equating the mysteries and philosophy. We note that the key ritual players from
mystery cult are represented in this episode: we have Porphyry as the figure of the
hierophant, Plotinus as the mystês whose knowledge of the initiatory secret allows
him to penetrate the veil of symbolic language, and the unnamed heckler in the
280See O’Brien 1994.
281Cherlonneix 1992, 385 notes that, contrary to his usual practice, Porphyry does not name his source
for the anecdote of the oath of secrecy, an act of ‘secrecy surrounding secrecy’ that has fired the
imagination of researchers; this extra touch of secrecy would of course have had the same effect on
Porphyry’s intended readership.
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crowd, who stands for the uninitiated masses. The self-serving aim of Porphyry’s
narrative here is clear, and should alert us to the ways in which philosophic silence,
in this case the themes of initiated silence drawn from the philosophic reading of
mystery cult, could act as a source of social capital; as the ‘hierophant’ of the episode,
Porphyry actually stands above Plotinus’ mystês in spiritual ‘rank’ - symbolically
‘initiating’ his master - even as the two of them are separated and put on a higher
level from the unphilosophic, uninitiated masses.
Turning to the important passage describing Plotinus’ (and Porphyry’s) union
with the one beyond being, it should now be clear that Porphyry’s description of
this state as ἐν ἐνεργείᾳ ἀρρήτῳ is more than a statement that it cannot be put into
words - it also evokes the silence of the mysteries, transposing the dichotomy of
initiated and profane into a Late Platonist context.
This chapter has shown some of the ways in which certain currents of early phi-
losophy utilised rhetorics of secrecy and acts of public hiding, and these brief com-
ments on Porphyry have indicated some of the ways in which these rhetorics could
play themselves out in the context of Late Platonism. The following chapters will
flesh out this late antique model with much more detail. Chapter Three discusses
the idea of tradition constructed by the Middle Platonists, followed by a chapter on
Plotinus’ own formulation of tradition; it will emerge from these discussions that
the philosophers cited in the present chapter (Pythagoras, Parmenides, Empedocles,
Heraclitus, and Plato) were read as constituting a single tradition by Plotinus, and
that the secret institutions of the mysteries and the Orphic texts were interpreted
as pre-philosophic traditions which esoterically taught the same truths. The impor-
tance of this idea of tradition for philosophic silence will be shown to lie in the eso-
teric nature of this tradition as read by the Platonists, a hermeneutic approach which
would shape an entire view of what it was to be a philosophic exegete.
Chapter Three: Perennial Wisdom and Platonist Tradition
Fabulae et symbola verum et demonstrant et tegunt, produnt et tacent.282
Plotinus describes himself, not as an innovative thinker or the founder of any
philosophical system, but as an exegete of ‘the ancients’. He tells his readers: ‘Our
doctrines are not novel, nor are they modern: they were said long ago, but not open-
ly. Our present doctrines are explanations of those older ones, and the words of
Plato himself show that they are ancient.’283 It is widely agreed that Plotinus was in-
deed engaged in exegesis of a philosophic textual tradition owing its greatest debt to
the Platonic dialogues,284 and his work, while usually described as ‘Neoplatonist’, is
better described simply as ‘Platonist’. Plotinus would not have understood the term
‘Neoplatonist’, and saw himself as a philosopher in the same tradition as Plato.285
But a further aspect of Plotinus’ express view of his philosophical project, en-
capsulated in the quotation above, is that his doctrines are not presented as ‘Platon-
ist’ doctrines; they are presented as explanations of ancient λόγοι, stemming from a
deeper tradition of which Plato is himself a part, rather than an originator. In other
words, Plato is seen as a strong exemplar of the philosophy of the ancients, and by
showing that one is in agreement with Plato, one can show that one is in agreement
with that philosophy.
An aspect of the problem of ineffability not yet touched upon is the problem of
transmission; how might a textual or other tradition discuss, teach, or otherwise
transmit knowledge of the unthinkable, the unsayable? One possible answer to this
282Casel 1919, 91, on Plutarch.
283V.1[10]8.10-12, translation based on Hadot 1993, 17-18.
284See e.g. Charrue 1978, 17-41; Fowden 1982, 38; Dillon 1992; Hadot 1993, 17-18.
285E.g. Charrue 1978, 16 and n. 7; Blumenthal 1996, 82. For a recent critique of the terms ‘Middle-’
and ‘Neoplatonist’, see Athanassiadi 2006, 23-6.
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question is suggested by the structures of Platonist philosophy: since the Forms are
eternal truths, access to the Forms (and, for Plotinus, access to nous, the location of
the Forms) guarantees the philosophic seeker an atemporal, unchanging reservoir
of truth upon which he may draw through personal philosophic anagôgê.286 This
method of accessing the truth is insisted upon by Plotinus, and much in the Enneads
may be read as detailed instructions for attaining to this type of knowledge;287 the
texts of Plato and other great philosophers would then be the textual concomitant of
this philosophic truth. But texts transmit knowledge; what tradition can transmit that
which transcends knowledge and speech?
A tempting answer is: The Neoplatonist tradition. Sara Rappe sees the attempt
at a textual incorporation of the ineffable as a central dynamic of Late Platonist writ-
ing.288 Reading Plotinus, we find that he gives a similar answer to this question;
he constructs just such an ‘unwritten’ textual tradition as Rappe sees in late Platon-
ism, but he locates this tradition in the Hellenic past. Plotinus sometimes finds the
unwritable truth of transcendence embedded, or culturally located, in very concrete
historical instances, textual and otherwise: in Platonic dialogues, of course, and in
the riddling phrases of Presocratic philosophers, but also in myths, religious ritu-
als, and oracles. This tradition is conceived by Plotinus as a perennial wisdom with
immemorial origins. As we might expect from the Platonist premise noted above,
that philosophic wisdom is eternal and unchanging; paradoxically, however, he lo-
cates it simultaneously within history, and thus in the world of body and of change,
and most interestingly for the present inquiry, defines it esoterically. The ‘truth’ of
the one’s ineffability is not explained by the great tradition; it is hidden within that
tradition.
286See e.g. V.8[31]4.36-7; V.8[31]5.5-9; cf. Hadot 1993, 40; Eon 1970, 260-1. Access to truth through
nous is discussed 215 ff. below.
287See Rist 1964b, 87-112 for an interpretation of this process in Plotinus.
288’It would not be an exaggeration to say that Neoplatonism conceives itself as a tradition that is
forced to allude to something like the principle of ineffability as the final authority for its exegetical
authenticity. Absurd as this may seem at first glance, what the Neoplatonists attempt at all costs is no
less than a textual incorporation of the ineffable.’ (Rappe 2000, 119-20).
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The conception of tradition held by Plotinus is thus very important for under-
standing his approach to philosophic silence; Plotinian exegesis is often explicitly
presented as a process of unveiling the hidden. It is important to keep in mind that
there are two concepts of ‘tradition’ at work in scholarly studies of Plotinus: on the
one hand, the concept of Neoplatonism, or simply of Platonism, constructions which
rightly refer us to the Platonists’ use of Platonic materials as dogmatic texts for exege-
sis, and on the other, the traditions constructed by the Platonists themselves. When
we pay attention to these conceptions of tradition, we find that the Platonists tend
not to define themselves as such; in fact, while Plotinus ardently defends his own
agreement with the philosophy of Plato, he never defines himself as a ‘Platonist’,
many scholarly assertions to the contrary notwithstanding.289
The purpose of the present chapter is to present the evidence which survives for
construction of tradition, and of self-definition in terms of that tradition, in earlier
Platonism, with a view to contextualising Plotinus’ own self-definition and esoter-
ic hermeneutics. Plotinus’ ideas about his tradition have often escaped notice or
been underplayed in scholarly literature, perhaps partly because they operate in the
background of his work, and he rarely feels the need to state them explicitly; this,
however, ought to alert us to their fundamental importance to his thought, as basic
assumptions lying behind his use of the philosophical tradition, rather than cause us
to discount these assumptions as unimportant to his philosophy. By examining the
Middle Platonists we can flesh out Plotinus’ own ideas of the perennial tradition to
which he feels he belongs and bring them to the foreground.
Philosophic Lineage and Perennial Wisdom in Platonism
To this end, a brief overview of certain aspects of post-Hellenistic philosophical
culture is in order, followed by an outline of the Platonist perennialism which rose
to prominence in the first and second centuries CE, which will elucidate many state-
ments found in the Enneads concerning the nature of the true philosophical tradition
and its esoteric character.
289See Appendix B, 269 ff. below.
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Hairesis and the Exegetic Turn in Post-Hellenistic Philosophy. To begin with,
we may note the formalisation of philosophical allegiance, beginning in the Hel-
lenistic period, which became a structural norm of philosophy as a practice and as a
genre thereafter.290 One was, for the most part, not simply a philosopher; one was
a philosopher of a given school. This is not to say that writings and discourses of
philosophers ceased to differ widely, or that these schools represented monolithic
orthodoxies;291 the point here is one of philosophic identity. This identity was de-
fined most usually in our period as αἵρεσις. This term, meaning ‘lineage’ or ‘school
of thought’, implies both the transmission of a certain intellectual content and cor-
responding loyalties and antipathies vis à vis competing schools.292 In the late an-
tique period αἵρεσις also seems increasingly to betoken a concern with what may
(somewhat inexactly) be called ‘orthodoxy’;293 it is used by Plotinus only in a context
where his version of philosophic truth is threatened by what is seen as a perversion
of the true tradition.294
A second broad development in philosophy, related to the rise of self-definition
by lineage, arose later, in the post-Hellenistic period: it might be called the ‘exegetic
turn’, whereby philosophers increasingly sought to situate their search for truth in
terms of a canon of privileged texts, rather than in the κανών, or criterion for true
290D.L. 1.17-21; the term αἵρεσις occurs more than forty times in this work, as do διαδοχή and its
cognates, showing the degree of importance attached to school-lineage. S.E. P. 1.1-17. On the rise of
‘schoolcraft’ in post-Hellenistic philosophy generally see Glucker 1978, 166-206; Hadot 1979; Sedley
1989, 97; Boys-Stones 2001, 130-1; Trapp 2007, 13. For a good general discussion with special reference
to Epicureanism, see Sedley 1989 passim.
291Cf. Rist 1964b, 57. See Lim 1995, esp. 31-69 on disputation, dialectic and competition between
Platonist philosophers.
292See Glucker 1978, 166-206 for a detailed discussion of this term, the related terms σχολή and δια-
τριβή, and their Latin equivalents. The latter terms refer to institutions (ibid. 159), while αἵρεσις refers
to a school of thought in the broad sense; it is the most apt ancient term for what is meant by the
modern ‘Neoplatonism’.
293See Athanassiadi 2006, 19-22 on αἵρεσις generally, and ibid. 21-22 for the increasing use of hairesis
in the late antique to indicate perverse or wrong choice of allegiance.
294The term appears in Plotinus with the meaning under discussion only in his attack on the Gnostics
(II.9[33]6.6. and 15.4; see further 146 below). In Porphyry’s Life the Christians and others (clearly
Gnostics, judging from the texts which Porphyry says they read) in Plotinus’ circle are αἱρετικοὶ δὲ ἐκ
τῆς piαλαιᾶς φιλοσοφίας (16.2; see Athanassiadi 2006, 129-30); the term, however, can still mean simply
‘school of thought’ in the neutral sense in Porphyry (Glucker 1978, 187).
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knowledge, which had been the main locus for the siting of truth claims in Hel-
lenistic philosophy.295 De Haas proposes, in this regard, a division of the history of
late ancient philosophy into two periods, the first (from the beginning of the post-
Hellenistic period until about Plotinus’ time) a period of ‘establishing the universal
truth’ and the second (from the time of Plotinus’ successors until the Arab conquest)
of ‘exploring the universal truth.’296 This is a useful generalisation, and with the
obvious297 and less obvious exceptions298 to the rule, provides a fairly apt overview
of broader developments in philosophical culture in the Roman Empire. Epicurus
might have claimed to have learned nothing from his teachers, or Zeno and Arce-
silaus have berated each other for lack of originality,299 but for a Stoic, Epicurean,
or Platonist to have made similar claims seems to have been unthinkable from the
post-Hellenistic period onward. As Armstrong observes,300 the authority of philo-
sophic founders commonly did not extend to the tradition as a whole; one could
and did disagree vociferously even with one’s immediate teachers, but never with
the canonic authors themselves.
An important phenomenon involving both school allegiance and the exegetic ap-
proach in post-Hellenistic and later philosophy is the movement toward ‘harmon-
isation’ of various schools or thinkers under the aegis of one’s chosen allegiance.
This took many forms. We see it already in speculations preserved by Cicero as to
295See generally Athanassiadi-Fowden 1981, 149; Hadot 1987b, 14-23; Armstrong 1990c, 414; De Haas
2003, 253-4; Van Nuffelen 2011, 2-3. On the κανών, see Sedley and Brunschwig 2003, 157.
2962003, 242-3.
297An obvious and prominent exception to this model is the Sceptical Academy, and perhaps this
is an exception which proves the rule, insofar as the Sceptics’ rejection of any universal truth as a
basic methodological principle was an approach which fell dramatically out of favour from the first
century CE onwards.
298One possible objection to this generalisation is based on an argumentum e silentio, but still in my
view worth noting; namely, that authors of this period who did pursue a more aporetic or inconclu-
sive approach to philosophic reasoning, or who did not base their arguments on the authoritative
philosophers of the past, would have ipso facto been unlikely to have achieved much recognition,
and were hence unlikely to have been copied in the manuscript tradition, precisely because of the
rise of the exegetical approach and the increasing school ‘orthodoxy’ of mainstream philosophic cul-
ture. The example of Galen stands out as a notable exception and our sole surviving exemplar of a
second-century philosopher who made strong claims to originality (see Trapp 2007, 17-18), but his
works were primarily medical, and so their survival is congruent with this conjecture, which should
be understood as applying to philosophy strictly understood.
299Cic. Acad. Pri. II.16.1-4; cf. Plut. Colot. p. 1121 F.
3001990c, 425.
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the fundamental unity of all the ‘Socratic schools’, who differ ‘more in terminolo-
gy than in ideas’,301 and it seems to have been a main component of Antiochus of
Ascalon’s philosophical project.302 The position of Aristotle vis à vis Plato was the
most outstanding issue in need of harmonisation for the Platonists,303 and was a
hotly contested issue at all times; the anti-Peripatetic second-century Platonist Atti-
cus wrote an Against Those Who Undertake to Interpret Plato’s Doctrines Through Those
of Aristotle,304 and Numenius, writing at roughly the same time, sees Aristotle’s
work as an entirely separate tradition from Plato;305 on the other side, Antiochus of
Ascalon is reported by Cicero to have defended the essential unity of the Academy
and Peripatos,306 and Porphyry explicitly embraces Aristotle as a Platonist.307 The
fifth-century Hierocles of Alexandria seems to have believed that mischievous later
philosophers actually bastardised (νοθεῦσαι) the works of Plato to make it seem as
though he and Aristotle had disagreed, when in fact they, like other philosophers in-
cluding Ammonius Saccas, Plotinus, Porphyry, Iamblichus, and Plutarch of Athens,
were all part of a single divine tradition.308 The matter seems to have been ultimate-
ly resolved in unanimous favour of Aristotle’s inclusion in the canon,309 although
observers continued to question the appropriateness of this harmonisation well into
late antiquity.310
Perennial Wisdom in Platonism. Against this historical background of school
loyalty and exegesis, which constituted the doxographical structure of post-Hellenistic
philosophic debate, the powerful idea of a perennial tradition of truth arose. It has
301Ac. II.15.12-20. . . Peripateticos et Academicos, nominibus differentis, re congruentis, aquibus Stoici ipsi
verbis magis quam sententiis dissenserunt (13-15).
302Cic. N.D. I.16; see Dillon 1977, 52-106; Boys-Stones 2001, 128; Trapp 2007, 16.
303See in general Hadot 1993, 17-18; Karamanolis 2006.
304Πρὸς τοὺς διὰ τῶν Α᾿ριστοτέλους τὰ Πλάτωνος ὑpiισκνουμένους. Fragments of this work are
preserved in Eusebius; see Des Places 1977, 8-9.
305Fr. 24.67-70. See Karamanolis 2006, 127-149.
306Acad. post. 15ff; Fin. 5.7.
307See Edwards 2000, xxxi-ii.
308Ap. Phot. Bibl. cod. 214, 173a18-18-40.
309Edwards 2000, lii describes it as a late antique Platonist ‘dogma’, and himself considers Aristotle
a Platonist (ibid. xi).
310Writing in the sixth century, Elias attacks Iamblichus for suppressing the differences between Plato
and Aristotle (see Edwards 2000, lii).
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been widely noted that certain currents of philosophy in the Roman Empire increas-
ingly theorised, from about the first century CE, that an ancient tradition of truth had
existed, traceable back to the earliest times.311 Van Nuffelen rightly argues that the
first appearance of this idea should be pushed back to the first century BCE on the
basis of evidence from Varro and others,312 but the work of earlier scholars tracing
the widespread rise of perennialism is right to date it to around the latter half of the
first century CE,313 which accords well with the concurrent rise of the exegetic ap-
proach, which led to a natural turning of the philosophic gaze toward the past as a
repository of truth.314
While Platonism was an exegetical movement and the product of an exegetical
age, ‘perennialism’, as I wish to define it, was more than simply an exegetical ap-
proach to a hallowed tradition.315 The idea in its most basic form, that knowledge
of the truth is as old as humankind or even eternal, has been seen as arising in later
Stoicism,316 the thought of Posidonius of Rhodes having exerted special influence in
this regard.317 The claim for a wisdom as old as mankind might at any rate make
sense in terms of Stoic cosmology, where innate logos serves as a constant source of
truth inherent in the structure of the universe. The Platonic Forms serve an analo-
gous function for followers of Plato, as mentioned above; perhaps this ideological
framework was one factor which led to the widespread adoption of perennialism as
a common, or even a characteristic, trait of Platonism from about the first century CE
onward.
311E.g. De Haas 2003, 251: ‘. . . The vexed issue of the criterion of truth was surpassed by the growing
belief in a universal truth from which all human wisdom had drawn since times immemorial. . . .
From the first century AD onwards most philosophers came to treat the history of philosophy as a
series of attempts at unfolding and exploring this single truth.’ Cf. Festugière 1981, I, 20-6; Hadot
1987b, 23 ff.; Whittaker 1987, 120-1; O’Meara 1989, 13.
312Van Nuffelen 2011, 27-45.
313See n. 311 above.
314Cf. Frede 1997, 220; 229-30.
315See Dörrie 1987, 16-32; Armstrong 1990c on the role of tradition and text in Platonism generally.
316See Frede 1994, 5193-4. The idea of an ancient wisdom may of course be pushed back considerably
further in Greek intellectual history (e.g. Boys-Stones 2001, 3-17, who begins his account of the rise of
the idea of a ‘primitive truth’ with the Hesiodic and early Orphic accounts of the lost golden age).
317Boys-Stones 2001, 45-49, citing Sen. Ep. 65.
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We do not find a perennialist stance in every Middle Platonist; we have little
reason to suspect such an approach in Atticus, for example,318 and Alcinoüs presents
himself as expounding Plato, and makes no attempt to situate Plato within a larger
tradition. Proclus refers to these thinkers as the ‘literalists’.319 On the other hand, we
find in Plutarch an extensive use of the themes of perennialism (identified below),
and there is no doubt that he believed in an ancient wisdom and saw his own work as
a continuation of it.320 Maximus of Tyre, generally considered a Platonising sophist,
shows a classicising respect for Homer and the very ancient Hellenic tradition which
amounts at times to a ‘scriptural’ approach to these texts.321
We may place Numenius and Celsus in the category of fully fledged Platonist
perennialists:322 they theorise an immemorial tradition of truth of which Plato forms
a part, they read this tradition as innately authoritative, and their conception of tra-
dition involves further characteristic elements of Platonist perennialism, to which
we now turn.
The ‘Ancients’ and the Ancient Sages. Perennialism as we find it developed in some
Middle Platonists and Plotinus is more than the basic idea of an ancient tradition of
wisdom, and contains ideological, hermeneutic, and rhetorical characteristics which
mark it more especially as Platonist. Ideologically, Platonist perennialism situates
the tradition that we call Platonism as part of a chain of transmission of what might
318The surviving fragments of Atticus’ Against Those Who Undertake to Interpret Plato’s Doctrines
Through Those of Aristotle goes against the trend in harmonisation, and show a concern with the
dialectical issues without reference to a chain of authorities.
319Proclus (in Tim. III.234.15 ff; cf. III.247.13 ff., I.284.13 ff.) refers to such authors as Alcinoüs and
Atticus as ‘following Plato to the letter’ (ἕpiεσθαι τῇ λέξει κρίναντες). Noted by Whittaker 1987, 120 .
320See Van Nuffelen 2011, 55-65. See ibid. 65 n. 102 for further Plutarchian references to the ancient
wisdom.
321See Oration 26.2-3: Plato’s status as a great philosopher is predicated upon his understanding of
the ‘philosophy of Homer’. Chapter Five of Malcolm Heath’s forthcoming Ancient Philosophic Poetics
discusses Maximus’ harmonisation of Homer and Plato.
322On elements of perennialism in Numenius see Armstrong 1990c, 425-6; Frede 1994, 5194;
Van Nuffelen 2011, 72-8. Celsus’ lost treatise, ὁ ἀληθὴς λόγος, is the earliest known Platonist peren-
nialist text according to the full definition outlined in this chapter (cf. Hadot 1987b, 24; Frede 1994,
5184; 5194).
PHILOSOPHIC LINEAGE AND PERENNIAL WISDOM IN PLATONISM 103
be called, following Boys-Stones, ‘strong authority’,323 or following the second cen-
tury Platonist Celsus, ‘the true account’ (ὁ ἀληθὴς λόγος).324 While privileging Pla-
to’s position in this transmission as pre-eminent, Platonist perennialism sees Plato
as merely a link in, rather than the beginning of, the ‘golden chain’.325 Indeed, he is
sometimes, as in Plotinus’ work, rhetorically situated at the end of that tradition in
its pristine phase,326 an idea perhaps predicated on the widespread belief that hu-
manity in general had undergone a decline in vigour, philosophic virtue, and simple
rude health since ancient times.327
The most important trope of Platonist perennialism is that of ‘the Ancients’ (most
commonly referred to by Plotinus as οἱ piαλαιοί). This term derived stylistically from
the references in Plato, discussed in the preceding chapter, to unnamed, ancient
predecessors, often Orphic and Pythagorean, but seems to be post-Classical in the
sense in which it was used by the Platonists,328 to refer to philosophic thinkers of the
Classical period and earlier.329 Boys-Stones points to two uses of οἱ piαλαιοί in post-
Hellenistic philosophy, one more or less equivalent to our ‘Classical’ and another a
more vague and authoritative reference to a tradition embodying the truth.330 This
term and its cognates became, by Plotinus’ time, a standard reference point charged
with an air of established authority which might partake of the divine.331 Already in
323Boys-Stones 2001, 102-5. Cf. Armstrong 1990c, 415, whose ‘traditionalism’, defined as ‘the accep-
tance of an absolute traditional authority’, is much the same as my idea of perennialism, except for
my stipulation of an immemorial or transcendent origin.
324See n. 322.
325Boys-Stones 2001, 118-22. See e.g. Celsus ap. Orig. Cels. VI.10: Plato does not claim to have made
any discoveries, but simply defends received doctrine. Plut. De Is. 56-7; 60.375c; 77.382d.
326See 138. Cf. Frede 1994, 5198-9; Boys-Stones 2001, 117, with n. 35.
327See e.g. Emp. frr. 128; Pl. Plt. 269a-274d, the myth of the ‘Age of Cronus’; Max. Tyr. 4.2-3;
5; cf. Plut. De Pyth. orac. 406b-407f: mankind in ancient times was more full of poetry, prophe-
cy, and divinely-inspired visions than their modern counterparts, who thus began writing in prose,
previously unknown.
328See Strange 2007, 99.
329This applies to Plotinus and Porphyry; in later Platonists the term can be applied to much later
authorities, as, for example, Iamblichus by Proclus (Strange 2007, 98-100).
330Boys-Stones 2001, 147 n. 31.
331Charrue 1978, 23-27. Armstrong (1990c, 418-19) and Sedley (1989, 101 ff.) give useful discussions
of the general background of classicism and respect for ‘the ancients’ in Græco-Roman culture which
underlay this way of thinking.
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the Middle Platonists we find Plato depicted as an interpreter of the ancients.332
This term is usually used to refer to philosophers of the Classical period. How-
ever, the concept of ancient, privileged founders is not limited to the Ancients; a
number of terms, notably οἱ σοφοί, οἱ piάλαι, οἱ θεολόγοι, and cognate appellations,
refer to a tradition of wisdom different from, and pre-dating, philosophy. In fact,
the Middle Platonists made a concerted move toward including a broad range of
pre-philosophic sources of wisdom in their canon, which allowed them both to ex-
ploit the cultural prestige of the Classical past and to ‘perennialise’ their tradition
fully, extending it back into an undefined past without a determinate beginning.333
The Platonist sages may include Homer,334 Hesiod,335 and Orpheus,336 understood
as inspired sages who hid their knowledge beneath a fictional screen of apparent ab-
surdities. These poets are commonly known as θεολόγοι,337 and ὁ θεολόγος became
332References are made to Plato’s handing down ancient doctrines (e.g. Plut. De Is. 60.375d) which
are not dissimilar in form to references to ancient logoi found in Plato’s dialogues (see 81 above). In
Celsus Plato is explicitly no innovator, but a defender of received doctrine (Orig. Cels. VI.10; see
discussion at Frede 1994, 5198), while in Numenius he is specifically a follower of Pythagoras (as
mentioned 84 above, and discussed further below).
333For a philosopher such as Plotinus, of course, the world has no beginning, and there is thus no a
priori reason to think that his idea of tradition is not literally perennial.
334On Late Platonist readings of Homer as a source of philosophic wisdom, see Lamberton 1989. We
have referred to Maximus of Tyre above (n. 321); the manuscript title of Maximus’ oration, Εἰ ἔστιν
καθ΄ ῞Ομηρον αἵρεσις, On Whether there is a Homeric Philosophic School, indicates Maximus’ approach,
conflating the poetic and philosophic enterprises; cf. Oration 4, Who Has Given a Better Account of
the Gods, Poets or Philosophers? 1, where the two enterprises are identified as one. We know of a lost
On Homer’s Philosophy by Favorinus (see Trapp 1997, 214) whose title promises a similar approach;
we also know of a lost Περὶ τῆς ῾Ομήρου φιλοσοφίας by Porphyry and a lost treatise by Longinus
investigating whether or not Homer was a philosopher (Lamberton 1989, 111). Celsus also indicates
that Homer knew the True Doctrine (Orig. Cels. 1.16 with VI.42); see further citations at Boys-Stones
2001, 119 n. 40. Num. fr. 35 cites Homer as an authority for a cosmological doctrine.; Cf. Plut. De Is.
51.371e. Porphyry’s De antro nympharum (on which see Lamberton 1989, 108-33) provides a surviving
extensive example of this type of commentary, and also makes clear, from its citations, that it is part
of a much older tradition of philosophical exegesis.
335Celsus (ap. Orig. Cels. IV.36) refers to ‘Hesiod and thousands of other inspired men’. Ennead
IV.8[31]1.21 seemingly conflates Hes. Op. 60-89 and Theog. 521, giving the myth of the primordial
creation of woman and reading it as containing an esoteric Platonist doctrine of matter.
336Orpheus became especially prominent among later Platonists; he does not make an appearance in
the Enneads, except indirectly through Plotinus’ retelling of the Orphic ‘mirror of Dionysus’ story.
337The fullest discussion of the early Greek poets as theologoi is Lamberton 1989, 22-31, where it is
made clear that this was a common appellation from the fifth century BCE onward. Aristotle’s refer-
ence to οἱ piερὶ ῾Ησίοδον καὶ piάντες ὅσοι θεολόγοι (Metaph. B 1000a9, noted by Lamberton 1989, 23-4)
may serve as a representative occurrence. Sextus Empiricus’ attacks on the authority of theological
poets (S.E. M. I.279-98; IX.192) are instructive as to the degree to which these authors were incorpo-
rated into philosophic discourse by the end of the second century CE, so as to require refutation by
the philosophically-serious Sextus.
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Orpheus’ unofficial title.338
Plutarch’s use of mystery cults as loci for the unearthing of esoteric philosophic
wisdom has been highlighted in recent scholarship.339 Numenius refers to the rites
of barbarian peoples in terms of an esoteric philosophic content, similarly under-
stood.340 In these examples the assumption is that there were certain ancient sages,
often referred to as sophoi and theologoi, who intentionally founded the mysteries and
fabricated the mythological stories of Hellenic antiquity to convey philosophic truths
hidden from the masses. Like the idea of an immemorial wisdom, this assumption
can perhaps be traced to later Stoic thought,341 and is found transformed in Platonist
writings; we find it in Numenius,342 Celsus,343 Maximus of Tyre344 and Plutarch.345
The Platonist theologoi and sophoi mirror the structure of the old Greek topos of the
nomothete, the founder figure who gave laws and identity to a city-state or peo-
ple, but the Platonist theologians are more elevated and authoritative from a post-
Hellenistic perspective, having for their purview not the framing of laws and a vir-
tuous polity, but universal concerns of theology, the highest division of philosophy
in Platonist eyes.346
Plutarch’s numerous scattered references to ancient theologians and lawgivers
in the On Isis and Osiris have been studied by van Nuffelen; the basic idea which
emerges from this study is one of ancient founders who formed rites and myths with
a view to concealing their true meanings from the superstitious and those incapable
338Linforth 1973, 189; Lamberton 1989, 22, 27, 28; Lamberton 1995, 150. E.g. Procl. In. Tim. III p.
161, 3 Diehl: ἅpiασα γὰρ ἡ piαρ΄ ῞Ελλησι θεολογία τῆς ᾿Ορφικῆς ἐστι μυσταγωγίας ἔκγονος, piρώτου μὲν
Πυθαγόρου piαρὰ Α᾿γλαοφήμου τὰ piερὶ θεῶν ὄργια διδαχθέντος, δευτέρου δὲ Πλάτωνος ὐpiοδεξαμένου
τὴν piαντελῆ piερὶ τούτων ἐpiιστήμεην ἔκ τε τῶν Πυθαγορείων καὶ τῶν ᾿Ορφικῶν γραμμάτων. The idea of
Orpheus having founded sacred rituals can be traced back at least to Aristophanes’ Frogs, where the
character of Æschylus expounds on the benefits brought to mankind by the ancient poets (1032-1036),
and has Orpheus teaching τελετάς to the Greeks.
339See 117 ff. below.
340Fr. 1a.
341As Boys-Stones 2001, 18-24.
342See Numen. fr. 37 l. 13, transmitted by Proclus: οἱ piαλαιοί...θεολόγοι. Van Nuffelen argues that
a belief in ancient theologians and sages lie behind scattered references in Numenius (Van Nuffelen
2011, 82-3).
343Or. Cels. VI.42.29-30 = Pherecyd. Syr. fr. B4 DK.
344E.g. Oration 4.3.60-3 et passim.
345See below.
346E.g. Plut. De Is. 1.351c; 2.351e; 11.355d-e.
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of higher philosophic understanding.347 Their wisdom is thus an esoteric wisdom,
and in need of philosophic hermeneutics to uncover it.348 Plutarch’s approach may
be summed up by a close reading of the following passage from that work:
This [a passage from Euripides] explains a very ancient doctrine
which comes down to poets and philosophers from theologians and
lawgivers - anonymous in origin, but with a strong verisimilitude
that is difficult to deny - preserved not only in oracles and auguries,
but also in the mystery initiations and ritual offerings of barbarians
and Hellenes everywhere, [stating] that the universe is not aban-
doned to itself, pilotless, without intellect or reason, nor does a sin-
gle logos rule and direct it as with a tiller or with reins that bring obe-
dience, but rather [there are] many things composed of a mixture of
good and bad. . . . 349
We note the order of transmission of this ancient doctrine: starting from ancient
founder figures, then to poets and philosophers, who are thus second in line and
placed in this context on an equal footing as inheritors of the ancient wisdom.350
We note, too, that the actual words of the gods themselves - in the form of auguries
and oracles - are adduced to the tradition as well. In a fascinating hermeneutic move,
Plutarch elsewhere tells us that the traditional obscurity of oracles is due to the gods’
wish to keep theological knowledge out of the hands of those unsuited to know it.
The gods themselves are esotericists, and to be interpreted according to the same
principles of esoteric reading as the sages.
Plutarch is discrediting here what he takes to be Epicurean and Democritan doc-
trine on the one hand, and Stoic doctrine on the other,351 using the ancient account
347Van Nuffelen 2011, 67-71; cf. Froidefond 1988, 78-80. See also De E Delphico 9 = 388f: κρυpiτόμενοι
δὲ τοὺς piολλοὺς οἱ σοφώτεροι κτλ.. The earlier context (388e) makes it clear that these very wise men
are poet-theologians. At De Pyth. orac. 407e the philosophic secrets in oracles are hidden, not from
the unlettered masses, but from tyrants, so as to protect the people from the potential abuse of power
such knowledge would give them. The implication, again, is that the philosophers who are able to
decode the oracular truths are immune from corrupt misuse of it. See Stroumsa 1996b, 274.
348Van Nuffelen 2011, 63-5. Cf. Frede 1994, 5197 with regard to Celsus. See 128 below on Philo, and
further below on Numenius.
349369b-c: Διὸ καὶ piαμpiάλαιος αὕτη κάτεισιν ἐκ θεολόγων καὶ νομοθετῶν εἴς τε piοιητὰς καὶ φιλοσόφους
δόξα, τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀδέσpiοτον ἔχουσα, τὴν δὲ piίστιν ἰσχθρὰν καὶ δυσεξάλειpiτον, οὐκ ἐν λόγοις μόνον οὐδ΄
ἐν φήμαις, ἀλλ΄ ἔν τε τελεταῖς ἔν τε θυσίαις καὶ βαρβάροις καὶ ῞Ελλησι piολλαχοῦ piεριφερομένη, ὡς οὔτ΄
ἄνουν καὶ ἄλογον καὶ ἀκυβέρνητον αἰωρεῖται τῷ αὐτομάτῳ τὸ piᾶν, οὔθ΄ εἷς ἐστιν ὁ κρατῶν καὶ κατευθύνων
ὥσpiερ οἴαξιν ἤ τισι piειθηνίοις χαλινοῖς λόγος, ἀλλὰ piολλὰ καὶ μεμιγμένα κακοῖς καὶ ἀγαθοῖς.... On this
passage cf. Van Nuffelen 2011, 61-5.
350Cf. De Is. 25.360d.
351Both of these schools are mentioned explicitly at 369a. Plutarch treats the Epicureans and
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(which happens here to be identical to Plutarch’s particular dualistic view of Platon-
ic cosmology) as proof of this refutation. This passage thus provides a very clear
example of the way in which the argument from authority in Platonist writing could
be given the imprimatur of anonymous ancients whose very anonymity makes them
irrefutable; the anonymity insisted upon by Plutarch, presented as though it were a
possible objection, is in fact a rhetorical strength.352 In a similar way, the esoteric
nature of the doctrine in question, hidden as it is within rites and oracles (the lat-
ter a notoriously obscure medium of information) adds to the effective authority of
the pronouncement by removing the possibility of refutation.353 The Stoics and Epi-
cureans, whose doctrines lie in plain sight, are helpless before the all-pervasive, but
hidden, wisdom of the ancients, whose latent ubiquity in culture itself makes them
irrefutable.354
Platonist Orientalism. The mention of barbarian rites in this passage from Plutarch
brings us to the next important theme of Platonist perennialism, the notion of a pri-
mordial barbarian wisdom, which in a Platonist context may be seen as part of a
more broad ‘Platonist orientalism’, a general fascination with exotic peoples found
in Plato and the Platonists.355 This theme, whereby a shifting group of ‘wise barbar-
ians’ (most commonly the Egyptians, Magians, Chaldæans, and Indian Brahmans,
and sometimes also such relative newcomers as the Jews) possessed a wisdom from
which the Greeks learned their form of the ‘true account’, had a very long histo-
ry in Greek thought,356 and Plato himself provides some of its formative loci in the
Democritus as a single school of thought.
352Cf. ibid. 64; 70.378: the origin of the true wisdom is lost in immemorial antiquity, and can be
claimed by no one.
353See Van Nuffelen 2007 for a discussion of Plutarch’s use of the philosophic silence (as I define it)
as a trump-card in dialectic; see further below, 117.
354On the ubiquity of the true wisdom, see further Plut. De Is. 67-68.377f-378a.
355Coined, as ‘Platonic orientalism’, by Walbridge 2001 with reference to the work of the 11th-
12th century Sufi Abu al-Najib al-Suhrawardi; the relevance of this category to ancient Platonism
bears witness to the persistent character of this trope in Platonist thought. Edward Said’s modern
conceptions of ‘Orientalism’ and ‘the Orient’ are helpful in this context; see Said 2003, 1-9; 12; 15.
356See Festugière 1981, I, 19-44; Hanegraaff 2012, 12-17.Heinrichs 2003, n. 10, pp. 238-9 offers a long
list of Greek primary sources for ancient oriental sages; Van Nuffelen 2011, 27, n. 1 gives a short
bibliography of the extensive modern scholarship on the subject.
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dialogues.357 The wise barbarians provide a powerful and much-used referent for
Platonist authors situating the origins of philosophic truth in the distant past or in
the current, but exotically authoritative, traditions of these privileged peoples.358
Platonists of the first centuries CE made eclectic use of a large pseudepigraphic
literature attributed to such ancient barbarian sages as Zoroaster and Ostanes,359
and the adepts of the Egyptian temple-cult;360 we might also include Moses in this
category.361
More contemporary philosophers of a certain type, such as Apollonius of Tyana,
could be portrayed as modern-day barbarian sages, partaking of the same hallowed
sources of wisdom as the ancients by virtue of their exotic origins,362 just as thor-
oughly Hellenic and Platonist works such as the Chaldæan Oracles could profit from
the aura of theological wisdom granted by their sobriquet.363 The Græco-Egyptian
religious texts known as the Hermetica feature occasional touches of Egyptian ‘lo-
cal colour’ that evoke the gravitas of ancient Egyptian wisdom and the theologi-
cal authority of the temple-cult.364 In all of this, there is little evidence of reliance
357E.g. Ti. 22d-e; Phdr. 274c-275b; R. X (the ‘Myth of Er’); Phlb. 18b-d; Plt. 290de; Epin. 986E,
987B, 987D-988A; Alc.1 121E-122A. See Boys-Stones 2001, 26-7 n. 37, Hornung 2001, 20-1 on Plato’s
valorisation of the Egyptians.
358E.g. Celsus ap. Orig. Cels. 1.14: the ἀρχαῖος λόγος handed down by the Egyptians, Assyrians,
Indians, and Eleusinians (!), among others; Plut. fr. 157.16-25 Sandbach = Euseb. Praep. 3.1.1.83c;
Num. fr. 1a: τὰ ἔθνη τὰ εὐδοκιμοῦντα; cf. fr. 9.
359See Bidez and Cumont 1938, Stausberg 1998.
360The reputation of the Egyptian temple-cult for esoteric wisdom was international and lasting in
antiquity: Fowden 1986, 14-15. See Heinrichs 2003, 225-6 n.60 for an extensive list of ancient works
of ‘Egyptian’ wisdom. Diodorus Siculus (I. 96-98) quotes Hecatæus of Abdera (4th c. BCE) on how
Orpheus, Homer, Lycurgus, Solon, Democritus, Pythagoras, and Plato, among others, all acquired
their wisdom in Egypt.
361Moses is treated as a sage by Numenius (frr. 1 a-c) and later by Porphyry (see fragments listed at
Boys-Stones 2001, 113), and of course by Philo (see 129 below).
362Philostratus’ Apollonius is depicted as an amazing combination of barbarian sage (e.g. III 41; IV
19) and the purest Hellenic philosopher. Educated in Cappadocia, he miraculously speaks a pure
Attic Greek (I 7), and spreads everywhere the praises of the ancient Hellenic ways, even rebuking the
Athenians (IV 21-22) and Spartans (IV 27) for having left the path of their Classical ancestors. Cf. II
40; IV 5, where even Romans are considered barbarians to the Hellenising Apollonius.
363See Athanassiadi 1999a. How old late-antique philosophers considered the Oracles to be cannot be
uniformly determined, nor is the authorship of ‘Julian the Chaldæan’ (pere or fils) uniformly attested
in antiquity (see Majercik 1989, 1-2), but the emperor Julian’s indignant defence of the Chaldæans as a
‘sacred and theurgic race’ (Jul. Gal. 354b) shows the degree of respect that a Platonist might accord to
Chaldæans qua Chaldæans in a context of theological or ritual matters, whether or not the Chaldæans
in question are truly ancient. See further n. 366 below.
364E.g. CH XVI 1; Ascl. 24 et passim.
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on, or access to, primary ‘oriental’ sources, but copious evidence of a large body of
Græco-Roman orientalist texts on which philosophers drew.365
This orientalism had positive and negative aspects. Eastern barbarian wisdom
had, on the one hand, a wide reputation as being especially potent in the realm of
theology and divine worship;366 contrariwise, these same barbarians were widely
seen as adepts in illegal and unphilosophical magical practices.367 The definition
of μαγεύειν in Hesychius’ lexicon (s.v.) as γοητεύειν· θεραpiεύειν θεούς instructive-
ly juxtaposes both ideas.368 The tensions between Hellenic chauvinism, whereby
all non-Greeks, even Romans, might be scorned as barbarians, and Platonist orien-
talism, whereby the Greeks were all children compared to the Egyptians, powered
complex ideological dynamics out of which ideas of the perennial wisdom grew in
late antiquity. These ideological currents deserve much further study, especially as
regards philosophy. The claims, counter-claims, and polemics become very com-
plicated, as one might expect in as ethnically diverse and ethnocentric a milieu as
the Roman empire.369 ‘Barbarian’ writers might argue that their wisdom had roots
among the same wise barbarians revered by Hellenic authorities,370 or argue that
365Millar’s comments on Porphyry’s orientalism (1997, 256-9) are relevant to Platonism as a whole.
See Richter 2001.
366‘Pl.’ Alc. 1 122A 2: the mageia of the Persian Magians defined as θεῶν θεραpiεία; cf. Amm. Marc.
XXIII.32: Magiam opinionum insignium auctor amplissimus Plato, hagistiam [sc. ἁγιστεία] esse verbo mystico
docet, divinorum incorruptissimum cultum; see ibid. 33; Ph. Quod om. 74: the Magi as natural scientists
and scholars of divine secrets; cf. Porph. Abst. 4.16; Porph. Philos. ex orac. = Euseb. PE 4.10.1-
4: Egyptians, Phoenicians, Chaldæans, Lydians, Hebrews (contrasted with the Greeks, who have
strayed from the path of the gods); Iamb. de myst. I.1, 2; VII.7; IX.4; the Assyrians and Egyptians are
ἱερῶν ἐθνῶν whose language is innately suitable for invoking the gods.
367See Bidez and Cumont 1938, 144-5; Said 2003, 56-8.
368Cf. D.Chr. Oration 36.41. Cf. Philostr. V.A. 1.2, where where Apollonius is accused of being a μάγος
because of his association with Brahmans and Egyptians; here μάγος is clearly understood to mean
‘sorcerer’. On the history and development of the terms μαγεία/magia, see Graf 1997, 2-6; Janowitz
2001, 9-13.
369In characterising the Empire in this way, the modern concept of ‘race’ is not intended; rather, the
more culturally- and linguistically-based ideas of ethnos and gens prevailing at the time.
370E.g. Josephus Ap. I.22, 179: the Jews’ philosophy descended from the ancient Indian wisdom. Cf.
Philo of Alexandria, Quod om. 73-74, who makes a synoptic survey of the sages of various nations,
listing the traditional seven sages of Greece, the Persian Magi (who are depicted as natural scientists
and theologians with a secret wisdom), the Indian gymnosophists and (75a1) the Jewish Essenes,
whose pious excellence is extolled at length, and clearly meant to be contextualised alongside the
authorities alluded to earlier.
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their race had a superior connection to the ancient wisdom than the Hellenes;371 ‘bar-
barian’ philosophers might also argue that their own thought was in fact Hellenic,
and Hellenic authors claim ‘barbarian’ institutions for their own, effectively Hel-
lenising them.372 We can only generalise here that ethnic identification could be and
often was part and parcel of philosophic self-identification in the post-Hellenistic
and beyond, and note that Platonist authors very often trace their doctrines to wise
barbarians,373 sometimes asserting that Plato himself learned at their feet,374 and
that this identification with barbarian wisdom functioned as a source of support for
Platonist ideas, importing a mystique both of antiquity and of strong authority.
The Pythagorean Mystique. A third important trope in Platonist perennialism is
the prominence given to Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans. It was a common obser-
vation from Aristotle onward that ‘Plato Pythagorised’, which could mean different
things to different people;375 In Platonism it came to mean, in essence, that Pythago-
ras was Plato’s predecessor in the true philosophical hairesis. If a master-lineage
common to all Platonists were to be constructed, it would for the most part include
Pythagoras as a philosophic predecessor in the same lineage as Plato,376 often with
reference to the period when Plato is reputed to have studied in Magna Græcia with
371Struck argues (2002, 395-6) that Iamb. Myst. VII.5, where Iamblichus describes the Greeks as
flighty and enamoured of novelty by nature, while the Assyrians are ‘constant in their ways’ and
hence true to ‘the ancients’, is an attempt by the philosopher to boost his own cultural prestige (as a
native Syriac-speaker) by assimilation to the ancient and respected Assyrians. It is however uncertain
that Iamblichus did speak Syriac (see apposite remarks on another ‘Syrian’ philosopher, Porphyry, at
Millar 1997). We might theorise something similar behind Numenius’ (from Apamea in Coele Syria)
disparagement of the Greeks as a ‘young’ race; cf. Athanassiadi 2006, 94.
372Julian, in his attack on the Christians (Gal. 354b), notes that he does revere the god of Abraham,
Isaac, and Jacob, because they were ‘Chaldæans of a sacred and theurgic race’; this polemical piece
as a whole illustrates the way in which foreign elements may be brought within the Hellenic fold via
Platonist orientalism. Cf. Athanassiadi-Fowden 1981, 123-4; 134; 141. Cf. Philostratus’ Apollonius
of Tyana, who is simultaneously a wise barbarian and the most purely Attic of philosophers (I.7; cf.
II.40, IV.5).
373See further p. 120 ff.
374E.g. Apul. Plat. 186; Plut. De Is. 10.354d-e; further citations at Boys-Stones 2001, 116-8, with 117
n. 34. Cicero proves that this belief existed before Platonism: in Rep. I.10, the character of Scipio,
discussing Plato’s peregrinations after Socrates’ death, has him travelling to Egypt to study, and then
to Italy to investigate the discoveries of Pythagoras with Pythagoreans there. As Morrison (1958)
points out, it is by no means impossible that Plato did make these journeys.
375Arist. Metaph. 6, 987a 29-31; cf. e.g. Aët. 2.6.6.; Cic. Rep. I.16, Fin. V.87; Num. fr. 24 ll. 46-48.
376See citations at Boys-Stones 2001, 117, n. 33, to which may be added Num. fr. 24 56-57. Cf.
Armstrong 1990c, 418; Kingsley 1995, 305.
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the Pythagoreans there,377 and sometimes make Plato a ‘Pythagorean’.378
In late antiquity reverence for Pythagoras became exceptionally sharp among
Platonists; Iamblichus’ On the Pythagorean Life and Porphyry’s Life of Pythagoras are
examples of the hagiographical way in which Pythagoras and his students were en-
visioned by Late Platonists as philosophers par excellence and as Late Platonists avant
la lettre.379 Pythagoras is often seen, and not only by the Late Platonists, as having
studied at the feet of oriental sages, usually those of the Egyptians and Magians, and
thus provides a bridge between the ‘oriental wisdom’ and the Greek tradition.380
Pythagoras (and sometimes Pherecydes of Syros381), seems to serve as the his-
torical crossover point between the sages and the philosophers; he is often treated
as a sage or theologos, but is also often seen as the founder of philosophy and is the
earliest philosopher ascribed to the perennial tradition.382 Plato himself probably
377Apul. Plat. 186.
378Numenius says, not only that Plato ‘Pythagorised’, but that Socrates received his wisdom from a
Pythagorean source (fr. 24, 46-8, cited 84 above), and that Plato, once removed from all the polemics
of different schools who have tried to claim him, reveals his true colours as a ‘Pythagorean’ (ibid. ll.
53-57); cf. Iamb. V.P. 127. Nicomachus of Gerasa seems to have equated Platonist and Pythagorean
schools (Nicom. Ar. I.1; XIII; cf. O’Meara 1989, 16). This type of lineage can take on an ambiva-
lent or even negative tone vis à vis Plato: Num. fr. 24 ll. 14-18: Plato is ‘not superior to the great
Pythagoras, nor yet perhaps inferior’. Moderatus of Gades (if it is he; see O’Meara 1989, 11, with n.
8; cf. Burkert 1972, 95) claims that Plato, Aristotle, and the Old Academy bastardised the teachings
of the Pythagoreans and stole their best doctrines from the same source (ap. Porph. V.P. 53, 61 ll. 20-
27), a claim which goes back at least to Aristoxenus (also cited by Porphyry ibid.). On Plato’s rather
widespread reputation as a plagiarist in antiquity, see Chroust 1961, esp. 225-7.
379Cf. O’Meara 1989, 35-40.
380See generally O’Meara 1989, 26; Boys-Stones 2001, 118; See Festugière 1981, 1, 24 for a collection
of antique sources linking Pythagoras with the Egyptians. Isocrates (Busiris 28) says that Pythagoras
obtained all his wisdom from the philosophy of the Egyptians, which he obtained by being initiated
into their mysteries, and was the first to bring it to Greece; cf. Plut. De Is. 10.354e-f; Cic. Fin. V.87;
Philostr. V.A. VI.11; Iamb. V.P. 12, 14, 18. Plutarch also has Pythagoras studying under Zoroaster (On
the Birth of the Soul in Timaeus 1.1012C; cf. Apul. Fl. 15); see Anastos 1948, 282-4 for many ancient
attestations of Zoroaster, Pythagoras, and Plato and their interrelations.
381Pherecydes and Pythagoras were closely linked in the ancient mind, as appears from a number of
sources (see Delatte 1922, 150), some of which make Pherecydes a teacher of Pythagoras (e.g. Iamb.
V.P. 9, 11). Celsus recounts a myth of the Titanomachy from Pherecydes which is interpreted as
concealing wisdom ‘bearing on both the mysteries of the Titans and the Giants. . . and on the [stories]
of Typhon and Horus and Osiris among the Egyptians’ (ap. Orig. Cels. VI.42.29-31). Whether it
is Celsus or Pherecydes who did the interpretation is unclear, but this type of mythical discourse is
typical of the theologos. Celsus describes Pherecydes as ‘much more ancient than Heraclitus’ (ibid.
22-3), which would also tend to place him in the theological, rather than philosophical, time-frame.
382Pythagoras appears as a lawgiver, typical function of the sage, in Porphyry (V.P. 20-22; cf. ). In
Iamblichus’ account he studies under Bias of Priene , one of the traditional Seven Sages of Greece
(V.P. 11), but is the first to call himself ‘philosopher’, having lived on into ‘later times’ (presumably
the beginning of the era of philosophy proper: ibid. 44, 58). On the history of the idea that Pythagoras
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refers to Pythagorean doctrines in the rhetorical mode of ancient wisdom. In the
Gorgias (507d-508b) Socrates, arguing with Callicles about the good life, makes ref-
erence to ideas of universal order and geometric proportion which seem a clear ref-
erence to the Pythagoreans, putting them in the mouths of σοφοί (507e6); Socrates’
visionary account of the ‘higher world’ in the Phædo (107d-114c), about which he
says mysteriously, ‘someone persuaded me of it’ (108c10), may be a similar reference
to Pythagorean doctrines.383
The Transposition of Religion in Middle Platonism
The final key aspect of Platonist perennialism is the most complex, namely the
incorporation, or transposition, of the religious sphere into philosophy, or, speaking
more properly, an increasing mutual interference between the religious and philo-
sophic spheres in Platonist philosophy. This is not to deny the differences between
religion and philosophy; with due regard for the anachronism of the term ‘religion’,
which has no precise Greek equivalent,384 we can say that the Platonists were keenly
aware of the difference between philosophy and religion. Indeed, they were often
keen to articulate this difference, with a philosophic agenda;385 as we shall see in the
following chapter, a lack of philosophic methodology is one of Plotinus’ criticisms of
the Gnostics whom he attacks in Treatise 33. It is rather to note the expansion of the
scope of philosophy increasingly to encompass areas, such as myth, initiation, and
ritual practice, hitherto seen as being the domain of religion.
was the first to call himself ‘philosopher’, see Burkert 1960.
383Kingsley 1995, 88-95.
384See apposite remarks at Cherlonneix 1992, 405-8.
385While the philosophers discussed in the present section all incorporate religious elements into their
philosophy, they do not see the two realms as coterminous. Plutarch is vocal about the difference be-
tween philosophically acceptable religion and superstition (De Is. 352b; 353e; 355e; see Van Nuffelen
2011, 65-71). Numenius shows a critical approach to his use of religious institutions as philosophic
materials (fr. 1a, and see below). Frede argues that Celsus, too, distinguishes between philosophy and
religion, while privileging both as transmitters of the True Account (Frede 1994, 5197-8). A distinction
between ‘philosophical’ and ‘hieratic’ Platonists survives from late antiquity, the latter type privileg-
ing ritual action as key to philosophic attainment (Suda I.159: ἱερατικὴ καὶ φιλοσοφία οὐκ ἀpiὸ τῶν
αὐτῶν ἄρχονται ἀρχῶν. Damasc. In Phd. 123, 113 ff. makes it clear that both parties in this distinction
are what we would call philosophers: Porphyry and Plotinus prefer philosophy, while Iamblichus
Syrianus and Proclus are hieratikoi who prefer hieratikê). The debate between Iamblichus’ De mysteriis
and Porphyry’s Letter to Anebo may be read as a dialogue between the two approaches to philosophy.
See Majercik 1989, 36.
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This subject, while fitting naturally with the themes of esoteric perennialism un-
der discussion, is important enough to merit a separate section of its own. Platonist
use of mystic terminology and ideas, and the philosophical transformation of the
mysteries in the post-Hellenistic period, are of great importance for understanding
Plotinus’ practice of philosophic silence. Plotinus makes extensive use of themes of
purification, initiation, and, of course, silence, drawn from the cultural and literary
heritage of mystic tradition in the Hellenic world, and more specifically from the
Platonist tradition. But for a true appreciation of the weight these themes have for
his literary practice of hiding and revealing we should avoid a reductionist approach
to the indeterminacy of register which these invocations of mystery create.
The term ἄρρητος can serve as an example of the danger of reductionism in this
context. Originally pertaining to a cultic milieu, this term was transformed in Pla-
tonist discourse, coming to refer to ineffability in an absolute sense; but this is not
to say that it ever lost its original cultural associations for a cultured Platonist read-
ing public, or that to invoke the ἄρρητον was ever to invoke only ineffability with-
out also invoking ideas of sacred obligation, initiated secrecy, and the punishments
indissolubly connected with the act of revealing the secret.
There remains always an irreducible element of indeterminacy in Platonist uses
of religious registers and themes: ‘l’arcane des philosophes s’enracine dans la pra-
tique religieuse’.386 Some of the most powerful passages in the dialogues are Plato’s
evocations of mystery initiation, and from Plato onward it is not uncommon to find
philosophers of different schools equating their practice with initiation.387 It is well-
known that in the Middle Platonists we find this equation developed to a thorough
and elaborate extent, and that in Late Platonism it is a standard topos. This section
will survey the evidence, firstly for Middle Platonist equation of philosophy and
386Pépin 1984, 24.
387E.g. Chrysippus SVF 11.1008: philosophic discourses about the gods are τελεταί; Sen. Ep. ad Lucil.
90, 98: Haec eius initiamenta sunt; Heraclit. (Stoicus) Cap. 3. As discussed in the previous chapter,
philosophers earlier than Plato, notably Pythagoras, Parmenides, and Empedocles, also had strong
links with mystery; in these authors, however, we are not faced with philosophy as an established
genre defining its relationship with another cultural institution, but with new forms of discourse
arising in part from a concern with giving accounts of the mysteries and their meaning.
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mystery, and secondly for Middle Platonist readings of mystery and myth as con-
cealed philosophic text. Taken together, these two sets of evidence militate against
a reading which presents these developments as mere window-dressing to more se-
rious philosophic concerns. While not yet showing the sacralised approach to Pla-
tonist philosophy evinced by Iamblichus, Proclus, and other post-Plotinian thinkers
of the tradition, the Middle Platonist uses of mystery themes show a strong move-
ment in that direction, and the indeterminacy of religious language often brings an
element into Platonist discourse that can only be called ‘sacred’.388
This dynamic of sacralisation had complex echoes across the notional bound-
ary between religion and philosophy: the Chaldæan Oracles, a corpus of theological-
philosophic verses originating in the second century CE in the broad milieu of Pla-
tonising religious currents of that time, were written in the literary form of the Clas-
sical hexameter oracle, and were read as oracles by Late Platonists.389 As will appear
below, Late Platonists would refer to the widely-disseminated Oracles as ‘mysteries’;
they were a published locus of philosophic silence.
No esoteric hermeneutic was needed in order to find Platonist metaphysical ideas
in the Oracles - they clearly originate from a source or sources well-versed in Middle
Platonist theory390 - and the Late Platonists were able to find in them a ‘scripture’ of
sorts with which they countered the revelatory claims of their competitors, the ambi-
tious Christian theologians of the third century and onward.391 Proclus, arguing for
the antiquity of the doctrine of the one as first principle, cites the Oracles as ipsissima
verba of the gods: ‘Not only Plato, but the gods themselves called it “the one”’.392 But
already in Middle Platonism the line between the Oracles and philosophic authors
cannot be drawn absolutely: the thought of Numenius is clearly connected with that
of the Oracles, although the nature of the connection - who influenced whom - is
388Cf. Mortley 1972, 588-90; Van Nuffelen 2011, 6-10.
389This thesis follows the edition of Majercik (1989). On the dating and provenance of the Oracles, see
ibid. 3.
390See ibid. 3.
391Cf. Hadot 1987b, 26.
392In Parm. VII V.2, p. 512, 89-94.
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unclear.393 Middle Platonist philosophy and Middle Platonising religion were con-
nected by reciprocal webs of influence, a fact nowhere more clear than in the case
of the Oracles, works attributed to ‘sacred and theurgic’ Chaldæan sages but actu-
ally reflecting Middle Platonist metaphysics, to which they added elaborate ritual
practices that were later reabsorbed by Platonist philosophy as theurgy.
Philosophy As Mystery. The comparison of (Platonist) philosophy to initiation
is very common.394 Most famously, Theon of Smyrna elaborately compares the
course of reading the Platonic dialogues as a step-by-step initiatory process, drawing
on the language of the Phædo (69d) and Phædrus (250c).395 This theme also appears
in Marinus, the biographer of Proclus, whose ‘mystagogy of Plato’ is also based in
a reading of the Platonic texts, and is to be properly prepared for by a course in
the ‘preliminary and lesser mysteries’ of Aristotle.396 In this Platonist topos we see a
complete fusion of the concerns with step-by-step education found in Plato with the
idea of graded initiations drawn from the mystery cults.
This approach is clearly laid out in Plutarch’s On Isis and Osiris. After a discussion
of different ritual vestments used in the mysteries of Isis and Osiris, which he reads
as representing the multiplicity of the world of sense and the unity of the noetic
world, respectively, Plutarch explains:
This is why Plato and Aristotle call this division of philosophy ‘epop-
tic’, since those who through reason have left behind this [realm
of] opinion, mixture, and diversity and spring out into the prima-
ry [realm] of the simple and the immaterial, fully in contact with the
pure truth of it, suppose that they possess the summation of philos-
ophy, as through an initiation (θιγόντες ὅλως τῆς piερὶ αὐτὸ καθαρᾶς
ἀληθείας οἷον ἐν τελετῇ τέλος ἔχειν φιλοσοφίας νομίζουσι.).397
393Majercik 1989, 1; Athanassiadi 2002, 274.
394See generally Pépin 1981; Pépin 1984, 29; Dillon 1982, 74-5. Graf 2003, 4-8, 19-20 gives a useful
survey of modern scholarly reception of the concept of mystery initiation; the present discussion
makes reference not to the historical realities of the ritual side of initiation, but to the Platonists’
equation of philosophy with initiation.
395Expos. rer. math. 14.18 ff.
396Marin. Procl. 13, in Edwards 2000, 76. As Lamberton notes, Proclus’ own commentary on the
Republic of Plato frequently approaches the hermeneutics of Platonic reading in terms drawing on
initiatory language (1995, 146).
39777.382d-e. Note the word-play on τελετῇ and τέλος, blending conceptions of ‘perfection’, ‘consum-
mation’ present in both terms, and importing one of ‘initiation’ into the latter; cf. Pl. Phdr. 249c8-10.
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Platonist philosophy, then, could be likened to initiation, through the structural par-
allel of a graded, sequential approach, and, like initiation, it had a final, supreme
goal, in which ideas of perfection and culmination were blended with notions of the
sacred and the secret.398
The idea of philosophy as a graded, privileged course of instruction was the nor-
mal Platonist approach, developed in part from the Platonic materials surveyed in
Chapter Two.399 We possess a Platonist curriculum from late antiquity, the anony-
mous Prolegomena to the Philosophy of Plato, which lays out a set course for read-
ing Plato’s dialogues, starting with the more basic (to Late Platonist eyes) ethical
questions and culminating in the ‘physics’ of the Timaeus and the ‘theology’ of the
Parmenides.400 Many other works indicate that such an approach was the norm.401
Porphyry was very interested in notions of step-by-step philosophic progress,402
and his ordering of the Enneads is structured as a curriculum, moving as it does
from ‘down-to-earth’ questions and culminating in the sixth Ennead, dealing with
the one.403
References to a ‘culmination’ or final goal of philosophy abound in the Platon-
ists, as does the denial of the possibility of attainment for those who have not fol-
lowed the proper course of education;404 a threefold division of education into eth-
ical, physical, and metaphysical components was common,405 the last of which we
Καθαρᾶς ἀληθείας, in this context, is probably an echo of the mystery theme of purification; see p. 57
above.
398Interesting in this context are two quotations by late Platonists of Heraclitus’ famous statement
that ‘nature loves to hide’ in an initiatory context, noted by Pépin (1984, 29 n. 53): Jul. Orat. VII
11.216b-e and Procl. In R. II p. 107, 5-14 Kroll.
399Cf. Hadot 1979, 221; 1981, 56-7; Hadot (I.) 1987; Lloyd 1990, 4-5.
400See Clarke et al. 2003, xxiii. This text has been attributed to Olympiodorus (Rappe 2000, 4). Cf.
Aulus Gellius’ report that Taurus the Middle Platonist’s course consisted in reading Plato in a certain
order (I.9[16]9-10).
401E.g. Enn. I.2[19]; Macrob. In somn. I, 8, 3-11 attributes his division of virtues to Plotinus; Olymp.
In Phd. 23, 25 ff. & 45, 14 ff.
402Abst. I.29-30; see Hadot 1981, 57. Sent. 17, 32; see Rappe 2000, 17-18.
403See Hadot 1993, 122; De Haas 2003, 255.
404See Plut. Def. or. 23; Quaest. conv. 8.2; Alcin. Didask. 187.7. Plotinus’ attack on the Gnostics is
instructive in this regard; see 144 below.
405Plut. De Is. 382d; Theo Sm. Expos. rer. math. p. 14 Hiller; cf. Clem.Al. Strom. I, 36, 176, 1-2. See
Hadot 1993, 122.
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have seen Plutarch refer to as the ‘epoptic’, or initiatory, stage of learning.406 Philo
of Alexandria’s works outline a very strict system of graded privileging of knowl-
edge, which would seem to draw on Platonic and Pythagorean themes as well as
Rabbinic practices, and which is expressed in vocabulary drawing on Hellenic mys-
teria.407 As with the later Platonists, the upper levels of Philo’s schema of knowledge
are self-hidden due to the ineffable nature of his god.408
The specific themes of silence associated with the mysteries also abound in the
Middle Platonists. Plutarch evokes them often, and van Nuffelen has analysed the
ways in which Plutarchian characters strengthen their dialectical position at times
by appeals to initiated silence, in effect creating unanswerable arguments: an in-
terlocutor in a Plutarchian dialogue may break off the development of a chain of
argumentation with an appeal to initiated silence, which serves not to concede or
suspend the debate, but typically as a kind of dialectical coup de grâce.409
Relevant here is Apuleius’ Apology, where the author tells the jurors at his trial on
charges of practising magic, ‘I will not speak of those high and divine Platonic [doc-
trines], known only to the most select among the pious, and otherwise unknown,
to all the profane.’410 Apuleius repeatedly invokes the philosophic arcanum, Plato’s
theological doctrines, as a kind of mystic secret which he is not at liberty to discuss,
thereby both avoiding answering all of the prosecution’s questions and laying claim
to the moral high ground. The appeal to mystic secrecy, then, could be used as a
strategic element of debate, philosophic and otherwise.
Mystic silence also came to stand more generally for the kind of elitism discussed
above, whereby the philosopher had a duty to protect the arcana of the higher realms
of philosophic attainment from the masses. In Oration 4 Maximus of Tyre argues that
poetry and philosophy are the same endeavour (1 et passim), except that the latter has
406Plut. De Is. 77.382d-e; Alex. 7.5, 668ab.
407See Casel 1919, 74-78 for a collection of testimonia.
408Ibid. 77-78.
409Van Nuffelen 2007.
410Apul. Apol. 12. Cf. ibid. 12, 13, 55, 56, 64, 80, other examples of ‘initiated silence’. ‘Pious’
and ‘profane’ are both somewhat vitiated terms of translation here; it should be emphasised that
the religious virtue and exclusion being invoked here are traditional Roman concepts, lacking any
Christian overtones.
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unwisely divested the former of its enigmas, leaving contemporary philosophers in
danger of being arrested for profaning the mysteries (ibid. 5). Much later, Proclus
theorises the philosophic use of secrecy and myth as a ‘screen’ (piαραpiετασμα) between
truth and the profane;411 for him, the relationship between philosophic secrecy and
mystic initiatory silence is one of equivalence.
But already in Apuleius the dividing line between the self-hiding secret of the in-
effable nature of god and the mystic arcanum is difficult to find. Discussing the nature
and incommunicability of the highest principle in his On Plato, Apuleius paraphras-
es Timaeus 28c 3-5,412 changing Plato’s ‘impossible to tell to everyone’ to ‘impossible
to reveal to the masses’ (εἰς piολλοὺς ἐκφέρειν ἀδύνατον).413 This change imports both
an increase in elite esotericism, τοῦς piολλοὺς carrying a pejorative sense absent in
the original piάντας,414 and the theme of the undivulgeable secret, through the mystic
technical term ἐκφέρειν,415 but in a context not of secrecy, but of ineffability. In his
Apology, by contrast, Apuleius emphasises the secret nature of the higher realms of
philosophy, which he treats as mystic secrets, citing the same Platonic passage as
justification.416 In this latter case, far from implying that Plato means to say that his
god is ineffable, he implies that it might well be spoken of, but that piety forbids
doing so. These two differing uses of the same Platonic material illustrate two main
sides of Platonist philosophic silence: the act of revealing an open secret, in this case
an ineffable reality, and the act of hiding a ‘secret’, in this case a mystic/philosophic
obligation. The unsayable and the ineffable begin to merge in Apuleius’ text, and it
is impossible to say precisely where the cultic prohibition ends and the ineffability
begins.
The practice of evoking mystic silence in philosophy served as a regular means of
reminding anyone who was paying attention of the existence of ‘secret knowledge’.
Plutarch’s On Isis and Osiris refers tantalisingly to cultic practices which, however,
411Lamberton 1995, 147-50, discussing Procl. In R. I p. 74, 12-30 Kroll.
412Cited 158 below.
413Pl. 1.5. This change noted by Mortley 1972, 589.
414As argued by Mortley (1972, 589).
415On this term, see 58 above.
416Apol. 68, and see citations at n. 410.
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must be omitted in his description as they are initiatory secrets.417 Later Platonists
increasingly used the language of initiation publically to ‘hide’ the truth: the Emper-
or Julian refers to the Chaldæan doctrine of the elevation of the soul (a reference to
the openly-published Chaldæan Oracles) as an initiatory secret;418 Proclus alludes (In
R. II.119.5) to λόγοι ἱερατικοί which can separate the soul from the body, but which
must be kept secret for reasons of initiated silence.
The widespread use of mystic motifs in this connection, emphasising the struc-
tural parallel between the secrecy imposed upon the initiand of traditional cult and
the restricted access to the higher levels of philosophic wisdom, theorised as the
privilege of the Platonist elite, served as an important tool for the acquisition of so-
cial capital by these philosophers. In Plotinus, the elite philosophic achievement
would be brought to an even more exalted level through the postulation of ineffable
states of being and knowing, attained to through the ascent up the chain of being;
these states are ineffable, and so self-hiding, but still described with the terminolog-
ical resources developed by Plato and the Middle Platonists from the mysteries. As
in the culture of initiation, the acquisition of the Platonist telos, whether inscribed
upon the act of reading and study (as exemplified in the curricula of later antiquity
and their ‘sacralisation’ by later Platonists) or upon inner states of philosophic pow-
er (such as the achievement of noêsis, with its claims to direct and unimpeachable
truth, or union with the one in Plotinus), is defined by these authors as conferring a
special status.
Mystery As Philosophy. The Platonists not only assimilated their philosophic
practice to mystery initiation; they also read the mystery cults as esoteric philo-
sophical texts. As we have seen, a key theme of Platonist perennialism was the
idea of ancient founding-figures, lawgivers and theologians. There was a tenden-
cy among Platonists to look to mysteries, both Hellenic and ‘barbarian’, in search
of Platonist wisdom hidden within their rites and ordinances, not least their prac-
tice of silence. The mysteries were ‘absorbed’ by Platonist philosophy and became
417E.g. 21.359c; 35364e.
418Orat. V, 172 A ff.
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part of the perennial wisdom as a whole.419 Platonism subsumed certain religious
practices, notably the mysteries, but also myth more generally, under the wing of
philosophy, rendering it in effect an esoteric textual source which might be drawn
on for philosophic truths.
Perennial Wisdom in the Mysteries. Instances of Platonists ‘reading’ the mysteries
in this way are many. Although no examples of Numenius’ hermeneutic survive, we
have a programmatic statement from the first book of his lost On the Good which lays
out his approach: firstly, having discussed the ‘testimonies of Plato’ and having gone
back further and linked them to statements of Pythagoras, Numenius then proposes
to discuss the initiations, teachings, and rituals that such nations as the Brahmans,
Jews, Magi, and Egyptians have established. This is not an uncritical reading of
the religious tradition: Numenius proposes to refer to ‘such [traditions] as are in
agreement with Plato.’420 Read in a modern light, this reads almost like an admis-
sion on Numenius’ part that he is constructing a tradition, but in the hermeneutic
world of Middle Platonism it is a methodologically-sound way of interrogating tra-
ditional sources. The wording ταῖς μαρτυρίαις ταῖς Πλάτωνος indicates Plato’s place
as a ‘witness’ to, rather than an originator of, the tradition, despite the methodolo-
gy being framed in terms of agreement with Plato, and, indeed, despite Numenius’
central debt to Plato as a thinker.421 The approach is typically perennialist, both in
its thematic use of Pythagoras and barbarian races and in its inscription of Plato’s
work into an esoteric tradition. Celsus refers to the ἀρχαῖος λόγος handed down
by the Egyptians, Assyrians, Indians, and Eleusinians, which, in light of the last-
mentioned group, we may safely assume to refer to mystery traditions.422 Plutarch
refers to piαλαιὰ φυσιολογία (perhaps ‘ancient natural science’) transmitted in enig-
mas in the Orphic poems and the accounts given by the Phrygians and Egyptians;423
419See Van Nuffelen 2011, 37-45. Cf. Stroumsa 1996a, 51-2.
420Fr. 1a. Cf. Van Nuffelen 2011, 78-80.
421See Frede 1987, 1044-8 on Numenius’ debt to Plato.
422Cels. ap. Orig. Cels. 1.14.
423Plut. fr. 157.16-25 Sandbach = Euseb. Praep. 3.1.1.83c. Discussed at Boys-Stones 2001, 108. For
enigma, see 124 ff. below.
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again, philosophic wisdom is esoterically concealed in the texts and ‘accounts’ of
ancient mystery practitioners, and again they are oriental ‘barbarians’.
Plutarch’s general approach to the mysteries as sources of philosophic wisdom
has been analysed by van Nuffelen.424 On Isis and Osiris is a good example of
this kind of reading of culture; it looks not only at myths and mystic lore, but at
ritual vestments, temple-architecture, and the way of life of the Egyptian priests,
all of which are read as transmitting esoteric meaning. In this way, the Platonist
hermeneutic is applied to the cultural institution of initiatory religion in the broadest
sense.
It is notable that in the surviving texts of Middle Platonism this kind of exegesis
is commonly applied to ‘barbarian mysteries’. The Hellenic mysteries were often
seen as stemming from oriental originals,425 and, in the stories of Greek philoso-
phers learning at the feet of barbarian sages, it is often a case of their being initiated
into their mysteries; both Pythagoras and Plato are said to have done so.426 We might
justifiably ask whether the widespread idea of ‘barbarian philosophy’,427 referred, in
part at least, to non-Greek religious practices and ideas, which the Platonist perenni-
alists read as philosophical in the same sense as they read their own myths and rites,
i.e., as being founded by ancients with true knowledge, and thus containing an eso-
teric philosophy. This question cannot be answered here, but deserves further study
with perennialism in mind as a key element of the intellectual context of Hellenic
observers of oriental cultures.
Revealing the Secret. Van Nuffelen draws attention to the fact that Plutarch both
emphasises the secret nature of the mysteries under discussion and reveals them in
424Van Nuffelen 2011, 55-6 (more generally 55-65).
425This was by no means an empty conceit: for the widespread mysteries of Demeter, including those
of Eleusis, ‘we can assume a common structural base stretching out beyond Greece to the Meter cult
of Asia Minor’ (Burkert 1983, 256).
426E.g. Hecatæus of Abdera, cited n. 360 on both Pythagoras and Plato; Iamb. V.P. 12, 14, 18, 19 on
Pythagoras.
427E.g. Porph. Plot. 3, 13-19.
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the course of his philosophical exegesis.428 Plutarch repeatedly underlines the se-
crecy of the sacred rites under discussion in On Isis and Osiris,429 but the work as a
whole examines and reveals them in detail. Just as this work contains initiated si-
lences (where Plutarch refers to a secret and refrains from saying more),430 it likewise
abounds in the acts of simultaneous hiding and revealing, as when Plutarch reveals
the identity of Hades and Osiris which the Egyptian priests are said to consider as
an initiated secret, a fact which he repeatedly emphasises.431
We know from a passage of Macrobius’ On the Dream of Scipio that Numenius
interpreted the Eleusinian mysteries philosophically. The passage is worth quoting
in full:
Again, dreams disclosed the displeasure of the divinities to Nume-
nius (who among philosophers is rather curious about occult mat-
ters), because while interpreting the Eleusinian rites he made them
public; it seemed to him that he saw the Eleusinian goddesses them-
selves, standing in harlots’ clothing before an open brothel. And
when he marvelled at this and demanded the reasons for a disgrace
not befitting divinity, they responded in anger that they had been vi-
olently dragged away from the sanctuary of their chastity and had
been prostituted to all comers by Numenius himself.432
It is interesting to speculate on how this anecdote was transmitted to Macrobius.
It may have been related by Numenius himself; in light of the play of the ‘secret
revealed’ trope in Platonist writings, we can by no means rule out its inclusion in the
very work which discussed the rites in question! If so, this dream-anecdote would
serve as an example of the motif of divine punishment attendant upon breaking the
mystic silence, a common topos often found in other published sources which might
themselves be seen as revealing at least some of the secret wisdom.433 If the anecdote
comes from another source, it might represent the view that Numenius had gone too
428Van Nuffelen 2011, 57-8.
4292.351e-352b; see discussion op. cit.
430See n. 417 above.
43178.382e-f. See further examples op. cit. 58.
432I.2[19]19; p. 7, 23-8, 3 Willis.
433See above, n. 154.
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far in his interpretation (either in his own judgement or in some other observer’s)
and passed the bounds of propriety in his interpretive revelations.
The dynamics of hiding and revealing, then, surely had limits, just as did the
practice of hermeneutically interpreting religious institutions as philosophy; but in
both cases it is difficult to reconstruct what these limits might have been. Doubtless
they varied from place to place and from thinker to thinker.434 It is however possible
to gain substantial insights into the way the Platonists themselves discuss esoteric
interpretation, which will go some way toward divining the boundaries of hiding
and revealing in Middle Platonism.
Esoteric Hermeneutics in Middle Platonism
We have seen how the Platonists interrogated poets, myths and rituals for hid-
den, inner meanings, and that they saw philosophy as providing the interpretive key
which rendered these meanings intelligible. We have discussed the belief that the an-
cient sages who had founded religious traditions had hidden these secret meanings
from the masses. From the surviving literature it seems that in the eyes of the Pla-
tonists these sages had done so using a very specific type of discourse, most often
termed αἴνιγμα.435 The ancient Greeks seem generally to have laboured under the
‘intentional fallacy’; that is, they believed that if something is found in a text, it must
have been put there intentionally by the author.436 With the exception of Plutarch,
who occasionally shows a remarkably sophisticated grasp of the way in which read-
ers construct meaning in a text, there is little evidence that Platonist philosophers
did not take their view of history seriously and even literally.437 We turn now to
their methods of interpreting it.
434Cf. Lamberton 1995, 150.
435Important general works on enigma and esoteric interpretation among the Platonists are Pépin
1976; Lamberton 1989; Lamberton 1995.
436Lamberton 1989, 21 suggests that certain Stoics may have understood the active role played by
readers in bringing their own meanings to texts.
437Plut. De aud. po. 34b discusses with approval the Stoic Chrysippus’ view that a certain intertextu-
ality might be exercised in interpretation, and that the reader might actively ‘expand’ the meaning of
the text ἐpiὶ piλέον τῶν λεγομένων (Lamberton 1989, 21, n. 54).
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Enigma, Symbolon, and Esoteric Hermeneutics. Enigma was a term current in
Alexandrian rhetorical science in the first centuries CE, indicating allegoresis, espe-
cially in Homer;438 it was a trope indicating an obscure meaning in need of scholarly
explication.439 The term had a parallel history in philosophy. Aristotle in his Poetics
defines enigma as a use of impossible or contradictory language to describe a fact;440
the classic formulation of a riddle. But his comment in the Rhetoric that μεταφοραὶ
γὰρ αἰνίττονται broadens his conception: the verb αἰνίττομαι refers to a metaphorical
transference of meaning across semantic spheres, not simply to riddling in its ba-
sic form.441 The term appears in Plato, mainly indicating philosophical problems or
aporiai, a usage not unlike the modern ‘enigma: a conundrum’.442 However, as we
have seen, Tht. 152c refers to an esoteric discourse rather than an aporia as such, and
in the Second Epistle unmistakably refers to a riddling sort of discourse (see 75 and
77 above, respectively).
The dictionary definition of αἴνιγμα as ‘dark saying, riddle’, etc.443 misses these
nuanced meanings from early Athenian philosophy. It also ignores the later devel-
opment of the word in Platonist exegesis, whereby it took on a specific technical
force. Αἴνιγμα in this context is neither a riddling way of speaking, a problem in need
438Charrue 1978, 29. Cook 2001 provides a survey of enigma in antique rhetorical theory.
439Cf. Charrue 1978, 38: ‘C’est d’abord un terme de rhétorique désignant la contradiction discursive
à dépasser pour que les significations partielles incompatibles soient réconciliées en une vision unifi-
ante. . . ’. Cf. Eon 1970, 274. Cook 2001, esp. 355 ff. offers further history of enigma as a trope in Greek
and Latin literature.
440Po. 22, 1458a 26.
441Rh. 1405ab. Cf. Charrue 1978, 38.
442Chrm. 161c-162b; Ap. 27a1; R. 1.332b12 (see Eon 1970, 274 n. 67); R. 332b (see Casel 1919, 38).
443LSJ s.v.
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of solution, nor exactly a form of allegoresis, but a type of esoteric text.444 Lamber-
ton points out the the ancient meaning of ἀλληγορία is ‘. . . broader [than the modern]
and more difficult to define’, and ‘. . . can comprehend virtually the whole of what
we call interpretation beyond mere parsing.’445 In what follows I argue that enig-
ma, for the Platonists, is not primarily allegory, but of course it would fit under such
a broad definition of allegory as this. The main thrust of my argument is that the
concept of enigma involves a concept of esotericism; thus, I am attempting to show
not so much that enigma is not comprehended by this or that definition of allegory,
but that it has a specific common feature that a given instance of allegory may or
may not have. In Plotinus, and, I would argue, already in Middle Platonism, enigma
signifies something different and very specific.
In Platonist enigma there is a text, most often a myth, but possibly a ritual or an-
other religious institution, with a deeper, true meaning, posited as hidden within that
text or institution, encoded enigmatically (ἐν αἰνίγμασι or ᾐνιγμένως).446 Αἴνιγμα takes
place through a mode of reading or interpretation which extracts hidden meanings
from texts, but it is important to remember that the enigma itself is read as presup-
posing a notional act of hiding by the original author. Enigmatic reading implies the
previous existence (or present construction, depending upon the standpoint from
which one reads) of enigmatic writers or, in the case of rituals read in these terms, of
enigmatic founders.
444The definition proposed differs somewhat from the general scholarly approach to Platonist enig-
ma, which tends not to separate it starkly from enigma as an ancient term of rhetoric (e.g. Lamberton
1989, 48, who defines αἰνίττομαι as ‘to hint at, indicate by means of symbols’; Mortley 1973, App. II;
Eon 1970, 274; Charrue 1978, 38). On ancient allegoresis, see Casel 1919, 42-48; Pépin 1976; Lamberton
1989, 20-1. In some early uses, such as the αἰνιγματώδης writing of the Orphic poet decoded by the
author of the Derveni papyrus (col. VII.5), the term does seem to indicate a fairly straightforward
allegorical reading, where gods stand for physical elements (Pap. Derv. col. xiii, xiv; cf. Seaford
1986, 21-22). While it is true that a Platonist enigma can indicate such an allegorical equivalence (as,
for example, Plut. De Is. 55.373e), it more often indicates a much looser metaphorical link between
signifier and signified: a ritual action may point to a doctrine of immortality, a myth may indicate
a complex philosophic doctrine, or, sometimes, a doctrine may mean something other than what it
seems to mean.
445Lamberton 1989, 20-1.
446The latter term appears at Enneads IV.3[49]12.26; VI.2[19]22.1.
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This chapter has investigated the likely Platonist candidates for such a method-
ology: ancients, theologians, and poets (the poets and theologians being often con-
flated), but a most interesting development that we find in Plotinus is the exten-
sion of this term to the writings of philosophers. This approach is adumbrated in
Plutarch, for whom both logoi and mythoi are susceptible to enigmatic reading.447 As
discussed in the following chapter, Plotinus expands these tentative strategies to a
wide-ranging esoteric hermeneutic: for Plotinus, Plato himself writes in enigmas,
and not only in his mythologising passages. Unlike ‘riddling speech’, whereby an
author might be purposefully unclear to hide his meaning, the enigma does not usu-
ally advertise itself until it is explicated by the philosophic reader; it is read as being
‘truly hidden’ until it is brought to light, a dynamic of reading which always priv-
ileges the interpreter (and therefore his reader) as somehow worthy of disclosing
what the original author meant to hide.
Casel sees the key difference between Stoic allegory and Platonist reading of
myth to be that the Stoics attempt to subject every element of myth to a rationalist
interpretation of equivalence, and see the mythic form as a mere ‘garment’ for philo-
sophic truths; the Platonists, by contrast, embrace myth as a form of discourse with
an ability to convey certain truths which rational language cannot encompass.448
There is some justice in this as regards Plato’s own appreciation of myth449 and in,
for example, Plutarch,450 but we should not let the sophisticated Platonist appreci-
ation of mythos as a mode of discourse blind us to the Platonists’ sometimes insen-
sitive approach to mythic materials, quite often reading them merely as ‘containers’
for philosophic truths. It should also be noted that enigma is sometimes seemingly
447De Is. 9.354b-c: the Egyptian philosophy expressed truths enigmatically in both modes of dis-
course; see Froidefond 1988, 81-2; 90. Ibid. 32.365f: a Pythagorean gnomic statement enigmatically
expresses a Plutarchan doctrine. But most often in Plutarch an enigma is a myth hiding a philosophic
truth, as at e.g. De Is. 11.355b.
448Casel 1919, 44-5. Cf. e.g. Plut. De Is. 36.365b-40.367c, where Plutarch interprets Egyptian myth
firstly as in elemental and astronomical terms, and approach which, he says, “resembles the theology
of the Stoics” (40.366c; cf. How to Read Poetry 4 19e-f, where the physical allegorical approach is criti-
cised), and then goes on to give his own, metaphysically abstract interpretation, which he presents as
a palaios logos expressed in an enigma.
449See Phdr. 229c; R. 378d.
450De Is. 20.358e-f.
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used as practically synonymous with ‘myth’.451 In short, allegory and enigma are
closely related, both generally linked to readings of myth, and often spill over into
each other; nevertheless, the Platonist practice of reading enigmas is characteristic
enough, in general, to demand a definition which emphasises the esoteric character
inherent in this mode of reading as distinguished from allegory.452
Quintilian’s characterisation of enigma as allegoria, quae est obscurior453 may point
us toward a concise working definition. Noting that obscurus may mean not only
“obscure” but also “closed, secret, reserved”,454 we can expand on Quintilian’s com-
ment and say that Platonist enigma, like allegorical reading, locates truth beneath
the surface of the text, but that the trope is not complete without the notional act of
breaking a written silence, of unearthing a secret.455
The term symbolon and its cognates seems to be a related, but different, term of es-
oteric discourse in Platonist eyes. It is associated with the Pythagoreans, as we have
seen, and is also very often linked with Egypt, especially with the hieroglyphic writ-
ing;456 Pythagoras is sometimes described as having learned the ‘symbolic method’
in Egypt from the priests there457 (interestingly, in the Neopythagorean Philo we
find the same account given of Moses).458 It is difficult to characterise exactly how
451Stroumsa (1996b, 271-83) argues that the terms myth and enigma were ‘identified’ in late antiquity,
but fails to note certain occurrences, discussed below, where Platonist enigma is applied not to myth
at all, but to symbolic actions, to architecture, or even, in certain Plotinian examples, to the texts of
Plato’s Parmenides and Republic, philosophic dialectic at its driest and least mythic.
452On late antique theories of the relationship between allegory and enigma see Cook 2001, 258-60.
453Inst. VIII.6.52.
454OLD s.v.
455Cf. Froidefond 1988, 90: ‘l’αἴνιγμα, qui implique qu’on a délibérément chargé un rite ou un mythe
d’un sens caché, différent du sens apparent.’ See also the useful discussion at Stroumsa 1996a, 12-
26. My understanding of Platonist enigma differs from that of Charrue (1978, 25 ), who sees enigma
simply as a technical term for allegorical exegesis. While the Stoics often carried out their allegorical
interpretations through the construction of straightforward equivalencies, they were by no means
always strangers to the idea that the narratives and rituals under scrutiny were esoterically hidden
by their original propounders; Chaeremon’s reading of the mysteries seems to have been one such
approach (Chaeremon Test. 9 Horst = Porph. Chr. fr. 39 Harnack; ibid. fr. 12). The contrast I am
drawing here is therefore one of characteristic generalities of approach.
456Chaerem. Stoic. fr. 2; Plut. De Is. 10.354e; cf. Plot. Enn. V.8[31]6.1.
457Plut. De Is. 10.354e. Iamb. V.P. 20, quoting Apollonius of Tyana, says that Pythagoras’ and the
Egyptians’ symbolic methods are identical; cf. Porph. V.P. 12.
458Ph. de vita Mos. I 23: Moses learned τὴν διὰ συμβόλων φιλοσοφίαν, ἣς ἐν τοῖς λεγομενένοις ἱεροῖς
γράμμασιν ἐpiιδείκνθνται. Philo elsewhere attributes symbolic discourse to the Pythagoreans (Quod
omnis prob. lib. 3) and the Essenes (ibid. 82). In the light of the Egyptian or Pythagorean character
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a symbolon functions in terms of Platonist reading, although there is no doubt that a
hidden meaning is involved; more research into the term’s exact parameters will be
welcome.459 Philo gives a very useful comment in this regard: ‘Another sense (nous)
is shown to have an esoteric meaning (enigmatôdê logon) by the symbolon; symbola are
open statements [the true meanings of] which are not clear and not apparent.’460 For
Philo, then, symbolon is a subcategory of enigma.461 For the present discussion, we
may note that the term symbolon is a mode of esoteric discourse associated with the
Pythagoreans and the Egyptians (specifically, the Egyptian temple-cult), along with
the exceptional Philonic Moses; we never find, to my knowledge, a symbolic method
practised by Plato or by Hellenic myth-makers.
It is with enigma that the Platonists are most concerned. Plutarch’s On Isis and
Osiris is full of the enigmatic method, as we might expect from the foregoing discus-
sion; a wide range of Egyptian myths and practices are subjected to the searchlight
of philosophical decoding, and, while a whole range of hermeneutic terms are de-
ployed by Plutarch, enigma preponderates by far; many examples have been cited
in the course of this chapter, and many more might be.462 Indeed, Plutarch’s work in
general constitutes our best surviving example of enigmatic interpretation in Middle
Platonism if we set aside Philo of Alexandria.
of symbolic discourse in seemingly all other antique sources, this last attribution of Philo should be
seen as an appropriation, for the Jews, of a form of esoteric transmission of wisdom from cultural
traditions of a known and respected antiquity and authority in Hellenic, and especially in Platonist,
milieus. Further research into his use of the symbolon would doubtless shed light both on Philo’s use
of Neopythagorean material and identity and his depiction of the Jews’ relationship to the Egyptians.
459Froidefond 1988, 90 essays to define the term in Plutarch as: ‘. . . prise comme répresentation
concrète d’une abstraction . . . ’. While accurate, this describes rather than defines the trope. Coulter
1976, 60-68 is an important discussion of the symbolon as a hermeneutic term in Platonism.
460De spec. leg. I 200.
461Cf. Quod omnis prob. lib. 3: the Pythagorean command not to walk on the well-frequented road ‘in-
dicates esoterically through a symbol’ (αἰνιττόμενος διὰ συμβόλου) that one should keep silent about
philosophic matters before the masses. Cf. Froidefond 1988, 90, who sees the terms enigma, sym-
bolon, and mythos as being used interchangeably in Plutarch’s On Isis and Osiris. At Plutarch De Is.
10.354e the enigma and symbolon do seem to blend, along with mystêriôdes, into a vague assertion of
Pythagorean and Egyptian esotericism.
462Froidefond 1988, 81-88; 79 n. 2; see ibid. for a list of passages employing αἰνίττονται and cognate
terms.
ESOTERIC HERMENEUTICS IN MIDDLE PLATONISM 129
Philo is a deeply esoteric reader; for him, the delivery of the truth in an ‘un-
adorned and naked’ form is the work of unreflective, work-shirking, and unphilo-
sophic practitioners.463 For Philo, Moses does not narrate myths, but ‘typological
exempla calling on (the reader) to use allegorical explication as to the subtextual
meanings’.464 Moses is assimilated by Philo to the Hellenic model of the theolo-
gian founder-figure: not only a prophêtês, he is a theologos.465 The lawgiver αἰνίττεται
constantly;466 the Mosaic laws are all to be read esoterically by the philosophically-
adept.467 We may note that, while scripture generally has overt and hidden sides
for Philo,468 the term enigma is evoked specifically in the Mosaic context to indi-
cate the esoteric writing of a lawgiver who wished to hide the deeper meaning from
those unsuitable to hear it. Again, enigma is read as an act of hiding in the distant
past made manifest by philosophical reading; again, the Philonic text, by drawing
attention to the enigma, is in effect breaking the silence so wisely instituted by the
founder.
The Limits of Esoteric Reading in Middle Platonism. In an important article
Robert Lamberton has approached the question of a Neoplatonist tradition in terms
of esoteric reading: where the Late Platonists posited and then read a secret peren-
nial wisdom in their canonical texts, Lamberton sees an esoteric hermeneutic at
work, and it is precisely this hermeneutic, in Lamberton’s analysis, which consti-
tutes the ‘Platonist tradition’.469 Lamberton sees this hermeneutic tendency as typ-
ical among the later Platonists, but suspects, with some justification, that it was the
rule throughout the Middle Platonist period;470 he even goes far as to suggest that
463De opif. m. 1 ff.: ἀκαλλώpiιστα καὶ γυμνά. The present discussion is based on Casel 1919, 79-81, who
collects a broad range of Philonic passages related to his hermeneutic method.
464This seems a just rendering of the rather obscure δείγματα τύpiων ἐpi΄ ἀλληγορίαν piαρακαλοῦντα κατὰ
τὰς δι΄ ὑpiονοιῶν ἀpiοδόσεις (ibid. 157).
465De vit Mos. II 115.
466Ibid. 154 et saepissime.
467See Casel 1919, 79.
468E.g. ἡ ῥητή and ἡ δι΄ ὑpiονοιῶν: de Abrah. 88 ff.
469Lamberton 1995, 150-1 et passim. Lamberton makes this claim in a more nuanced manner than I
have paraphrased it here.
470Ibid. 151.
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when Platonists refer to the unwritten doctrines of Plato they are referring, ‘. . . in an
easily-intelligible way, to a tradition of interpretation.’471
Lamberton doubts that there is a set of interpretive rules which might span Pla-
tonism as a movement: ‘There was certainly no uniform hermeneutics at work here.’
We are again faced with the problem of the limits of interpretation. But he notes that
the idea of a secret writing is indeed a constant across the range of materials which
the Platonists used.472 There are perhaps some guidelines which can be discerned
in the multifarious instances of Platonist esoteric reading, based precisely on the act
of esoteric reading itself. It is instructive to apply the typology of Joseph Katz, an
assiduous observer of mystical traditions in religious movements, to Platonist enig-
matic reading. The similarities between the two types of esoteric hermeneutic are
instructive, as are the differences.
Katz suggests that hermeneutics in mystical traditions tend to follow five basic
rules:
(1) First, each tradition holds that there are things that the canonical texts do
not (and could not) claim and do not (and could not) teach.
(2) Second, each mystical tradition recognizes specific texts as canonical, and
not others.
(3) Moreover, mystical interpretation must at least generally conform to accept-
ed moral rules - and often mystics set far higher standards.
(4) Then, too, when one provides a reading of a canonical text, despite the le-
gitimate interpretational multiformity. . . , the original context of the relevant
scriptural verses has to be taken into account and “respected” (this is a very
broadly interpreted rule).
(5) . . . the mystical interpreter, while searching out the underlying purposes and
truths encoded in the canonical sources, generally acknowledges both the
objective correctness and the value of the exoteric doctrine entailed in the
literal meaning of the authoritative text.473
The first postulate applies throughout Platonist exegesis: no one claims, for exam-
ple, that Plato did not teach the immortality of the soul, or that the dialogues de-
ny the existence of the Forms. Nor could they do so and be taken seriously. The
471Ibid. 144.
472Ibid. 150.
473Katz 2000, 18-20.
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second postulate applies very well to Platonist methods of canon-building, as ex-
plored in the present chapter. Due sensitivity to the differing ways in which Pla-
tonist philosophers and religious thinkers approach, and construct, their canons is
of course needed. The debate over Aristotle mentioned above474 within Middle Pla-
tonism provides a concrete example of the way in which canon-formation worked in
the Platonist milieu through a process of published argument. Aristotle’s eventual
canonisation, conversely, shows how a respect for canonical authority, once estab-
lished, functioned: Aristotle provides exegetic material for Plotinus and the later
Platonists in a way which integrates him with the school of the ancients, even at the
cost of considerable exegetic pains.475 By the same token, we see Middle Platon-
ists hard at work in the effort to define which authors should be excluded from the
canon; the surviving fragments of Numenius’ On the Academy’s Abandonment of Plato
make it clear that this work was a tour de force of this sort of exclusion.476
Katz’s third postulate brings a moral dimension into the exegetic question which
has been absent from this thesis, and the present discussion cannot hope to do justice
to the question of Middle Platonist morality or ethics. This postulate is, nevertheless,
a good fit, with certain reservations. Platonists were never of an antinomian bent;
they seem to have been content to go along with the moral beliefs of society at large
and avoid any conflicts in that regard - perhaps they were inspired in this by the fate
of Socrates. But, of course, Platonism followed Plato in positing a strict ethical code
for philosophers; the philosophers of the Laws and Republic constitute a social class
set apart partly by the stringent ethical purity of their conduct. Platonism, then,
differs from many mystical movements in that, positing ‘far higher standards’, it
exempts itself from the common law; traditional religious observances, for example,
could be scorned by Platonists, who nevertheless found truths hidden within them.
I am aware of the summary character of this treatment of Middle Platonist ethics,
but as ethical questions are far from the central concerns of this thesis, I leave the
474P. 100.
475On Aristotle’s position in Plotinus, see Appendix C, p. 275.
476Ffr. 24-28. See Boys-Stones 2001, 138-42.
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matter here.
The fourth postulate, taken in a Platonist context, applies very well to the Platon-
ists’ historical understanding; regarding esotericism, the main subject of this thesis,
we have seen how Plato’s doctrines, and the doctrines of other privileged founders
of the perennial tradition, were delivered esoterically for what are seen as concrete
historical reasons, and sometimes in a specific historical context. We have seen that
the Platonists read their sources more or less under the influence of the ‘intentional
fallacy’; their readings were concerned with the imagined intention of the original
authors or founders. As the next chapter will show in some detail, Plotinus’ treat-
ment of Plato’s text is better understood when we consider the historical context in
which Plotinus understands it, that is, as coming at the latter phase of a tradition of
perennial wisdom.
Finally, Katz’s fifth postulate is perhaps the best fit with the interpretive strate-
gies outlined in this chapter, and brings up the importance of emphasising that the
esoteric reading of Plato and other canonic sources as hiding deeper truths was not
seen as bringing their overt doctrines into disrepute. This will become very clear
in the following chapter on Plotinus’ hermeneutics of the tradition: again, one nev-
er contradicts the canon, even when one’s reading would in fact seem to distort it
beyond recognition. The extreme lengths of contresens to which Plotinus will go to
preserve the correctness of Plato’s text, while simultaneously reading it as conceal-
ing a different, or even antithetical meaning, are a clear example of this dynamic of
interpretation.
This typology, with due alterations allowing for the special characteristics of the
philosophic genre, and applied in a sensitive fashion, gives some idea of the unwrit-
ten rules of interpretation within which the Middle Platonists read their traditional
forbears. Special care is needed if the rather broad statements of the foregoing chap-
ter as to the absolute authority of the Middle Platonist canon are not to be seen as
somehow equating Middle Platonist reading with the scriptural approaches begin-
ning to arise in Christianity around the same time. An absolute authority arising
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out of philosophic culture in the Roman empire will have always been treated with
what, to Christian eyes, would have seemed like a shocking amount of liberty. Lat-
er Platonists, likewise, saw the Christians’ deference to a set of revealed texts as a
slavish obedience to an untried and probably bad master.
And yet the degree to which a typology formulated for the study of religions is
applicable to a philosophic movement should perhaps not surprise us in the con-
text of Middle Platonism. In their construction of a tradition of truth, their stance
as interpreters of this tradition rather than as innovators, and their incorporation of
plainly religious materials, the Platonists are not only continuing long term trends
intrinsic to philosophy as a genre, but also show aspects of a broad change in ways
of thinking that began in their time and which informed philosophy and new reli-
gious movements. This was the rise of ‘orthodoxy’ as an element in discourse;477 not
orthodoxy understood according to the usage which developed within Christianity,
but the broader change in ways of thinking in the empire which led to the possibil-
ity, and eventually the necessity, of a single tradition being granted primacy, or sole
access to the truth.
The canonisation of tradition in later Platonism was doubtless partly inspired by
the scriptural approach to text which, with the rise of Christianity, became an enemy
strategy to be countered; one battled scripture with counter-scripture.478 This pro-
cess takes an overt form in the religious politics of the emperor Julian,479 but can be
seen in more subtle form in Plotinus.480 I do not wish to suggest that Middle Pla-
tonist exegesis was a ‘religious’ movement, nor that it was on the whole consciously
concerned with countering a perceived threat from any religious group. The threat
of deviation within philosophy itself was generally seen as the much greater threat
to the integrity of the ‘tradition’ than any religious movement, although Celsus’ True
477See Athanassiadi 2002; 2006.
478Cf. e.g. Lamberton 1989, 16; 30.
479See Athanassiadi-Fowden 1981, 121-2 et passim. Salutius’ ‘pagan catechism’ (Athanassiadi-Fowden
1981, 26-7), presumably composed at the emperor’s request, is a heavy-handed example of this, im-
porting a Christian literary form into unfamiliar Hellenic surroundings and attempting to subvert
it.
480See the discussion of Plotinus’ anti-Gnostic polemic in the following chapter.
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Account, among other works, did attack Christianity directly.481 Rather, I am sug-
gesting that one important aspect of canon-building among the Middle Platonists,
the formation and use of an absolute source of authority, was structurally similar to
the ‘scriptural’ approach to canon-building found in contemporary Christian writ-
ers such as Irenaeus, in that it sought to establish a pedigree which was unassailable
because embedded within an unimpeachable canon, and also sought to establish
its pedigree in opposition to its Other, the texts, authors, and ideologies excluded
from the tradition. Some early Christian thinkers made the corresponding opposite
move, and sought to assimilate the prestige of philosophy to Christianity, arguing
that Christian religion was in fact the true philosophy.482 The Middle Platonists and
the early Christian canonists, then, were not for the most part directly confronting
each other in hostility; they were rather both struggling, alongside many other intel-
lectual currents, to make headway in a broad field of intellectual struggle whereon
the developing discourse of ‘orthodox thinking’, with its new requirements, was
being played out.
481The True Account is, by all accounts, the earliest anti-Christian text from any source; see Dillon 1977,
400. At Orig. Cels. 3.10 Celsus specifically attacks the Christians’ lack of unanimity, to be contrasted
with the unanimity of the True Account, the ‘ancient logos which has existed from the beginning,
which has always been maintained by the wisest nations and cities and wise men’ (ibid. I.14).
482See Cox 1983, 18.
Chapter Four: Plotinus and ‘The Ancients’; Tradition, Truth, and
Transcendence
Mystery is neither a set of abstruse doctrines to be taken on faith nor
a secret prize for the initiated. Mystery is a referential openness into
the depths of a particular tradition, and into conversation with other
traditions. The referential openness is fleeting. As Plotinus said, as
soon as one thinks one has it, one has lost it. It is glimpsed only in
the interstices of the text, in the tension between the saying and the
unsaying.483
I have argued that there were certain typical themes which characterised a Pla-
tonist perennialism discernible across a wide spectrum of second-century Platonist
thought. The significance for Plotinus of this line of argument will become clear in
the present chapter. Plotinus, like Plutarch, Numenius, and Celsus, believed in the
wisdom of the ancients, and the Enneads show a thoroughgoing deference and cul-
ture of respect toward the canonic sages of the past. But most importantly for this
thesis, Plotinus applies a hermeneutic of enigma and esoteric meaning to this tra-
dition in a way which seems to have been unprecedented and innovative: like the
Middle Platonists he finds wisdom hidden in myths and rituals, but unlike them, he
also unearths it, with the same methodology, in Plato.
The tradition to which Plotinus allies himself has an ‘open’ side - the realm of
philosophical dialectic, the disputes and liberties proper to a culture of parrhêsia and
the ‘republic of letters’ of Græco-Roman Hellenism484 - but there is no corner of
Plotinian philosophy which is not also informed by an esoteric privileging of knowl-
edge. This chapter will help to nuance and complete our picture of the ‘open’ aspects
of Plotinus’ project with a contextualised understanding of the ways in which the
483Sells 1994, 8.
484The role of Hellenism in Plotinian philosophic silence is discussed 144 ff. below.
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practice of esoteric reading and writing define his relationship to, or construction of,
a perennial tradition.
The Plotinian Idea of Tradition
In light of the well-known remark of Plotinus, cited at the beginning of the pre-
vious chapter, that he is not an innovator but an exegete of the ancients, and of the
evidence presented subsequently for a widespread Platonist tradition of perennial-
ism, it will come as no surprise that Plotinus may profitably be described as a Platon-
ist perennialist. While my formulation of Platonist perennialism is in some respects
new, the fact that Plotinus saw himself as indebted to an immemorial tradition is
well known.485 What remains is to investigate the contours of this putative tradition
in the Enneads, with special emphasis on its esoteric aspects.
To begin with, we must take into account the fact that Plotinus’ writings are
deeply classicising: there is no explicit reference to anyone later than Epicurus in
the Enneads,486 with one important exception to be discussed below. As far as the En-
neads are concerned, the philosophic tradition has been silent for nigh on six hundred
years. But we know from Porphyry that Plotinus’ philosophic seminar made exten-
sive use of near-contemporary authors, especially Middle Platonists and Aristote-
lean commentators; Cronius, Numenius, Alexander of Aphrodisias, and others.487
To modern eyes, then, Plotinus was engaged with theories and debates current in
his time; he was in fact part of quite contemporary developments in philosophy.488
We know that he was accused of plagiarising the works of the second-century Nume-
nius; this is evidence, again, for a contemporary style of thought in his philosophy
as seen by his contemporaries.489 His presentation, however, grounds itself exclu-
sively in authors and traditions of the distant past. The Enneads are presented as in
485Various sides to the question of Plotinus’ self-definition in terms of perennial tradition have had
important treatments by Eon 1970; Charrue 1978; Hadot 1987b, to which the following discussion is
indebted.
486Noted by Charrue 1978, 33.
487Porph. Plot. 14.
488Cf. Dillon 1977, 414.
489Porph. Plot. 17.
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dialogue with the ancients.
The Ancients in Plotinus. When Plotinus refers to ‘the ancients’, οἱ piαλαιοί, he is
referring primarily to philosophers of the Classical period;490 the Presocratic philoso-
phers are sometimes distinguished as the ‘very ancient’ (οἱ piάνυ piαλαιοί)491 and the
‘archaic’ (οἱ ἀρχαίοι).492 As mentioned above, Pythagoras and Pherecydes seem to
straddle the two periods in Platonist eyes, and are sometimes seemingly grouped
among theologoi as well. Plotinus’ vagueness makes it difficult to draw solid lines
between different classes of ancient predecessors, nor is there much evidence that
Plotinus himself drew such lines.493 But the appellation ‘the ancients’ in Plotinus
never serves merely to indicate a period in history; it indicates not only the respect
for antiquity that we would expect from a classicising writer, but also a philosophical
lineage behind which lies a unanimity of doctrine.494 Proof of this may be found in
the fact that the Stoics whom Plotinus wishes to refute, and the Epicureans whom he
heartily attacks, are never, as far as I can see, included among the ancients; instead,
their views may be refuted precisely by the the contrasting views of the ancients.495
The ancients constitute an ancient tradition, a school of thought. Their doctrines
include the Platonist theory of forms,496 and other teachings, which we might call
common Platonist-Pythagorean topoi, such as the immortality of the soul and metempsy-
chosis.497 Plotinus also finds in the ancients his doctrine of the transcendent, inef-
fable one beyond being, the doctrinal point which is most commonly seen as the
490An ‘ancient account’ (piαλαιὸς λόγος) or similar formulation is sometimes cited which would seem
to refer rather to non-philosophical traditions of truth (e.g. the doctrine that the virtues are purifica-
tions which, from the context, is intended as an evocation of mystery tradition [I.6[1]6.1-5]), echoing
Plato’s similar references to ‘ancient accounts’ (e.g. Phd. 69 c3-d2). ‘The ancients’, as such, seems
always to refer to philosophers.
491VI.1[42]1-2, probably citing Thales, Anaximenes, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and
Democritus, although doctrines rather than names are given.
492As at V.1[10]9.
493The τοῖς piάλαι σοφοῖς of Ennead V.1[10]6.4-2-8 are presumably Pythagoreans; cf. IV.3[49]14.5 for
enigma in Pythagoras and his followers. Plotinus’ vagueness with regard to tradition is discussed
below.
494Cf. Charrue 1978, 19.
495E.g. VI.1[42]30.28 ad fin.
496V.8[31]5.24-5.
497VI.4[22]16.4-8: Embodiment, descent and ascent at fixed periods, judgements, and metempsy-
chosis into animal bodies; cf. IV.3[49]25.31-33.
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essential ‘Neoplatonist’ position,498 a point returned to below. Merlan goes as far as
to formulate a concrete lineage of philosophic predecessors for Plotinus: ‘It becomes
obvious that for Plotinus Anaxagoras, Parmenides, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Plato,
and Aristotle belong to the same αἵρεσις, whose founders were Pythagoras and Phere-
cydes.’499 With the problematic exception of Aristotle, these names will be uncontro-
versial to Plotinian scholars;500 while he never defines his lineage in such a straight-
forward manner, Plotinus clearly sees himself as part of a tradition of thinkers some-
thing very like that outlined by Merlan.501 We find hints of a historical approach in
the Enneads which, when taken together, indicate the belief in a decadence in human
affairs; philosophy and knowledge of the truth have been in decline ever since the
most ancient times,502 and Plato is represented, not as the originator, but as a final
iteration, of the pristine tradition of truth.503
The ancients, for Plotinus, have a special status vis à vis philosophical disputa-
tion: in propounding a doctrine, Plotinus tells us, it is important to show that it is
in agreement with that of the ancients, ‘or at least not in disagreement’.504 But Plot-
inus is aware that this may be difficult, as the ancients can contradict one another.
Introducing an inquiry into the nature of time and eternity, Plotinus says:
. . . the statements of the ancients on these matters differ one from
the other, and it may be that the commentaries on these [statements]
also differ; thus we leave off and reckon it sufficient, if asked, if we
are able to say what they [the ancients] thought, happy to be freed
from further inquiry. One must suppose that certain of the ancient
498V.1[10]6.4-2-8; VI.8[39]19.12-19.
4991969, 7. The italics are Merlan’s; Aristotle’s interesting place in the Plotinian lineage is addressed
in Appendix C.
500A glance at the index fontium in the edition of Henry and Schwyzer shows their presence in the
Enneads. The Presocratic philosophers, especially, tend to be used in a superficial and anecdotal way
by Plotinus; his knowledge of their texts may have been based in florilegia of his time rather than in
their full works (so Schwyzer, Real Encyclopaedie XXI, col. 572 s.v. ‘Plotinos’). Nevertheless, there is
no doubt that Plotinus respected them and saw them as members of the ancient tradition, although
he found their ‘archaic’ manner of expression lacking in clarity (see 140 below).
501Cf. Charrue 1978, 19, citing the specific authors mentioned at V.1[10]8 & 9; V.1[10]9.1.1 (discussed
below); IV.8[31]1.
502II.3[20]16.26-29: οἷον ἄνδρες ἄλλοι piάλαι, νῦν δὲ ἄλλοι, τῷ μεταξὺ καὶ ἀναγκαίῳ τῶν λόγων εἰκόντων
τοῖς τῆς ὕλης piαθήμασι (the logôn in question are the formative principles of men’s souls, rather than
discourses or accounts; see Appendix D, 280).
503Cf. Charrue 1978, 20-21.
504VI.4[22]16.4-7. Cf. III.6[1]2.5-8.
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and blessed philosophers have found the truth. But which of them
especially achieved this, and how we might attain to understanding
concerning these matters, it is right to enquire.505
This passage encapsulates well the role of the active philosopher pursuing truth in
the tradition; presented with an authoritative philosophical corpus, his role is to seek
and explicate within it.
It is thus Plotinus’ belief that certain ancients fell short of a complete exposi-
tion of the truth; this is not to say that they were wrong, only that they possessed
a greater or lesser degree of completeness in their understanding or presentation.
The long philosophic survey at V.1[10]8-9 supports this reading. Having discussed
Plato’s (Plotinian) theory of three primary hypostases, Plotinus concludes with the
famous passage cited at the beginning of the last chapter (p. 95 above), linking
his thought with that of the ancients, and citing Plato as proof of this identifica-
tion (V.1[10]8.1-14). He then goes on to discuss Parmenides, noting that Parmenides
in Plato’s dialogue speaks more clearly (ἀκριβέστερον) about the one than the his-
torical Parmenides (ibid. 14-27), Anaxagoras, who also lacks clarity ‘on account of
his archaic character’ (δι΄ ἀρχαιότητα), Empedocles, and Heraclitus (V.1[10]9.1-7), all
of whose accounts of the one differ. In each case, Plotinus mentions the degree to
which these philosophers ‘got it right’: Anaxagoras knew that the one was separate
and intelligible, while Heraclitus knew that bodies were subject to constant change
and coming-to-be. Finally, Aristotle is discussed: his conception of noetic heavenly
spheres, which, for Plotinus, divide up the noetic ‘in a different way from Plato’ (ibid.
11-12), is criticised as ‘positing a plausible scenario, but one which is not philosoph-
ically necessary’ (ibid. 12: τὸ εὔλογον οὐκ ἔχον ἀνάγκην τιθέμενος). Plotinus criticises
Aristotle’s view in a vigorous manner until line 28; a close reading of the text, how-
ever, shows that Plotinus shies away from saying that Aristotle is simply wrong,
although this is essentially his message here.
505III.7[45]1.9-16: ...τὰς τῶν piαλαιῶν ἀpiοφάσεις piερὶ αὐτῶν ἄλλος ἄλλας, τάχα δὲ καὶ ἄλλως τὰς αὐτὰς
λαβόντες ἐpiὶ τούτων ἀναpiαυσάμενοι καὶ αὔταρκες νομίσαντες, εἰ ἔχοιμεν ἐρωτηθέντες τὸ δοκοῦν ἐκείνοις
λέγειν, ἀγαpiήσαντες ἀpiαλλατόμεθα τοῦ ζητεῖν ἔτι piερὶ αὐτῶν. Εὑρηκέναι μὲν οὖν τινας τῶν ἀρχαίων καὶ
μακαρίων φιλοσόφων τὸ ἀληθὲς δεῖ νομίζειν· τίνες δ΄ οἱ τυχόντες μάλιστα, καὶ piῶς ἂν καὶ ἡμῖν σύνεσις
piερὶ τούτων γένοιτο, ἐpiισκέψασθαι piροσήκει. Unsurprisingly, it is Plato who has especially achieved
this understanding, travelling under the name of piαλαιοῖς καὶ μακαρίοις ἀνδράσιν (ibid. 7.10-12).
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The final lines of Section 9 elucidate the whole procedure:
Thus, those of the archaic thinkers (τῶν ἀρχαίων) who are most close-
ly aligned with Pythagoras and his followers and with Pherecydes
were in greatest possession of this nature [sc. the nature of the one];
however, some of them worked these matters out in their own ac-
counts, while others demonstrated them not in [written] accounts,
but in unwritten discussions, while still others did not deal with
them at all.506
The first important point to note from these passages, and in all of Plotinus’ explicit
engagements with his tradition, is the culture of humble politeness with which the
philosopher should approach his predecessors. Even Aristotle is treated with kid
gloves, although Plotinus plainly feels he is wrong in his teachings on the plane-
tary spheres. This is in line with the widespread culture of canonicity and respect
for canonical authors’ authority in philosophic matters outlined in the preceding
chapter, and is understood by Plotinus as part of the basic comportment and ‘good
manners’ of a late antique philosophic practitioner; the Gnostics whom he attacks
in Ennead II.9 are said to be ‘unphilosophical’ precisely for breeching this practice of
decorum.507 Due reverence for the tradition is thus a prerequisite for approaching
traditional materials in a proper way.
We also note, however, that Plotinus is quite comfortable criticising the Preso-
cratic philosophers for a lack of clarity, due to their ‘archaic character’; ἀκριβεία is
mentioned here and elsewhere as the chief way in which Plato excels over his pre-
decessors.508 Elsewhere, Pythagoras is described as unclear ‘because he wrote po-
etry’, again, a reference to the use of expository methods lacking in accuracy by the
truly ancient sages, although we do not know which pseudo-Pythagorean work is
506V.1[10]9.27 ad fin.
507See II.9[33]6.23, 26-7, 36, where Plotinus roundly berates the Gnostics for their breach of prop-
er philosophic comportment in maligning the ancients. His attack here is specifically aimed at the
Gnostic’s lack of the proper philosophic approach; in essence, at their ‘appalling manners’ (see ibid.
14.11-13; 6.43-52).
508After a survey of the unclear Presocratics Heraclitus, Empedocles, and the enigmatic Pythagoras
and his school, the ‘divine Plato’ is adduced as the best authority for matters relating to the descent
of the soul into bodies (IV.8[31]1.23-26). Cf. V.1[10]8.24, where Plato’s Parmenides is more clear than
the historical Parmenides. Cf. Athanassiadi 2006, 97 n. 80.
THE PLOTINIAN IDEA OF TRADITION 141
meant.509 On a rhetorical level, then, Plato is set apart from the Presocratics not on
account of a greater possession of the truth, but on account of a facility for expressing
it clearly; Pythagoras and Pherecydes constitute the yardstick of truth in the passage
under discussion. It should be noted, of course, that certain early philosophers were
also simply not of the Plotinian haeresis; Democritus, for example, is not one of the
Ancients.510
We note further the reference to orality in the closing lines of the passage, which
goes a long way toward providing a mechanism for harmonising the seemingly
conflicting views of the Presocratics: they may have elucidated the metaphysical
truth in unwritten conclaves (synousiais), much as Pythagoras, Plato, and Plotinus’
own teacher Ammonius, had done. They may also not have examined a particular
problem or set of problems. We may adduce the reference to ‘hidden expression’ of
the truth among the ancients cited in the last chapter: Plotinus is an exegete of an-
cient ideas which were expressed long ago, but not openly.511 Esoteric hermeneutics
provide a key to doctrinal unanimity among the ancients.512
The Perennial Wisdom in Plotinus. As we have seen, Platonist perennialism,
while a philosophic movement, did not concern itself solely with philosophers. The
scattered references to belief in ancient sages, lawgivers, and theologians among
the Middle Platonists serves to contextualise the Enneads in this respect, where we
find similar beliefs, often implicit, informing Plotinian discourse. It is clear from the
Enneads that the ancient philosophers are not the only source of truth; Plotinus often
509IV.8[6]1.21-23. Cf. Maximus of Tyre’s view of philosophic history, whereby the ancient poets wrote
philosophy ‘wrapped up’ in poetic finery, but moderns, having lost the poetic subtlety of their for-
bears, laid the previously-hidden doctrines bare (IV.3), or Plutarch’s comparable view of the history
of philosophy (n. 327 above).
510The sole exception which I have found to this rule occurs at VI.1[42]1.1 ff., where οἱ piάνυ piαλαιοί
clearly refer to such thinkers as Democritus and other materialists. This would seem to be a simple
slip from Plotinus’ usual practice of confining the name ‘ancients’ to thinkers notionally associated
with the great tradition that he espouses.
511V.1[10]8.10-12, cited 95 above.
512Appendix C provides additional discussion of the importance of esoteric reading for Plotinus’
engagement with Plato and Aristotle.
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reads traditional stories from Hellenic mythology,513 as well as the ritual heritage
of the mystery cults,514 as containing hidden philosophical truths. Plotinus follows
Platonic and Platonist precedent in referring to piαλαιοὶ λόγοι as sources of truth to be
discussed alongside the later contributions of philosophers.515 These institutions, in
Plotinus as in the earlier perennialists, hide esoteric philosophic doctrines that were
concealed by their wise founders from the unlettered and unphilosophic masses.
We might expect to find in Plotinus a group of sages responsible for these acts of
hiding, as in the Middle Platonists, and we do so in occasional references scattered
throughout the Enneads. Plotinus refers to sophoi who hid messages in the institu-
tions which they founded. It is notable that, in Plotinus, these sages are often priests
or other sacred practitioners. Sometimes these sages are theologoi, who, filling out the
few brief references in Plotinus with what we have seen in Plutarch, may be under-
stood as proto-philosophic religious founder-figures or theological poets.516 While
Homer and Hesiod are never explicitly called theologoi in the Enneads, Homer’s pres-
ence in particular is notable as one of Plotinus’ favourite sources, and Homer speaks
in enigma.517 Theologoi are mentioned, in one passage, alongside priests (hierôn),
both understood as having relevant opinions on philosophic matters;518 it is unclear
where the priests end and the theologians begin, but sophoi, theologoi, and hiereis
taken together undoubtedly comprise an ancient class of religious specialists with
513E.g. IV.8[31]1.21 (cf. Hes. Op. 60-89. Theog. 521); III.5[36]2.24: V.8[31]4.25-6; V.2[11]22;
VI.2[19]22.1.1 & 13; VI.8[39]19.1.14; III.7[45]13.10. See Eon 1970, 273; Charrue 1978, 25; Boys-Stones
2001, 147. On myth in Plotinus, see generally Cilento 1960.
514VI.9[9]11.1 ff. (quoted in full 14 above); cf. I.6[1]6.1-5 (quoted in full n. 515 below); III.6[1]19.25-27.
Cf. Stroumsa 1996a, 21.
515I.6[1]6.1-5:῎Εστι γὰρ δή, ὡς ὁ piαλαιὸς λόγος, καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀνδρία καὶ piᾶσα ἀρετὴ κάθαρσις
καὶ ἡ φρόνησις αὐτή. Δίο καὶ αἱ τελεταὶ ὀρθῶς αἰνίττονται τὸν μὴ κεκαθαρμένον καὶ εἰς ῞Αιδου κείσεσθαι
ἐν βορβόρῳ διὰ κάκην φιλον· cf. e.g. Pl. Phd. 69 c3-d2.
516E.g. III.5[36]2.2: piερὶ δὲ τοῦ ὃν θεὸν (τὸν ῎Ερωτα) τίθενται...θεολόγοι καὶ Πλάτων κτλ. The context
is a discussion of the treatments of erôs in the Symposium of Plato; here Plato’s invented myths are
notionally assimilated to a more ancient theological tradition.
517I.6[1]8.18-20. Edwards notes (2000, 27 n. 148) that Homer is the second most quoted author in the
Enneads, after Plato. Plotinus interprets a passage from the Odyssey philosophically at I.6[1]8.16-21
(see Lamberton 1989, 106-7). Lamberton notes that a passage from Homer specifically condemned
by Plato (R. II.381d) is quoted by Plotinus with approval (VI.5[23]12.31-2), an ‘instance - however
mild - of defensive interpretation’ (Lamberton 1989, 98-9). Put another way, this is an example of the
authority of the theologians (Homer) in dialogue with that of the ancients (Plato), and of the former
actually trumping the latter.
518III.5[36]8.21.
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access to the perennial wisdom and an interest in hiding its truths within religious
institutions.
This wisdom, then, may be found in the teletai of mystery religions,519 and often
transmitted by religious specialists.520 Discussing the nature of matter, which for
Plotinus is essentially a negative, sterile lack of qualities, contrasted with the fecun-
dity of the logoi which arise in soul from its noetic nature, Plotinus suggests that,
‘It was for this reason, I think, that the ancient sages, [communicating] esoterically
and secretly in the mystery rites (μυστικῶς καὶ ἐν τελεταῖς αἰνιττόμενοι), portrayed the
archaic Hermes with his member always ready for the work of procreation’, the ithy-
phallic Hermes indicating the generative nature of the noetic logos.521 Again, in an
elaborate exposition of the philosopher’s encounter with the transcendent one be-
yond intellect, drawing heavily on cultic traditions, Plotinus uses the statues which
stand before a temple sanctuary as symbols of intellect, as seen by the philosophic
aspirant, and then passed by in the course of the ascent toward the unpredicated,
unrepresentable one. ‘These [statues] are images; and therefore it is transmitted es-
oterically by the wise among the interpreters of holy things how that god [intellect]
is seen; and a wise priest who understands the enigma may make the contemplation
real by entering the sanctuary.’522 The architectural conventions of traditional Hel-
lenic temples are read by Plotinus as encoding truths about the highest ontological
realms, while the philosopher is transformed into a priest.
Plotinus elsewhere discusses how the Egyptian sages (οἱ Αἰγυpiτίων σοφοί) used
their hieroglyphics to illustrate the instantaneous, non-discursive nature of intel-
lect,523 an art which he contrasts with the later decline into cursive script, which he
associates with discursive thinking.524 Plotinus’ intriguing reference to the ancient
sages’ (οἱ piάλαι σοφοί) art of ‘ensouling’ statues, reminiscent of the famous passage
on the animation of statues in the Hermetic Asclepius, is seemingly made without any
519To summarise, at VI.9[9]11.1 ff; III.6[1]19.35-27; I.6[1]6.1-5.
520To summarise, at III.5[36]8.17-23; VI.9[9]11.27; III.5[36]2.2; V.8[31]6.1; IV.3[49]11.1-3.
521III.6[1]19.35-27. The Plotinian concept of logos is discussed in Appendix D, p. 280 ff.
522VI.9[9]11.27.
523V.8[31]6.1-9.
524Ibid. ll. 9-12.
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metaphorical intent, but cited as a historical example illustrating the current topic of
discussion, the working of universal sympatheia and its effects on seemingly inan-
imate objects.525 This latter passage, in particular, reminds us that, while Plotinus
often uses religious materials in a metaphorical way, and sometimes in a bantering
and lighthearted manner, he presents the ancient sages and theologians as having a
definite historical reality. These ancient hieroi were endowed with power in a con-
crete and, it must be said, philosophically significant sense; the position of these
religious specialists in Plotinus’ view of the history of truth should alert us to the
need for considering Plotinian religion, that is, the philosopher’s thoughts about the
proper practical relationship to the gods, as part and parcel of consideration of his
ideas of tradition and the transmission of wisdom.
Against the Gnostics: the Tradition as Hellenism. In light of these observations, it
is worth examining Treatise 33, the attack Against the Gnostics, for its relevance to
Plotinian ideas of tradition. This treatise is unique in that it sees Plotinus refer di-
rectly to contemporary philosophic debate; indeed, to the current situation in his
own circle.526 It thus constitutes the sole exception to the classicising approach taken
throughout the Enneads; the Gnostics’ perversion of philosophy, in Plotinus’ eyes, is
heinous enough that he is willing to attack them directly, while remaining silent on
every other philosopher or philosophic development of the preceding six hundred
years.527 In this treatise Plotinus gets his hands dirty, and provides unique evidence
as to his view of the proper relation of the philosopher to tradition.
The philosophical grounds for Plotinus’ attack have generally been seen as the
‘anticosmic pessimism’ of the Gnostics, their rejection of the world as evil,528 along
with their proliferation of levels of reality, which Plotinus counters with an emphatic
525IV.3[49]11.1-3; cf. Ascl. 37.II (Nock and Festugière 1947, 347). On the so-called telestic art in later
Platonism, see Boyancé 1955; Dodds 1968, 293; Lewy 1978, 495-6; Majercik 1989, 26.
526For the Gnostics among Plotinus’ ‘friends’ see II.9[33]10.3-14; cf. Porph. Plot. 16. It is clear that
these were people who frequented Plotinus’ philosophic seminar.
527Plotinus does not name his opponents in this treatise (although the reference to gnôsis at
II.9[33]13.10 may be an ironic reference to the name “gnostics”); however, his polemic attacks spe-
cific items of Gnostic doctrine, thus leading Plotinus outside the canonical subjects of debate and into
a wholly contemporary field of metaphysical speculation, where he is elsewhere loath to go.
528E.g. Armstrong 1992; Kalligas 2000, 124-5.
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statement that there are three primary hypostases.529 But just as sects among the
early Christians attacked each other far more vehemently than they attacked pagans
- those who claim to follow the true path but in fact stray from it, being more of a
threat to an ideology than those who follow a different path altogether - Plotinus
attacks the Gnostics not only for straightforward philosophical errors, but for what
he perceives as their perversion of Plato, and of the Hellenic tradition as a whole.530
Scholars have seen a defensive move here, Plotinus’ philosophy having so much in
common with the Gnostic movements he attacks.531 As John Dillon points out: ‘In
the process of polemical self-definition, a notable phenomenon is the extent to which
one finds oneself borrowing concepts and formulations from one’s opponents.’532
However, Plotinus’ attack is not confined to philosophic doctrine. We have seen
his criticism of what he sees as the Gnostics’ execrable philosophic deportment: they
argue tendentiously and without the proper reserved and pleasant style. Worse still,
they treat the canonical tradition with contempt. The Gnostics, Plotinus says, should
listen to the blessed and godlike philosophers (II.9[33]6.26-7 & 36) and to Plato (23),
and ‘accept their teachings with a good grace, since they are more ancient [than their
own] (εὐμενῶς δεχομένους τὰ ἐκείνων ὡς piαλαιότερον, 37). Plotinus goes on to state
that such correct doctrines as the Gnostics do hold are all from this tradition, with an
implication that they have been pilfered rather than come by honestly, while others
they invent in a quest to found their own philosophy (ibid. 10 ff; cf. 15.31-2). Plotinus
also levels the related criticism that their doctrines are new;533 in light of the current
529II.9[33]1-2.
530II.9[33]6.1-10; 8; 44.
531E.g. Jonas 1971; Wallis 1992b, 463. It was once common to deny any relationship between Plotinus’
thought and Gnosticism (see Broek 1983 for a coherent statement of this position), but this has become
less possible as scholarly knowledge of Gnosticism has increased. However, the precise nature of the
relationship continues to be hotly debated. See Mazur 2010, 17-25 for an up-to-date history of this
debate. Important works in this connection are Puech 1960, with discussion 175-190; Jufresa 1981;
Kalligas 2000; Mazur 2005; Mazur 2010. The series Nag Hammadi Studies, published by Brill, contains
a wealth of resources on Gnosticism, both editions and commentaries and secondary studies; Scholer
1971 and 1997 collect relevant bibliography. Especially important in the context of Platonism are
Turner 2001; Mazur 2010.
532Dillon 1982, 60.
533II.9[33]5.37: τὶ τὸ καινὸν τοῦ λόγου·; 6.5-7: the Gnostics are καινολογούντων attempting to establish
their own hairesis, in contrast to the ancient Hellenic [sc. hairesis], by fabricating new doctrines; 6.11:
καινοτομοῦσιν. Athanassiadi (2006, 129) notes the word-play in Ennead II.9 between καινός, “new”,
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discussion, this is clearly a strong attack, and an example of the use of the idea of
perennial tradition as a tool of polemic.
The tradition invoked by Plotinus takes on very interesting contours in this polem-
ical context. In this treatise, and here only, he uses the term αἵρεσις;534 it seems clear
that, already in Plotinus, the process by which the term for ‘school of thought’ came
to mean ‘heresy’ is in operation, although still in an early stage of development.535
The Gnostics want to found ‘their own school’ (ἰδία αἵρεσις).536 Plotinus presents
this statement as self-evidently incriminating; his intended audience are expected to
share his perennialism, or at least his respect for the Platonist philosophic canon.
Also only in this treatise, Plotinus refers to ‘the Hellenes’. In fact, he refers to
an ‘ancient Hellenic hairesis’, one which maintains the ascent from the cave and the
step-by-step advance of the philosophic seeker toward the truth familiar from Pla-
to’s Republic.537 This may represent another early appearance of an ancient term in
a new guise, this time the term ‘Hellene’ meaning ‘pagan’, as it came to do in Chris-
tian circles from about the time of Constantine.538 At any rate, it is clear that Plotinus
is responding to an attack on ‘the Hellenes’ by a group who identify themselves as
something other than Hellenes, Greek though their sacred texts were,539 and doubt-
less too their language of debate. But it is also a reference to the cultural institution
of Hellenism, which had long come to refer to a basic educational standard of cul-
tivation.540 The Gnostics’ belief that they can bypass Hellenic education, and the
philosophic elite education which constituted the basis for philosophic class supe-
riority, was an assault on a social order in which Platonist philosophy had a great
stake. It is no accident that Plotinus’ Hellenes have the gradual progression of the
and κενός, “vapid” or “false”.
534II.9[33]6.6. and 15.4. These are the only appearance of hairesis as ‘school of thought’ in the Enneads;
Plotinus uses the term elsewhere in its basic meaning of ‘choice’.
535See Athanassiadi 2006, 19-22; 129-30.
536II.9[33]6.5-12.
537II.9[33]5-10; cf. Pl. R. VII 514a ff.
538On this evolution of the term, see Bowersock 1996, 10, who does not suggest such an early
appearance of this usage as I am doing here.
539The texts mentioned by Porphyry (Plot. 16) as being read by the Gnostics, although extant only in
Coptic, are generally agreed to have had Greek originals.
540See generally Brown 1971b, 14; 29-30; Armstrong 1990a; Bowersock 1996, 7 et passim.
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philosopher as their rallying-cry: this was the educational hierarchy through which
Platonist social hierarchy was defined and implemented.
It is also possible that we should see this partly or wholly as a move on Ploti-
nus’ part toward a ‘Hellenisation’ of the tradition in the cultural or ‘ethnic’ sense.
The orientalism discussed in the previous chapter among the Middle Platonists was
even more prominent in Plotinus’ successors; he is unique among surviving Late
Platonists in having made only the sparsest reference to barbarian wisdom.541 While
an absence can only lead to an argument from silence, this is a very striking absence
indeed, and I believe we can draw the conclusion from it that Plotinus took a mi-
nority view, envisioning the tradition as privileging Hellenic thinkers, an especially
interesting position in a native Egyptian.
Hellenism, of course, was not understood as an ethnic or even a linguistic phe-
nomenon in antiquity, but a broad-ranging cultural phenomenon including under its
rubric a literary canon, educational norms, and an ‘art of living’ which defined the
cultivated classes of the Roman empire in late antiquity.542 What we are seeing here,
I would argue, is an early skirmish in the cultural struggle which took place between
Christians and pagans for the right to ‘ownership’ of Hellenism, a struggle in which
Plotinus is not usually seen as taking part. But, taking into account his construction
of a tradition of truth hidden within traditional Hellenic myths and rites, assimilated
to a chosen lineage of philosophers, and his overt cultural polemic for the Hellenes
in Against the Gnostics, we can say that Plotinus is engaging in an early phase of the
struggle for the cultural capital of Hellenism. This struggle would come to involve
Christians who sought to exist within, or to ‘Christianise’ Hellenism, such as Justin
Martyr, Clement of Alexandria, Gregory of Nazianzos, and especially Origen, and
those who sought (to some degree at least) to reject it, such as the desert fathers,
St Jerome, or John Chrysostom. On the other side were pagans like Porphyry, the
541Cf. Armstrong 1990c, 421. The reference to the Egyptian sages (see 143 above) mentioned above is
in fact the sole unambiguous reference in the Enneads.
542See authors cited n. 540 above.
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Emperor Julian, and Proclus, who claimed Hellenism, increasingly viewed as syn-
onymous with the great tradition, for their own. The Plotinian tradition wields the
inherent power of antiquity and strong authority; it also lays claim to elements of
cultural prestige and chauvinism.
Plotinian Hermeneutics of the Perennial Tradition
The Unwritten, Enigma, and Secret Doctrines in Plotinus. The esoteric reading
of myth and mystery surveyed above in the Middle Platonists brings religion into
the fold of philosophy, allowing it to be mined as a source for potential philosophic
truth and used as a source of authority for philosophy. As discussed, a key reading
methodology was enigma, a rhetorical term adapted and used in a specific technical
sense by the Platonists. Authoritative philosophers of the past, the Ancients, might
speak with a certain riddling style, or deliver their doctrines in a fashion intended
to conceal them from the many in the interests of philosophical elitism; they are de-
coded through dialectical reasoning. The religious founders delivered the truth in a
different manner, if for similar reasons; they concealed it behind a screen of myth or
symbolism, to be read as enigmas. While Pythagoras enjoys, in some Middle Platon-
ists as in Plotinus, the status of both sage and philosopher,543 in general the Ancients
are philosophers, and the sophoi sages, each to be approached through the appropri-
ate reading methodology. An interesting development of this methodological rule
first appears in Plotinus; Plotinus applies ‘enigmatic’ and other esoteric modes of
reading to the text of Plato. Plotinus applies the methodology of reading the sophoi to
the philosophoi, an early example of what would become a trend in later Platonism of
increasingly dovetailing the two wisdom traditions into one, and, correspondingly,
of swapping methodologies between them.
Plotinus’ reading of religious practices and architecture as esoteric text has been
emphasised above, but the majority of enigmatic readings in the Enneads are of
543See p. 111 above.
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myths.544 The myth of Lynceus, who saw into the earth, is an enigma for the kind
of eyes human souls have in Intellect, with the ability to comprehend multiplicities
instantaneously as wholes.545 A man who sees his reflection in water, chases it, and
sinks serves as an enigma for those who pursue beautiful bodies rather than the
Beautiful itself.546 The myth of Kronos, wisest of the gods, who, before the birth
of Zeus, kept back within himself all that he begat is an enigma (with wordplay be-
tween Kronos and koros) for the self-sufficiency of Intellect and the fact that it contains
the forms and noetic gods.547 This passage builds up to the famous affirmation of
the antiquity of Plotinus’ and Plato’s school of thought quoted at the beginning of
the last chapter (V.1[10]8.10-12), illustrating the way mythological discourse could
be drawn into philosophic discourse to reinforce its antiquity and authority.
The myths of Plato are ostensibly treated no differently from mythic materials
gathered from other sources:548 the story of the two Aphrodites from Plato’s Sympo-
sium 180d-e is read as an enigma for the fact that every soul is Aphrodite because of
its innate love of the good,549 and the intricacies of characterisation and the myth’s
position in the dialogue are ignored.550 The creation-myth of the Timaeus is also
read enigmatically.551 Elsewhere, another passage from the Timaeus is quoted anony-
mously as ‘esoterically and divinely said’.552 The word θείως emphasises the reli-
gious register of the passage cited, situating Plato’s words among the other sources
of truth hidden in myth, as inspired wisdom rather than reasoned knowledge.
544See in addition to the passages cited below I.6[1]8.11; V.1[10]7.27 ff; IV.3[49]12.8-26, 14.5 ad fin;
Many other esoteric readings of myth in the Enneads do not make specific reference to enigma, e.g.
III.6[1]25-41; VI.9[9]11.25-30, 43-45; &c.
545V.8[31]4.26.
546I.6[1]8.11.
547V.1[10]7.33 ff.
548Cf. Lamberton 1989, 97-8.
549VI.9[9]9.31; cf. III.5[36]7-9 for the same myth at greater length.
550The other accounts of erôs in the Symposium are presented by Plato as trumped by Socrates’ account
of the teaching of Diotima, and, read in context, they would seem to constitute a strange source of
wisdom for Plotinus. Plato read esoterically, however, is expected to express wisdom and truth at
every stage of the dialogue. Plotinus’ reading frees the myth from its dialogic context, just as he frees
traditional stories from their religious context.
551VI.2[19]22.1; cf. V.8[31]8, an extended reading of Plato’s myth of the demiurge in the Timaeus. Plato
does not use enigma here, but he does sêmainein, ‘indicate’, which term often indicates a symbolic or
otherwise indirect or hidden discourse in Plotinus (see 240 below).
552IV.1[21]2.49: τοῦτ΄ ἄρα ἐστι τὸ θείως ᾐνιγμένον· κτλ, going on to quote Tim. 35a1-4.
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Thus far, the methodology does not differ strikingly from earlier Platonists’ uses
of enigma. However, in some passages Plotinus breaks new ground with his Pla-
tonic reading; we see an occasional move of assimilation between the philosophic
and the mythic without parallel in the surviving evidence of any previous Platonist.
This takes various forms. At VI.8[39]19.14, discussing the nature of the first prin-
ciple as part of a long apophatic passage (discussed in detail below), Plotinus cites
the ἐpiέκεινα οὐσίας of Republic VI 509b9 as an enigma, but puts it in the mouth of the
ancients.553 The enigmatic form of reading is thus notionally applied to the ‘peren-
nially vague’ forefathers of philosophy, rather than to Plato’s dialectic. In another
passage Plotinus discusses the nature of erôs and Aphrodite in a mythic-philosophic
discourse drawing on Plato’s Symposium and on traditional cultic customs; the two
sources of mythology are interwoven to a degree that when Plotinus tells the reader
that ‘for this reason they said that she (Plato’s heavenly Aphrodite) was ‘motherless’,
hiding their true meaning’, it is unclear whether Plato or some unnamed theologic
forefathers are meant.554 One passage of Plotinus fully breaks down the barriers
between Platonic myth and logos. At VI.2[19]22.1 ff., Plato speaks ᾐνιγμένως of the
way in which intellect sees the Forms in the complete living creature, referring to the
mythologising discourse of the Timaeus (31b1 and 39e7-9), but slightly further on in
the discussion (13-14) he quotes the Parmenides 144b4-c1, a dialectical passage from
the least mythological of dialogues, as also containing Platonic enigma (αἰνιττόμενος
ὁ Πλάτων).
This passage represents the earliest use of enigma which I have been able to find
referring to an attributed philosophic text in a non-mythological register.555 The
method of enigma, previously associated primarily with religious materials, begins
to merge with the realm of dialectic. This move should also, I think, be under-
stood in the context of the absorption and adaptation of religious materials by Pla-
tonism. As with his characterisation of philosophers as priests, Plotinus’ reading
553χρὴ δὲ ἴσως καὶ τὸ ἐpiέκεινα οὐσίας καὶ ταύτῃ νοεῖσθαι τοῖς piαλαιοῖς λεγόμενον δι΄ αἰνίξεως, κτλ.
554III.5[36]2.24-25: ὅθεν αὐτὴν τούτῳ ᾐνίττοντο, τῷ ἀμήτορα εῖναι.
555Again, setting aside the Pythagoreans, who were especially associated with symbolic and
enigmatic discourse.
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of Platonic myth as myths simpliciter, not separated from traditional myth at large,
and of Platonic dialectic as enigma, are signs that Plotinus has gone further than his
predecessors in blending the realms of religion and philosophy.
The ‘Arrogance’ of Esoteric Interpretation. It can be said that all interpretation
is arrogance, insofar as, limiting the possible range of significations of a given text
to a single one, the reader overwrites the author in the moment of reading: ‘It is re-
markable that involuntarily we always read as superior beings.’556 Plotinus’ esoteri-
cist approach to Plato and the tradition takes this dynamic a step further than simple
reading, in a manner shared by many esoteric interpretive traditions. In positing a
hidden wisdom in a set of texts, and then seeking to explicate it, there is of course the
arrogance inherent in the position of having found the singular privileged reading.
But there is the further assumption that the interpreter, and notionally his audience
themselves, stand in the privileged category of readers worthy of understanding the
hidden message, and moreover that the publication of this explication, which should
theoretically oppose the secretive aims of the original esoteric author, is a legitimate
undertaking.
This arrogance can take many forms, and be ‘managed’ by various rhetorical
caveats. The rhetorics surrounding published secrets in the Greek magical papyri
constitute a case in point; the circle of readership in this case is presented as a pro-
tectively limited group of those ‘in the know’.557 Publication of the secrets is thus
notionally removed from the purview of the profane, but we have no evidence that
these texts were genuinely kept from public consumption. In cases of published se-
crecy like the Derveni papyrus (discussed p. 61 above), the fact of the text’s ritual
immolation probably does indicate a rare instance of genuine circumscription of its
possible audience; that is, it may genuinely represent a secret text, rather than an
example of public hiding and revealing.
Similarly, the motif of the oath or adjuration to secrecy in various forms is not
unknown in Platonist texts, usually based on a similar logic of a select readership,
556Ralph Waldo Emerson, quoted at Bloom 2005, 48.
557See Betz 1995.
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and probably partly inspired by the command of the Second Platonic Epistle to de-
stroy the text after having read it. Julian begins his oration On the Mother of the Gods
by asking himself whether he ought to write ὑpiὲρ τῶν ἀρρήτων and reveal that which
should not be revealed (τὰ ἀνεξοίστα), and then proceeds to do so at length.558 Pro-
clus’ huge commentary on the Republic of Plato begins with a command to the reader
to keep the book’s contents secret.559 The opening sentence of Marinus’ biography of
his teacher Proclus is another example of the appeal to silence which is immediate-
ly broken: Marinus, contemplating the greatness of the philosopher, suggests that,
‘It would seem best to me to keep silence. . . ’, before embarking on a verbose and
detailed account of Proclus’ life and doings.560
We might compare these examples with a more philosophically phrased example
from Plotinus’ Treatise 39, which nonetheless says much the same thing: having
delivered a long apophatic passage on the one, relentlessly removing it from the
realm of predication and describablility (Sections 7-10), he asks:
But this ‘non-reality’, what is it? We must leave the matter and be
silent, and, with our thought at a loss, assert that we must search no
further.561
The rest of the treatise, of course, ‘searches further’ in its attempts to say the un-
sayable. The motif of the ‘secret revealed’ flagged by protestations that the author
had better keep silent, is only the most obvious indicator that a Platonist author is in
fact in an untenable position as exegete, if the claims to secrecy are taken as having
logical, rather than rhetorical, force.
The Platonist stance as exegetes of esoteric ancients is a position implying pub-
lished secrecy, and every act of reading an enigma or other text read esoterically is in
a sense an act of arrogance. A modern example is the Platonic reading of the Tübin-
gen school, who claim to have decoded the metaphysical doctrines hidden within
558Orat. VIII 1, 158d.
559I.69-205. See Lamberton 1995, 147: ‘. . . we are left with a text whose relationship to writing and
publication is contradictory and problematic. It broadcasts its secrets, bracketed by instructions to
keep them concealed.’
560Marinus, Procl., trans. Edwards 2000, 58.
561VI.8[39]11.1-3.
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Plato’s dialogues; the caveat for this betrayal is presumably the unspoken assump-
tion that, whatever Plato’s reasons for having hidden his true doctrines, they are no
longer valid, or do not apply to the Tübingenschule and their readership.562
Platonism has a unique perspective on this problem of dissemination due to the
Platonic literary insistence on orality as the preferred means of transmission and
the complementary dangers of written publication. Plotinus is portrayed as having
struggled with this problem. As discussed in Chapter Two, Porphyry’s accounts of
his oath to keep the doctrines of Ammonius Saccas secret, which the Enneads be-
trayed, and of his hesitation to publish at all should be understood as ‘silent philoso-
pher’ themes with parallels in many documents of the third century and earlier.
Fundamentally, the Platonist philosopher as exegete of the hidden will always be
guilty of the arrogance of interpretation if judged by his own stated rules: indeed, it
is only when the subject is broken off on account of mystic or philosophic secrecy, a
practice of the esoteric that we have seen in Plato, Plutarch, and elsewhere, that one
could posit a literal-minded respect for the secrets of Platonist wisdom. But esoter-
ic silence is never literal silence, but always a statement of secrecy, a revealing of a
hiding.
However, it should be emphasised that Plotinus’ discourse, while often giving
short shrift to ideas which the philosopher considers foolish, and, in the case of the
Gnostics, reacting with a certain haughtiness to their behaviour and teachings, does
not come across as ‘arrogant’. Plotinus’ relationship with Plato and the tradition
which he constructs pre-dating Plato is not a pretence of respect concealing a desire
to plunder and pervert; it is a creative, genuine desire to read, understand, and ex-
plain. That Plotinus would wish to explain the secrets of Plato in written form is a
notional betrayal which, I will argue below, is defused by the Plotinian notion of the
ineffable transcendent, the self-hiding secret par excellence. Insofar as Plotinus can
guide a reader toward the ontological truth (and note that this is different from ‘the
truth about ontology’, as Chapter Six will discuss), that reader will have ipso facto
562See Appendix F, 292.
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proved himself worthy of initiation into the mysteries. The Conclusion will return
to this paradoxical ‘openness’ in Plotinus’ discourse.
Creative Misinterpretation. Plotinus’ reading of tradition should also not be
seen as simple ‘fabrication’ in the derogatory sense. Not only imaginative lineages
like the Platonist perennial tradition, but all traditions, literary, cultural, philosophic,
or religious, are creative negotiations with an imagined past. Whether or not histor-
ical analysis recognises the tradition’s existence as genuine or historical, its reality
to its interpreters is the only meaningful criterion of validity, and the interpretation
itself the only ‘existence’ the tradition could ever have.563 From a certain point of
view, the Plotinian tradition may be seen as a ‘false’ or constructed lineage, but this
position begs several questions.
While the procedures of philosophy, with their emphasis on active engagement
with source material, put limits on the scope of interpretation, these limits are easy
to see in their broad outlines, but difficult to pinpoint in detail. To argue for an ‘es-
sential’ Platonism is to forget that the Old Academy, the sceptical Academy, Late
Platonism, and even Patristic and esoteric Islamic and Jewish traditions are in part
developments of the same textual and oral tradition, the Platonic. Whether we con-
sider Plotinus’ developments of this tradition to be creative interpretation or creative
misinterpretation is to a large degree a question of our own construal of what Pla-
tonism should be, or of what Plato really meant.564 Scholars of Platonism are thus
often guilty of their own arrogance of interpretation in reading Late Platonist doc-
trines and finding novelties or distortions in them. Augustine, an acute reader with
no stake in defending Plotinus’ ‘orthodoxy’ as a philosopher, saw him as so faithful
to Plato’s doctrines as to be like ‘Plato reborn’.565
But we are still justified in addressing what we know were controversial doc-
trines in Plotinus’ own time with a view to seeing the process of creative (mis)interpretation
563Cf. Bloom 2005, 56: ‘There are weak mis-readings and strong mis-readings . . . but there are
no right readings, because reading a text is necessarily the reading of a whole system of texts, and
meaning is always wandering around between texts.’
564Cf. Charrue 1978, 11.
565Contra Ac. 3.41 ad fin.
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in its historical context.566 Just as Plotinus berates the Gnostics’ reading of Plato as
wrong, we can see tensions in the Enneads where it is clear that Plotinus himself is
straining the fabric of the tradition in a direction he feels it must tend.
Scholars have noted several important tensions within the philosophic tradition,
the dynamics of which informed Plotinian Platonism. To begin with, viewing the
Platonic writings as a univocal expository corpus, without development of thought,
demands considerable mental gymnastics.567 The task of harmonising Aristotle and
Plato was another such tension, whose dynamics echo through the Enneads and the
whole history of Late Platonism. The ontological reading of the Platonic Parmenides,
discussed in the following chapter, can also be read as a ‘creative (mis)interpretation’
with deep importance for Plotinus and his successors.
Plotinus’ negotiation of this exegetic terrain occurs throughout the Enneads, and
has been studied from many points of view.568 The current discussion can only
briefly point to esoteric reading as a powerful strategy for such negotiation. The
myth of the Timaeus was especially problematic for Plotinus, involving as it does, on
the face of it, a creation of the world in time and a positive view of matter, two doc-
trines to which Plotinus was opposed. Esoteric interpretation allows him to explain
how Plato’s myth really tells a Plotinian story, even if he sometimes finds his own
reading far-fetched.569 Similarly, in Treatise 15, On Our Allotted Guardian Spirit the
‘Myth of Er’ from Plato’s Republic speaks in enigma; Plato’s real meaning in refer-
ring to a ‘choice’ of guardian spirit in the other world is not ἅιρεσις but piροαίρεσις,
not ‘choice’ but ‘purpose’, thus allowing Plotinus to avoid any haphazardness in
the world of intellect, and other philosophic consequences for the soul’s freedom in
this world.570 Esoteric reading was one of the interpretive keys which allowed for
this kind of reading ‘against the grain’. Functionally, the supposition of an esoteric
wisdom hidden beneath the surface of a tradition opens the gates of interpretation;
566Cf. comments on ‘fortuitous mistranslation’ at Wilson 1995, 307.
567Cf. Rist 1961, 163-4. Cf. Plutarch’s reading of the Plato cited 85 above.
568See generally Dillon 1992. On the ontological reading of the Parmenides see Appendix A, 267. On
tensions between Platonic and Aristotelean thinking in Late Platonism, see Karamanolis 2006.
569III.6[1]19.25 ff.
570III.4[46]5.1 ff., citing Pl. R. X 620d8-e1.
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one is no longer limited to the overt meaning, and an author may in fact mean the
opposite of what he says.
Part II: The Transcendent Absolute, the
Ineffable, and Plotinian Poetics of
Transcendence
Chapter Five: The Development of the Transcendent Absolute in
the Middle Platonist Milieu
Τὸν μὲν οὖν piοιητὴν καὶ piατέρα τοῦ piαντὸς εὑρεῖν τε ἔργον καὶ εὑρόντα
εἰς piάντας ἀδύνατον λέγειν.571
In the first centuries CE, a remarkable conceptual evolution occurs in Græco-
Roman thought: across a wide spectrum of the evidence which has come down
to us, both philosophical and religious, we find an increasing intellectual commit-
ment to a totally transcendent first principle or god.572 This is not to say that Greek
thought before this time had always emphasised the ontological ‘proximity’ or epis-
temological availability of the nature of the first principle or of the true nature of
reality or being.573 For Plato, truth, especially truth about the most basic realities,
might be very difficult indeed to find and communicate: ‘To discover the maker
and father of the all is no mean task, and, having found him, to speak of him to all
people is impossible.’574 Nevertheless, Greek thinking up to the first centuries CE,
including the work of Plato, shows a great commitment to the elucidatory power of
λόγος, with all the complex nuances of discriminatory power, articulate language,
coherent argument, and the capacity to give an account of reality which this term
invoked; even Scepticism relied on ἀντικείμενοι λόγοι in its attacks on the λόγοι giv-
en by philosophers.575 With the rise of strong notions of transcendence in first- and
second-century world-views we see this confidence begin to erode.
571Pl. Ti. 28c 3-5.
572O’Meara 1998, 146-7; cf. Festugière 1981, IV; Mortley 1986, II, 17 et passim.
573Appendix A, p. 266 ff., briefly discusses the evidence for a philosophy of the transcendent in Plato
and the Early Academy.
574Ti. 28c 3-5, cited just above.
575Mortley 1986, 33-37.
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The Rise of the Ineffable Transcendent
Following the logic of transcendence to its conclusion, as Plotinus attempts to do,
as it were automatically gives rise to ineffability; that which is beyond all qualities
is ‘by nature’ beyond the ability of words to comprehend.576 But in Middle Platonist
discourse, found in such thinkers as Alcinoüs, Celsus, Numenius, and Plutarch, and
among such Neopythagoreans as Moderatus and Pseudo-Brontinus, a process may
be discerned in which authors, taking the theoretical transcendence of their first prin-
ciple as a matter of course, have not developed literary tools with which to deal with
its consequent ineffability and paradoxicality.577 The bulk of the present chapter is a
brief historical survey of the rise of the idea of transcendence in the Middle Platonist
milieu, concentrating on the effort to express the inexpressible nature of this reality
in writing.578
I begin, however, by proposing two theoretical considerations with significance
for Plotinian silence: firstly, a model of ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ transcendence through
which I will characterise the different literary options available to philosophers of
transcendence. I then lay out a theoretical model, more purely philosophical than lit-
erary, of ‘indirect modes of knowing’, whereby writers, removing their first principle
from the field of the knowable (and thus of course of the sayable), posit alternative
means of approach.
Interestingly, it is in the realm of Platonising religion that we find pre-Plotinian
examples both of stronger transcendence and apophasis on the one hand, and tran-
scendent ways of knowing on the other, and so this chapter will also discuss the rise
of the concept of the transcendent in the Hermetica and Gnostic texts, in the Chaldæan
Oracles, and in the anomalous Philo Judaeus. The first centuries CE saw a populari-
sation of Platonist ideas, especially in the religious field. Certain concepts, such as a
576See Rist 1964b, 69; Sells 1994, 3-4.
577The differences between Plotinian and Middle Platonic theories of transcendence have been wide-
ly noted (e.g. Majercik 1989, 5-6; Bechtle 1999, 86-8); my approach differs in that it locates an
important difference not primarily in theory, but in literary approach.
578Earlier developments, in particular Plato’s Parmenides and the work of Speusippus, are surveyed
briefly at Appendix A.
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divinised or hypostasised nous (or several such), a hierarchically-ordered cosmos of
incrementally-decreasing reality or goodness, and an immortal, immaterial soul sep-
arate in essence from the body, form a koinê in religio-philosophic texts dating from
this time such as the Hermetica, Platonising Gnostic tractates, and the Chaldæan Or-
acles, and these texts also sometimes utilise technical philosophic terminology from
the Platonist tradition.579
It should thus be kept in mind in what follows that, while ‘Middle Platonism’ and
‘Middle Platonists’ are taken to refer to the group of philosophic thinkers discussed
in Chapter Three, ‘Middle Platonist’ is to be taken in a broader sense, to indicate
any intellectual current of the period from about the beginning of the first century to
about the end of the second century CE in which the basic cosmological and anthro-
pological ideas mentioned above are found. As increasingly highlighted by recent
Plotinian scholarship, only a discussion of the Middle Platonist milieu in its broadest
sense, taking into account not only Neopythagorean speculations but also Platonis-
ing religious currents, can provide the necessary background to Plotinus’ conception
and deployment of philosophical silence regarding the one beyond being.
‘Strong’ and ‘Weak’ Transcendence. The Oxford English Dictionary defines the
term ‘transcendence’ most relevantly as: “Of the Deity: The attribute of being above
and independent of the universe; distinguished from immanence”.580 This defini-
tion presents itself as unproblematic, but its philosophical implications, if unpacked,
might turn the definition against itself. We might, for example, logically question
the idea of predicating any such attribute as ‘transcendence’, or any distinction from
‘immanence’, to a transcendent reality. Or we might question how something inde-
pendent of the universe could be described at all using language which originates
within the universe and which is thus posterior to it and dependent on the concepts
which it furnishes. We might also enquire as to what relevance the notions of iden-
tity implicit in “the Deity” might have for a truly transcendent entity (immediately
579Majercik 1989, 5.
580S.v. 1b.
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questioning the term ‘entity’ itself in this context). Transcendence, then, militates
against straightforward linguistic presentation.
On the conceptual level, transcendence seems to be an either-or proposition which
does not admit of degrees. But on the level of written practice, a range of strategies
may be employed which highlight the alterity of the transcendent. These strate-
gies result in some form of self-denying or paradoxical language, or in conceptual
dissonances that go unresolved. Michael Sells discusses degrees of “performative
intensity” in apophatic discourse, defined as ‘a function of the frequency and seri-
ousness with which the language turns back upon its own propositions’;581 similarly,
there is a range in philosophic treatments of the transcendent absolute to be found in
the development of Platonism. Apophatic language is one technique through which
philosophers approach the problem of writing the transcendent; others are discussed
below.
The relevant criterion here is one of performativity; the dictionary definition cit-
ed at the beginning of this section is an example of very weak transcendence. By
‘weak transcendence’ I mean any one of a range of statements presenting the idea
of transcendence, with the essential notion of radical otherness conceived of as su-
periority, which does not pursue, or does not pursue fully, the logical consequences
of transcendence, especially as they relate to the act of making statements about it. Any
speech-act of strong transcendence, by contrast, will be in some degree self-reflexive
and self-critical concerning its own truth-value. A statement of transcendence is
never complete, always constituting a promise rather than a manifestation. But it
may approach the ever absent fulfilment to a greater or lesser extent through its
performance; hence, strong and weak transcendence.
Indirect Modes of Knowing, Direct Modes of UnKnowing. The quotation from
Plato’s Timaeus at the beginning of the present chapter, a favourite locus for Middle
and Late Platonist authors, suggests two levels of epistemological difficulty; firstly
581Sells 1994, 3: ‘A mere statement that God is ineffable, followed by a list of attributes of God, and
ending with a reminder that God is ineffable serves as an example of the low end of the spectrum
of intensity, while at the high end we find the true apophatic discourse, with all its employment of
paradox, self-negation, and other discursive measures which attack normal predication.’
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the difficulty of knowledge of the transcendent, and then the further difficulty of
expressing this knowledge. Plotinus goes beyond Plato in this regard; for him, the
impossibility of expressing the nature of the highest, not only to the ‘mass of men’
but even to a philosophical elite, is an axiom, and is accompanied by a correspond-
ing impossibility of knowledge itself.582 As Mortley’s work highlights in detail, the
decline in confidence in λόγος led to a range of alternative modes of epistemolo-
gy in late antiquity.583 Analysing the modes specific to Middle Platonism will help
to make sense of the dynamics and internal paradoxes of the ways in which Ploti-
nus, having denied expression and cognition of the transcendent, nevertheless writes
about it at length.
The Middle Platonist milieu, in distancing its transcendent principle from normal
modes of cognition, brings to bear several distinct theories (and written practices) of
‘indirect knowing’, and, beyond these, of something else, something which is di-
rect, but which is not knowing. This nameless faculty or philosophic achievement is
nevertheless universally located at the top of the epistemological hierarchy; while it
takes the form of a kind of superconsciousness or ineffable apprehension, rather than
of knowledge or thought, it makes sense to discuss it in terms of modes of knowing,
as the lower stages of philosophic cognition are depicted as being aimed at, or hav-
ing their final fruition in, such a mode. For the sake of clarity, I have anatomised
these modes into four main types, representing a range of possibilities adopted in
varying ways by different authors.
1. Discursive Indirect Knowing. Platonists generally recognise that certain meth-
ods of reasoning - induction, negative dialectic, and other indirect modes of ap-
proach to the absolute - can give us some, necessarily incomplete, idea of the nature
of the first principle. These methods are discursive, that is, they deal in concepts,
and can approach the transcendent reality only obliquely, a limitation we have seen
above in Plotinus’ criticism of his own use of negative language as an incomplete
582See 218 ff. in the following chapter.
583See especially Mortley 1986.
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mode of expression, necessarily trapped at the level of discursive thought.584 The
terms διάνοια and λογισμός and their cognates apply to this type of thinking. These
methods of reasoning specialise in telling us what the transcendent is not. A very
widespread reason for placing such limitations on discursive thought is the common
Hellenic maxim that ‘like is only known by like’, which has a pervasive presence
in Greek thought both within and outside philosophy proper;585 the human mind
could comprehend the transcendent only if it itself were transcendent. The more
characteristically Platonist critique of thinking as ‘discursive’, and thus necessarily
indirect (implying a thinker and a thought, and therefore lacking unity) is a philo-
sophic concern, and should not necessarily be read into the religious texts quoted
below, which nevertheless level similar criticisms of incompleteness and limitation
against everyday modes of thinking.
2. Non-discursive Direct Knowing. A non-discursive mode of knowing may be
theorised, superior to discursive modes, because consisting in direct apprehension
of the known by the knower. The high status given to noêsis is universal in Middle
Platonism, in which noêsis, however defined by individual authors, is privileged as
pertaining to nous, conceived of as a hypostatic reality of a high order. For some
authors, as we will see, noêsis constitutes a direct mode of knowing the transcendent
absolute; these tend to be the same authors who see this reality as itself being nous.
3. Non-discursive Indirect Knowing. Plotinus’ conception of noetic non-discursivity
will be unpacked in some detail in Chapter 6, but in the present context we may
simply point out that, for Plotinus, noêsis represents a truly direct way of knowing
realities, since in the act of noêsis nothing, neither time, nor any separation between
the knower, the known, or the act of knowing, can interfere with direct apprehension
of truth. It cannot, however, directly apprehend the first principle, which is beyond
nous, and ἀνοητός. For authors such as Plotinus who take this view586 we may call
584See 11 above.
585In the Platonist tradition see e.g. Pl. Ti. 45c with Arist. de An. 4046ff; Pl. Smp. 195b5, where
Agathon presents the doctrine that ‘like always stays close to like’ as a piαλαιὸς λόγος; Arist. Metaph.
1000b; Alcinoüs XIV.2; Num. Fr. 2 ll. 3-4; Ph. de Gig. 9; Plot. VI.9[9]11. See Mortley 1975, 369-70.
586E.g. V.1[10]6.12 ff; VI.7[38]15, 16; V.3[49]11; III.8[51]8.31.
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this faculty ‘non-discursive indirect knowing’ with regard to the transcendent; while
serving as the mode of direct knowing par excellence at the level of entities, beyond
that level noêsis cannot penetrate.
4. Direct Unknowing. Some authors present other, more direct, modes of ap-
proach to the transcendent; these may take the form of ‘vision’ or other verbs of
sensing or of contact, of gnôsis, or of another ability or philosophic action (some-
times extending to ritual actions, whose efficacy is independent of discursive con-
tent). It is difficult to know what to call these modes of approach; they are often
themselves presented as ineffable, a wide range of apophatic techniques may be em-
ployed to delineate these modes from their cousins, noêsis and the like, and they are
often accompanied by the rhetorics of silence and of secrecy. I choose to call these
modes ‘direct unknowing’ because, while descriptions of them privilege metaphors
of contact, unity, and ineffability, and tend to deny ‘knowing’ in any normal sense
of the term, they nevertheless occupy structurally the top of the hierarchy of modes
of knowing (from discursive to non-discursive, and finally transcending knowing
itself). While they are from time to time characterised as forms of knowledge, this is
never anything except one of a range of partial metaphors used to attempt to signify
an ineffable act conceived of as transcending the written text. The awkwardness and
paradoxicality of the term ‘direct unknowing’ serves to flag in the following discus-
sion the elusive character of the (non)phenomena in question, which tend to evade
definition even as they are privileged above the defining mind and even intellect.
The Transcendent in Middle Platonist Thought
While much excellent work has been done on the concept of the transcendent
in Middle Platonism, somewhat less attention has been given to the precise ways
in which the Middle Platonists tended to respond rhetorically to the situation of a
formally transcendent first principle. Two points should be made here, grounded
in the concepts of weak and strong transcendence and indirect knowing outlined
above. Firstly, while the ineffability of the transcendent first principle is indeed ‘un
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lieu commun’ among Middle Platonists,587 the surviving evidence presents us with
no sustained example of the writing of strong transcendence which Plotinus and
his successors practised.588 Secondly, these philosophers are generally much more
optimistic than Plotinus concerning modes of indirect knowing; while sometimes
showing cognizance of the potential problems inherent in any epistemology of tran-
scendence, the Middle Platonists can be said (with possible exceptions discussed
below) to posit incomplete, but relatively unproblematic, discursive methods, and
non-discursive methods with some direct connection to the transcendent principle.
Strong and Weak Transcendence in Middle Platonism. The Didaskalikos of Alcinoüs
(probably 2nd century CE, though possibly as late as the third)589 furnishes our
strongest example of Middle Platonist theoretical transcendence.590 Alcinoüs intro-
duces his section on theology thus: ‘We must next discuss the third principle [third,
that is, in order of discussion, after matter and the forms], which Plato declares to
be more or less beyond description. However, we might arrive by induction at some
notion of it in the following fashion.’591 Alcinoüs states that this principle is un-
sayable, and graspable only by nous, because it/he has no attributes, being neither
good nor bad, nor indifferent.592 He is clearly making an attempt to remove the first
principle from the range of normal predications, and shows some recognition of the
consequences of his conception for discourse with his use of the “neither this nor
its opposite, nor a third, middle term” trope, a variation on the basic apophatic unit
discussed above.593
Wolfson suggests594 that when Alcinoüs and later Platonists say that the first
principle is ‘unsayable’, they are employing negation (ἀpiόφασις) in the sense defined
587O’Meara 1998, 146-7; cf. Casel 1919, 94-95; Whittaker 1969c, 368 n. 4; Mortley 1986, II, 17.
588Cf. Bechtle 1999, 86-88; O’Meara 1998, 146-7.
589On this dating, see Whittaker in Alcinoüs 1990, xii-xiii; Dillon in Alcinoüs 1993, xii-xiii.
590References to this text are to the edition of Whittaker (1990).
591X.164 7-8. Translation Dillon (1993), ad loc.
592X.4 = 165.5-13 H: ῎Αρρητος δ΄ ἐστὶ καὶ νῷ μόνῳ ληpiτός...ἀλλ΄ οὐδὲ συμβέβηκέ τι αὐτῷ, οὔτε κακόν· οὐ
γὰρ θέμις τοῦτο εἰpiεῖν· οὔτε ἀγαθόν· κατὰ μετοχὴν γάρ τινος ἔσται οὕτως καὶ μάλιστα ἀγαθότητος οὔτε
ἀδιάφορον κτλ.
593P. 30 above.
594See Wolfson 1952, 120-1; 1957, 145-6. Cf. Mortley 1986, II, 57.
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by Aristotle, rather than privation (στέρησις), by which latter term Aristotle indicates
what is termed ‘negation’ in more conventional parlance.595 To Aristotle, a negation
is not considered a predicate, because it asserts nothing about its object except that
it is not something. A privation, by contrast, implies its opposite: to say that one
had a good day implies that a bad day was a possibility. Negation in this technical
sense does not mean that the opposite of the predicate can be applied to the ineffable
reality so described; instead, ‘it rather means the exclusion of God from the universe
of discourse of the predicate in question’.596
This Aristotelean distinction helps make sense of what Alcinoüs is doing in fol-
lowing a statement of the one’s ineffability with a chain of attributes; if the primary
god is indeed ‘ineffable’ it cannot also be ‘eternal, ineffable, “self-perfect”,’ and the
rest,597 unless these attributes are understood in this special sense.598 It should be
noted that the attributes used by Alcinoüs are all either alpha-privative adjectives,
or modified after they are stated in a semi-apophatic manner, and Alcinoüs insists
that he is not attempting to ‘circumscribe’ or ‘define’ (χωρίζων) the reality he is dis-
cussing. Alcinoüs’ comment, then, that the first principle is ‘more or less beyond
description’ may be taken as a shorthand for an understanding that certain seeming
predicates are not really predicates, but rather forms of ‘unsaying’.
To the Aristotelean term ἀpiόφασις the Platonists, from Alcinoüs on,599 generally
prefer the term ἀφαίρεσις, but with the same meaning of ‘removal’ of concepts rather
than predication of concepts.600 Although, technically, Plotinus would for the most
595Arist. Metaph. IV 2 1004a, 14-16; IV 6 1011b 18 ff.; X 5 1056a 15-18.
596Wolfson 1957, 146. Cf. Mortley 1975, 373-5.
597X.164.33-34: Καὶ μὴν ὁ piρῶτος θεὸς ἀίδιός ἐστιν, ἄρρητος, αὐτοτελὴς τουτέστιν ἀpiροσδεής, ἀειτελὴς
τουτέστιν ἀεὶ τέλειος, piαντελὴς τουτέστι piάντη τέλειος· θειότης, οὐσιότης, ἀλήθεια, συμμετρία, ἀγαθόν.
Λέγω δὲ οὐχ ὡς χωρίζων ταῦτα, ἀλλ’ ὡς κατὰ piάντα ἑνὸς νοουμένου. Καὶ ἀγαθὸν μέν ἐστι, διότι piάντα
εἰς δύναμιν εὐεργετεῖ, piαντὸς ἀγαθοῦ αἴτιος ὤν .
598Cf. Dillon 1993, 103.
599Didask. 165 H.
600Wolfson 1952, 120-1; Schroeder 1996, 337. On the Platonic and Middle Platonist history of aphaire-
sis, see Wolfson 1952; Hadot 1981; Mortley 1986, I, 134-6. The term ἀpiοφάσις would again come into
use in the Athenian School of Proclus (Mortley 1986, II, 86).
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part call the examples of negation noted above ἀφαιρέσεις,601 I use the terms apopha-
sis (as defined p. 30 above) and aphairesis to refer to specific methods pursued by
Plotinus, discussed 227 ff. below; they should be regarded as terms of art in this
thesis.
The Aristotelean background of Alcinoüs’ negative method and the methods of
indirect and direct knowing which he posits, discussed below, show a standard re-
sponse to the problems of transcendence. It is likely that his account draws on an es-
tablished school tradition which no longer survives. We note that, for all the empha-
sis on negation, Alcinoüs’ literary method is quite conventional in this passage; with
the understanding that certain attributes lie outside the realm of formal predication,
he is happy to employ them liberally and relatively unproblematically. In contrast,
we will see strong expressions of transcendence in Plotinus which negate the one be-
yond being, and then deny these very negations. Alcinoüs’ Chapter Ten also sits like
an island of negations in a sea of conventional positive formulations; Plotinus’ acts
of unsaying go on and on, sometimes even crossing the boundaries between treatises
in extended exercises of unsaying. Alcinoüs’ account of the first principle is thus an
example of a relatively weak expression of transcendence in systematic form.
Alcinoüs’ account has come down to us in an unusually good state of preserva-
tion; many of the writings of Middle Platonism are by contrast lost. As far as the
limited evidence extends, however, other authors of the period give comparable, if
less systematic, accounts of the transcendent first principle. Maximus of Tyre (sec-
ond century CE) tells us that the first principle exceeds the powers of the senses or of
speech to comprehend,602 but presents a relatively weak transcendence; the philoso-
pher is able to grasp the nature of the first principle through a more or less standard
601As at e.g. VI.7[38]36.7. But note that at V.5[32]6 Plotinus uses the term ἀpiόφασις (28) and the verbal
ἀpiοφήσῃ (32) in the sense of ‘negation’, pace Wolfson.
602Orat. 11.9.204-5.
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course of Platonist via eminentiae, and there is little emphasis on this principle’s re-
moteness or unsayability.603 Plutarch speaks of τὸ μὴ φατὸν μηδὲ ῥητὸν ἀνθρώpiοις κάλ-
λος, the ineffable beauty of god;604 we might translate the last four words as a state-
ment of Platonist elitism (‘not to be told to the many’) or as an absolute statement of
the limits of language (‘not expressible by humankind’). In either case, the statement
does not result in a great deal of strong language of transcendence in Plutarch, and
is practically unique in his extensive work.
Among Latin writers, Calcidius, writing in the fourth century CE but probably
basing his account on a Middle Platonist source, describes Plato’s supreme god as
‘the highest good, and beyond every substance and every nature, and greater than
reason or intellect. . . ’605 and leaves the matter there. Apuleius of Madaura (fl. mid-
second century CE) makes several statements of the deity’s ineffability.606 In the On
the God of Socrates he attributes this ineffability to the paucity of human language,607
and in his On Plato he says, citing our ever-recurring lines from Plato’s Timaeus, that
god is ‘not bounded by place nor time nor any force, so that he is comprehensible
to few, sayable to none’.608 This interesting author does, however, import themes of
mystic silence in a way which foreshadows the approach common to Late Platonism,
an approach otherwise unexampled among surviving Middle Platonists.
We might expect a strongly transcendent first principle from Numenius of Apamea
(fl. c. 150 CE),609 whose system of thought struck third century readers as so like
Plotinus’ that they accused the later philosopher of having plagiarised him;610 un-
fortunately the surviving fragments do not give enough evidence for us to make
603On the via eminentiae, see n. 626 below.
604De Is. 393a.
605In Tim. 176, p. 204 5 ff. Waszink: qui est summum bonum ultra omnem substantiam omnemque naturam,
aestimatione intellectuque melior. . . ; see Whittaker 1969a, 92.
606See discussion Festugière 1981, IV 102-9.
607Soc. III.124: [Plato] praedicet hunc [deorum parentem] solum maiiestatis incredibili quadam
nimietate et ineffabili non posse penuria sermonis humani quavis oratione vel modice conprehendi.
608De Plat. I.5. . . neque loco neque tempore neque vice ulla comprehensus eoque paucis cogitabilis, nemini
effabilis (cf. Tim. 28c3-5). Cf. Apul. Apol. 64.7.
609See Dillon 1977, 362 on Numenius’ floruit. Translations of Numenius are from Petty’s 2011 edition
, which follows the numbering of Des Places’ 1973 Budé edition.
610Porph. Plot. 17; see Athanassiadi 2006, 89-90 with n. 58.
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such a judgement. Numenius strongly distances the first god, the good, from any
sensory or spatial attributes, and seemingly places it beyond essence.611 He regards
it as a transcendent aspect of intellect (frr. 16, 17, 20; cf. 21), a nous which precedes
nous (fr. 17).612 But nothing survives of Numenius which could be characterised as
a strong expression of transcendence.
It is even more dangerous to speculate about the stylistic nuances of Celsus,
whose True Account, written some time after the year 160,613 survives only in frag-
ments quoted by the hostile Origen. It is clear that, in removing his first principle
beyond the realms of intellect, of existence, and of real beings, Celsus placed it in a
theoretical position of transcendence.614 It is unlike any other form (VI.63.13-14: ὁ
θεὸς οὒτ΄ ἄλλῳ εἴδει οὐδενὶ ὅμοιος), which Frede takes to mean ‘God does not have
any qualities’,615 it has none of the characteristics we predicate to things (VI.62.13-
14), and cannot be expressed in words (VII.42-43). Nevertheless, from the small
amount of material which survives, there is no indication that Celsus explored the
stronger side of transcendence beyond the employment of such negative descrip-
tions, with the tantalising exception of a direct mode of ineffable apprehension,
discussed below.
Modes of Knowing the Transcendent in Middle Platonism. A tradition of indirect dis-
cursive modes of knowing the first principle was current in Middle Platonism.616
Alcinoüs describes a number of technical methods of reasoning, well discussed by
611Fr. 2 ll. 13-14: ἐpiὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ seems to be a more flowery equivalent of the usual ἐpiέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας
of Pl. Rep. 509B 8-9.
612Pace Festugière, who finds an intellectual first principle somehow alien to Numenius’ ‘essential
thought’ despite recognising the plain facts of the text (1981, IV, 127). Perhaps Festugière was under
the influence of Plotinus’ extensive arguments as to why the first principle could not be an intellect,
discussed in the next chapter.
613See Dillon 1977, 400; Frede 1994, 5188-90.
614See Orig. Cels. VII.45.20-24 for a long negative definition of this principle, which, however, is not
apophatic as I define the term. This and many of the metaphysical citations that follow are collected
at Frede 1994, 5206.
6151994, 5206. I would rather be tempted to speculate that Celsus had identified the first principle
with the Form of the Good of the Republic, and was concerned to differentiate it from the other Forms;
this is not however to say that such a Form would not be free of qualities in Celsus’ thought.
616See generally Festugière 1981, IV , 79-132, with the useful summary at 136-7; Dörrie 1960, 213-4;
Krämer 1964, 105-8; Daniélou 1973, 340-3.
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Festugière:617 we have seen induction (ἐpiαγωγή) recommended for attaining some
indirect idea of the first principle. Alcinoüs expands on the specific methods which
this entails: the negative method of abstraction of attributes (ἀφαίρησις)618 (a method
which we will see transformed by Plotinus), analogy (ἀναλογία),619 and a third method,
usually known as the via eminentiae. Celsus recommends synthesis, analysis, and
analogy for approaching the ultimate reality indirectly.620 While these two authors
furnish the main surviving programmatic methodological statements about these
modes of knowing,621 we find them in wide use in Middle Platonist writing; the ex-
amples of negative attributions given above may furnish one case in point, which
would fit easily under the method of ‘removal’ propounded by Alcinoüs, or that of
‘analysis’ propounded by Celsus,622 and the characteristically Platonist via eminen-
tiae is discussed below.
Of more concern to the present thesis are the non-discursive modes of knowing,
and whether they are conceived as being direct or not. As we have seen, Alcinoüs
places his first principle within the reach of noêsis; he conceives of this principle as
itself an exalted form of nous,623 and so we would expect this. Maximus of Tyre al-
so argues for a noetic god (11.8), and describes with some flourishes the means by
which the philosopher, freeing himself from the senses and the world of matter, at-
tains to knowledge of it through ‘the noblest and purest and most intelligent and
subtlest and most venerable aspect of the soul’ which grasps it ‘all at once in a single
act of comprehension’.624 Plutarch also emphasises the suddenness and ‘singular-
ity’ of noêsis of the highest nous, in a passage replete with mystic terminology.625
Both Plutarch’s and Maximus’ accounts contain narrative elements, and rhetorical
content drawn from the mysteries, to which the discussion will turn in approaching
6171981, IV 92-132. Cf. Turner 2001, 486-8.
618X.165.16 ff.
619X.165.20 ff.
620Orig. Cels. VII.42. See Festugière 1981, 116-117; 122-3.
621But see also Numen. fr. 2 ll. 3-4.
622Cf. Max.Tyr. 11.11.
623X.164.18 ff. There is possible ambiguity here, but see Dillon 1993, 102-3.
62411.9.205-8, trans. Trapp 1997, 103.
625Plu. De Is. 382 D-E. Cf. Numen. fr. 2 ll. 6-7.
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Plotinus’ apophatic narratives of contact with the one beyond being. As for their
characterisation of noêsis as an instantaneous, synoptic mode of cognition, Plotinus
will approach this theory with a depth of scrutiny and subtlety not found in his pre-
decessors, resulting in a certain ineffability found already at the level of nous before
the approach to the truly ineffable one.
The via eminentiae, the conceptual ascent, is a popular epistemological tool for
indirect knowing of the absolute in Middle Platonism,626 but it constitutes a special
case. In the locus classicus, the climactic speech of Plato’s Symposium, Socrates de-
scribes the ascent, fueled by erôs, from beautiful particulars to genera, and from gen-
era finally to the beautiful itself, moving always toward the better from the worse,
until the best is attained. He describes it, however, not in terms of his own erotic
quest, but as an initiatory path which was described to him by the mysterious Dioti-
ma.627 Such a path, in terms of Platonist understanding of modes of knowing, goes
from the realm of discursive knowledge (particulars) to non-discursive knowledge
(genera, Forms); this anagôgê might either stop there, in a system culminating in an
intellect,628 or pass beyond, in a system culminating in an ineffable principle beyond
thought and being.
A narration of such a journey would remain on the level of discourse, but by
pursuing such a journey the philosopher might theoretically attain to direct non-
discursive knowledge of truths, or even pass beyond knowing into direct unknow-
ing. In terms of the four categories outlined above, then, the via eminentiae as a
literary device is an indirect, discursive programme for non-discursive awareness, or
even its transcendence; this is a mode of knowing often presented in a distinctive
narrative style, and one which promises more than it can itself deliver. Chapter Sev-
en discusses both types of via eminentiae in Plotinus, characterised as discursive and
practical aphairesis.
626We are fortunate to have a description of this method by Alcinoüs (Didask. 10.165.10 ff).
627Smp. 201d-212a; mystery initiation evoked at 209e5-210a2; the course of anagôgê described 210a4-
212a7.
628Maximus of Tyre gives a well-known example of the genre, in which he attempts to demonstrate
that god must be an intellect (11.8).
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There are two accounts in the surviving Middle Platonist literature which seem
to posit ineffable modes of direct unknowing. The first is Numenius’ lost work On
the Good. Numenius says in fragment 17 that the first god is completely unknown
among mankind; as with the quotation from Plutarch above, there may be some
ambiguity here between the idea of absolute unknowability and the implication of
an elite who can know. Numenius has Plato address humankind, informing them of
another intellect beyond the demiurgic intellect which they know, one that is ‘more
august and more divine’.629 In fragment 2 from the same work Numenius lays out
a theory of knowledge more systematically. After a brief discussion of reasoning
from analogies inherent in material objects, he rejects this or any equivalent method
as a means of approach to the first god, here called ‘the good’ (τἀγαθόν). Numenius
indicates that contemplating number (τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς θεασαμένῳ) rather than sensibles
will lead the aspirant beyond the lower forms of reasoning to something higher, and
continues in a vein which has much in common with Plotinian passages describing
both the contemplation of intellect and the ineffable contact with the one:
In this way must one, after going far away from sense-objects, have
converse with the Good, alone with the Alone ( μόνῷ μόνον). There,
where there is neither any person nor any living thing, no corporeal
object large or small, but rather a divine solitude, absolutely inde-
scribable and ineffable; there the abodes, pastimes, and splendours
of the Good are found, and the Good itself, the gentle, sovereign
one, graciously seated above essence.630
Although it is removed from its broader context in the original work, we can be fairly
confident in seeing in this passage a description of a direct mode of unknowing; the
language of silence and secrecy, the negative description, albeit compressed, and the
lack of any verb ‘to know’ are tell-tale signs of this.
Celsus also seems to have propounded a transcendent apprehension beyond
knowing. While placing the absolute beyond the reach of nous or any other form
629Cf. Festugière 1981, IV, 128-132.
630Fr. 2 ll. 9-14. The striking ‘alone with the alone’ is echoed by Plotinus at I.6[1]7.9; VI.9[11]51;
V.1[10]6.11-12.
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of knowing,631 he speaks tantalisingly and paradoxically of ‘a certain ineffable abil-
ity’ by which the absolute might be intelligised.632 Taken in its context, this noêtos
cannot correspond to any form of noêsis; it would seem that Celsus is reaching to-
ward a description of an ineffable knowledge-beyond-knowledge, or unknowing,
which acts toward the god as nous does toward the intelligibles, but which takes the
philosopher (and the reader) out of the purview of words, concepts, or noêsis.
Transcendence in ‘Pythagoreanism’. To this account of Middle Platonist philosophy
should be added that of the Pythagorean, or Neopythagorean, materials current in
the same period.633 The term Neopythagorean may be taken in what follows to refer
to an intellectual tendency in antiquity, rather than a philosophical school, toward
ontological speculation which privileged number as a fundamental reality, and/or
which posited a monad as the primordial reality.634 The Pythagorean bios which
had typified the early Pythagorean sodalities was gone; in its place we find a meta-
physical tendency.635 There is also the separate question of definition and identity;
philosophers could and did define themselves, or others, as Pythagorean, as we will
see in the case of Numenius ‘the Pythagorean’. In this context, however, ‘Neopy-
thagorean’ becomes a modern misnomer, and the term should be understood in
what follows as referring to a speculative tendency rather than any consideration
of identity.
Neopythagorean speculations played an important part in the formulation of
631Ap. Orig. Cels. VII.45.21-25.
632Ibid. VII.45.25: the first principle is ἀρρήτῳ τινὶ δυνάμει νοητός.
633The terminology here is problematic, because, if Burkert is right in seeing almost all surviving
written evidence of early Pythagorean ideas (aside from that of Aristotle) as being filtered through a
Platonist lens, virtually all Pythagoreanism is ‘Neopythagoreanism’, and the actual teachings of the
historical figure Pythagoras and his school in the sixth century are not only lost to us, but were lost to
ancient philosophers as well (argued at length at Burkert 1972, 15-90). This is by no means a closed
issue, despite Burkert’s massively erudite exposition; see e.g. Kingsley’s arguments contra Burkert
(Kingsley 1995, 317 ff.), which, however, do not materially affect the working definition outlined
here.
634It would be difficult to find more common features than these across Neopythagorean literature, a
very heterogeneous genre or collection of genres. Cf. Whittaker 1969b, 98 n.10.
635Cf. Peters 2004, 74/204.
THE TRANSCENDENT IN MIDDLE PLATONIST THOUGHT 174
ideas of the transcendent absolute.636 The importance of Neopythagorean litera-
ture637 for Middle Platonists is in some cases clear, and in others may be considered
a likelihood; we must take care, however, in making sharp distinctions between the
two movements, which were already cognate in many ways from Plato’s time on-
ward, and which had, moreover, come to be strongly identified by some Platonists
and ‘Pythagoreans’ alike in the first and seconds centuries.638 Numenius is usually
regarded as a Pythagorean by ancient commentators, but Proclus sees him as a Pla-
tonist.639 Plotinus, too, was known by his contemporary Longinus as an ‘expounder
of Platonic and Pythagorean principles’,640 from which I think we are justified in
concluding that certain of Plotinus’ doctrines, most probably his doctrines of the
transcendent one and his thought on number, partook of the Neopythagorean ten-
dency. We know that Plotinus read the Neopythagorean works of Numenius, and
his reference to poetic works of Pythagoras (which he finds unclear) shows that he
had delved into the pseudepigraphic tradition; however, the complexities of this
tradition make it impossible to say which works he might have known.641
The most important Neopythagorean conception for the present discussion is
that of the one or monad, which Whittaker has argued had a primary role to play
in the shaping of post-Hellenistic and late antique ideas about the transcendent ab-
solute.642 Neopythagorean theories of the one have been divided by Whittaker into
two main types: (1), the one combining in itself opposing characteristics in a kind
636See generally Whittaker 1969b; Whittaker 1973, 78-83, esp. 78-9; Mortley 1986, II, 20. Cf.
Armstrong 1967, 14.
637On this literature, see generally Thesleff 1961; Dillon 1977, 353; Festugière 1981, I, 15-16. A basic
corpus is established by Thesleff’s edition of 1965. These writings, most of which are lost, ranged over
a large and varied number of genres and themes, including pseudepigrapha attributed to Pythagoras
and others ‘of his school’ (see Casel 1919, 52-3; Thesleff 1961, 119, 202; Burkert 1972, 201), sacred
hymns, treatises on number (Festugière 1981, I, 15-16; cf. Dillon 1977, 353), so-called hieroi logoi (see
67 above), and, of course, philosophical works, such as the writings of Numenius.
638See 110 above.
639Numenius the Pythagorean: Longinus ap. Porph. Plot. 20; Euseb. Pr. ev. IX, 7, 1 = Numen. Fr.
1; Nemesius De nat. hom. 2, 6-14 = Numen. Fr. 4b; Orig. Cels. V.38 = Numen. Fr. 53. The Platonist:
Procl. In Tim. III p. 33, 30-34, 1; 34, 6 Diehl; In R. II p. 96, 11 Kroll.
640Porph. Plot. 20.71-3.
641See 140 above on Plotinus’ reception of the ‘Pythagorean’ poems. Merlan 1970, 84-88 summarises
the textual issues.
642Whittaker 1969b.
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of coincidentia oppositorum, and (2), the one transcending these opposites entirely.643
Whittaker gives examples from a range of evidence to link the idea of a first principle
to which all attributes, even that of unity, are denied with Neopythagorean specu-
lation, and considers the appearance of such concepts in Platonist authors and in
texts such as the Hermetica to be signs of Neopythagorean influence.644 In doing so,
he may be pushing the source critical method further than it will go, but his work
nevertheless makes it clear that some Neopythagorean authors were expounding
doctrines of a transcendent monad in the first centuries CE.645
Moderatus of Gades (first century CE) tells us that, ‘according to the Pythagore-
ans’, there are three monads, the first of which he declares to be ‘above being and
every essence’,646 a quotation which some scholars have taken to be the first known
reference to a ‘one beyond being’ in a broadly Middle Platonist milieu.647 The lost
‘On Intellect and Thought’ of Pseudo-Brontinus648 is reported to have dealt with a
monad which transcended both nous and being in power and seniority,649 although
we cannot say much more than this about it.650 The so-called ‘Theology of Arith-
metic’ is a surviving treatise on number, apparently culled from the work of Nico-
machus of Gerasa and others. The section on the monad in this text provides many
examples of the kind of paradoxical transcendence which Neopythagoreans of the
first centuries CE were developing: the monad of the Theologumena generates the oth-
er numbers with no loss to itself (1, 6-8), and possesses in potentiality all the qualities
643Whittaker 1973, 77 and ff.
644Ibid. 78-82.
645But not all. Anatolius, for example, considers the monad to be noetic (On the Decad 22, 19-22; cf.
Theon Exp. 100, 4-6).
646Ap. Simpl. In Phys. 230, 34-231, 27 ff. Diels; ὑpiὲρ τὸ εἶναι καὶ piᾶσαν οὐσίαν ἀpiοφαίνεται (36-37).
647Dodds 1928, 136-9; Jufresa 1981, 4, with n. 21. These three monads have also led to suspicions
that a Neopythagorean writer may have penned the second Platonic Epistle, with its three princi-
ples (see Rist 1965a, 80-81, discussing Pl. Ep. II, 312d-313a), a claim which, if true, would demon-
strate a concrete, formative influence of Neopythagorean transcendental speculation on the ‘Platonic’
tradition.
648Περὶ νοῦ καὶ διανοίας, a text tentatively dated as early as the second or third century BCE by Thesleff
(1961, 115) and as late as the second CE by Whittaker (1969a, 95 n. 3). The MSS give his name variously
as Βροντίνος and Βροτίνος .
649Syrian. In Metaph. 166, 5 ff. Kroll: Βροτίνος δὲ ὡς νοῦ piαντὸς καὶ οὐσίας δυνάμει καὶ piρεσβείᾳ piερέχει.
See Merlan 1969, 8.
650See Whittaker 1969a, 95.
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manifested in the other numbers (1, 9 ff; 3, 2 ff.). Like the Plotinian one, it is thus the
source of all, yet completely unmoved by and transcendent of all things.
A detailed investigation of the complicated relationships between these texts,
and between these texts and their Platonist readers, is beyond the present investi-
gation. Important here is the general consensus that Neopythagoreanism (known in
antiquity simply as ‘the Pythagoreans’ and their thought) was a recognised current
of philosophic speculation in antiquity, one especially appreciated by Platonists who
preserve for us many of the quotations we still possess of this literature, and that
this current was typified by speculations concerning a monadic first principle which
was sometimes defined as formally transcendent. There is some evidence that some
Neopythagorean thinkers dealt to some degree with the problem of ineffability; we
are told, for instance, that Pseudo-Lysis, a thinker of the first century CE, defined god
as an ‘ineffable number’.651 However, the contributions of Neopythagorean theory
to the broader culture of philosophic silence are outshone by the contributions of the
Pythagorean mystique, and its attendant tropes of philosophic silence as a form of
logos, discussed in Chapter Two above.
The Transcendent God in the Platonising Religious Currents of the First Cen-
turies CE. Speaking generally, it is a valuable truism that many currents of Græco-
Roman religion, from about the first century CE, underwent a broad move toward a
more remote, more unknowable, more transcendent supreme deity. A rise in the use
of alpha-privative adjectives in describing the deity can be seen as a symptom of this
trend; there is an increasing concern with negative descriptions and a reluctance to
define the god in the limited terms of everyday discourse.652 God is often said to
be beyond naming, to possess many or all names,653 or given a generic descriptor in
place of a name.654 Again, speaking generally, the theme of the theos agnostos appears
651Athenagoras Legatio 6 (PG VI 901 A): ἀριθμὸν ἄρρητον.
652Mortley 1986, II, 13-14.
653See e.g. Ephesians 1.21; CH V 1.1-2; 10.1-2; the Hermetic Asclepius 20; Basilides ap. Hippolytus,
Haer. VII, 20 (PG 16, 3302 C) and 21 (PG 16 3303 A); Apuleius gives god many names (Mun. 37) and
elsewhere calls him innominabilis (Pl. 1.5). See Festugière 1981, IV, 65-70.
654See e.g. Mitchell 1999 on the late antique cult of ‘the highest god’.
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in many traditions; while Dodds, Festugière, and others have argued that this con-
cept, once deemed by some scholars foreign to the ‘Greek mind’ and doubtless an
import from dubious Eastern cults, in fact has its roots in Platonist and Pythagore-
an tradition,655 this does not lessen its ubiquity in late antique popular religious
thought.656 This ubiquity points in part to the demotic Middle Platonist character of
many religious traditions of the period.
The Hermetica. The overall approach to the ‘hypercosmic’ supreme god in the
Hermetica657 has been analysed by Festugière.658 The Hermetic texts present a nous
as the ruling and demiurgic principle of the cosmos,659 one which can be known,
although not necessarily expressed in words;660 paraphrasing Plato, Hermes tells us
that ‘To know (νοῆσαι) god is difficult, but to speak of him is impossible, even in-
sofar as it is possible to know him.’661 ‘Above’ this intellectual principle, however,
is a transcendent, ineffable source about which nothing can be said and no defini-
tions can be made.662 This first principle is often described in negative or privative
terms: ‘So pray, my son Tat’, Hermes instructs his pupil and interlocutor, ‘first to the
655See Dodds in Proclus 1963, App. I, 310-313; Festugière 1981, IV, 1-3.
656See e.g. the altar to ‘the unknown god’ in Athens, Acts 17:23. There are of course two senses
in which ‘unknown’ can be understood: simply unknown (through lack of knowledge) or abso-
lutely unknown (through impossibility of knowledge), and the meaning of agnôstos will have had
indeterminate shadings of both meanings (see n. 32).
657The degree to which the disparate tractates of the Corpus Hermeticum present a coherent world-
view has been questioned, but recent consensus favours a substantial coherence of doctrine (see e.g.
Festugière 1981, IV, 54-5; Fowden 1986, 95-115, esp. 97-9, who sees the apparent contradictions be-
tween texts as signs of a graded, initiatory approach to teaching, corresponding to the Hermetic
pupil’s ascent from reason toward gnôsis; Copenhaver 1992, xxxix). What ancient testimony we have
points to the existence of some kind of ‘Hermaïc movement’ in antiquity which was responsible for
these texts (see Iamb. Myst. VIII.4 ff.; the ‘books of Hermes’ mentioned by Plutarch (De Is. 61.375f)
and Clement (Strom. 6.4.35.3 ff.) may refer to iterations of this textual tradition). It is worth empha-
sising that we have every reason to believe that such a movement existed as a literary and intellectual
tradition, but no proof that it existed in a ritual or practical sense as groups of ‘practising Hermetists’.
I will speak in a somewhat loose fashion of Hermetic doctrines, most of which are contradicted some-
where in the corpus, but which still represent a characteristic approach running through the Hermetic
texts; the authors of the Hermetica did not stress terminological precision.
658Festugière 1981, IV, 54-78, esp. 70-78. The following summary is indebted to Festugière’s
discussion.
659E.g. CH I.9-14.
660CH I.30-1.
661Herm. ap. Stob. II 1 (Exc. I,1,1,): θεὸν νοῆσαι μὲν χαλεpiόν, φράσαι δὲ ἀδύνατον, ᾧ καὶ νοῆσαι
δυνατόν. Cf., once again, Pl. Tim. 28c3-5.
662See Festugière 1981, IV, 70-77.
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lordly and unique, not one, but that from which comes the one.’663 It is sometimes
described, in terms familiar to students of Late Platonism, as transcending being or
essence,664 or described in cryptic religio-philosophic terms which simultaneously
affirm and deny its essence: ‘We should dare to say, O Asklepius,’ Hermes tells his
interlocutor, ‘that the essence of God (if, that is, he has an essence), is the good.’665
Festugière collects a list of juxtaposed passages ascribing attributes to the deity,666
some of which are highly reminiscent structurally of philosophical apophatic lan-
guage through their use of unresolved paradox: ‘He is the god superior to naming,
he is the unmanifest, he is the most manifest.’667
With regard to indirect and direct modes of knowing, the Hermetica furnish sev-
eral interesting passages. The Hermetic texts show little interest in the technical
philosophical modes of discursive indirect knowing - analogy, synthesis, and the
like - postulated by the Middle Platonists; we sometimes find in their place what
have been called ‘occult arts’ - astrology, for instance, conceived as a propaedeutic
to higher knowledge.668 They do, however, reflect the common Platonist differenti-
ation between discursive, limited thought and higher faculties, and tend to favour
a strong discourse of direct knowledge of the transcendent. Tractate IX.10 discusses
the relative merits of logos and nous:
To intelligise (νοῆσαι) is to have certainty, and not to have certainty
is not to intelligise. Reasoned discourse (logos) does not reach the
truth, but intellect is great, and, when it has been guided by reason
up to a point, it has the means to get [as far as] the truth. After
intellect has considered everything carefully and discovered that all
of it is in harmony with the interpretations of reason, it has certainty,
and finds rest in this beautiful conviction.
663CH V.2: σὺ οὖν, ὦ τέκνον Τάτ, εὖξαι piρῶτον τῷ κυρίῳ καὶ μόνῳ καὶ οὐχ ἑνί, ἀλλ΄ ἀφ΄ οὗ ὁ εἷς.... Cf.
II.12, 14.
664CH II.5; the divine is οὐσιῶδες, but God is ἀνουσίαστον, ‘without essence’. See Festugière 1981,
70-1. Cf. e.g. Enn. 2.6.1: οὐσιώδης νόησις.
665CH VI.4; τολμητέον γὰρ εἶpiειν, ὦ Α᾿σκληpiιέ, ὅτι ἡ οὐσία τοῦ θεοῦ, εἴγε οὐσίαν ἔχει, τὸ καλὸν ἐστι ;
see NF 77, n. 18. Cf. CH XII.1[53]
666Festugière 1981, IV, 66-7.
667CH V.10: οὗτος ὁ θεὸς ὀνόματος κρείττων, οὗτος ὁ ἀφανής, οὗτος ὁ φανερώτατος. Tractate V passim
is a storehouse of creative paradox.
668See NF xxxix; Copenhaver 1992, xxxviii.
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We note that, like the philosophers, the Hermetic author maintains a certain, limited
merit for reasoned thinking (discursive indirect knowing), which, however, is super-
seded by nous, which is able to attain to the truth denied to discursive thinking. To
use intellect is, by definition, to be persuaded.
This and other passages make it clear that the Hermetic authors privilege noêsis
as a direct mode of knowing truths about the cosmos; but the evidence indicates
that it is conceived as only an indirect mode of knowing the transcendent beyond
the cosmos. Another faculty, that of gnôsis, conceived as a salvific form of ‘direct
unknowing’, is able to penetrate to the transcendent, ‘hypercosmic’ deity.669
Tractate X.5 describes the quest for the vision, through the purified ‘eyes of nous’,
of ‘the unperishing, ungraspable beauty of that good [sc. beyond nous]. You will see
it when you have nothing to say about it; for knowledge (γνῶσις) of it is a holy silence
and a latency of all sensation.’670 We note here a shift in vocabulary: the actual at-
tainment of the transcendent beauty is not through nous itself, but through ‘the eyes
of nous’, vision, and gnôsis. The passage goes on to equate gnôsis with deification,
ἀpiοθεωθῆναι. This passage is a strong description of a mode of direct unknowing of
the transcendent: the function of gnôsis as supernal and transformative is reinforced
through the use of the rhetoric of silence (indeed, the identification of gnôsis with
silence) and through the abstraction of all possible concepts, both of which deny it
any content, and through the shift from words of knowing (nous) to words of sensing
(θεάσασθαι, juxtaposed to the denial of any sensory experience). Gnôsis is the end of
the quest for knowledge, but it is something other than knowledge.
The well-known visionary ascent in the Poimandres (CH I) is another such lo-
cus for alternative, and direct, means of knowing the transcendent. Framed as a
first-person narrative of a visionary dialogue between an unnamed narrator and a
personified Nous, this tractate explores several philosophical issues: the nature and
pre-eminence of Nous (4-6), the origin of the elements of the natural world through
the action of the demiurgic Nous (8-14), the nature of the return from the world of
669Gnôsis salvific: CH I.20.
670Cf. XIII.2: σοφία νοερὰ ἐν σιγῇ.
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becoming to the world of true reality (24-26), and the deification of the aspirant. This
treatise is of great interest in the present context for its climactic description, in the
form of a prayer for gnôsis, of the god as ‘unsayable, ineffable [or secret], whom we
address through silence’671 and the fascinating interplay between logos and silence
which permeates the entire text.
Platonising Gnostic Texts. It is among Gnostic writings that we find discourses
of transcendence which most closely resemble the approach followed by Plotinus
and later Platonists.672 More specifically, it is among the so-called Platonising Sethi-
an treatises, certain Valentinian writings, and especially in the surviving fragments
of Basilides.673 These Platonising authors remove the first god decisively from the
realm of attributes and being; more importantly, they seem to have grappled with
the attendant problems of speaking of this god. Platonising Gnostic texts abound in
negative and privative descriptions of the first deity, and often embrace paradox and
contradictory superlatives in their pursuit of strong expressions of transcendence.
The Sethian Allogenes, one of the texts which circulated among Plotinus’ students at
Rome,674 abounds in statements of the transcendence of the supreme god, known
as the ‘Triple Power’: he is invisible, incomprehensible, ineffable, unnameable, a
‘nonsubstantial substance’. ‘He lives without Mind, or Life, or Existence, incompre-
hensibly’.675 The Zostrianos, similarly current in Plotinus’ circle, describes a supreme
god with an ‘origin better than existence’, and ponders the way in which being arises
67132: ...ἀνεκλάλητε, ἄρρητε, σιωpiῇ φωνούμενε....
672The term ‘Gnosticism’ is problematic, derived as it is from the opponents of these movements
whose accounts are often polemical in the highest degree (for a brief overview of modern debate over
the term, see Mazur 2010, 20). For this and other reasons Williams proposes ‘Biblical demiurgical
movements’ as an alternative (see Williams 1999a, with discussion at Burns 2004, 64-66). As the pro-
posed ‘Biblical’ alternative seems not to apply to certain texts, the ‘Platonising Sethian treatises’ in
particular (Turner 2007, 55), this thesis retains the flawed term ‘Gnostic’, with the caution that it is
taken to refer to a loosely-affiliated group of movements which may or may not have defined them-
selves in terms of ‘gnôsis’ and which occupy a huge spectrum of religio-philosophical possibilities.
Recent studies have identified the more ‘Platonising’ elements in Gnosticism as an identifiable trend
within the category as a whole (see Turner 2007, 55-58), and it is with these texts that we will be
engaging, as the texts most relevant to philosophic silence in Plotinus.
673On the basic taxonomy of the Nag Hammadi library, see Turner 2001, 3-5.
674Porph. Plot. 16, 1 ff. We possess only the Coptic version of the Gnostic texts mentioned by Por-
phyry, which are generally agreed to have been based on Greek originals, which are the texts to which
Porphyry refers.
675NHC XI; Robinson 1977, 444-5.
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from ‘an existence which does not exist’.676 These speculations cannot but remind us
of Plotinus’ approach to the one beyond being, discussed in Chapters Five and Six
below, although a glance at the Gnostic texts in extenso shows a radically different
thought-world and style.
The Sethian Apocryphon of John is a text which survives in three fragmentary ver-
sions, two of them from the Nag Hammadi library, which, taken together, deliver
a reasonably complete text.677 It is a good example of the more overtly religious
mode in Gnostic texts, and blends the religious esoteric with themes of ineffability
and transcendence. The text opens with an evocation of secrecy of a type very com-
mon in Gnostic apocrypha:678 ‘The teaching [of the] savior and [the revelation] of
the mysteries, the things hidden in silence, [even the things which] he taught John,
[his] disciple.’679 The ‘he’ in question is Christ; we are in the territory of the early
Christ movement, but an esoteric wing thereof, which defines its written teachings
as ‘secret knowledge’.680 An apophatic passage occurs in both the Apocryphon of John
and the Allogenes relating to the transcendence of the first deity. Citing the Allogenes
passage, which is the most complete, we read:
He is neither divinity, nor blessedness, nor perfection; but he is
something unknowable (and) it (i.e. knowability) is not proper to
him. Rather, he is something other which is superior to blessedness
and divinity and perfection. For he is not something perfect, but an-
other thing which is superior. He is neither unlimited, nor limited
by something else, but he is something superior. He is not corpo-
real; he is not incorporeal. He is not large; he is not small. He is
not quantifiable, for he is not a creature. Nor is he something exist-
ing that one can know, but he is something else superior which one
cannot know.681
676NHC VIII, 1; Robinson 1977, 369.
677I cite the text and translation of Waldstein and Wisse (1995); on the state of the text, see ibid. 1-8.
678See Stroumsa 1996a, 39-40.
679NHC II, 1 ll. 1-5; p. 13.
680We might compare Allogenes 52.15–28, where the eponymous protagonist is instructed by the an-
gelic being Youel that the discourse he is about to receive is a ‘great mystery’ that he must guard from
the uninitiated, which she then proceeds to narrate. The ‘secret knowledge’ in question concerns,
among other things, the ineffability of the Triple Powered One: mystic silence is enjoined to ‘protect’
the unrevealable secret.
681Allog. XI 62, 27-63,13.
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As Chapter Six will show, each of these statements is a perfect fit with Plotinus’
philosophy, with due allowance for differences in stylistic approach, and many find
direct parallels in the Enneads. We should also note the combination of themes of
the esoteric with themes of the ineffable in this treatise: here, and more generally
in Gnostic texts, ‘secret’ writing seems to have been a stylistic norm; this has led to
widespread belief that secret Gnostic societies existed in antiquity, but there is little
evidence of this, and more likely the writers in question were exercising literary
secrecy.682
Other Platonising Gnostic teachings invoke strong negativity, and many topoi of
silence, in characterising the first god. The Valentinians are reported to have main-
tained an absolutely transcendent, ineffable first god, known among other names
as Bythos, ‘Abyss’.683 Irenaeus tells us that they gave their transcendent god a con-
sort called Σιγή, Silence, although claiming that the first god was itself ‘beyond male,
beyond female’,684 and ‘nothing/no thing whatsoever’.685 Here we have Silence per-
sonified and attending upon a god whose nature is ineffable, that is, can only result
in silence. Clement of Alexandria tells us that, ‘They say Silence is the mother of all
things given forth by the Abyss; in that she could not speak of the Ineffable/Secret
[τοῦ Α᾿ρρήτου, sc. the Abyss], she had fallen silent, and in that she apprehended
(κατέλαβεν) it, she had called it “Inapprehensible” (ἀκατάληpiτον).’686 The Valentinian
Silence speaks in order to hide; her only utterance locates the subject of her speech,
the Ineffable Abyss, beyond comprehension.
The Gnostic teacher Basilides (early second century Alexandria) seems to have
682Williams 1999b, 34. Cf. Stroumsa 1996a, 55-61, who thinks that secret Gnostic ecclesiolae did exist.
If this was the case, my argument would then be that their literary secrecy would in that case act as
a kind of mystic silence, advertising the existence of the secret groups and emphasising their special
status as initiates. If they were secret and wishing to hide their existence it would be foolish of them
to publish ‘secret’ mythological works.
683Turner 2001, 34.
684Adv. haer. I .2. 4 (PG 7, 457-460).
685Ibid. I 11. 5 (PG 7, 569): μήτε ἄρρενα μήτε θήλιεαν, μήτε ὅλως ὄντα τι.
686Exc. ex Theodoto 29.
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posited a strongly transcendent, and remarkably Plotinian, first principle.687 Hip-
polytus quotes Basilides on the ‘moment’ before the cosmos came into being:
There was a time, he [sc. Basilides] says, when nothing was, but
the nothing was not any existing thing; rather there was purely
and straightforwardly, without any sophism, absolutely not a sin-
gle thing. When I say ‘there was a time’. . . I am not saying that there
[literally] was, but I say that ‘there was absolutely not a thing’ in or-
der to intimate what it is that I am trying to explain. For that is not
absolutely ineffable which is named; that indeed which we call ‘in-
effable’ is not ineffable; and the ‘not [even] ineffable’ is not named
‘ineffable’, but is. . . above any name it could be given.688
On the level of theory, what Basilides is describing need not differ on the face of it
from the unpredicable first principle described by Alcinoüs; on the level of written
practice, however, Basilides is taking this unpredicability seriously. Not content with
denying his readers the luxury of conceiving of a ‘god’ or ‘principle’, he denies them
the descriptor ‘ineffable’ as well.
The same passage continues in a strongly negative vein which, by negating neg-
ative adjectives, raises the stakes a level beyond the authors discussed so far:
So when there was nothing - no being, no not-being, no simple, no
complex, no unintellective, no unsensory, no human, no angel, no
god, nor altogether anything that might be given a name or appre-
hended through the senses or through intellect. . . a not-being-god,
without intellection, without sense, without willing, without choos-
ing, without undergoing, desired, without desiring, to make the
cosmos. I say ‘desired’. . . for the sake of intimating [what I mean]
(σημασίας χάριν), since it was unwilling, unintellective, and unsens-
ing. . . .689
My translation stubbornly attempts to maintain the awkwardness of the original,
which not only hypernegates (not satisfied with a god that is not intellective, Basilides’
687The latter noted by Jufresa 1981.
688Hippol. Haer. VII.20 (PG XVI/3 3302): ἦν, φησὶν, ὅτε ἦν οὐδέν, ἀλλ΄ οὐδὲ τὸ οὐδὲν ἦν τι τῶν ὄντων,
ἀλλὰ ψιλῶς καὶ ἀνυpiονοήτως δίχα piαντὸς σοφίσματος ἦν ὅλως οὐδὲ ἕν. ῞Οταν δὲ λέγω, φησὶν, τὸ ἦν, οὐχ
ὅτι ἦν λέγω, ἀλλ΄ ἵνα σημάνω τοῦτα ὅpiερ βούλομαι δεῖξαι, λέγω, φησὶν, ὅτι ἦν ὅλως οὐδέν. ῎Εστι γάρ,
φησὶν, ἐκεῖνο οὐχ ἁpiλῶς ἄρρητον, ὃ ὀνομάζεται· ἄρρητον γοῦν αὐτὸ καλοῦμεν, ἐκεῖνο δὲ οὐδὲ ἄρρητον· καὶ
γὰρ τὸ οὐδ΄ ἄρρητον οὐκ ἄρρητον ὀνομάζεται, ἀλλὰ ἐστί, φησὶν, ὑpiεράνω piαντὸς ὀνόματος ὀνομαζομένου.
689Ibid. VII.21 (PG XVI/3 3303); ᾿Εpiεὶ οὖν οὐδὲν ἦν, οὐχ ὕλη, οὐκ οὐσία, οὐκ ἀνούσιον, οὐχ ἁpiλοῦν,
οὐ σύνθετον, οὐκ ἀνόητον, οὐκ ἀναίσθητον, οὐκ ἄνθρωpiος, οὐκ ἄγγελος, οὐ θεὸς, οὐδὲ ὅλως τι τῶν
ὀνομαζομένων ἢ δι΄ αἰσθήσεως λαμβανομένων ἢ νοητῶν piραγμάτων...οὐκ ὢν Θεὸς...ἀνοήτως, ἀναισθήτως,
ἀβούλως, ἀpiροαιρέτως, ἀpiαθῶς, ἀνεpiιθυμήτος κόσμον ἠθέλησε piοιεῖσαι. τὸ δὲ ἠθέλησε λέγω, φησὶ,
σημασίας χάριν, ἀθελήτως καὶ ἀνοήτως καὶ ἀναισθήτως....
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god is ‘not-even-not-intellective’), but also contradicts itself in a provocatively para-
doxical manner (‘desired, without desiring’), with a clear aim toward a very strong
written praxis of transcendence. This passage of Basilides furnishes an example of
strong transcendence which, stylistically, reminds one more of Proclus or Pseudo-
Dionysius than of Plotinus, but in terms of the determination with which it refuses
to predicate (and in light of its origin in the Alexandria of Plotinus’ time), cannot but
put us in mind of the philosopher’s apophatic unsaying of the one. Both of these
passages use the verb σημαίνω or its cognates to express an incomplete communica-
tion of what the author means to express, a usage which is also very important for
Plotinus, as discussed page 240 ff. below.
Modes of Knowing in Gnostic Texts. The name ‘Gnostics’ is derived, of course, from
gnôsis, the salvific, transcendental knowledge which was long supposed to have
characterised the thought of these groups. Modern scholarship has largely decon-
structed this monolithic model; in fact, the movements gathered under the rubric
of Gnosticism show a variety of theories of knowing. Especially relevant to Plot-
inus, however, are the so-called Sethian movements, both because we know their
works circulated and were critiqued in Plotinus’ own circle,690 and because of the
similarities between Sethian and Plotinian theories of the highest levels of knowing.
Zostrianos and Allogenes present narratives of the ascent of a Gnostic aspirant out
of the cosmos and toward the transcendent first god.691 These narratives are full
of lavish mythological detail; the cosmic and hypercosmic realms are not places of
impersonal metaphysical realities, but densely populated worlds replete with me-
diating deities and quasi-deities.692 These the soul must negotiate, often by means
which combine ritual practices and philosophical conceptual ascent in a way where
the two cannot be distinctly separated,693 a situation doubtless owing partly to the
Middle Platonist reading of the religious materials in Plato’s own ascent narratives
690Porph. Plot. 16.
691On Sethian ascent narratives, see Turner 2001, 297.
692See Mazur 2010, 176-7.
693E.g. Zostrianos 22.2-23.20.
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in the Phædrus, Symposium, and Republic; to Middle Platonist eyes, these texts already
incorporated ‘the mysteries’ of philosophy.
There is some debate over whether the protagonist of Zostrianos attains to the
summit of hyperessential reality,694 but it is clear that Allogenes does so, attaining
the ‘primary revelation’ of the unknowable first god.695 This revelation is expressed
as a state of ‘unknowing’ which transcends modes of thought and knowledge,696 and
its description is followed by a passage of negative theology (Allog. 61.22–67.38), a
section of which is cited page 181 above, which hammers this point home.
What is especially important here in terms of Plotinus is that, while he by no
means adopts the mythopoeic style of the Gnostics, he does incorporate narrative
elements into his account of the ascent which form an important part of his praxis of
unsaying the ineffable encounter with the one.
The Chaldæan Oracles. These philosophical hexameter texts constitute an impor-
tant source for transcendence in the Middle Platonist milieu.697 Although nothing
in the surviving fragments equals the extremes of unsaying in Basilides or the Allo-
genes/Apocryphon of John parallel passage, the uses to which the Oracles were put by
the Late Platonists who cite them show, at the very least, that they could easily be
interpreted as propounding a strong transcendence. The supreme god of the Oracles,
generally known as ‘the Father’, but also, like the Valentinian god, called ‘Abyss’ (fr.
18) has ‘snatched himself away’ from the power of nous to comprehend,698 and ex-
ists outside the All.699 The Anonymous Commentary on the Parmenides700 states that
the Oracles avoid the use of the term τὸ ἕν because to name it thus would betray its
ineffability (τὸ ἕν λέγειν αὐτοῦ εἶναι piαντελῶς piαραιτεῖσθαι), an idea, however, which
694See ibid. 185 with n. 19.
695Allog. 59.28–32, 60.39.
696See Mazur 2010, 188; 220-8.
697Lewy 1978 and Majercik 1989 support a second-century origin for the Oracles, but, as Potter 1991,
225 points out, we have no direct references to them before Porphyry in the late third. The most
persuasive piece of evidence for the earlier dating is Numenius’ seeming knowledge of the Oracles
(Majercik 1989, 144-5), which, however is open to some question (see 114 above).
698Fr. 3: ὁ piατὴρ ἥρpiασεν ἑαυτόν / οὐδ΄ ἐν ἑῇ δυνάμει νοερᾷ κλείσας ἴδιον piῦρ.
699Fr. 84: αὐτὸς piᾶς ἔξω ὑpiάρχει.
700On this text, see Appendix A, 268.
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we need not necessarily read into the Oracles themselves.701 It is at any rate certain
that the Oracles remove the Father beyond thought and speech.702
The Chaldæan ‘Flower of Nous’. The Oracles are especially important to this dis-
cussion for their concept of the ‘flower of nous’, a hyper-intellectual faculty which
seems to be a direct mode of unknowing. Fr. 1 describes its function:
For there exists a certain Intelligible which you must perceive with
the flower of the mind. For if you should incline your mind to-
ward it and perceive it as perceiving a specific thing, you would not
perceive it.703
This faculty, also called the ‘flame of nous’ later in the same passage, has much
in common with both the ‘eyes of nous’ of the Hermetica and with the ‘summit of
nous’ or ‘proto-nous’ theorised by Plotinus, discussed in the following chapter: all
of these faculties are noetic yet not noetic, and all must lose the perception of the
transcendent reality as an object before they can perceive it.
Philo Judæus. Philo of Alexandria (c. 20 BCE-50 CE) deserves some separate treat-
ment; while clearly a philosopher in the Platonist vein (he has been called the ‘earli-
est Neoplatonist’),704 Philo’s project of Jewish scriptural exegesis has made him dif-
ficult to categorise.705 In light of the preceding remarks on the breadth of the Middle
Platonist milieu, this should cause no problems for the present discussion. There
have been attempts to link Philo’s work with Plotinus’ philosophy, as the ‘Neopla-
tonist’ elements of Philo’s thought, namely his doctrines of transcendence of being
and of ineffability, have understandably reminded scholars of Plotinus’ teachings,
and a direct line of influence has been posited.706 There remains a lack of hard
701IX.7. See Whittaker 1973, 82; cf. Hadot 1968, II, 93 n. 3; Majercik 1989, notes to frr. 9, 10. The
mythologising form of the Oracles and their fragmentary character makes it difficult to determine
what precise doctrine they propounded in this regard: Porphyry would equate the Chaldæan Father
with the Plotinian one, but Proclus considered him an exalted noetic principle (Majercik 1989, 6),
showing that Platonists with access to the complete text also found no agreed doctrine.
702Frr. 3, 18, 84, and 191 express ideas of unknowability, with fr. 3, as we have seen, expressing the
all-important transcending of nous. Fr. 191 describes him as ἀφθέγκτον, ‘unutterable’.
703Trans. Majercik 1989. The capitalisation of ‘Intelligible’, though contrary to my practice in this
thesis, is perhaps justified given the theistic style of the Oracles.
704Lewy 1978, 315.
705On Philo’s thought see Dillon 1977, 139-83; Brehier 1950 offers a book-length study.
706E.g. Wolfson 1952, 115; Gatti 1996, 12.
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evidence that Plotinus knew Philo.707
Like the philosophers discussed above, Philo posits a transcendent first princi-
ple; in his case, a god beyond being.708 While this god is formally ineffable709 and
unknowable,710 Philo does not employ systematic negations such as we have seen
in our Middle Platonist authors.711 He does, however, evoke a strong transcendence
through other means. Employing a blend of Græco-Jewish and Platonist methodolo-
gy, Philo draws deeply on traditional imagery from the mysteries712 on the one hand,
and on Torah exegesis on the other,713 to surround his ineffable god with rhetorics
of silence and secrecy.714 As we have seen, his Moses delivers the Hebræic law in an
esoteric form, the true meanings of which are available only to an elect, and hidden
from the aphilosophos; one becomes a philosopher through a long process, described
in initiatory terms, of exegesis and penetration of mysteries.
Philo also presents a direct mode of unknowing the unknowable god in the form
of a visionary ascent narrative (De op. mun. XXIII.70-71) which combines the motifs
of the Platonist via eminentiæ, mystery terminology, and visionary ideas in a fascinat-
ing way, the details of which unfortunately lie outside the scope of this thesis. What
can and should be emphasised here, however, is that, like Basilides, Philo emerges
as a predecessor of Plotinus in expressions of strong transcendence, whether or not
he represents an actual source for Plotinus’ writings.
Conclusions. The main purpose of this chapter has been to give some back-
ground to Plotinian transcendence. No attempt at a source-critical approach has
been made beyond the general move toward a transcendent first principle in middle
707Dodds in Proclus 1963, 310, with n. 4.
708E.g. Ph. De op. mun. I.8[51]. See Whittaker 1969b, 79; Mortley, I, 156.
709See Casel 1919, 83.
710E.g. De poster. Caini 13 ff; De spec. leg. I 37; see Casel 1919, 77.
711Mortley 1986, I, 156.
712See Pépin 1984, 28-9.
713Philo may be the first author to refer to god as ἄρρητος (e.g. De somn. 1.67 (see Dillon at Alcinoüs
1993, 101); De mut. nom. 14, 15; Quis rer. div. heres 170 (see Casel 1919, 77)), a term which could quite
naturally evoke both the Hellenic mysteries and the Hebrew ‘ineffable name’ of God which arose in
Rabbinic Judæism (see Jufresa 1981, 3; Ph. De vita Mos. II 114). On Philo’s complex relationship with
the Greek mysteries, see Casel 1919, 73-6.
714See Casel 1919, 72-86.
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Platonism which supplied an intellectual foundation from which Plotinus’ approach
to transcendence took flight. More detailed questions of sources are fraught with
difficulty in this connection; we might reasonably ask why the approaches to tran-
scendence in contemporary Gnostic writings, which Plotinus certainly knew well
enough to refute at length in Treatise 33, or in the Hermetica which arose in the same
Græco-Egyptian milieu as Plotinus, have so much in common with Plotinus’ writ-
ings where the surviving works of Middle Platonist philosophy do not.715 We will
return to this question in concluding, and offer some tentative contributions to the
ongoing debate on Plotinus’ sources.
715Cf. Armstrong 1990a, 100: ‘It is difficult to be sure when and where this conviction of the negative
transcendence of the supreme divinity first appeared. It is found in these first centuries of our era
among Gnostics as well as among Hellenic philosophers. . . [who were] Platonized Pythagoreans or
Pythagoreanizing Platonists.’
Chapter Six: The Transcendent Absolute and the Ineffability of
Reality in Plotinus
Determinatio negatio est.716
Plotinus’ world-view is, in a sense, very simple; at the same time, it is very dif-
ficult to understand and explain. Plotinus is intensely aware of this difficulty, and
his work is full of repeated attempts at clarifying the ramifications of his world-
view. The Enneads reflect to some extent the day-to-day disputations of Plotinus’
philosophic seminar,717 and the reader can often detect the puzzled questions of
his students informing the varied approaches Plotinus musters to clarify difficult
points, and in his patient, indefatigable attempts to explain these matters one sees
the Socratic midwife gently encouraging the truth, bit by bit, into the light of day.
Scholarship, particularly over the course of the last fifty years, has gone a long
way toward explaining how Plotinus thinks the world is, and why it is that way.
There is a problem prior to the questions of metaphysics, however, which the disci-
plines of analytic philosophy and the history of ideas have largely failed to address.
This is the problem of ineffability and its implications for written philosophy.
Plotinus simply does not believe that reality is fully susceptible to an explanatory
account. He has cogent and well thought-out reasons for this belief; the history of
philosophy has long since disposed of the anachronistic figure of Plotinus the anti-
rationalist, who took refuge in the vague territory of ‘mysticism’, and has brought
forth in its stead the more accurate model of a philosopher whose reason led him
716Baruch Spinoza, Ep. 52.
717Or so Porphyry seems to indicate at Plot. 5 62-3: the subjects of Plotinus’ writings arose from
problems which happened to arise in the course of school discussions.
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to place certain aspects of reality outside the scope of thought and language.718 An-
alytical philosophy has done an excellent job not only of delineating the levels of
reality in Plotinus’ metaphysics, but also of showing exactly at what points Plotinus
believes discourse and thought fall short of reality; we have, as it were, a good map
of Plotinus’ world-view, with the borders carefully marked. The present chapter
explores these borders, noting the limits Plotinus places on discourse and on dif-
ferent types of cognition. While recognising these limits, we should also be alive
to the power of rhetoric in philosophy; the following chapter will thus proceed to
tear down this elegant systematic structure, when we address Plotinus’ writing of
the unwritable, in which he repeatedly assails, and passes beyond, these self-erected
borders.
The Architecture of the Ineffable in Plotinus
It has become almost a tradition in Plotinian studies to describe Plotinus’ uni-
verse by surveying, in turn, the three primary hypostases or realities: the one, nous,
and Soul.719 This approach has the merit of beginning with the most unified and
primary reality and moving down the chain of being to the world of greatest di-
vision, difference, and multiplicity, thus following Plotinus’ own judgement of the
relative importance and reality of each hypostasis in descending order. It has the
drawback of inevitably tending to present Plotinian reality as a sort of ontological
‘wedding cake’. It should be kept in mind that all the ‘levels’ of Plotinus’ reality,
which may even appear as separate ‘worlds’ when viewed from the fragmentary
vantage point of the embodied soul, comprise, when viewed sub specie æternitatis, a
single, unified whole, whose primary nature is an absolute, undifferentiated, infinite
unity, and whose multiple dynamic interactions are best understood as the ‘internal
acts’ of that reality.720
718See n. 7 above. Cf. comments at Emilsson 2007, 6.
719While the term ‘hypostasis’ is often taken to mean ‘level of reality’, its basic meaning is simply
‘something truly real’. The three primary hypostases are thus not the only hypostases in Plotinus’
universe, and the one can only be said to be a hypostasis in a manner of speaking (see Appendix D,
277). The hypostasis Soul is capitalised to differentiate it from the souls of individual human beings.
720See 204 below.
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It has been remarked that, in order to consider any one aspect of Plotinus’ world-
view, it is necessary to consider his world-view as a whole.721 Considerations of
space mean that no serious survey of Plotinian metaphysics can be undertaken here,
but fortunately a large body of excellent studies of the subject exist, to which this
chapter makes liberal reference.722 I propose a restricted inquiry here, aimed at elu-
cidating the problems of discourse specific to each hypostasis. This section will at-
tempt to clarify in a basic, schematic way, the degree to which each hypostasis is
said by Plotinus to be thinkable and describable, and, if there are ways in which the
hypostasis is not thinkable or describable, the reasons for this.
After this analysis of the levels of reality, the following section will ‘reintegrate’
them, discussing some of the implications of Plotinus’ monist world-view for the
ineffability of his picture of reality as a whole. The artificial separation of intel-
lect from the one, and soul from intellect, is a discursive necessity which Plotinus
struggled with, but which he found necessary for philosophic discourse to proceed.
The present discussion faces the same limitations and difficulties, but will attempt
to mitigate these by emphasising the importance of the unitary nature of Plotinus’
world.
The One or The Good. Attempting a summary characterisation of the Plotinian
one presents serious problems. This is particularly true in a thesis dealing with the
ways in which Plotinus denies the possibility of describing the one; the one is the
conceptual locus for Plotinus’ apophatic strategies and verbal denials of the efficacy
of language. Let it be understood at the outset that every statement which follows
is to be taken as a kind of provisional metaphor for the one’s nature; as Plotinus
says at the beginning of one of his most extensive descriptive passages concerning
the one, what follows will, in fact, be incorrect (οὐκ ὀρθῶς), since accurate discourse
721E.g. Deck 1967, 3.
722Good systematic accounts of Plotinus’ universe include Armstrong 1967; Bréhier 1958; Rist 1967b.
On the relationship between the one and nous Bussanich 1988 is essential; see also Emilsson 2007. On
the nature of soul, Blumenthal 1971 is the standard work; Merlan 1969 is also important.
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concerning the one is impossible.723 Plotinus is clear that nothing can be predicated
of the one, not even the name ‘one’, and that every statement made about it must in
some way be qualified.724 At the same time, he tells his readers a great deal about
the one; I argue in the following chapter that an overarching principle of Plotinian
reading is that any kataphatic assertion about the one will be in some way negated or
modified, resulting in irreducible indeterminacy of the object of discourse. Keeping
these apophatic considerations in mind, we can turn to what Plotinus does tell us
about the one.
The one or good, for Plotinus, is the ultimate reality; as Armstrong points out,
this may be the only statement which can be made about it which does not require
serious qualification.725 It is the source of everything; ontologically, it gives rise to in-
tellect, and from intellect Soul arises, which in turn creates time, space and bodies.726
This series must, however, always be understood as one of ontological priority, and
never as a sequential process in time.727 The one, although its primary nature is one
of ‘repose’, ‘silence’, and absolute inactivity,728 is nevertheless the latent source of
all existence. While the one is the first hypostasis, in the sense of the first ‘reality’,
Plotinus rarely describes it as such, more often qualifying it as ‘like a hypostasis’ or,
‘hypostasis, as it were’.729
723VI.8[39]12.37-13.1-5; cf. 47-50; 18.52-3; 21.20. I accept Igal’s addition of οὐκ in the second passage,
as this harmonises it with the later passages.
724See 194 below.
725Armstrong 1967, 1. Cf. V.3[49]13.1-6, cited 240 below.
726The one is efficient cause of all composite beings: VI.4[22]10; VI.7[38]23.22-4; V.3[49]15.12-28, 17.10-
4. See Deck 1967, 93-109.
727V.1[10]6.19-22; VI.6[34]6.4-5; VI.7[38]35.29; II.4[46]5.24-8. Plotinus found the idea that the universe
had a beginning in time absurd (II.1[53]4.25-6; cf. III.2[19]1.20-21; V.8[31]7), and emphasises that, far
from having created reality and then gone on to other tasks, the one is perpetually sustaining existing
things, at least as understood from a temporal perspective. From the one’s ‘perspective’ there can be
no perpetuity, as there is no time (VI.7[38]23.22-4).
728V.1[10]4.38-9, 6.12-13.
729E.g. VI.8[39]7.46-7: οἷον ὑpiόστασις. See Appendix D, 278.
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The One as the Good. The one is identified with the good ‘beyond being’ of Plato’s
Republic,730 an identification Plato himself is said to have made in his oral teaching.731
This good must be understood in one sense as the absolute good, since it is not a
good depending on a comparative bad for its meaning.732 However, the good is
not ‘good to itself’; like many of the quasi-attributes which Plotinus applies to the
one, the characterisation of the one as ‘good’ is understood as ‘the good of other
things’;733 that is, the good in lower hypostases derives from the one, but it itself
transcends the attribute ‘good’.
Plotinus uses striking images to express the superabundant goodness of the one:
its nature ‘overflows’ into manifestation; it is ‘as it were boiling over with life’.734
Plotinus also extensively employs apophatic language in attempting to delineate the
one’s productive relationship to the realm of being: ‘Everything both is the one and
is not the one. Everything is the one, in that it comes from the one; but it is not the
one, in that the one granted [its existence] whilst abiding in himself.’735 The discur-
sive consequences of this simultaneous immanence and transcendence are discussed
further below.
The Simplicity of the One. The one is also a transcendent monad; it is not a uni-
ty, but rather ‘unity as such’ (αὐτόεν).736 Plotinus uses the Platonic categories of
Sameness and Otherness in this regard: the one contains nothing of Otherness, and
thus there can be no ‘parts’ which might make it multiple, nor any second terms to
730Pl. R. 509b8-9 (cited more than 30 times in the Enneads; see index locorum H + S2). Plotinus does
not see the one as the Form of the good discussed by Plato in the dialogue, but rather as beyond the
forms (see e.g. II.9[33]1.5-6); his relegation of the forms to the level of nous, discussed below, would
make such an identification impossible. Indeed, the Plotinian one is ἀνείδεος, ‘formless’ (VI.9[9]3.44;
V.5[32]6.4-5; VI.7[38]33.13, 21, 37).
731See 79 above. The equation of the good with the one is not explicit in Plato’s dialogues, although it
can be argued that it is implicit (as Gaiser 1980, 12 n. 26, who argues that Plato arrives at this equation
through mathematical considerations).
732VI.9[9]6.55-7. See Hoffmann 1997, 348.
733VI.9[9]6.39-42; VI.7[38]41.27-31; cf. III.8[51]2.2-8, 11.10-19; I.7[54]1.13-23. See Heiser 1991, 61.
734VI.5[23]12.10: οἷον ὑpiερζέουσαν ζωῇ; V.2[11]1.8-9: οἷον ὑpiερερρύη καὶ τὸ ὑpiερpiλῆρες αὐτοῦ piεpiοῖηκεν
ἄλλο. Gersh 1978, 17-20 discusses key terms in Platonist emanatory terminology, including Plotinus’
ζεῖν and ὑpiερζεῖν, ‘boiling’ and ‘boiling over’.
735V.2[11]2.24-26. Cf. ibid. 1.1: Τὸ ἓν piάντα καὶ οὐδὲ ἕν.
736V.3[49]12.51. For the probable influence of Neopythagorean speculation in this context, see
especially Whittaker 1973.
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which it might be compared.737 It is radically simple; so much so that it cannot be
comprehended by human discourse or language, since ultimate simplicity is incom-
prehensible to any knower which has the slightest multiplicity in it, even nous,738
an evolution of the axiom that ‘like is only known by like’ which we have seen in
certain Middle Platonic sources. Plotinus also considers this problem from the op-
posite direction: since every act of knowing or cognition must involve, minimally,
the duality of a knower and a known, the one can itself possess no knowledge, even
of itself.739
This is a major reason, for Plotinus, why the one cannot be comprehended by
thought or language: for, ‘what discursive description (διέξοδος) can there be of the
absolutely simple?’740 Indeed, its simplicity takes its unity beyond unity: having no
possible second term, it cannot even be called ‘one’.741 Far from being an exalted
form of numerical unity, it is called the negation of all number;742 ‘the one’ must be
regarded as a negative description, which can only tell us what the one is not, rather
than revealing the truth of what it ‘is’.743
Plotinus applies this thinking of radical simplicity very specifically to the realm
of language: a perfectly simple reality must be unpredicable, since any predication
involves at least subject, copula, and predicate, even if one or more of these is only
implied. To say even that ‘The one is’, involves two concepts - ‘one’ and ‘is’ - which
would imply, for Plotinus, that the one’s ‘is-ness’, its being, is a separate characteris-
tic from its essential nature.744 By ‘radical simplicity’ we cannot mean ‘true oneness’;
737Although the one is other than all things (V.4[7]1.6; V.3[49]11.18; cf. III.8[51]8.9), the principle of
Otherness is not present in the one (VI.9[9]8.32 ff; see Rist 1971; Schroeder 1987, 680). Sameness and
Otherness are among the five ‘greatest kinds’ considered at Pl. Sph. 254d ff., and feature as a pair in
the Timæus 35 ff. On their use in Plotinus see Schroeder 1978, 63-7.
738E.g. V.8[31]5.19-24; V.5[32]1.38 ff. Cf. Trouillard 1961, 431-2.
739VI.7[38]37-41, 39.19-20; V.3[49]1.3-4, 11 & 12; III.8[51]11.12-14.
740V.3[49]17.21-25; cf. VI.8[39]8. See Hoffmann 1997, 343.
741V.5[32]6.26-30; II.9[33]1.1-8. Cf. V.4[7]1.9-11: It is false to call ‘one’ that about which there is no
account or knowledge, and which is said to be beyond being.
742VI.2[19]10.14; V.5[32]4 passim. Cf. III.8[51]9; nous is number, but the one is that which is beyond
number, and its source.
743V.5[32]6.29-31. Cf. Bréhier 1958, 157; Heiser 1991, 61.
744V.3[49]10.35-40. See Mortley 1975, 367-8, 373; Schroeder 1996, 343-4. On unpredicability in Plotinus
see Schroeder 1985, 75-6; Hoffmann 1997, 343.
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in fact, it is more accurate to say that the one is ‘radically undetermined’, which is
another reason, for Plotinus, why no statements may be made about it.745 This ‘law
of unpredicability’ is understood by Plotinus to be an absolute law when ‘speaking
properly.’746 He does not always ‘speak properly’ about the one, however, and to
do so would be not to speak at all. The strategies by which Plotinus ‘manages’ this
discursive law are discussed in the following chapter.
The One Beyond Being. The negative fact that the one is situated beyond οὐσία,
whether we translate this term as ‘substance’, ‘essence’, ‘entity’, or ‘being’, is also
crucial for the way in which its unpredicability is conceived in the Enneads. Οὐσία
is a key term in the Platonist tradition, and a thorough discussion of its parameters
is beyond the scope of this thesis; however, its significance for Plotinian ideas of
inexpressibility should be noted here.
As discussed in the previous chapter, the idea that the first principle is ‘beyond
being’ was generally accepted in Middle Platonist discussions of the first principle,
and these authors show various signs of an appreciation of the ineffability of a truly
transcendent reality, although the surviving literature leaves us only with passages
expressing a fairly weak transcendence. In Plotinus we see a major development of
the philosophy of transcendence: for Plotinus, ‘beyond being’ means very definitely
both ‘beyond thought’ and ‘beyond discourse’. The philosophic reasons for this are
complex, but the main thrust of Plotinus’ thinking on the subject is that, οὐσία being
the primary characteristic of the Forms and of the noêsis through which the Forms
are instantiated (see below), a reality beyond being would logically be beyond the
ability of nous to comprehend.
Nous or Intellect. Nous or intellect is the primary being, in distinction to the
primary reality, since the one cannot be said to be anything, but may for the purposes
of exposition be said to be ‘real’. In fact, being is the essence of nous, and the being
745VI.9[9]3-4. See Schroeder 1996, 344.
746VI.9[9]3.51, 5.29-34; V.5[32]6.26-30; II.9[33]1.1-8; VI.7[38]38.4-9. Cf. III.7[45]2.6-7.
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of everything else that is, is derived from its primary being.747 Plotinus repeatedly
quotes with approval the cryptic statement of Parmenides, τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε
καὶ εἶναι, to indicate that the act of noêsis is the act of being;748 we begin to see one
reason why transcending οὐσία would mean transcending nous.
Plotinus’ nous is a divine intellect. Plotinus often describes nous as a god, or sim-
ply as god,749 an appellation used for the one or good, by contrast, in only a few in-
stances.750 Plotinus’ concept of nous famously combines the Platonic idea of a world
of Forms with Aristotle’s conception of the supreme god as self-contemplating intel-
lect.751 The result is an intellect whose ‘thoughts’, νοήματα or νοητά, are the Forms,
and Plotinus argues at length for the location of the Forms within nous, despite the
considerable difficulties this raises for epistemology and ontology.752 Nous is the
divine mind, whose ‘thoughts’ are realities.
With nous we can be said, with some reservations, to be safely out of the realm of
the formally ineffable: truth-bearing statements about nous are possible, and indeed
the truth-value of statements is dependent on nous, since noêsis has for its objects the
Forms, which are the self-verifying, unchanging objects of true knowledge.753 But
nous is by no means easily understood or expressed, and, as I will argue below in
the context of noêsis, while not formally ineffable in the sense that the one is, nous
is nevertheless treated by Plotinus as a principle which cannot be fully expressed
through language. The reasons for this rest mainly on two paradoxes.
The first of these is that, unlike the one, nous cannot be said to be ultimately
simple, and is comprised in some sense of ‘parts’; however, it is still an indivisible
747V.1[10]4.26 ff; V.2[11]1.11-13; I.3[20]2.13. Nous is being, intellect, and life: III.6[1]6.10 ff; V.1[10]4;
V.6[24]6.22-3; V.5[32]1. At V.3[49]13.2-3 Plotinus alters the Platonic ἐpiέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας (Pl. R. VI
509b9-10) to ἐpiέκεινα τοῦ νοῦ, illustrating the equivalence of the two concepts.
748Parm. Fr. B3 DK, cited at V.9[5]5.29-30; V.1[10]8.17-18; V.6[24]6.22-3; III.5[36]7.51; VI.7[38]41.18;
I.4[46]10.6; III.8[51]8.8. See Mortley 1986, I, 63-9. Cf. Sikkema 2009, 149.
749See Sleeman and Pollet 1980 s.v. θεός (b).
750See ibid. (c). Elsewhere, however, Plotinus states that the one is ‘greater than nous or god’
(VI.9[9]6.12-13). See Rist 1964b, 69-73.
751See Szlezák 1979, esp. 126-32. Metaph. 1072b is the most important Aristotelean passage in this
connection.
752See in particular V.5[32].
753See 215 below.
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unity.754 This paradox of unity in multiplicity extends down through the ontological
chain to soul and even to individual material bodies, but it is especially sharp at the
level of nous, as nous is the reality which achieves the difficult task of bridging the
gap between non-being and being. The second paradox is that nous, like the one,
is simultaneously transcendent and immanent. While undetermined by space, nous
can be said to be ‘everywhere’ in a way that the spatial cosmos cannot; its transcen-
dence is equal to an emphatic universal presence.755 Similarly, it is both present to
and absent from the soul.756 Both of these problems are discussed in the follow-
ing section. In the meantime, two further characteristics of Plotinus’ nous should
be discussed here. These involve the relationship of nous to the individual human
being.
Intellect as Intelligible World. The Plotinian nous is outside time and space, and
it contains no qualities (piοιότεις).757 But it nevertheless has contents which have
relative position and interact with each other: not only Forms, but intelligible gods
and human beings inhabit the noetic world. In fact, everything that is present in the
world of bodies is present in nous: the sun and revolving heavens,758 ‘earth and sea
and plants and animals and men’759 and everything that is made through logos and
according to Form.760 Nous is in fact an intelligible cosmos, of which the world of
754The unity in multiplicity of intellect is approached from many different angles by Plotinus. E.g.
V.3.15.12: it is the one-many (ἕν piολλά) of Pl. Prm. 144e5. VI.7[38]33.11: the Forms taken together are
τὸ piάγκαλον καὶ piοικίλον καὶ οὐ piοικίλον. Cf. IV.8[31]3.10 ff. Cf. V.3[49]1, where intellect’s necessary
unity is stated, vs. ibid. 10, where Plotinus argues that intellect cannot be completely without parts.
Cf. VI.9[9]5.16. At V.7[18]1.25-6 nous is infinite (τὴν δὲ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ ἀpiειρίαν) and partless (ἐν ἀμερεῖ),
but ‘comes forward’ [i.e. exists] when it acts. Beierwaltes 2008 explicates the theory of unity and
multiplicity of nous in Proclus, a discussion which is also very useful for understanding Plotinus’
theory.
755V.9[5]13.13-14: ῾Ο μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητὸς κόσμος μοναχοῦ, ὁ δὲ νοητὸς piανταχοῦ; V.2[11]2.20-1; VI.4[22]2;
V.5[32]9 passim; III.9[33]4.4-6; VI.8[39]16.1-2. See O’Meara 1980; Gerson 1994, 18; Wilberding 2005,
317.
756V.3[49]3.26-7: nous is ‘ours yet not ours’ (ἡμέτερον καὶ οὐχ ἡμέτερον). Cf. VI.4[22]2.47-9: nous is
totally present to those ‘for which it is neither distant nor near, but who are able to receive it’ (Καὶ
ὅλως ἐστὶν ἐκείνων ἑκάστῳ, οἷς μήτε piόρρωθέν ἐστι μήτε ἐγγύθεν, δυνατοῖς δὲ δέξασθαί ἐστιν).
757II.6[17]3.10-20: qualities arise through thinking, when logismos grasps the Forms and produces
imitations of them. VI.2[19]14; VI.1[42]12.42 ff.
758II.9[33]4.29-32.
759V.8[31]3.32-6. Cf. II.9[33]4.26-32, where noetic fire, the noetic earth, and the noetic sun are
mentioned.
760VI.7[38]11.3-4 and ff: fire, water, and plants are mentioned.
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sense is an image.761
This conception of intellect brings us to a paradoxical affirmation of action and
movement without time or space. While this is difficult to comprehend, it is un-
doubtedly what Plotinus wishes to convey. Nous should also be seen as occupying
a location with regard to the world of the senses, that is to say outside the sphere
of the fixed stars, while still being understood as occupying no space.762 Plotinus’
references to the noetic world as οὐρανός may thus be taken as a literal description,
at least when viewed from the perspective of the embodied soul, doubtless arising
at least in part from a literal reading of Plato’s Phædrus 247c-e.763
As an intelligible world, nous can be visited by the philosopher. Plotinus de-
scribes journeying to and through this supernal realm:
Often, awakening to my self from the body, and becoming sepa-
rate from all other externals, going within myself, I have seen an
extraordinarily marvellous beauty. Convinced then that this was far
the better portion, I actually lived the best life, and was assimilat-
ed to the divine (ζωήν τε ἀρίστην ἐνεργήσας καὶ τῷ θείῳ εἰς ταὐτὸν
γεγενημένος). Establishing myself in that, I came to that noetic re-
ality above all others and established myself there. After this estab-
lishment in the divine, having descended from intellect to discursive
reasoning, I am baffled by how I have now come down, and how my
soul has ever come to be within the body, when it has shown itself
to be of such [a nature] by itself, even when in the body.764
We will return to this description in the discussion of modes of cognition in the next
section, but note for now the characteristic Plotinian dichotomy between ἐνταῦθα,
‘here’ (that is, in the realm of matter and of the senses) and ἐκεῖ, ‘there’ (that is, in
nous and its timeless realm of being and unified perception), which runs through
the Enneads as a leitmotif. We should also note that there are several phases to Plot-
inus’ sojourn in nous; first, assimilation to the divine intellect, and then a further
movement to the highest noetic reality.
761VI.4[22]2.32-49.
762Wilberding 2005 argues, based especially on IV.3[49]17.3-4, that nous can be said to be spatially
located, outside of the celestial spheres.
763E.g. IV.3[49]18.13-15. Cf. Armstrong 2003, Vol. 4, 88 n. 1.
764IV.8[31]1.1-11. Cf. V.3[49]6.13-18.
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Intellect as Faculty. It remains briefly to introduce the role of nous as a faculty
of intellection, discussed more fully in the following section. As well as being a
supreme, transcendent divine intellect, and a universe containing all reality, νοῦς of
course has the function of νοεῖν. But what might seem the most basic function of in-
tellect, intellection, in fact presents the most perplexing difficulties for interpreters of
Plotinus, especially when considered in parallel with nous’ role as intelligible world
and intelligible deity.
This thesis either leaves noêsis untranslated, or uses the awkward ‘intellection’,
for the reason that, as will emerge below, modern English lacks a word that even
approximates its meaning. Noêsis is certainly not ‘thinking’,765 and, while it is, in a
sense, a kind of ‘knowing’, the latter term applies better, in the nominative sense of
‘knowledge’, to ἐpiιστημή or ἔννοια, or in the verbal sense of ‘knowing’, to γνῶσις.
Noêsis is, for Plotinus, a form of cognition wherein the knower, that which is
known, and the act of knowing are one.766 That which intelligises (νοῦς or ὁ νοῶν)
becomes, in the act of intellection (noêsis), that which is intelligised (τὸ νόημα, τὸ
νοητόν, that is to say, εἶδος/εἴδη, one or more Forms). Noêsis is an act, but does not
take place in time; it is purely instantaneous.767
The importance of this definition for this thesis is the way Plotinus’ concept of
noêsis removes it radically from what might be called everyday, or ‘normal’, modes
of cognition, raising it to a status above discursivity and therefore language. Since
noêsis has the Forms as its objects (its ‘thoughts’, as it were), it deals, by defini-
tion, only in truth. However, with the introduction of some mediation between the
thinker and the Forms (as is the case with the temporally-fragmented thoughts of
the soul at the level of dianoia), mistakes become possible. Plotinus thus removes
absolute truth claims from the realm of language, insofar as the soul, at the level of
765See 215 below.
766V.3[49]6.7-8: νοῦς γὰρ καὶ νόησις ἕν· καὶ ὅλος ὅλῳ, οὐ μέρει ἄλλο μέρος; V.9[5]5.7-48, 8.3-4; V.4[7]2.46-
51; VI.9[9]5.14-15V.1[10]4.21; V.3[49]5.21-48; I.8[51]2.16. In fact, Plotinus makes the subject and object
of intellection both a unity and a plurality; see n. 847 below. See Sorabji 1982, 310-11; Sells 1994, 23;
Hoffmann 1997, 342.
767IV.4[28]1; III.7[45]3; V.3[49]2, 5. See Sorabji 1982, 310-11.
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discursive thought, will have only a mediated access to the Forms - ‘it will intelligise
secondarily’.768
It follows, too, from the above, that the soul, if it is to engage in noêsis, must
somehow become nous, at least in the moment of noêsis, since otherwise the act of
noêsis would not involve the necessary unity of intellect, intellection, and intelligised.
This is indeed the case, but before this point can be explained a few notes on soul are
in order.
Soul. Plotinus’ theory of the soul is perhaps even more perplexing than his theo-
ry of intellect; it certainly perplexed his contemporaries.769 To begin with some basic
premises of Plotinus’ theory, we may say that soul is immaterial and immortal,770
and that, while in some way connected with the material body, which is ‘inside’
soul,771 its true home is intellect and, ultimately, the one beyond being.772 Plotinus’
account of the human soul contains elements both of an Aristotelean ‘faculty psy-
chology’, with various δυνάμεις capable of different functions, and a Platonic soul
having different ‘parts’ (μέρη).773
There are several distinct realities which may be encompassed by the term ‘soul’
in Plotinus: the primary hypostasis Soul (ἡ piᾶσα ψυχή, III.9[33]3.1), the world-soul
768V.6[24]2-8: νοήσει [sc. ἡ ψυχή] δευτέρως.
769Porphyry relates that, early in his study under Plotinus, he once spent three consecutive days
questioning the master concerning the relationship between body and soul (Plot. 13, 11-18).
770IV.7[2]10-12, discussed at Blumenthal 1971, 171, is a representative argument for the existence of an
immaterial, immortal soul. Rist 1967a, 411-14 discusses the origins in Plato’s dialogues for Plotinus’
theory of soul, concentrating on R., Phdr., Tim., Lg., & Grg; Blumenthal notes the Aristotelean elements
in Plotinus’ theory (see n. 773 below).
771The soul’s connection to the material body was perplexing to Plotinus himself (IV.8[31]1, cited 198
above; cf. V.3[49]6.13-18). Following Plato (Tim. 36e), Plotinus states that body is within soul (e.g.
V.5[32]9.30 ff; IV.3[49]9.36-51, 20.14-15, 22.8-9), as is, indeed, the whole material cosmos (V.5[32]9.29-
30). See Blumenthal 1971, esp. 16 ff.
772Every soul longs to return to the good: I.6[1]1.1-2; cf. VI.2[19]11.24-5; IV.4[28]16.26-27; V.5[32]12.7-
9.
773Blumenthal 1971, 20-30 notes a lack of consistency with regard to faculties and parts of soul in
Plotinus, but concludes that, overall, Plotinus rejects or ignores the Platonic tripartition of the soul
in treatises later than IV.3 (27th in chronological order), adopting a faculty psychology. Blumenthal
theorises that such a model worked better alongside Plotinus’ conviction that the soul was a funda-
mental unity (ibid. 25). However, Plotinus does not have a problem with simultaneous unity and
multiplicity, as we have seen in his account of nous, describing soul for example as τριμερῆ and yet
indivisible (IV.7[2]14.9), and as both μεριστή and ἀμεριστός (IV.2[4]1.65; cf. 2 ff.). And he never loses
his conviction that the soul has a better and a worse part, the better turned toward nous, the worse
toward matter and the body (e.g. the late treatise I.4[46]4.34-36); cf. Clark 1996, 282-3.
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(ἡ τοῦ piαντός ψυχή, IV.8[31]7.27), and the individual soul. While each of these iter-
ations of soul has its reality in Plotinus’ world, they are also all in some sense one,
being fundamentally expressions or ‘parts’ of the hypostasis Soul.774 As a hyposta-
sis, Soul is inherently productive, and its reversion to nous, whereby it contemplates
the beauty of the Forms and the intellectual world, actually ‘generates’ the world
of the senses.775 But each individual soul is really part of Soul, and indeed of nous
(see below), and is, according to its true nature, a ‘noetic cosmos’.776 Soul is thus
simultaneously the locus for individual human thoughts and actions, and a godlike
cosmic entity. Plotinus’ philosophical concerns focus very much on the individual
soul and its journey ‘home’ to intellect and beyond, the process of attaining to the
soul’s divine potential. Different souls have different qualities, some being suited
by nature for the philosophic ascent (the ‘winged souls’ of the Platonic Phædrus),777
while others are, by nature, mired in the sensory dross of the material world.778
Two main characteristics of soul should be emphasised with regard to the prob-
lem of discourse about the transcendent reality, both having to do with the soul’s
relationship with matter and the body: the first is the difficulty the embodied soul
faces in trying to escape from conceiving reality in terms of space and time, and the
second is what I call Plotinus’ theory of the ‘indeterminate identity’.
Space and Time: Metaphor and Reality. The souls of individual humans are in a
sense separate entities and in a sense merely manifestations of the hypostasis Soul;
as will be discussed, they are also always in some way present to nous, and can even
become identified with nous. However, because of their relationship with matter - a
relationship which Plotinus finds it difficult to explain - they tend to be cognitively
774V.1[10]10; II.9[33]8; IV.3[49]1-2; I.1[53]10.10-11. See Bréhier 1958, 64-73; Clark 1996, 285-7. The most
in-depth study of the paradoxical unity and multiplicity of the soul(s) in Plotinus is Merlan 1969.
775On the productivity of hypostasis, see Appendix D, 279.
776III.4[46]3.21-2, 6.22-23: καὶ ἐσμὲν ἕκαστος κόσμος νοητός. This is most thoroughly discussed at
II.2[19]2.3 and III.4[46]3 and 6. Cf. V.7[18]1.9-10.
777I.3[20]3.2; IV.8[31]1.37; I.1[53]3.2-3, &c; citing Pl. Phdr. 246c. Plotinus describes philosophers as
suited to the noetic ascent ‘by nature’, e.g. I.3[20]1.9, 3.1.
778E.g. I.3[20]1.6-10, citing Phdr. 248d1-4. It is unclear how this inequality of souls is to be squared
with the doctrine of the ‘undescended soul’ described below, but perhaps the most simple explanation
is that Plotinus regards all souls as capable of the philosophic ascent in potentia, but many as unable
to escape the body in practice.
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trapped at the level of dianoia, discursive thought, and its external analogue, speech
and language. The defining characteristic of time and space is extension; extension
in thought results in the necessity of placing thoughts sequentially, and considering
propositions in order, just as language must form whole ideas from individual words
and phrases.
For Plotinus, as we have seen, time and space are both absent from the higher
realms of reality. Concerning Plotinus’ intelligible world, Bréhier has said: ‘Intel-
ligence, viewed as the intelligible world, is an ideal transposition of the world of
sense. It is the world of sense minus its materiality, that is to say, minus change (the
eternal having replaced time) and minus the mutual exteriority of the parts.’779 This
is an excellent summary of a difficult aspect of Plotinus’ theory of nous, but it should
be corrected with regard to ontological priority: the intelligible world is not an ideal
transposition of the world of sense, but rather the world of sense is a materialised
and temporalised reflection of the world of intellect. Souls within time and space
are severely limited in their abilities both to comprehend, and to express, higher
realities.
A major factor to be considered in connection with Plotinus’ ideas about ineffa-
bility, then, is the fact that language is inevitably pervaded by temporal and spatial
constraints; in short, by extension. The primary realities can only be described in
language drawing on the natural world, the world of the senses, which is essential-
ly informed by spatial metaphors when approaching the abstract.780 But the term
‘abstract’, with its etymological meaning of ‘drawing out’ general principles from
particulars, reverses the actual order of events for Plotinus: concrete individual bod-
ies are, for Plotinus, in fact ‘abstracted’ from the Forms. This is a problem for the
language of transcendence against which Plotinus musters a considerable arsenal of
methodologies of disorientation in his attempts to ‘shock’ his audience out of spa-
tial ways of thinking.781 The same goes, perhaps more so, for the temporal;782 the
7791958, 92-3.
780V.1[10]10.7 ff; V.2[11]2.19-23; VI.8[39]11.13-28.
781See 252 below.
782See V.1[10]6.19-23; V.8[31]12.25-26; VI.7[38]35.28-9; III.7[45]6.22-27, 13.43-4; V.3[49]17.12-28 on the
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metaphysics of the Enneads are shot through with sequential descriptions of the gen-
esis of the cosmos through what is expressed as a step-by-step process, qualified or
contradicted by statements which attempt to tear down the temporal structures thus
created.
The ‘Indeterminate Identity’. A second problem of the individual soul relates to its
nature as subject. For Plotinus, the soul is the ‘true self’, but the embodied soul has a
kind of parasitic accretion, a pseudo-self,783 which might best be termed the ‘person-
ality’,784 acquired through its connection to matter. This pseudo-self is sometimes
described as ἡμεῖς, ‘we’, a usage not unlike the modern ‘ego’ derived from Freudian
theory.785 Plotinus also discusses ‘two men’: the ‘first man’ is the soul in its state
of perfect noêsis, but at some point in the ontological ‘history’ of anthropogenesis
a ‘second man’ attached itself to the first, bringing with it in turn an attachment to
matter and the body.786 Plotinus doubts whether the soul in nous could have any
memories,787 and his theory of metempsychosis denies the survival of the personal-
ity, though not of the soul’s innate excellence: Pythagoras may become Socrates in
another life, but this does not make the two men the same personality.788 The sen-
sory experiences of a good man (that is, a philosopher) do not penetrate to his inner
self,789 nor do magical incantations, which operate only at the cosmic level, effect
him.790
need for temporal language in describing atemporal processes.
783I.1[53]9.8. See Aubry 2008, 108.
784I use the modern term ‘personality’, which has no precise Greek equivalent, to indicate the set of
characteristics which Plotinus refers to most commonly as ἤθη (see Sleeman and Pollet 1980 sub voc.).
The personality owes its characteristics to the force of necessity, which comes to bear upon soul when
it descends into the world of matter, and another principle, the soul or self proper, is ontologically
anterior to this descent (see e.g. II.3[20]9). On the ‘self’ in Plotinus see in the first instance Dodds
1960a; O’Daly 1973; Armstrong 1977; Remes 2007.
785Dodds 1960a, 5. On the Plotinian ἡμεῖς, see Oosthout 1991, 31-42; Aubry 2008.
786VI.4[22]14 - 5 passim. At I.4[46]13 ff. Plotinus refutes Stoic and Epicurean views on the problem
of evils using this theory: pain and such are indeed evils, but they only affect the lower man, not the
true self. Aubry (2008) sees the ἡμεῖς as the linkage between these ‘two men’. See Clark 1996, 284-5,
Smith 1978.
787IV.4[28]1.1.-2; cf. IV.3[49]25.14-30: since nous exists outside time, the concept of memory is
inappropriate to its state of being, and thus to noêsis. See Bréhier 1958, 75-9.
788V.7[18]1.5-9.
789I.4[46]8.10-13.
790Plotinus attacks the Gnostics’ magical practices (II.9[33]15.2-11) not for writing incantations
(ἐpiαοιδάς) per se, but for composing them not just piρὸς ψυχήν but piρὸς τὰ ἐpiάνω, since this would
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For Plotinus, then, that aspect of the human being most commonly referred to in
modern discourse as the ‘self’ - the conscious, discursive awareness of perceptions,
events, and memories - has no fundamental reality, and is not coextensive with the
soul, which is the true self. The soul thus has a lower self; as will be discussed later
on, it also has a higher self, through its ability to attain to union with the world-soul,
with Soul, with nous, and even, in some sense, with the one itself. The soul’s identity
is thus indeterminate, and ‘. . . there is no point at which one may determine one’s
own limits, so as to say “so far it is I”’.791 The consequences for discourse here are
fascinating: on the one hand, when Plotinus says ‘I’, whom are we to understand
to be the speaker? On the other hand, what does it mean to say that soul ‘moves
toward’ or ‘touches’ the ineffable, if, in doing so, it ceases to be soul?
Many Worlds, One World. Plotinus has been rightly characterised as a monist,792
but it is important to specify what we mean by this term. Plotinus does not seek to
prove, like Parmenides or Spinoza, that there is only one reality, but rather posits
gradations of reality in direct proportion to degree of unity. The more unified some-
thing is, the more real it is, with the converse necessarily following. The one would
thus be the ‘most real’ reality, but its reality in fact transcends reality altogether; it is
‘hyperreal’. However, the hyperreal one is never disconnected from any reality; for
Plotinus, all is one, and the differences which arise in this incomprehensible unity-
multiplicity are best described as ‘acts’ of the inactive one. Every true action, for
Plotinus, is of a double nature, having a component which is internal to the actor -
identical with its essence - and a component which is extrinsic.793 Nous is the exter-
nal act of the one, and so different from its nature,794 but at the same time, nous and
the universe are ‘inside’ the one.795
subject the higher realities to speech and other powers proper to the lower world (cf. IV.4[28]30.28-30
ff.).
791Bréhier 1958, 73, citing VI.5[23]7.14-15. Cf. Armstrong 1967, 4: ‘The boundaries shutting off the
self from the universe are largely illusory, and disappear in the highest stages of perception.’ Aubry
2008, 120.
792E.g Rist 1965b.
793See Schroeder 1987, 679.
794See e.g. V.4[7]2.26-36.
795Ibid. 13-19.
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The exposition above has presented the Plotinian universe piece by piece - such
are the limits of discursive exposition. The paradoxes just stated at the end of the last
paragraph illustrate this deficiency. Just as a radical unity cannot, in Plotinus’ eyes,
be expressed by predicative language, so the simultaneous ‘event’ that is the uni-
verse cannot be encompassed in any holistic account. This is not only because, for
any map to be truly complete, it would have to become the territory it describes, but
also because a monist world such as Plotinus’ is, by his own admission, indescribable
at the level of time and space. Any account, therefore, is bound to encounter para-
doxes when viewed from that standpoint. Several of these paradoxes are explored
below, with a view to approaching a better understanding of how, for Plotinus, the
one is the all.
Immanence and Transcendence. The first of these is the simultaneous omnipresence
and transcendence of Plotinian realities. As we have seen, Plotinus asserts the tran-
scendent unity of the one, which exceeds any numerical unity to the degree that it
actually negates all number, and is beyond being and any predication whatsoever.
On the other hand, all things, at whatever ontological level, are things only insofar
as they themselves partake of unity; in some passages, Plotinus actually has the one,
as principle of unity, ‘participated in’ like a Platonic Form.796 All things of course
partake of multiplicity as well, which is why the cosmos exists as it does rather than
as an undifferentiated, ‘silent’ transcendent principle.797 In the sense that the effi-
cient cause of all being is the one,798 the one can be said to be all. Plotinus also
expounds the one’s status as a primal cause of everything as a form of immanence-
transcendence:799 with a word-play that does not fully transfer into English, Plotinus
tells us that Τὸ ἓν piάντα καὶ οὐδὲ ἕν, which we might translate as ‘the one is all things
and not any thing’, but could also render as ‘the one is all things and not [even]
796As at III.8[51]9.19-24.
797The primary nature of the one is still and silent, and if there were no Otherness, all things would
be in this simple silence (V.1[10]4.38-9); but, in order for all things to be, the one must be still (ἡσυχίαν
ἄγειν: V.3[49]12.35-6.
798See n. 726 above.
799See Bussanich 1996, 50.
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“one”’, emphasising Plotinus’ overarching project of denying attributes and names
to the first principle.800
But Plotinus is also concerned to show phenomenologically how it is that, he
believes, the embodied human being can attain to some kind of contact with the
one.
And again, since knowledge (γνώσεως) of other things comes to us
through nous, and we are able to know nous by nous, by what simple
apprehension (ἐpiιβολῇ ἀθρόᾳ) might we grasp this, which transcends
the nature of intellect? It is necessary to indicate (σημῆναι) how this
is possible. We shall say ‘by that in us which is like it.’ For there is
something of it present to us. Or, rather, there is nowhere where it is
not, with regard to those things capable of participating in it.801
The one’s immanence is specifically a presence to those beings with some aspect
of the one in themselves; most importantly, it can be present to human souls, who
participate in unity.802
The presence of the one is also an absence, insofar as the knowing hypostases
nous and soul ‘look away’ from it and toward multiplicity and becoming. This al-
ternation of presence and absence is discussed in more detail below, but it is well
to make a preliminary note here that the choice of which realities to contemplate
determines the one’s presence or absence; this is one example of the way in which
Plotinus’ ontology is directed and preceded by the concept of contemplation. Hu-
man souls become present to nous or to the one beyond being by directing their
contemplation thither. The traditional ontological dichotomy between immanence
and transcendence is thus interwoven with the phenomenological problem of pres-
ence and absence. The two pairs of seeming oppositions cannot be separated in
Plotinus.803
The Axiom of Continuous Hierarchy and Universal Sympathy. A further considera-
tion which can be usefully discussed under the rubric of ‘monism’ is what has been
800V.2[11]1.1. Cf. Pl. Prm. 160b2-3.
801III.8[51]9.19-24. On ἐpiιβολή see n. 893 below. Cf. VI.9[9]7.4: the one always present to those able
to touch (θιγεῖν) it.
802Cf. VI.9[9]3.51: ἔχομεν τι piαρ΄ αὐτοῦ.
803Cf. Trouillard 1976, 313.
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called the ‘axiom of continuous hierarchy’.804 This is the principle that there can be
no breaks in the chain of being, which can be seen as a metaphysical expression of the
axiom that ‘like is known by like’. The one or good is remote and transcendent when
regarded from the point of view of the material world; yet it is intimately linked with
that world by a seamless flow of intermediary entities: ‘Nothing is separated or cut
off from that which precedes it.’805 This is often expressed by the term συνουσία and
the verb συνεῖναι, which can signify the integral wholeness of each reality, its ‘verti-
cal’ connection to the realities above it, or the relationship between the product and
its producer (i.e. Soul’s relationship to nous).806
I argue below that, for Plotinus the answer to this problem lies not in a prolifera-
tion of internal dynamics within the hypostases, as in the later Platonists, but rather
in a blurring of their edges. The one and nous overlap, as do nous and Soul, whence
arise individual souls and material objects.807 At no point is there a break in continu-
ity between the most profound and the most nugatory realities; when we remember
that, despite the schematic arrangement of the preceding discussion, Plotinus’ real-
ity is not a ladder or a chain, but a structured unity, we see how this results in a
monist world-view. There is only one world in Plotinus, and it is fundamentally a
unity beyond unity expressed, by degrees, as a multiplicity.808
This unity-in-multiplicity is expressed in the cosmos (that is, the sublunary sen-
sory world of change and coming-to-be) by cosmic sympathy (συμpiάθεια). All things
are interconnected by unseen links, not at random, but appropriately each accord-
ing to its nature.809 Every soul is connected through sympathy with all parts of
the cosmos.810 Plotinus’ theory of sensation is based on sympathy: both sight and
hearing occur, not through a medium, but through sympathy between the sensory
804Mazur 2005. Cf. Mortley 1975, 376.
805V.2[11]1.22: οὐδὲν δὲ τοῦ piρὸ αὐτοῦ ἀpiήρτηται οὐδ΄ ἀpiοτέτμηται.
806Schroeder 1987, 678-9 et passim. On the productive function of hypostasis in Plotinus, see
Appendix D, 277.
807See 252 ff. below.
808Cf. Deck 1967, 110.
809VI.7[38]2.32-6.
810III.4[46]6.21-30.
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organs and their objects.811 Cosmic sympathy is also what causes magical rituals
to function, prayers to be answered, and, in general, provides an explanation for
many occult parallels in the Plotinian cosmos.812 The interconnectedness expressed
on the macrocosmic scale by the fundamental unity-in-multiplicity of all the pri-
mary hypostases is thus mirrored on the microcosmic level, where each individual
thing is connected to every other individual thing in an invisible nexus of non-causal
determinations.813
The Doctrine of the ‘Undescended Soul’. Plotinus states that the soul is always con-
nected with the higher realities (viz. intellect, but with the potential for attaining
to the one in some indescribable fashion as well),814 while at the same time being
manifest in (or more accurately, manifesting) the world of the senses.815 The highest
part of Soul, for Plotinus, has never left nous;816 in fact, when man stops being ‘man’
and becomes nous, he is most fully himself.817 ‘For we are not cut off from it, even
now.’818
This doctrine removes any ceiling from the heights to which the indeterminate
self may aspire; the human soul is potentially any reality, with the proviso that it
may cease to be soul in becoming that reality. Its relevance for discourse will become
apparent in the following section, to which we now turn.
811IV.5[29], On Sight; on hearing, ibid. 5.19-31. Plotinus accepts a medium for sight at V.5[32]7, but
seemingly as an illustrative metaphor (cf. Armstrong 2003 n.1 ad loc.).
812Magical rites effective through sympathy: IV.9[5]3.4-5; IV.4[28]26, 35, 40 ad fin; I.4[46]9.1ff. See 143
above for the Egyptian sages’ animation of statues through sympathy. On Plotinus’ theory of magic,
see Merlan 1953, 344-5; Mazur 2003.
813Rappe 2000, 37-41.
814See 222 below.
815IV.7[2]13.16 ff; V.1[10]10.13-18; VI.2[19]22.31-3; IV.8[31]8.2 ff; ; II.9[33]1.57-63, 2 passim; IV.3[49]12.4-
5. See also I.6[1]2.7-11.
816III.3[20]5.16-18; cf. II.5[36]3.31-3; III.4[46]3.21-8.
817Cf. Armstrong 1967, 4-5. On ‘becoming nous’ see further 216 below.
818VI.4[22]14.21-2: οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ νῦν ἀpiοτετμήμεθα.
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Modes of Knowing in Plotinus
Knowing and Being in Plotinus819. Reference was made above to the way in
which the ontological dichotomy between immanence and transcendence corresponds
in Plotinus to the phenomenological pair of presence and absence. This is because
the conceptual realms of ontology and epistemology are simply not separate for Plot-
inus;820 or, at least, not separate at the level of intellect.821 How could they be, when
‘to intelligise is to be’, and when the highest being, nous, is also a faculty of con-
sciousness? It has been observed with some justice that Plotinus is the earliest known
philosopher fully to equate levels of being with states of consciousness,822 and the
section which follows, outlining the modes of consciousness as theorised by Ploti-
nus, will be seen to correspond intimately with the ontological schema outlined in
the previous sections.
It should be emphasised that this is not a case of parallelism, of ontological reali-
ties and cognitive realities mirroring one another. Rather, cognitive and ontological de-
scriptions are both possibilities in describing the Plotinian realities; they are differing, par-
tial descriptions of concepts which cannot, by their nature, be succinctly described
through discursive language. Nous is an intelligible world, and also acts as a faculty
of noêsis; but there is only one nous, which is both of these things. The discussion
will now take a phenomenological turn. Plotinus wants his readers to understand
higher realities, but, as I will argue in the following section, this understanding is
valued chiefly as a propædeutic to living these realities.
The discussion which follows concentrates on discerning what kinds of con-
sciousness Plotinus believes to be available to human beings, but it is worth noting
here, in the spirit of the previous section’s emphasis on the unity of the Plotinian
world, that the entire universe, for Plotinus, is conscious. Contemplation (θεωρία)
819Useful studies of modes of knowing in Plotinus, and on the limits of knowledge and language
with regard to the transcendent include Meijer 1992, 164-8; Hoffmann 1997, 355-6; Turner 2001, 481-4;
Emilsson 2007.
820Cf. Mortley 1975, 370; Rappe 2000, 25-44; Mazur 2010, 33.
821Cf. Emilsson 2007, 2.
822Bréhier 1958, 192-5. Cf. Perl 2006, 9 n. 25.
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is an ontological and epistemological function of the Plotinian universe. Plotinus’
theory, which has been called ‘contemplationist metaphysics’,823 states that all re-
alities contemplate; specifically, they contemplate the reality which precedes them
(nous contemplates the one, Soul nous, and so on), and the contemplation generates
the reality which follows it (i.e., Soul is generated by the contemplation of the one by
intellect).824 Plotinus’ metaphysics (and even his physics) are thus predicated upon
a kind of consciousness - contemplation - which has an ontological result - genera-
tion.825 ‘All things strive for contemplation’, and ‘contemplation is coming-to-be’.826
The fact that Plotinus’ universe constantly generates itself through contemplating it-
self is one way in which the terms ontology and epistemology fall short of describing
what Plotinus means.
This applies at the cosmic level as well. Allusion was made earlier to the in-
terconnectedness of the Plotinian universe through cosmic sympathy. As we might
expect from the universal contemplation in the Plotinian universe, the term συμpiά-
θεια retains, for Plotinus, at least some of the experiential force of the word piάθειν;
individual parts of the cosmos are in some way conscious of each other, hence their
innate mutual response to each other. This is underlined by Plotinus’ use of the word
συναίσθησις almost as a synonym for συμpiάθεια, and in similar contexts.827
The discussion which follows on the modes of knowing refers mainly to the
modes through which the individual soul comes to ‘know’ the primordial principles
whence it arises, but should be contextualised in terms of the larger Plotinian world,
which is a network of interconnected self-knowledge, the parts contemplating the
whole and aware of each other through cosmic sympathy.
Discursive Indirect Knowing. For Plotinus, as for the Middle Platonists, ‘dis-
cursivity’ (διέξοδος), the necessity for both speech and reason to deal with problems
823Gatti 1996, 33.
824III.8[51] passim; II.9[33]2.13-15. See Deck 1967, esp. 93-109; Gatti 1996, 31-2.
825See Bréhier 1958, 166; Gatti 1996, 31-4. Cf. Armstrong 2003 n. 1 to III.8[51]7.15-28.
826III.8[51]1.2-3: piάντα θεωρίας ἐφίεσθαι καὶ εἰς τέλος τοῦτο βλέpiειν; III.8[51]5.1-2: θεωρία ἡ γένεσις.
827Noted by Schroeder 1987, 684, referencing IV.4[28]24.21-22, 45.8. On συναίσθησις in Plotinus see
ibid. 682.
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sequentially, is a primary logical reason for the exclusion of both reason and speech
from the highest reaches of reality.828 As we have seen, that which is perfectly sim-
ple cannot be comprehended by a divided mode of cognition, no matter how close-
ly it approximates unity; we must not make the one multiple, even in thought.829
Both διανοία and λογισμός are forms of discursive thought.830 Blumenthal has shown
that the διανοετικόν and λογιστικόν actually pertain to the same faculty of discursive
thought in the soul; the former is the more general term and the latter tends to re-
fer specifically to the style of dialectical reasoning pursued by philosophers.831 As
might be expected from the foregoing, the soul engages in discursive thinking (and
its linguistic externalisation) only in the cosmos; the soul separated from the body
does not.832
Discursive thought, for Plotinus, is by no means empty of meaning; just as the
things and events encountered in the world of bodies and of the senses are multiple
and incomplete reflections of their unified, integral archetypes, so the thoughts of
dianoia are fragmentary, sequential glimpses of the eternal truths of noêsis. The soul
in the cosmos must engage in dianoia. But if dianoia is to contain any truth, it must
somehow partake of noêsis, the cognition of the Forms themselves.
Plotinus expresses the presence of noêsis to the embodied soul in several differ-
ent ways. Sometimes he asserts a faculty of phantasia as a mediator between nous
and the discursive mind, a faculty of soul which enables the ‘translation’ of eternal
archetypes into temporalised and materialised forms of thought.833 But nous func-
tioning within souls is sometimes described as a second, subsidiary nous to the ‘nous
828For διέξοδος, see V.9[5]7.9-11; VI.2[19]21.27-28; V.8[31]6.7-12; VI.6[34]16.23; cf. III.7[45]11.22-25.
829V.8[31]13.3.
830It should be noted here that Plotinus is well-known for a certain terminological sloppiness (cf. e.g.
Blumenthal 1971, 43 n. 23; 104 ff.), and that he sometimes refers to discursive thought with the verb
νοεῖν, falling into the more normal way of speaking rather than the technical philosophic register. It
is generally easy to see when this occurs (e.g. at II.4[46]5.4 ff.).
831Blumenthal 1971, 100-11. Cf. Oosthout 1991, 83-4. This thesis will use the more common dianoia as
a general term, with the understanding that logismos and any other discursive mode of thinking is to
be taken as covered by this label.
832V.1[10]8.27; IV.3[49]18.1-19;: neither the world-soul nor human souls that have departed this life
engage in reasoning; cf. IV.2[4]2.53-55; VI.7[38]9.9-10.
833IV.3[49]30.1-16. On phantasia in Plotinus, see Lloyd 1990, 142.
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above’,834 known as ‘dividing intellect’ (μερίζων νοῦς),835 the ‘inner intellect’ (ὁ ἔνδον
νοῦς),836 or the soul’s own intellect (νοῦν οἰκεῖον ἐχούσης [sc. ψυχῆς]).837 Plotinus also
describes the function of noêsis in dianoia as a ‘state’ (ἕξις) of the soul, whereby noêsis
informs dianoia.838 Discursive thought can thus be true thought, but at one remove
from the unmediated self-apprehension that is noêsis, showing the image of noêsis ‘as
in a mirror’.839 He elsewhere proposes a model whereby the absolute truths of nous
are ‘filtered’ through discursive thought, resulting in a fragmented ‘trace’ (ἴχνος) of
noêsis at the level of soul, which makes true discourses possible.840 Statements of
partial truths are possible; truth itself, however, resides in nous, beyond discourse.
At the same time, nous ‘bleeds’ into the world of discourse, its transcendence always
balanced by presence. ‘Indeed it [sc. nous] is ours and not ours. That is why we
make use of it and do not make use of it - whereas reason we always use - and it is
ours when we use it, but when we do not use it, it is not ours.’841 Altogether, Plot-
inus’ accounts of the relationship between discursive thought and nous propound a
number of mutually contradictory viewpoints, a point returned to in the following
chapter.
Language and Discursive Thought. Speech, for Plotinus as for Plato in the Sophist, is
an externalised form of discursive thought842 (and discursive thought is sometimes
described as an interior dialogue),843 and human souls in intellect have no need of
834V.3[49]2. This passage makes it clear that the lower intellect is not characterised by perfect self-
knowledge like its more elevated counterpart.
835V.9[5]8.20-23, cf. 9, 1-2.
836V.3[49]14.14-15.
837V.2[11]2.9-10; V.3[49]3-4.
838I.1[53]8.2. Cf. V.9[5]3.21-24, 33-37; V.3[49]2.14-25.
839IV.3[49]30.8-11. Cf. Heiser 1991, 25-6; Turner 2001, 483.
840E.g. V.3[49]3.10-12. This trace is also sometimes called ‘a kind of imprint’ (V.3[49]2.10: οἷον τοὺς
τύpiους). This is in fact a very elegant solution to the ancient problem of the manner in which the
Forms make discourse possible while remaining outside the constraints of time and coming-to-be.
841V.3[49]3.26-29, trans. Oosthout.
842Pl. Sph. 263e; cf. Tht. 189e-190a. V.1[10]3.7-10; I.2[19]3.27-30; VI.8[39]9.2-3 characterise speech
as an externalised form of thought. See Mortley 1986, I, 115; Hoffmann 1997, 367-8; O’Meara 1998,
154-5. The relationship between discursive thinking and language in Plotinus has been ably set out
by Heiser (1991), reasoning carefully from Platonic passages on which we know Plotinus drew and
from the Enneadic texts themselves.
843VI.9[9]10.6-7 and V.3[49]3.3-4.
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it, although they do communicate.844 for Plotinus, the truth of a linguistic state-
ment can be considered as separate from the words themselves; ‘let him abandon
the verbal signification and grasp the meaning of what is being said’.845 This state-
ment both implies great limits to the power of language as a transmitter of truth,
and also paradoxically exalts it as a kind of vessel from which the truths of nous,
the ‘meaning’, may be extracted. Another way of looking at this problem is by con-
trasting the self-certifying knowledge of nous, which ‘is what it says it is’, with the
language of difference that is discourse, referring as it always does to objects outside
the linguistic system.846 Plotinus shows at times a striking degree of doubt as to the
truth-claims of language, and yet the fact of his teaching and writing remain to show
that he did not believe discourse to be futile.
The Limits of Discursivity. The limits of discursivity, as Plotinus sees them, have
already been touched on. The constraints of time and space on dianoia are two such:
these are phenomena of soul, and do not exist in nous or beyond nous. A further
constraint is the discursive mind’s inability to think total unity. Plotinus reasons that
any cognition, no matter how unified, must have at least a thinker and a thought,
and thus involve multiplicity.847 The soul tries to fasten on the formless (ἀνείδεον)
‘but slides away and fears it may have nothing.’848 Plotinus also denies the efficacy
of dianoia to comprehend higher realities by arguing ‘from the top down’: there is no
discursivity in nous, so discursivity cannot apprehend the things ‘there’.849
For Plotinus, since dianoia cannot grasp the one, when we ‘speak’ the one, we are
actually ‘speaking ourselves’, our own affections or experiences (piάθη).850 Similar
844Cf. Hoffmann 1997, 346-7. Plotinus denies that there is speech (φωνή) at the level of nous
(IV.3[49]18.13-24), but he believes that there is communication there, and communication of a su-
perior type: thus, ‘all of the things that are said there are beautiful images’ (V.8[31]5.21-22; cf.
IV.3[49]18.20-22) rather than mere words. See further n. 859 below.
845VI.4[22]2.11-12.
846Sorabji 1983, 152; Lloyd 1986, 259; Rappe 2000, 156; Turner 2001, 482.
847This is a delicate point for Plotinus, and one which results in certain paradoxical statements; he
wishes, following Aristotle, to make the intellect and its intellection a single phenomenon, but also
insists on a certain multiplicity in such an arrangement, especially when compared with the ultimate
unity that is the one. See Emilsson 2007, 18.
848VI.9[9]3.4-6.
849Argued by Rappe 2000, 35 ff. based on V.8[31]7.
850VI.9[9]3.49-54.
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limits apply to nous, as we shall see; it grasps not the one itself, but a multiple image
of the one. This is an important aspect of the way in which Plotinus conceives of the
attempt to express the ineffable; every attempt at such expression in fact expresses
the speaker, the ‘subject’ of discourse perpetually eluding capture.
That said, the one is never absent, since all things are things insofar as they
partake of oneness.851 Thus, the one should in some way be present to discursive
thought. In some treatises Plotinus is willing to concede a certain indirect knowl-
edge of the one even to dianoia, insofar as all things participate in unity, and have
thus a connection, however attenuated, with the primordial unity.852 However, the
fact that the soul is able somehow to apprehend the one because ‘it has something
of the one in it’853 generally takes place in Plotinian narrative at a stage where the
soul has ceased to exercise dianoia, and come to exercise, or rather, to be, noêsis. I say
‘generally’; I argue in Chapter Seven that the presence and absence of the one at the
level of dianoia are in fact indeterminate, apophatic options in Plotinus.
Non-Discursive Indirect Knowing.
Noêsis. Scholars have argued over whether or not noêsis, as Plotinus conceives it,
is possible or coherent, sometimes pushing Plotinus’ theory quite far in the attempt
and losing some of the subtleties of his argumentation.854 Others, I would argue,
have brought noêsis too close to discursive thought, finding its non-discursive traces
in Plotinus’ metaphors and other non-literal techniques of writing, almost as a kind
of non-verbal element of normal discourse.855 Both approaches may be argued for
on the basis of a chosen selection of Plotinus’ writings, since almost any statement
he makes about noêsis in one place is contradicted, or at least modified, elsewhere in
the Enneads.856 What, then, can we say about noêsis?
851VI.9[9]1.1.
852V.3[49]14 makes the case for the one’s presence and absence at the level of dianoia. Cf. VI.8[39]16.1-
3.
853VI.7[38]31.8-9.
854E.g. Sorabji 1982.
855E.g. Rappe 2000, 3; cf. 20 et passim.
856Cf. Emilsson 2007, 18.
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Noêsis is a faculty of cognition, engaged in both by souls and by nous itself. Ploti-
nus most commonly likens noêsis to a form of synoptic vision, in contradistinction to
a form of thinking.857 Plato’s opposition of nous and dianoia, whereby nous does not
deal with sensible images, and can rise above hypotheses to the Form of the good,858
certainly influenced Plotinus’ account, and holds true for Plotinus’ thought,859 al-
lowing for the later philosopher’s distinctive metaphysics.860 So noêsis deals with
its objects non-representationally: it does not intelligise about Forms; it ‘intelligises
Forms’.861 Moreover, whatever the contents of its intellection, it does not intelligise
them one-by-one, but in a synoptic or holistic manner, so that, despite the varied
nature of the Forms, its comprehension of them, in a given act of intellection, is in-
stantaneous and lacks no detail or nuance.862 The Forms, as we have seen, are inside
nous; all noêsis is thus self-apprehension.863
Noêsis is thus a priori always true; for how could any error creep in between
an instantaneous, unified, holistic act of direct apprehension and its apprehender,
especially as the two are in some way unified in the act of apprehension?864 For
857E.g. VI.9[9]6.52-55.
858Pl. R. 510b, 511a ff. On the truth-claims of nous in Plato, see Brisson 1997.
859V.8[31]5.19-25: ‘We should by no means suppose that either the gods or the most blessed ones there
see propositions (ἀξιώματα ὁρᾶν); rather, the things said there are fair images καλὰ ἀγάλματα, such as
one would imagine to be in the soul of a wise man, images not of written characters, but beings (οὐ
γεγραμμένα, ἀλλὰ ὄντα). This is why the ancients said that the Forms are beings and essences.’ Cf.
V.5[32]1.38 ff: the realities in nous are not piρότασεις, ἀξιώματα, or λεκτά, but Forms themselves.
860To reiterate, Plotinus’ one is ‘the good’, but no longer the Form of the good; to call it a Form would
place it within nous, which Plotinus does not wish to do, and would also make it unequivocably a
νοητόν, which is a problem he struggles with (see 219).
861The verb νοεῖν in this sense is transitive and takes a simple direct object, like ἰδεῖν (see Perl 2006,
3-4); for the Hellenic mind generally, then, noêsis was an act conceived of as a direct apprehension of
its objects of intellection. However, Plotinus’ approach to intellect results in a mind which literally
becomes its thought; its action (ἐνεργεία) is its being (οὐσία). Hence, the absolute truth claim discussed
below. Mortley 1986, I, 61-76 is a good overview of Hellenic thinking on the faculty of noêsis, and of
Plotinus’ particular take on this tradition.
862See Bussanich 1996, 39.
863Most strongly formulated at V.3[49]1. See Sorabji 1982, 311; Emilsson 2007, 77-8.
864VI.9[9]5.12-13; V.5[32]1.1-2, 2.16. See e.g. Bussanich 1996, 39.
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Plotinus, self-apprehension is the most sound form of apprehension, as only self-
apprehension can be said to be direct apprehension, rather than apprehension medi-
ated by images.865 Truth in nous is ‘what it says it is’.866
Turning Toward Nous. This presence of nous is to be cultivated. The philosopher
is exhorted to ‘move toward’ nous; to leave behind the world of dianoia, and to ‘turn
inward’ toward the noetic universe, therein to dwell, contemplating the eternal ver-
ities.867 In some passages, Plotinus says that the soul, in focusing its consciousness
in nous, becomes or is unified with nous.868 In this case, Plotinus indicates that the
soul, in the act of being nous, ceases to be soul; in gaining its truer nature, it loses its
less true, temporary identity.869 Otherwise, it follows, the soul could not truly know
nous, since its knowledge would not be self-knowledge, but knowledge of an image.
However this is understood, it is clearly depicted as a practical and desired re-
sult of philosophical practice; that is to say, however difficult to comprehend we
find Plotinus’ conception of noêsis, it is propounded as a practical option for the
philosopher, to be sought out and cultivated. We have seen Plotinus offer his own
experience as an example; he describes having dwelt timelessly within nous, and
his subsequent bafflement upon ‘returning to the body’, attempting to make sense
of the noetic experience upon his return to the limits of time and space.870 But we
should bear in mind that nous is the same world as that of the senses, but without
time and space; the soul in nous senses, touches, and communicates with the world
around her in some way.871 This is clearly paradoxical at the level of discursive logic.
865This has been called the ‘identity theory of truth’ (Rappe 2000, xiii) or the ‘internality thesis’ (Emils-
son 1996, 238-9). On self-apprehension in Plotinus, see Deck 1967, 20; Oosthout 1991, 75-82; Emilsson
2007, 124-170. Cf. ibid. 10.35; V.5[32]2.18-20. Cf. Hoffmann 1997, 342.
866V.3[49]5.25: τὴν ἄρα ἀλήθειαν οὐχ ἑτέρου εἶναι δεῖ, ἀλλ΄ ὃ λέγει, τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι.
867V.1[10]12.13-14: εἰς τὸ εἴσω ἐpiιστρέφειν, κἀκεῖ piοιεῖν τὴν piροσοχὴν ἔχειν.
868E.g. VI.5[23]12.16-25; IV.4[28]2.27-30; VI.7[38]35.4; V.3[49]4-5. See Bussanich 1996, 56.
869V.3[49]4.7-13, 29-31. Nous is once described (V.1[10]11.9-13) as ‘a kind of other self’ (οἷον ἄλλον
αὐτόν).
870IV.8[31]1.1-11, cited p. 198 above. Porphyry supports Plotinus’ claims with corroborative
testimony, discussed in Chapter Two, p. 53.
871The relationship between the noetic αἴσθησις, noêsis, and θεωρία has yet to be explained in a com-
prehensive way. It may be that Plotinus’ terminological imprecision results in an impression of multi-
ple faculties where he actually means to indicate aspects of a single phenomenon, or it may be that he
was himself unsure about the precise relation between these different faculties. Alternately, he may
have seen the problem as insoluble at the level of discourse.
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This does not trouble Plotinus: he does not expect the soul, in its state of isolation
in the relative unreality of the cosmos, to be able to conceive the truth of noêsis in its
fullness.
Speaking About Noêsis. The contrast between noêsis and dianoia is a constantly
recurring theme, especially in Enneads Five and Six, often expressed ontologically
through the dichotomy of ‘here’ and ‘there’. More than the ineffable one itself, the
state of noêsis, barred from discursive treatment by its very nature but at the same
time central to any and all discursive formulations (since without noêsis, there could
be no dianoia),872 seems to inhabit a space just beyond the pages of Plotinus’ text.
Every reference to this state is in a sense a negative statement, since it can never be
described; or rather, while it is conceived as a completely direct, completely open
revelation of truth, it can never be fully translated into the language of the embodied
soul. This being the case, it is no wonder that the state of contact with the one is
ineffable. As Plotinus says, ‘There is nothing wonderful in the difficulty of saying
it [i.e. the nature of the one], when it is not easy to say what being or Form are;
but we do have gnôsis based on the Forms.’873 Being mindful of the ontological-
epistemological overlap in Plotinus’ philosophy, we see how this remark applies to
modes of knowing as much as to types of beings.
Is noêsis, then, ineffable? There are many passages in Plotinus which suggest that
nous itself cannot be accurately described through language. Discursive thinking
and language deal in images, and thus cannot represent nous: ‘What image could
one form of it in itself’?874 We also recall the multiple, mutually contradictory ac-
counts of the way in which the soul is supposed to engage with nous cited on page
211 above; it is a state of soul, a faculty of soul, a subsidiary nous within soul, an
aspect of soul that is itself nous. The noetic cannot be summed up in a few simple
sentences or doctrines; it must be approached through multiple, tentative, discursive
approaches, since any one discursive approach cannot, by definition, comprehend
872As discussed 211 above.
873VI.9[9]3.1-3.
874V.8[31]3.11: τίνα ἂν οὖν εἰκόνα τις αὐτοῦ λάβοι·
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its nature.875 This, in my reading, accounts for the paradoxical statements which
Plotinus makes about nous: nous is both a unity and multiple,876 it is nowhere and
everywhere,877 it is both present and absent to the soul;878 it must be sought but re-
quires no seeking.879 These are best read, not as paradoxes eternally clashing, but
as contradictory statements intended to point toward a synthesis on a higher level
of reality;880 if we make the effort of removing time and space from our thinking,
and remember the indeterminate nature of the Plotinian self, it becomes easier to see
how these paradoxes might be envisioned as paradoxical only to the embodied soul.881
But are we to say that the function of nous, noêsis, is also inherently ineffable, or at
least not susceptible to a fully coherent account, at the level of dianoia and language?
I would argue that the difficulties mentioned at the beginning of this section, where
scholars have been tempted either to force nous into a non-contradictory mould or
to reduce its strangeness and find in it something not so different from everyday
consciousness, point us in this direction; as I argue in the following chapter, Plotinus’
conflicting accounts of nous and noêsis are best understood as an apophatic exercise
of unprecedented scope. This is not because nous is absolutely ineffable in the radical
sense in which the one is, but because it cannot be fully conceived by discursivity,
and thus language, which in many ways amounts to the same thing as far as the
practice of discourse is concerned. This reading does not defuse the difficulty of the
problem of nous in Plotinus, but it allows our accounts of Plotinus’ philosophy to
appreciate his internal contradictions as intentional and irreducible. He is giving an
account, insofar as possible, of that which transcends accounts.
The Limits of Intellect. Intellection is never wrong, and always true. It is, how-
ever, limited by its internal multiplicity from apprehending the one in its radical
875IV.2[4]3.20-32. Cf. V.8[31]5-6; III.5[36]9.26-9; VI.7[38]35.28-30. Cf. Bussanich 1997, 5315.
876See n. 754 above.
877See n. 755 above.
878See n. 756 above.
879Nous seeks: V.3[49]10.50-1. Nous does not seek: V.1[10]4.16; V.3[49]4.18-19, 5.22.
880Cf. Emilsson 2007, 18, which shows an awareness of the contradictory nature of nous in Plotinus,
and also seeks to account for it in terms of the limits of language.
881Cf. Bussanich 1997, 5315.
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unity; for Plotinus, no cognition, even self-cognition, can directly grasp the perfect-
ly simple.882 To be sure, the highest element of nous contemplates the one, but in a
‘multiple manner’: ‘This is why intellect, which is multiple, desires to intelligise that
which is beyond it, which is itself one, but wishing to reach it in its simplicity, always
ends up apprehending something within itself, and [thus] made multiple.’883 Nous
is thus only an indirect mode of knowing, a way-station on the path to the ultimate
reality, which transcends both epistêmê and noêsis.884
Such is Plotinus’ normal approach to the limits of noêsis. However, in the early
Treatise 7 (V.4.2) he states that the one, as object of nous’ contemplation, is a νοητόν.
This is an unusual approach for Plotinus,885 and has been seen by some as evidence
of an evolution in his thought from an earlier stance, something like that of Nume-
nius, of the one as a kind of transcendent intellect, toward his later, more radical
belief in its total transcendence of intellect.886 I address this passage in the follow-
ing chapter, where I read it, instead, as one of a number of formally false statements
which Plotinus makes about the one which are intended to be read intertextually,
their mutual contradiction serving to open up a cognitive space in the reader that is
undetermined.
A Kind of Direct Knowing of the Transcendent? We have seen the ways in
which noêsis penetrates the realm of discursive thinking, despite the limits inherent
in the latter. Similarly, at the limits of noêsis we find a subtle and highly abstruse doc-
trine of the ability for this form of cognition to transcend its own limits and somehow
to grasp, perceive, or touch the one. Plotinus speaks in several passages of a ‘higher
intellect’,887 sometimes described topographically as the highest point in the noetic
world, through which the ascending philosopher has first travelled.888
882V.1; V.3[49]10-11; VI.9[9]
883V.3[49]11.1-4. Cf. III.8[51]8.31; VI.7[38]15.
884VI.9[9]4.1-3.
885Cf. Armstrong 2003, V, 138.
886On the relations between different intellects in Numenius, see Armstrong 1967, 7-9.
887VI.9[9]3.26-7; ; V.5[32]8.22; VI.7[38]35.19-24; V.3[49]14.15. On this ‘higher nous’ in Plotinus see Rist
1964a; Schroeder 1985; Mazur 2010, 7-8.
888I.3[20]1.16-18: εἰς τὸ ἔσχατον τοῦ τόpiου ἀφίκωνται, ὃ δὴ τέλος τῆς piορείας ὂν τυγχάνει, ὅταν τις ἐpi’
ἄκρῳ γένηται τῷ νοητῷ; IV.8[31]1.1-11, cited 198 above.
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At this stage in his epistemological schema Plotinus begins to employ apophatic
formulations in earnest. This intellect is a ‘nous which is not nous’,889 which may
equally be described as a pre-noetic principle within the one itself.890 It has an intel-
lectual power when viewing its own contents, but when it contemplates that which
is beyond it, its mode of cognition is described as a seeing891 or even a touching892
rather than as noêsis. Plotinus also uses words denoting cognition of sorts, but for-
eign to the Platonist tradition,893 again, one assumes, seeking ways to describe an ap-
prehension which is not an apprehension by avoiding the usual terms for describing
cognitions. Nous, to apprehend the one, must cease to be nous.894
So it hastened toward it [sc. the one] not as nous, but as a vision
not yet seeing, but returned having something which it itself made
multiple. Thus it longed for one thing, having some indeterminate
image [of it] in itself, but left having something else, which it had
made many in itself. For it has an impression of the sight [which
it saw]; otherwise it would not have made it possible for it to arise
within itself. But this became many from one, and, knowing it, it
saw itself, and then became a seeing vision. It is already nous, when
it possesses this, and possesses it as nous; but before it was only a
longing and a formless vision. So this nous cast its apprehension
toward it, and grasping it, became nous, perpetually lacking [it] and
becoming nous and being and noêsis, when it intelligised; for before
this there was no noêsis, since it had no noêton, nor was there nous, it
having not yet engaged in noêsis. 895
There is thus in Plotinus, as in the Chaldæan Oracles, a faculty of nous which tran-
scends the limits of noêsis. But nous’ apprehension of the one is expressed indeter-
minately: either it reaches its goal and ceases to be intellect, or it remains intellect
and attains only an interiorised, noetic reflection of its goal; its location, as within
889V.5[32]8.22-23.
890VI.8[39]18.21-22.
891I.6[1]7.9; VI.9[9]7.20, 9.56; V.8[31]11.2; V.5[32]8.10-12; VI.7[38]34.13, 36.20.
892Many passages describe a ‘touching’ or contact with the one (e.g. VI.9[9]4.27, 7.4, 9.55, 11.24;
V.6[24]6.21-35; VI.7[38]39.15-19; VI.8[39]11.10-13; V.3[49]10.41-4, 17.25-34). See Trouillard 1961, 434;
Sorabji 1982, 312; Hoffmann 1997, 357-60.
893E.g. VI.7[38]35.19-23: Καὶ τὸν νοῦν τοίνυν τὴν μὲν ἔχειν δύναμιν εἰς τὸ νοεῖν, ᾗ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ βλέpiει, τὴν
δέ, ᾗ τὰ ἐpiέκεινα αὐτοῦ ἐpiιβολῇ τινι καὶ piαραδοχῇ, καθ’ ἣν καὶ piρότερον ἑώρα μόνον καὶ ὁρῶν ὕστερον
καὶ νοῦν ἔσχε καὶ ἕν ἐστι.; cf. III.8[51]9.21: ἐpiιβολῇ ἀθρόᾳ. ᾿Εpiιβολή and piαραδοχή are both outside the
standard lexicon of Platonist terms for cognition.
894VI.7[38]35; III.8[51]9, 32.
895V.3[49]11.4-16. I accept the reading ἐνδεόμενος, ‘lacking’, for the corrupt ἐνδιάμενος of the MSS;
see note ad loc. H-S 1.
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the highest point of nous or within the one itself, is also indeterminate. It may thus
be said that Plotinus both does and does not posit a noetic faculty which can attain
to the highest reality. Such a faculty exists at the highest point of nous, and therefore
within the soul which has become unified or identified with nous, but in the moment
of apprehension the apprehender (nous or the soul) ceases to be itself. This is the
famous Plotinian unio mystica, to which we now turn.
Direct (Un)Knowing. In Chapter Two we examined Porphyry’s claim that Ploti-
nus, among his many accomplishments, had attained to a state of union with the god
‘with neither shape nor any form, established above nous and all the noetic world’;
moreover, that he had attained to this goal ‘not potentially, but in ineffable reali-
ty.’896 Porphyry’s description is echoed by many passages in the Enneads; Plotinus
describes, sometimes in considerable detail, a state entered into by the philosopher
who has attained to the highest summit of nous. This philosopher, who has already
ceased to be his individual self and become divinised through identity with nous,
then enters yet another transformative state, one which simply cannot be described
in language. Scholars have argued about whether this state should be considered
an annihilation of the self,897 or whether it should rather be seen as a union of the
philosopher with the supreme principle.898 In fact, one might term this state of con-
tact with the one as annihilation or union with equal felicity of expression: at this
state of reality, Plotinus folds his language back on itself with a dynamic apophatic
intensity which leaves no doubt that what he is attempting to describe is meant to
be indescribable. It is at any rate certain that this state is not any kind of knowing,
although it stands at the summit of the chain of modes of knowing: ‘The difficulty
becomes great, because our awareness of it (ἡ σύνεσις ἐκείνου) is neither through noê-
sis nor through epistêmê, as with other objects of intellection, but through a presence
(piαρουσίαν) greater than epistêmê.’899
896Porph. Plot. 23, cited 53 above.
897E.g. Mazur 2010, 50-52, who sees this state of annihilation as being followed paradoxically by a
state of union (see ibid. 58-69).
898E.g. Rist 1967b.
899VI.9[9]4.1-3.
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Despite the philosophic reasons which lead Plotinus to posit such a union - con-
tained in the whole metaphysical and epistemological framework which he inherited
and developed from the Platonist tradition - there is nothing in Plato or in Middle
Platonism remotely like his descriptions of the moment of contact with the supreme
principle.900 Certain Platonic passages are clear sources of inspiration for Plotinus
- the ‘mysteries of Diotima’ from the Symposium is an essential source for Plotinus’
account of the ascent, as are passages from the Parmenides and Republic - but there is
nothing like Plotinus’ descriptions in Plato. From the evidence presented in the pre-
ceding chapter it will be clear that Plotinus’ approach to the ineffability of the tran-
scendent first principle has much stronger parallels with earlier Platonising religious
materials than with the Platonist tradition sensu stricto; unsurprisingly, then, we find
strong parallels with his account of contact with the one in Platonising Gnostic texts,
and perhaps in the Hermetica.901 What are we to make of this?
As discussed in Chapter One, the concepts ‘mysticism’ and ‘mystical experience’
are of limited help here. If there is anything which can be certainly said about this
ineffable state of being (or non-being), we must find it in Plotinus’ texts, even if all
that we find are inadequate words pointing at something beyond their power to
express. We may begin, then by looking at what Plotinus definitely tells us about the
encounter with the one.
We have seen that the highest level of nous ceases to be nous upon contacting
the one. We have also seen that the soul, in pursuing the noetic ascent, ceases to be
soul and becomes nous. The nous in question, then, which ceases to be itself and be-
comes something unnamed which sees, approaches, or touches the one, may well be
900With regard to Middle Platonism, this lack of evidence might of course be an accident of textual
survival. Numenius and Celsus, in particular, would seem to be good candidates for such an ap-
proach to the final ontological/epistemological state, to judge from the direct modes of unknowing
which we know that they posited. Numenius’ probable engagement with the Chaldæan Oracles (see
114 above), too, would add likelihood to such a speculation, but speculation it must remain barring
new evidence.
901Zeke Mazur has recently put forward detailed arguments that the source of Plotinus’ account
of the ascent toward and union with the one is in fact Sethian Gnosticism (Mazur 2010). Mazur’s
arguments are perhaps not provable, but at least demonstrate beyond any doubt that there were
connections between Plotinus’ thought and that of the Sethian Gnostics.
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the philosopher himself, having undergone radical transformations during the as-
cent toward the first principle. These successive transformations are the framework
within which to understand the idea that the soul ‘becomes one’ with the good. The
human self will have ceased to be itself before it attains to the one. It will, in some
passages, have undergone a process of radical simplification or auto-unification, so
that it is like the one enough somehow to become present to it,902 while in other pas-
sages it will have become ‘silent’ like the one, and thus able to attain to it.903 This
said, the philosopher will find himself returned to the body after this timeless mo-
ment of transformation, which, from the perspective of time and space, is perceived
as of brief duration.904
We have seen that Plotinus, at the level of nous, begins to employ apophatic lan-
guage and paradox. His descriptions of the direct unknowing of the one take para-
dox and self-contradiction much further, as discussed in the following chapter. In
addition, we have seen straightforward statements of the one’s ineffability, and ref-
erences to the fact that the experience of the one cannot be spoken. While Plotinus’
accounts of the noetic world, or of noêsis, contain self-contradictions at the level of
dianoia - that is, sequential consciousness cannot comprehend the paradoxical nature
of noêsis - contact with the one is formally stated not only to be unsayable, but un-
graspable by nous. We recall that the true meaning of the initiatory secret in the mys-
teries, as interpreted by Plotinus, is that the nature of the one cannot be spoken.905
The vision of the one is attended by speechlessness and an utter lack of thought:
‘What, then, could anyone say there, having ascended toward that which is above
nous and looking at it?’906
The state of contact with the one is perhaps best described as an act of presence. As
the preceding sections will have made clear, different parts of the Plotinian universe
are potentially present to each other; it is the contemplation and attention which
902E.g. VI.9[9]4.22-8. This process of stripping away multiplicity is described in the next chapter as
‘practical aphairesis’.
903I.3[20]4.15-16.
904VI.9[9]9.60-10.2; V.5[32]7.35; VI.7[38]34.13, 36.18; V.3[49]17.29. See Hadot 1986b, 245.
905Cited 14 above.
906VI.8[39]9.34-5.
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act to focus a given reality from the potential state of δύναμις into the actualised
state of ἐνεργεία. The vision of the one comes about not through knowledge or noê-
sis, but ‘according to a presence greater than knowledge’ (κατὰ piαρουσίαν ἐpiιστήμης
κρείττονα).907
This act of presence to the transcendent is the primary locus of Plotinian written
silence. Plotinus, as we have seen, is reluctant to call the one ‘the one’; it is ‘the good’
only in a certain sense. He is prone to refer to it by negative names: ‘something which
is not nous’, ‘that which is beyond being’, or more simply ‘that which is beyond’, or
‘something other’.908 Such an ineffable reality, left alone, would present much the
same literary dynamic as the negative passages we have surveyed in the Middle
Platonists. But Plotinus insists on bringing this unspeakable, indeterminate reality
into the realm of the phenomenological. The presence to the one is, in fact, something
which he claims for himself, as an event in his spiritual life. It is a kind of possession,
something that the philosopher attains to and has.
The One’s Own Modes of Knowing. Plotinus also sometimes attributes a kind of
consciousness to the one itself:909 while it does not think or engage in intellec-
tion, he sometimes describes it as variously possessing ἐγρήγορσις καὶ ὑpiερνόησις,910
κατανόησις,911 and occasionally other quasi-cognitive attributes.912 He has philo-
sophic reasons for doing so which go beyond the scope of this thesis. But this quasi-
consciousness of the one is a problem with great relevance for philosophic silence.
As the following chapter will argue, the significance of these forms of conscious-
ness which are not forms of consciousness lies in the Plotinian attempt to create
indeterminacy surrounding the one and its relationship to beings - the one both has
consciousness and does not have consciousness.
907VI.9[9]4.1 ff. The work of Frederic Schroeder has emphasised the importance of presence in
Plotinus: see particularly Schroeder 1985 and 1987.
908E.g. II.9[33]13.32-3; VI.8[39]9.34-5.
909See Rist 1967b, 36-52; Schroeder 1987, 691.
910VI.8[39]16.32. Cf ibid. 24; the one has a self-directed νεῦσις.
911IV.7[2]12.9. See VI.8[39]16.1-39, a highly apophatic passage which makes it clear that the affir-
mation of this type of ‘consciousness’ to the one is to be taken as indeterminate. Cf. Sells 1994,
25.
912Cf. VI.7[38]39.1-4: self-directed ἐpiιβολή; V.3[49]13.6-9; V.4[7]2.15.
Chapter Seven: The Poetics of Transcendence in Plotinus
To keep silent does not mean to be dumb. . . .[K]eeping silent authen-
tically is possible only in genuine discoursing.913
Returning to the question of philosophic writing posed at the outset of this thesis,
we are now in a better position to give answers as to what Plotinus is doing in the
Enneads, given his understanding of the limits of discursivity and modes of knowing.
Having examined these limits in a general way, we are in a position to examine them
in practice in Plotinus’ philosophy; this chapter will concentrate on close reading of
several main passages, pulling out various elements of written silence and transcen-
dence. It consists of three sections: the first explores Plotinus’ negative methodolo-
gies; the second explores his paradoxical explorations of the positive side of lan-
guage with regard to the ineffable; the third and final section discusses the overarch-
ing state of indeterminacy which Plotinus’ positive and negative approaches to the
highest reality create when read as a single discourse.
The picture which emerges is, on the one hand, a philosophical deployment of
indeterminacy: Plotinian negative methodologies, especially in combination with
qualified and paradoxical positive methodologies, can only be called ‘indetermina-
tions’. They do not tell us what the one is, or how the different levels of reality relate
to each other; instead, they inspire us to cease to imagine that the one is something,
or that the relations between the hypostases are fully explicable through discourse.
They eliminate the determined bounds of thoughts, leaving in their place τὸ ἄpiειρον,
‘unboundedness’.
On the other hand, these methods are shot through with rhetorics and tropes of
written silence, especially invocations of the mysteries and other religious tropes. In
913Heidegger 1962, 208.
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the context of the well-established tradition of Platonist philosophic silence, the re-
minder that the one is ineffable should be considered in part as an example of written
silence - the writing of the self-hiding secret. They also contain elements of what can
only be called ‘philosophic religion’; Plotinus, in a few passages, refers to a form of
silent prayer directed to nous, and even to the one itself. The religious element in his
evocations of the unsaid and unsayable cannot be reduced to metaphor or stylistic
window-dressing for ‘serious philosophic concerns’; in the Plotinian universe, prac-
tical contact with higher realities and the literal divinisation of the soul is the highest
philosophic concern.
The manifestations of philosophic silence deployed by Plotinus often take the
form of extended literary techniques; as his writing style often flows along a series
of problems and investigates different ways to approach them, reflecting the dis-
cussions from which the Enneads were in part drawn,914 isolated citations rarely do
justice to what he is doing in a literary sense. With a view to appreciating Plotinian
philosophic silence in its ‘natural environment’, I quote an exemplary passage deal-
ing with the means of approaching the first principle in extenso, to which the present
chapter will refer back in several contexts, and in juxtaposition to other passages
from the Enneads. The passage is very dense, and rewards repeated scrutiny and
close reading. All references to this passage throughout this chapter will simply be
to line numbers.
The passage is Section 6 from Treatise 32, That the Noêta are not Outside of Nous,
and on the Good. In the lead-up to our passage, Plotinus has been discussing the
presence and absence of the one vis à vis the realm of being, calling being itself a
trace (ἴχνος) of the one, and etymologising εἶναι and its cognates as derived from
ἕν.915 He then departs on a passage of intense unsaying:
But let these [etymologies] be as they may. Since the being (οὐσίας)
which arises is Form - for one would not call it anything else which
arises from [that source; sc. the one] - and not a Form of something,
but of everything, so as not to leave anything outside it, then that
914See n. 717.
915V.5[32]5.12 ad fin.
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[sc. the one] must necessarily be formless. But if it is formless, it is
not being; for being must be something, and this something must be
definite, but [the one] cannot be taken as such. For then it would not
be a principle, but only that which you have said it is. So if all things
are within coming-to-be (τῷ γενομένῳ), which of them will you say it
is? Since it is none of these things, one would say it is beyond them.
These are beings, and being itself; thus, it is beyond being (ἐpiέκεινα
ἄρα ὄντος). But this phrase ‘beyond being’ does not determine it (οὐ
τόδε λέγει), for it is not a statement. It does not say a name for it, but
states only that it is ‘not that’. But in so doing, it does not compre-
hend the one at all; for it would be absurd to seek to comprehend
that boundless nature. Anyone wishing to do so has utterly left off
following its trace (ἴχνος), even for a short distance. But, just as one
wishing to see the noetic nature who has nothing of sensory percep-
tion will see that which is beyond the sensory, so he who wishes to
see that which is beyond the noetic will only see when he has let
go of all that which is noetic. He learns that it is [i.e., that the one
‘exists’] through this [sc. nous], but he learns in what way it is by
letting this go. But this ‘in what way’ should be taken as signifying
‘not in what way’ (τὸ δὲ οἷον σημαίνοι ἃν τὸ οὐχ οἷον); for there is no
‘in what way’ where there is no ‘what’. But we, in our birth-pangs,
are at a loss for what to say, and we speak about the ineffable (piερὶ
οὐ ῥητοῦ), and we name it, wishing to signify it to ourselves as well
as we can. And perhaps even the name ‘one’ is a denial of multiplic-
ity. This is why the Pythagoreans signified esoterically (συμβολικῶς
piρὸς ἀλλήλους) that ‘Apollo’ was a denial of multiplicity.916 But if
‘the one’, both the name and the [reality] that the name clarifies (τό
τε ὄνομα τό τε δηλούμενον), is [taken as] a positive proposition, then
it would be less clear than if no name had been applied to it. Per-
haps it was so applied so that that seeker, beginning from this point,
which signifies total simplicity, would finally negate this as well. It
was posited as well and fairly as possible by the one who posited it,
but it is not worthy even as a means of clarifying that nature, which
cannot be heard, nor understood by one who hears, but, if at all, by
one who sees. But if the one who sees seeks to look upon a form, he
will not know this.917
Negative Methods in Plotinus
Dean Inge, in his study of Plotinus, speculated that if Plotinus had known of a
mathematical concept for ‘zero’ he might have termed the one ‘nothing’.918 In fact,
he does so, calling it οὐδὲ ἕν, ‘no thing’,919 and, as we have just read in Treatise 32 (l.
916See 69 above.
917V.5[32]6.
918Inge 1923, 107-8.
919V.2[11]1.1.
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9), οὐδὲν τουτῶν, ‘none of these [existing] things’.920 The previous chapter discussed
Plotinus’ rule that predicates cannot be applied to the one, as well as the fact that
Plotinus often breaks this rule, trespassing into the territory which he himself places
beyond discourse. The present section discusses one way in which Plotinus indicates
that this may be permissible: through negations, such as calling it ‘nothing’.
The negative method in Plotinus has been analysed particularly well in a series
of articles by Wolfson.921 He points out, firstly, that the Aristotelean theoretical dis-
tinction between negation and privation (discussed 165 above) applies in Plotinus,
and so Plotinus’ negative descriptions of the one should not be seen as predicates,922
an approach we have seen formulated by Alcinoüs.
Wolfson makes further observations which may be applied with profit to our pas-
sage from Treatise 32. He notes that Plotinus’ negative method should not be associ-
ated solely with grammatically negative statements; not all Plotinian negations need
contain the word ‘not’. Positive predicates can be used with a negative meaning - e.g.
Plotinus’ use of the term ‘one’ as a denial of multiplicity, rather than as an affirmation
of any kind (ll. 26-7). Negation can also be expressed by affirmative propositions us-
ing adjectives with a built-in negative meaning - e.g. the alpha-privative adjectives,
such as ἀνείδεον, ‘formless’.923 Elative statements may also be negations. ‘Beyond
being’, as Plotinus understands it, is a negation, denying to the one any share in the
ontic realm, but not therefore determining it in another way: ‘This phrase “beyond
being” does not determine it, for it is not a statement. It does not say a name for it,
but states only that it is “not that”’ (ll. 11-13). The ‘hyper-’ adjectives also function
in this way elsewhere in Plotinus: to say that the one is ὑpiέρκαλον certainly does not
920At VI.9[9]5.31 Plotinus says of the one ᾧ ὄνομα μὲν κατὰ ἀλήθειαν οὐδὲν piροσῆκον, εἴpiερ δὲ δεῖ
ὀνομάσαι, κοινῶς ἂν λεχθὲν piροσηκόντως ἕν, a phrase which Armstrong is probably right to translate as
that ‘which in truth has no fitting name, but if we must give it a name, “one” would be an appropriate
ordinary way of speaking of it.’ This passage could, however, be translated as ‘that to which the name
“nothing” is truly fitting, but if we must etc.’
921Wolfson 1952 & 1957.
922Plotinus seems to show specific knowledge of this distinction at VI.3[44]19; VI.7[38]36. See Mortley
1975, 373-4.
923Plotinus elsewhere employs a range of alpha-privative adjectives to describe the one, such as
ἄμορφον and ἀνείδεον (VI.7[38]17.40), ἀμέριστος (VI.9[9]5.38-41), ἀνενδεής (VI.9[9]6.24-6), and many
others.
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mean that it is ‘extremely beautiful’, but rather, ‘beyond beauty’.924 Often, as well,
a Plotinian comparison which seems positive in sense turns out to have a negative
force; e.g., the one is like the sun, but only in that it is not seen by means of another
entity, but by its own ‘light’, which is not light at all.925
Plotinus makes self-reflexive statements as to the effectiveness of negative deter-
minations of the one beyond being, and concludes that they remain at the level of
dianoia; that is, that may tell us something about the one - namely, what it is not - but
they cannot express the one itself.926 This distinction should be understood in the
light of the identity theory of truth; non-discursive truths, by way of contrast with
negative statements about the one, are predicates in the truest possible sense. To
a nominalist understanding of language, all predicates will fall short of expressing
things in themselves; according to a Plotinian realist perspective, by contrast, certain
predicates are adequate and accurate; indeed, they express things in themselves, and
constitute a completely ‘open’ form of knowledge. But certain others (predications
applied to that which is beyond being) cannot, by definition, capture their referent,
which remains perpetually hidden.
Α᾿piόφασις. This thesis began with some discussion of apophatic language - the
use of multiple negations or contradictions resulting in non-predication. I mentioned
that my definition of this term is more broad than some found in scholarly literature;
in the post-Plotinian Platonists, as well as in the Christian theological tradition, the
apophatic method takes on a formalism which it does not yet have in Plotinus.927
Apophasis, as I understand it, does not necessarily involve negations in the sense
of negative statements, but it will always involve negations in the Aristotelean sense
outlined in Chapter Five; its defining feature as a method is that it uses multiple
statements which, taken individually might even be conventional predicates, but
924VI.7[38]33.19-20. Cf. I.8[51]2. These observations are expanded from Wolfson 1957, 146. On
Plotinus’ use of superlatives and ‘hyper-’ adjectives to describe the one, see Rist 1964b, 69-70.
925V.3[49]17.38, cited 234 below. Cf. e.g. VI.7[38]35.8-20; III.8[51]10.4-5. This dynamic of ‘negative
comparison’ noted by Schroeder 1996, 337.
926See e.g. Rist 1964b, 87 n. 129; Hadot 1986b, 247, and citations at 11 above.
927See 30 above. On apophasis in Plotinus, see Wolfson 1952, 1957; Armstrong 1967, 14-28; Mortley
1975; Sells 1994, 14-33.
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when taken together create a situation of non-predication. Thus, statements such
as ‘the one is neither this nor that’, or ‘the one is neither moved nor at rest’928 are
examples of the basic ‘apophatic unit’; they posit something, then contradict it, cre-
ating a situation of indeterminacy rather than of predication.929 Passages such as our
exemplary quotation from Treatise 32, however, are an extended, and more subtle,
criss-crossing kind of apophasis, applying self-negation to the act of speech itself.
Analysing a section of the passage, its propositions can be set out as follows:
(1) The phrase “beyond being” does not determine the one since it is not a
statement. It does not name the one (ll. 11-13).
(2) Thus, it does not comprehend the one, which cannot be comprehended (ll.
13-15).
(3) Anyone seeking to comprehend the one has strayed from the path which
leads to the one - has ‘lost its traces’ (ll. 15-17).
(4) Someone seeking to see the one must eliminate the noetic (ll. 17-21).
(5) He learns from nous that the one exists, but he learns ‘in what way’ it exists
by letting go of nous; i.e., from the one itself (ll. 21-22).
(6) This phrase ‘in what way’, however, should be understood as meaning ‘not
in what way’ (τὸ δὲ οἷον σημαίνοι ἃν τὸ οὐχ οἷον), since the one is not a ‘what’,
i.e., is no thing (ll. 22-23).
(7) The philosophic discourse has fallen into aporia, since it is attempting to dis-
cuss the ineffable, and has resorted to naming the one in order to signify it
to ourselves as well as possible (ll. 24-26).
(8) Perhaps the name ‘one’ itself is merely a denial of multiplicity, which may be
useful as a basic starting point for a philosophic seeker, but the seeker will
eventually have to negate this name as well, since it cannot even clarify the
nature it seeks to describe (ll. 29-35).
Proposition 1 denies that ‘beyond being’ applies a name to the one; proposition 7,
928VI.9[9]3.47; ibid. 42-44. Cf. VI.9[9]6.48-9; V.6[24]6.31 ff.
929See 30 above.
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however, states that the discourse has named the one as well as possible, thus con-
tradicting proposition 1. We are left with a mode of writing that is neither a naming
nor not a naming. Proposition 5 indicates that the seeker learns ‘in what way’ the
one is, not from nous, but from the one itself; proposition 6 negates proposition 5,
using the grammatically adventurous construction τὸ δὲ οἷον σημαίνοι ἃν τὸ οὐχ οἷον.
The nature of the knowledge acquired beyond nous is thus left indeterminate; we
know only that it is not the knowledge attained through nous itself. The proffered
explanation, that it is knowledge of the οἷον of the one - its state or type of being, its
‘how’ as opposed to its ‘what’ - is no sooner given than it is taken away. Proposition
7 states that the discussion has attempted to clarify the one as much as possible - to
‘signify’ it; proposition 8 denies that the name ‘one’, even as a denial of multiplicity,
can clarify the one’s nature. Here Plotinus casts doubt even on the propriety of neg-
ative attributes, and even when applied as a mode of clarification insofar as possible.
He also indicates that even the attempt at clarification is counter-productive: ‘. . . It
would be absurd to seek to comprehend that boundless nature. Anyone wishing
to do so has utterly left off following its trace (ἴχνος), even for a short distance’ (ll.
14-17).
This passage presents itself as an attempt to give the best account possible of the
one, given the limitations of language and discursive thought, but it denies its own
ability to do this. Then again, if it is read as strictly applying the logic of negative lan-
guage, i.e. non-predicative statements, it indicates that these, too, are names (pred-
icates), and thus forbidden. The overall technique here may be profitably regarded
as subtle and refined form of apophatic discourse, in which Plotinus is unsaying not
only the one itself, but also the very linguistic strategies which he deploys in order
to give some account of the one.
My analysis of Plotinus’ discourse about the one is thus in a way more pessimistic
than that of certain scholars, whose accounts of Plotinus’ negative techniques take
Plotinus’ repeated statements that he wishes to give the best possible account of the
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one at face value.930 Close reading of Treatise 32, 6 shows that Plotinus unsays his
own saying in this regard; that he denies that he is giving such an account, even as
he gives it. We may, however, question whether Plotinus really intends anything as
straightforward as giving an account of the one.
The logical contradictions in the apophatic passage cited should be clear. It is
instructive to consider the parallels between the contradictions inherent in giving an
account which denies the possibility of that giving and other tropes of hiding and
revealing which we have seen in Platonist discourse, such as the trope of the ‘secret
revealed’, and the appeal to mystic silence. In all these types of statement there is an
unresolvable contradiction if the text is read looking for logical coherence. But, as
many examples cited in the course of this thesis have shown, acts of written silence
are not intended as logically coherent statements; they are rhetorical statements of
an absence. Structurally, then, Plotinian apophatic discourse can profitably be read
as a trope of philosophic silence more generally, in that it generates a kind of ‘secret
knowledge’, the nature of the one.
Discursive Α᾿φαίρεσις. A second negative methodology, used throughout the En-
neads, is the practice known as aphairesis, ‘removal’.931 It consists in eliminating
misconceptions about higher realities through ‘a process of mental abstraction’.932
In Treatise 33 Plotinus berates the Gnostics for despising the earthly existence, un-
aware as they are of the soul’s true excellence: ‘They ought to have removed it [i.e.
the bodily nature] in their thought (piεριέλοντας τῇ διανοίᾳ) and seen what remained, a
noetic sphere encompassing the Form of the cosmos’.933 Here, as often, aphairesis is
a process of discursive clarification, which often takes the form of extended passages
of removal of concepts, or of ambitious thought experiments.934
930E.g. Heiser 1991, 61; Bussanich 1996, 45. Wolfson 1952 and 1957 rightly anatomises the Aristote-
lean theory behind Plotinus’ use of negations, but fails to notice the passages where Plotinus denies
the adequacy of this methodology.
931See generally Whittaker 1969a; Hadot 1981, 188; Mortley 1986, II, 45-62.
932Whittaker 1969b, 123.
933II.9[33]17.4-6.
934Other examples include IV.7[2]10.30; VI.9[9]4.7–10, 4.33, 6.51–2, 7.17, 18–20, 9.50–52, 11.8–11;
III.8[30]9.32, 10.31; V.8[31]11.4, 11.11; V.5[32]7.31–32, 13; VI.8[39]19.4; V.3[49]9.1 ff., 17.38.
NEGATIVE METHODS IN PLOTINUS 233
In Treatise 38 Plotinus makes a self-reflexive reference to this method, contrasting
it to the practical achievement of contact with the one:
For the knowledge (γνῶσις) or touching of the one is the greatest
thing, and he [sc. Plato in R. 505a2] says that this is ‘the greatest
study’ (μάθημα), not calling the looking at it a ‘study’, but meaning
that we learn something about it beforehand. Comparisons and ab-
stractions and knowledge (ἀναλογίαι τε καὶ ἀφαιρέσεις τε καὶ γνώσεις)
of the things that come from it teach us, and are like steps upon the
way to it (ἀναβασμοί τινες), but purifications and virtues and adorn-
ments convey us toward it itself, [as do] progress through the noetic
world and establishment there and feasting on the things there.935
Aphairetic and other discursive methods are clearly contrasted with their practi-
cal counterparts in the practice of philosophy as a way of life, and it is these latter
which bring the aspirant to his goal; logical methods merely ‘teach us something
beforehand’.936 We may adduce the references in Treatise 32 to the knowledge of
the one which nous gives as contrasted with the knowledge-that-is-not-knowledge
of the one which is acquired by removing the noetic from the soul, and the vision of
the one which is gained by putting aside ‘hearing’ - that is, language and discourse
(ll. 35-6).
Practical Α᾿φαίρεσις. Aphairesis is also understood by Plotinus in quite a different
sense, precisely as this spiritual practice of freeing the soul from dianoia, and then
even of noêsis,937 in the movement toward the one. In this sense of the term, in which
context he usually employs the verbal form ἀφαιρέω, Plotinus means something very
different from the epistemological method described above, propounding instead a
method which should be described as both ontological and epistemological - indeed,
the very method which is contrasted, in the passage cited just above, with conceptual
aphairesis.938
935VI.7[38]36.3-10.
936Cf. Hadot 1986b, 247. The attentive reader will have noticed a completely improper use of the term
gnôsis in this passage, referring to knowing the one, followed by gnôsis in its normal Plotinian sense
(see 199 above). Plotinus’ use of cognitive terminology in this ‘improper’ way is discussed below.
937VI.7[38]34.3.
938Cf. Hadot 1981, 188: ‘un méthode. . . en quelque sorte transintellectuel’; Mazur 2010, 36: Aphairesis
‘. . . seems to involve both a cognitive aspect. . . and a corresponding ontological aspect - the dismissal
from one’s own self (the locus of mystical subjectivity) of any thought, any knowledge, and indeed
any mental activity whatsoever.’
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The classic description of this method occurs in Treatise 49, Modes of Knowledge
and the Transcendental.939 Passing beyond discursive descriptions, and even nous
itself, in approaching the one, the soul suddenly ‘takes light’ (φῶς λάβῃ),940 and
being enlightened, it has what it sought, and this is the true goal of
the soul, to touch that light and to see it through itself, not through
another light, but it itself, by which it also sees. For that by which
it is enlightened is that which it must see; for neither is the sun
[seen] by the light of another. So how does this happen? Take away
everything (ἄφελε piάντα)! 941
Here we have aphairesis as removal from the soul of everything that is not the one:
compare Treatise 32, where ‘he who wishes to see that which is beyond the noetic
will only see when he has let go of all that which is noetic’ (ll. 19-21). When we recall
that, at the level of nous, cognitive events are ontological realities, we see how this
method cannot be described simply as a process of clearing away ideas about the
one, unless “ideas” are understood in a strongly realist sense, as non-temporal states
of being. It is an ontological transformation of the soul into a simple form, whereby
it is able to see, touch, or otherwise contact the one because of the simplicity to which
it has attained.942
True simplicity for Plotinus is ineffable; for the soul to enter such a state means it
will have ceased to be anything which can be truly put into words. Plotinus uses a
number of strategies to indicate this self-yet-not-self state of being. I have translated
the final lines of our passage from Treatise 32 as ‘But if the one who sees seeks to
look upon a Form, he will not know this’ (ἀλλ΄ εἰ τὸ ὁρῶν εἶδος ζητεῖ βλέpiειν, οὐδὲ
τοῦτο εἴσεται.).943 My translation has tried to capture the indeterminacy of the Greek.
What is the ‘this’ which the seer will not know? It is unclear whether it is a Form
939Armstrong translates the title Περὶ τῶν γνωριστικῶν ὑpiοστασέων καὶ τοῦ ἐpiέκεινα as On the Knowing
Hypostases and that which is Beyond; I have preferred the translation of Oosthout 1991, as it emphasises
the phenomenological approach which characterises this treatise, approaching the hypostases rather
as modes of knowing than as ‘levels of being’. The Plotinian hypostasis is always both of these
things, and Plotinus’ approach depends on which function of hypostasis he is concerned with in a
given context.
940V.3[49]17.21-28.
941V.3[49]17.34-8.
942Cf. VI.9[9]8.32-6: the one is fully present to anything which contains nothing of otherness. Cf.
Mazur 2010, 47-50.
943Ll. 36-7.
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(i.e., ‘if the seer tries to look at a form, he will not know even that’, as Armstrong)
or the one itself (i.e., in seeking to see a something with Form, the soul will miss the
formless one). The ambiguity serves to indicate the lack of definite differentiation at
this level of reality, where total simplicity has stripped away everything, so there is
nothing for an analytic account to describe.
This process, which I call ‘practical aphairesis’ in distinction to the conceptual
aphairesis described above, does not inhabit the text in the same way that discursive
formulations do. It is a methodology that the Enneads recommend, but we do not
find the practice itself in the Enneads, only narrative descriptions thereof. We have
seen a similar extra-textual referencing in certain Middle Platonist examples of the
via eminentiæ (see 171 above), but Plotinus’ approach differs from his predecessors’ in
two main ways. Firstly, it orients the narrative descriptions more forcefully beyond
the text. Since Plotinus makes it clear that this process of stripping away, in its higher
levels, takes place in nous, and even involves the final shedding of noêsis itself, it is
thus far beyond any accurate discursive description; indeed, it cannot be said to
be a process except from the time-bound perspective of the embodied soul. The
educational function of discursive aphairesis is often described in terms of the first
steps of this journey, as in Treatise 38, cited page 233 above, or Treatise 32, where
the seeker uses the name “the one” as a starting point, which he then negates in
pursuit of the reality itself (ll. 31 ad fin.). Plotinus’ written passages of abstraction
may be seen as a basic or propaedeutic phase of the practical method, but its later
stages leave the text behind. A second difference between Plotinus’ descriptions
of practical aphairesis and earlier examples of via eminentiæ is the emphasis which
he places on the act of radical simplification or ‘stripping away’ of attributes. He
essentially makes a negative method out of what had been, in Plato and Middle
Platonism, primarily an elative method.944
944Mortley 1975, 373 follows Whittaker 1969b, 123 ff. in denying that Plotinian aphairesis is a negative
method. Two problems with this analysis are 1) that both authors fail to distinguish between discur-
sive and practical aphairesis, and thus miss the radical distinction which Plotinus draws between the
two, and 2) that discursive aphairesis certainly makes no positive statements about the one, and its
overall aim is to remove concepts, a negative procedure, while practical aphairesis is not a discursive
methodology at all, so cannot be said to be negative or positive. However, Plotinus’ descriptions of
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Plotinus often refers to this process of removal in terms drawing on the mysteries:
it is a katharsis,945 it is like the ritual stripping off of clothing before initiation,946
and it leads to one becoming a θεατής with the place of the cultic θέαμα947 taken by
nous948 or by the one itself.949 Plotinus is by no means original in equating the higher
reaches of Platonist achievement with initiation, as Chapter Three has shown. But
the sacralisation of this process in much of his writing is striking.
Both the invocation of the mysteries and the evocation of an extra-textual, in-
effable encounter with the one are acts of hiding and revealing. Plotinus is in fact
putting himself in the position of the initiate,950 and his references to this act of see-
ing partakes of the same dynamics of exclusion as the invocation of initiated silence
by the initiand. Treatise 1, On Beauty, presents a good representative example of
this blending of religious and philosophic concerns. Having evoked a piαλαιὸς λόγος
which states that the virtues are purifications, he cites as confirmation the esoteric
message of the mystery rituals (αἱ τελεταὶ ὀρθῶς αἰνίττονται), which state that the un-
purified man will lie in the muck upon his arrival in Hades.951 Having thus set the
tone, Plotinus enters into a discourse blending concerns of an ontologised aesthetics
in which beauty is reality (ll. 21-22) and in which the one itself is called ‘beauty’ (τὴν
καλλονήν, l. 26). Plotinus then shifts to a phenomenological register:
So our task is to ascend again to the good, toward which every soul
is reaching. And anyone who has seen it knows what I mean by
‘beautiful’.952
practical aphairesis share the same negative methodologies as his discursive aphairetic passages, as
the examples cited above show: the vision of the one is not attained through discursive thought or
nous.
945I.6[1]7.6; I.2[19]19.4. Indeed, the katharsis referred to in the citation from Treatise 38 above as a
practical technique contrasted with logical methods may include this conception of aphairesis in its
sphere of meanings.
946I.6[1]7.5-8.
947On these terms, see 58 above.
948E.g. IV.3.1.12.
949VI.7[38]36.11; VI.9.10.20, 11.20. See Pépin 1984, 30, n. 56, who gives parallels from Iamblichus,
Proclus, and Pseudo-Dionysius.
950I.6[1]7.2-3.
951I.6[1]6.1-5.
952Ibid. 7.1-3. Cf. VI.9[9]4.17-20: ‘And if someone has not come to the θέαμα, then his soul would
have no understanding of the glory there. . . .’
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The phrase ‘anyone who has seen it knows what I mean’ seems to echo a stock phrase
used to evoke the secret of the mysteries in potentially uninitiated company.953 Plot-
inus is not revealing the nature of the encounter with the one, but rather employing
the mystery trope of philosophic silence, fully embedded within the ‘double bind of
secrecy’:954 he holds out the beauty of the vision of the one to the reader, but the
reader is excluded from it, unless, that is, he has already experienced it, in which
case he has no need of Plotinus’ description.
‘Speaking Improperly’: Kataphatic Descriptions of the One
For all that Plotinus insists, repeatedly, that only negations may be posited of the
one, he is also willing to make statements about the one which are clearly predica-
tive. This he does with the overarching reservation: ‘But if it is necessary to bring in
these appellations for that which we are seeking, let it again be said that this is not
speaking properly (οὐκ ὀρθῶς εἴρηται)’.955
Modes of ‘Improper’ Speech in Plotinus. It is often conjectured that Plotinus’
kataphatic statements about the one, which are relatively common in the earlier trea-
tises, gave way to a more thoroughgoing application of negativity in Plotinus’ later
work. But the late Treatise 39, On the Volition and Will of the One, is a tour de force
of kataphatic descriptions of the one;956 we must conclude that seemingly positive
descriptions of the one played a role in Plotinus’ methodology of exposition even in
his later work.957
The treatise begins with an initial essay on the problem of free will, and Plotinus
then introduces a long treatment of the one.958 An apophatic passage follows, de-
scribing the one as the source of all good things, and also as not their source (quoted
p. 10 at the outset of this thesis). This passage falls within a methodological excursus
953See Athanassiadi 2006, 37, n. 17. Cf. Paus. I 37, 4.
954See 36.
955VI.8[39]13.1-3. See n. 723 above.
956See Heiser 1991, 62 ff.; Bussanich 1988, 21 ff.
957Cf. Bussanich 1988, 21.
958Beginning from VI.8[39]8 and continuing until 13.
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which severely attacks the ability of discourse to express the one. Our speech about
the one takes place through the importation of lesser concepts drawing on lesser
beings, and
due to the impossibility of saying what is appropriate to it, we say
these things. Nevertheless, not only can we find nothing to say in ac-
cordance with it (κατ΄ αὐτοῦ), but neither [can we even say] anything
about (piερὶ αὐτοῦ) it, properly speaking.959
Plotinus then makes one of his strongest statements of ineffability, combining apopha-
sis and aphairesis:
It is necessary to say that it is in relation to absolutely nothing (δεῖ δὲ
ὅλως piρὸς οὑδὲν αὐτὸν λέγειν). For it is what it is before them; then
we take away even the ‘it is’ (ἐpiεὶ καὶ τὸ ἔστιν ἀφαιροῦμεν), so as to
[remove] all relations whatever with beings.960
An aphairetic passage follows, where Plotinus removes various concepts from the
field of terminology appropriate to the one. We cannot say ‘as it is by nature’ (ὡς
piέφυκεν)’, since φύσις is a temporal concept, nor ‘it is not from itself’ (οὐ piαρ΄ αὐτῆς
εἶναι), since we have already taken away the verb ‘to be’, nor that ‘it came about’
(συνέβη), which implies an action separate from the essence of the thing which came
about, and thus multiplicity.961 This passage is especially striking, in that it occurs
in the most kataphatic of the later writings; these statements devoted to denying
the possibility of saying anything about the one - ‘neither [can we even say] any-
thing about (piερὶ αὐτοῦ) it, properly speaking’ - are presented in a context full of rich
characterisations of the one, often taking a theological tone in its treatment.962
The reader of Treatise 39 is struck by the widespread use of the equivocating ad-
verbial οἷον, used to indicate that Plotinus is making statements which approximate,
959VI.8[39]8.2-6.
960Ibid. 12-15.
961Ibid. ad fin.
962Cf. Armstrong 2003, VI, 223.
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or give a notion of the nature of what he is attempting to discuss.963 Heiser has not-
ed that the adverbial οἷον normally serves to signal an analogy of some kind, and
that this is strictly impossible in the case of the one, which is incommensurate with
any comparandum;964 nevertheless, Plotinus does sometimes use it in this analogical
sense, though always in a qualified way.965 Heiser’s observation, however, is correct,
if we take Plotinus’ use of οἷον with predicates as a way of speaking ‘improperly’; any
such analogy can be only a ‘quasi-analogy’.
These constructions serve to indicate precisely that Plotinus is speaking improp-
erly. The instances of οἷον in Treatise 39 are especially rigorous in this regard, and
avoid even ‘quasi-analogy’, serving rather to ‘undetermine’ the object of discussion.
The one has ‘quasi-hypostasis’, which is its ‘quasi-action’, quasi-attributes which
Plotinus immediately qualifies with a series of denials that leave the reader wonder-
ing how these quasi-attributes could be said to mean anything at all.966 As Plotinus
says in the midst of a particularly intensive deployment of οἷον, ‘It is necessary to go
along with the names if we are to say anything about it, using them perforce for the
sake of elucidation, although we do not allow them speaking accurately; let the οἷον
be understood in every case.’967 Even when he does not write οἷον, he means οἷον.
As Heiser argues, Plotinus uses οἷον to indicate that he is not applying predi-
cates, but ‘quasi-acts’, to the one.968 By ‘quasi-acts’, however, we must understand
that what Plotinus is doing is steering the reader’s understanding in a certain di-
rection, whilst simultaneously refusing to determine the nature of the goal. ‘Elative
963Οἷον appears more than seventy times in the treatise, well above the average, even taking into
account the great length of the work; it occurs approximately the same number of times in Treatise 38,
the previous work chronologically, perhaps indicating that Plotinus was experimenting with pushing
the limits of equivocal language with regard to the one at this period of his working life.
964Heiser 1991, 63.
965E.g. III.8[51]10.4-5, an example of the ‘negative comparison’ described 229 above.
966VI.8[39]7.47: ἡ οἷον ὑpiόστασις αὐτοῦ ἡ οἷον ἐνέργεια, negated ad fin.
967VI.8[39]13.47-50.
968Heiser 1991, 65-6, following the terminological usage of Deck 1967. It has been argued that οἷον
has a specific technical force, and is not in fact equivocal in Plotinus (Anton 1977, 266-267), but this
argument has not met with any success; both the uses of οἷον in the context of the one, and Plotinus’
approach to predication more generally make it difficult to maintain. Anton objects to the use of
‘quasi’ when translating Plotinian attributes of the one, arguing essentially that these attributes are
elative; i.e., he would substitute ‘hyper-’ for ‘quasi-’. The point, though useful, may be argued over-
strenuously.
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indeterminism’ is perhaps the best way of describing Plotinus’ method here. In the
last chapter we discussed a mode of cognition which can only be called a mode of
cognition because of its position at the summit of a chain of lower modes - a mode
of direct unknowing, which, in Treatise 39, Plotinus attributes to the one itself under
the name of hypernoêsis.969 All the quasi-acts and attributes which Plotinus applies
to the one in Treatise 39 may be understood as occupying the supreme position in
other chains of reality, a supreme, yet transcending, position which he occasionally
indicates through the use of constructions with ὑpiερ- (ὑpiέρκαλος, ὑpiεράγαθος, ὑpiερόν-
τως),970 but more often indicates through alternating predications and negations, or
the use of οἷον.971
Verbs of Incomplete Communication. Plotinus uses a number of verbs when
speaking of the one which I will term ‘verbs of incomplete communication’. The one
cannot be said (λέγειν), but it may be ‘intimated’ (σημαίνειν) or ‘clarified’ (δηλοῦν). We
have seen both of these in Treatise 32 (ll. 23, 25, 35; cf. 32, σημαντικόν), where I have
translated σημαίνειν as ‘signify’ and δηλοῦν as ‘clarify’. We may compare a passage
from Treatise 49:
Therefore it is truly ineffable (ἄρρητον τῇ ἀληθείᾳ). For whatever you
say, you say something. But ‘beyond all things and beyond the most
august nous’ is the only true [statement] of all the things we can say
about it, there being no name for it. But [we should instead say]
that it is neither one of the totality of things that exist, nor is it its
name - that we can say nothing of it. But insofar as it is possible for
us, we try to indicate something about it (σημαίνειν ἐpiιχειροῦμεν piερὶ
αὐτοῦ).972
Plotinus often uses these verbs to indicate the kind of necessarily incomplete account
of the one which he wishes to give: barred from speaking its nature, we can say
969VI.8[39]16.32.
970VI.9[9]6.40; VI.8[39]14.42; I.8[51]2.8.
971This interpretation is in line with Armstrong 1990b, 32, who suggests that the kataphatic sections
of Treatise 39 should be read in tandem with the intensive apophatic writing of the previous Treatise
38. We can thus, ‘. . . see its strongly positive affirmation about the One. . . as part of the exercise of the
most radical negative theology, that of the negatio negationis.’
972V.3[49]13.1-6. Armstrong translates οὐκ ὄνομα ὂν αὐτοῦ as ‘it is not its name’ rather than, ‘there
being no name for it’; Oosthout translates ‘there is no name for it’. Both readings are possible, as ὄν
could modify ὄνομα or τὸ ἕν, the main subject of the sentence. On this passage see Schroeder 1985,
75-7, 1996, 344; Oosthout 1991, 158-9; Bussanich 1996, 41.
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something about it.973 The one cannot be named, but if we must name it for purposes
of discussion, ‘the one’ is a good name to choose.974
But passages like those cited above from Treatises 32 (ll. 29-36) and 49, considered
from a strictly logical perspective, deny that this is a worthy or effective procedure.
Plotinus’ account of his own account of the one makes it indefinite in scope, hov-
ering between giving some account and giving none whatever. In a passage from
Treatise 49 which has given rise to some controversy, Plotinus differentiates between
‘saying’ (λέγειν) the one, which is impossible, and ‘speaking about’ (λέγειν piερί) the
one, which is possible but inadequate.975
So how are we to speak about it (Πῶς οὖν λέγομεν piερὶ αὐτοῦ)? We
say something about it, but we do not at all say it in itself, nor do
we have gnôsis or noêsis of it. So how do we speak about it, if we do
not have it? Or does not having it in gnôsis mean not having it at all?
No, we have it in such a way as to speak about it, but not to speak it
in itself (piερὶ αὐτο μὲν λέγειν, αὐτὸ δὲ μὴ λέγειν). For we say what it
is not; what it is, we do not say.976
Here Plotinus again offers a partially effective means of apprehending the one with
words, namely the standard negative method of non-predicative description, de-
scribed as ‘speaking about’ rather than directly speaking. The controversy about
this passage has centred on the difference between between λέγειν and λέγειν piερὶ,
only the latter being possible with regard to the one.977 Schroeder rightly argues
that λέγειν will always be equivalent to λέγειν piερί in the context of the one; we may
‘discuss’ the one, but never ‘disclose’ it. He goes on to postulate a third mode of
speaking of the one, ‘declaring’ it, based on V.3[49]14.8-20.978 I agree, however, with
the critique of Heiser,979 that no such way of speaking is apparent in the text. But if
973E.g. VI.8[39]18.52-3: the one is unsayable, we say it as best we can. Cf. II.9[33]1.5-8: ‘When we
call it “one” or “good”, it is necessary to suppose [it right] to say its nature is also one, not predi-
cating anything of it, but clarifying (δηλοῦντας) it to ourselves as much as possible.’ VI.9[9]3.49-51;
V.1[10]10.1 ff.; V.5[32]6.23-6; VI.7[38]38.4-9.
974VI.9[9]5.31-2.
975V.3[49]13.
976Ibid. 14.1-8.
977Schroeder 1985, 75-6; cf. Hoffmann 1997, 344.
978Schroeder 1985, 76-80.
979Heiser 1991, 59, n. 2.
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we return to Treatise 39, cited on page 238, we see that Plotinus denies the possibility
even of ‘speaking about’ the one. I feel that the resolution to this controversy lies in
recognising that Plotinus’ account of speaking of the one can only be read as indeter-
minate. The philosopher cannot speak the one itself; this much is uncontroversial.
But, in terms of speaking about the one, the philosopher both can and cannot do so.
Incomplete Communication as Esotericism. It is interesting to note the ways
in which the indirect modes of communication posited by Plotinus overlap with
his esoteric reading of the philosophical tradition. We return to Treatise 39, where
Plotinus brings Plato into the discussion of the one:
This is why Plato speaks of ‘necessary’ and ‘opportune’, wishing to
indicate as it were (ὁ Πλάτων ὡς οἷόν τε ἦν σημῆναι ἐφιέμενος) that it
is far from being the product of chance, but that it is necessary that
it be as it is.980
Plato’s ‘indication’ is justified on the grounds that ‘this is the way one must say this,
being unable to speak as one would wish’.981 I suspect that σημῆναι is to be read here
as more or less equivalent to αἰνίξασθαι; we cannot attribute Plato’s lack of accuracy
in speaking solely to the ineffability of the subject in question, without taking into
account a suggestion of secrecy.
In short, Plato is read here as exercising Late Platonist philosophic silence. Just as
with the true meaning of the secrecy of the mysteries being the fact of the one’s inef-
fability (see 14 above), Plotinus’ reading of Plato here is characterised by an interplay
between the concepts of secrecy and of unsayability. This reading is strengthened by
a reference in the following section to a doctrine of ‘the ancients’:
And we should perhaps also understand what was said esoterically
by the ancients (τοῖς piαλαιοῖς λεγόμενον δι΄ αἰνίξεως) [sc. the ‘beyond
being’ of Pl. R. VI 509b9] as a reference to the fact that it is not only
gives rise to being, but that it is not enslaved to being or to anything
else. . . .982
980VI.8[39]18.43-6. The reference to δέον and καιρόν is to Pl. Plt. 284d-e, taken radically out of context.
981Ibid. ll. 52-3.
982Ibid. 19.12-19.
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We encountered this passage in Chapter Four as an example of the assimilation of
particular Platonic doctrines to a larger tradition, and of the extension of esoteric
reading to Plato’s dialectical writing. Here we note the way in which this passage
also elides the esoteric and the ineffable.
At V.8[31]7-8, an extended reading of Plato’s myth of the Demiurge in the Timæus,
Plato ‘wishes to signify’ (σημῆναι θέλων, 8.7-8) a true, Plotinian meaning beneath the
apparent meaning of the myth; again, the verb here seems to indicate an esoteric
discourse.983 We might adduce our passage from Treatise 32:
But we, in our birth-pangs, are at a loss for what to say, and we
speak about the ineffable (piερὶ οὐ ῥητοῦ), and we name it, wishing
to signify it to ourselves as well as we can. And perhaps even the
name ‘one’ is a denial of multiplicity. This is why the Pythagoreans
signified esoterically (συμβολικῶς piρὸς ἀλλήλους) that ‘Apollo’ was a
denial of multiplicity.984
Note the way in which an esoteric mode of expression is called upon to indicate
a doctrine of ineffability in the tradition. We have seen the way in which esoteric
interpretation allows Platonist perennialists to find the doctrines they seek in pre-
decessors who probably entertained no such ideas. But Plotinus’ use of verbs of
incomplete communication does more than this. In this passage, and the previous
citation discussing Plato and ‘the ancients’, themes of ineffability, often signposted
by the verb σημαίνω, and the idea of esotericism, embodied as enigma and symbol-
on, interfere and cannot be precisely separated. Once again, secrecy and silence are
interconnected.
Indeterminacy and the Open Secret
The one or good is the primary locus for written silence in the Enneads, but,
because of the phenomenological nature of Plotinus’ approach to higher realities -
the fact that they are depicted as places the philosopher may visit, or inner states
to which he may attain - the discourse of ineffability has an extended application.
983Cf. Armstrong 2003, V, 262 n. 2: ‘There is nothing in Plato to suggest the interpretation given by
Plotinus here.’
984Ll. 24-8, also discussed 69 above.
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As discussed in Chapter Two, the philosopher’s inner achievements may include a
practical life in the noetic realm and an ineffable union with the first principle. The
ineffable is thus not confined to the purely ontological realm of metaphysical de-
scriptions, or quasi-descriptions, of the one as a level of reality, but extends to the
epistemological and ontological realm of practical philosophic transformation, the
philosopher’s ascent (ἀναγωγή) through higher realms of being and knowing.
As argued in the previous chapter, Plotinus’ discourse of ineffability is not con-
fined to the highest level of his ontological scheme; noêsis, too, can only be described
through temporal or spatial metaphors which fail to capture its essence as a whole.
The fragmented partial accounts that are possible of nous and noêsis are not attacked
with the same apophatic vigour which Plotinus applies to his own speech ‘about the
one’, but they are subjected to constant qualification, hedging, and paradoxical for-
mulations. We might expect, then, that an account of the philosophic ascent should
be a locus of philosophic silence, the performance of which increases incrementally
according to the level of knowing-being under discussion. Put another way, Ploti-
nus speaks in different philosophic registers depending on which level of reality he
is addressing, and the degree to which language is thought to be able to capture the
reality in question is in inverse proportion to that level’s position up the chain of
being. As the philosopher ascends, the ability for discourse to capture his journey
decreases.
Hiding and Revealing the Philosophic Ascent. The process of anagôgê may be
said to have theoretical and practical components, corresponding to the two dif-
ferent types of aphairesis. It is seen by Plotinus as beginning with instruction in
the basic sciences, with a gradual, step-by-step movement toward higher concep-
tual realms. The negative and qualified positive methods of exposition explored
above belong to this first stage. The relationship between the discursive and non-
discursive components of the journey are well-described at the opening of Treatise
20, On Dialectic:
What skill or method or practice leads us up (ἀνάγει) to where we
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need to go? We may take it that where it is we need to get to -
to the good and the first principle - is agreed, and demonstrated by
many proofs. And, indeed, this process of proof was a kind of ascent
ἀναγωγή τις ἦν.985
Plotinus goes on to describe the aspirant’s entry into nous, described topographically,
and traversal of the noetic territory to its ‘highest point’, nearest to the one (ll. 13-18).
At this stage of the process dianoia has been left behind, and Plotinus’ qualification of
his school’s dialectical discussions as ἀναγωγή τις should be read as just that: ‘a kind
of ascent’, rather than the true ascent. We may adduce Treatise 32 (ll. 17-21), where
the seeker must abandon sensory perception and even nous in the quest for the first
principle.
In concentrating on the post-discursive part of Plotinus’ ἀναγωγή, I am not sug-
gesting that he undervalues the practice of discursive reasoning. Indeed, without
philosophic understanding and proper beliefs about reality, the further ascent is im-
possible. Plotinus attacks the Gnostics for attempting to bypass this process through
their alleged access to higher realities:
This is fabrication (καινολογούντων) with a view to establishing their
own hairesis. For, as if they had nothing to do with the ancient Hel-
lenic [hairesis], they fabricate these things, knowing full well that the
Hellenes speak - without arrogance - of ascents out of the cave and
of gradual progress by small degrees toward a truer vision.986
There can be no short-cuts to the higher ascent; one must undergo the process of
education which the Hellenic ancients described in their Allegory of the Cave.
Plotinus also ascribes a persuasive function to philosophic discourse: the soul in
nous has no need of persuasion, since it is present to self-affirming truths, but the em-
bodied soul may require persuasion concerning higher realms of being.987 Discourse
can have a further, hortatory role, whereby the soul is inspired to undertake the quest
for reality.988 Although the one is unsayable and unwriteable, when we speak and
write we ‘impel toward it’ (λέγομεν καὶ γράφομεν piέμpiοντες εἰς αὐτό), an unusual turn
985I.3[20]1.1-5.
986II.9[33]6.5-10.
987V.3[49]6.8-24.
988E.g. V.8[31]13.4.
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of phrase which calls to mind the image of Plotinus pushing his students up the
foothills of philosophic endeavour by main force.989 However, all discursive formu-
lations, such as the name ‘one’, even understood as a negation of multiplicity, will
have to be left behind in the course of the practical ascent (Treatise 32, ll. 26-7). The
ascent itself is absent from the text, since it goes beyond discursivity.990
Plotinus’ treatments of the ascent are the most powerful passages in the En-
neads.991 They may be divided into two types for convenience - discursive aphairetic
passages and practical ascent narratives - but the types often overlap. The aphairetic
passages discuss the concepts which must be removed in the course of the ascent; we
have encountered them already. They often call upon all the mental resources of the
reader to follow Plotinus as he strips away every concept. But in the practical nar-
rative descriptions, it is no longer concepts which need removing from the soul, but
ontological and epistemological qualities such as multiplicity and Otherness. The
ascent narratives are another kind of writing entirely, and call upon the heart as well
as the mind.
Plotinian ascent narratives convey a hortatory message; evocations of the beauti-
ful narrative passages from Plato’s Symposium and Phædrus992 combine with original
compositions describing the beauties of the noetic realm,993 and kataphatic descrip-
tions of the encounter with the one, abounding in metaphors of light and illumina-
tion, touching, and intimate contact.994 Some passages evoke erotic imagery draw-
ing on Plato’s Symposium and a range of tactile descriptions which verge on the ‘erot-
ic’ in the more everyday sense of the term: the lover finds satiety in the beloved, and
989VI.9[9]4.11-16; see also ibid. 13-14.
990Cf. useful comments at Mazur 2010, 5.
991These include I.6[1]7.1–19, 9.6–25; IV.8[6]1.1–11; VI.9[9]3.14–27, 4.1–30, 7.1–23, 9.24–60, 10.9–21,
11.4–25, 36–46; III.8[30]9.19–32, 10.28–35; V.8[31]11.1–19; V.5[32]4.1–12, 7.31–8.23; VI.7[38]31.5–35,
34.1–22, 35.1–45, 36.10–26; VI.8[39]15.14–23, 19.1–16; V.3[49]4.4–15, 17.16–39.
992I.6[1]7 is a classic Plotinian evocation of Smp. and Phdr. in the context of vision of the one. Many
others may be found in the index fontium, H + S 2.
993E.g. the descriptions in Treatise 31, On the Noetic Beauty.
994Illumination: we have seen V.3[49]17.21-8 (cited 234); see Mazur 2010, 62-65. Cf. VI.7[38]36.10–26.
The stock Platonic comparison of the one to the sun (e.g. V.5[32]8) is also common. Nous is also often
described in terms of light: it is like an illuminated sphere (VI.7.15.24-5). See especially Beierwaltes
1961. On touching the one, see n. 892 above.
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the two cannot be separated in their moment of joining .995 Such passages are clearly
intended to kindle erôs in the soul of the reader for the true philosophic goods of
nous and the one, and to turn it away from the apparent goods of the sensory world.
Yet in these narratives the erotic drive of the soul’s yearning to return to its
source seems sometimes to overwhelm the determination to unsay any attribution
of the one which we have seen in Plotinus’ text, causing the philosopher utterly to
transgress against the limits he himself puts on speaking. Descriptions of the vi-
sion of the one and of touching the one, in particular, bring a paradoxical concrete-
ness into the carefully constructed indeterminate mental space of direct unknowing.
However, the substitution of concrete imagery, especially that drawing on the phys-
ical senses of sight and touch, in fact serves to distance the reader from associating
normal modes of knowing with contact with the one, while at the same time em-
phasising presence: the sense of touch cannot operate at a distance, and is thus an
apt metaphor for a state of absolute togetherness with the first principle.996 The Plo-
tinian ascent narrative might thus be seen as the positive side to his philosophy of
transcendence, emphasising the presence of the soul to the one just as the negative
apophatic and aphairetic techniques distance it and affirm only its absence.
The Religious Register in Plotinian Ascent Narratives. Even with the vast stylis-
tic differences between their methodologies, Plotinus’ ascent narratives remind the
reader of nothing in Middle Platonist philosophy so much as the visionary narra-
tives of Sethian Gnostic treatises (see p. 184 above), and the Hermetic Poimandres
(see p. 179 above).997 Even the noetic ascent described by Philo Judæus (see p. 187
above) does not reach the levels of narrative immediacy which Plotinus brings to
his subject. His descriptions of the higher stages of the ascent also sometimes draw
directly on imagery from the mysteries. We have seen that the final stage of philo-
sophic achievement was widely associated with ἐpiοpiτεῖα or the culmination of the
995VI.7[38]34.8–14; VI.9[9]4.16–21; VI.7[38]35.23–32. See Mazur 2009 on erotic contact with the one in
Plotinus.
996Cf. Bréhier 1958, 157.
997Mazur 2003, 35-7 discusses a number of parallels in the Hermetica and Gnostic treatises.
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mystic ritual, and that Plotinus characterises the one as a θέαμα. In his narrative
mode, Plotinus employs a religious register absent elsewhere in the Enneads.
One of the most striking images for the ascent, which Plotinus uses repeatedly,
is that of a temple, with its sacred inner precinct which may be entered only by the
initiate. In Treatise 1, one of Plotinus’ richest treatises in terms of ascent imagery, the
philosopher asks: ‘How will anyone see the “inconceivable beauty” (Pl. R. 509a6)
which remains in the holy sanctuaries and does not emerge, lest some uninitiat-
ed person should see it?’ The beauty in question is that of the one, which, in this
treatise at least, Plotinus seems happy to equate with an ultimate beauty and erotic
goal.998 At V.1[10]6.12-15 the one is silent as if within a temple, and the aspirant must
contemplate what corresponds to the statues which stand before the temple, i.e. the
noetic world. In both of these passages we see the familiar combination of the exclu-
sion evoked through cultic tropes of secrecy and the idea of an ineffable contact with
the one which is hidden by its nature from the reader.
A third evocation of the temple sanctuary takes place at VI.9[9]11, in a passage
which contains nearly all the tropes of philosophic silence discussed in the foregoing
discussion. It begins with the equation of the silence of mystery cult and the ineffable
nature of the one cited at the beginning of this thesis. It then proceeds to detail the
union of the seer (the philosopher) with the seen (the one), whereby the seer has
become one (8), and transcended logos, noêsis, and even himself (11-12). He is like
a man who has entered into the sanctuary and left behind the outer statues, which
he again sees upon his descent. But in the sanctuary itself he sees ‘not a statue or an
image, but itself’ (21-2). A cryptic statement follows:
And it is said esoterically (αἰνίττεται) by the wise among interpreters
of holy things, how it is that that god is seen; and a wise priest,
understanding the esoteric meaning (αἴνιγμα), may there make the
vision real, entering the sanctuary.999
This is the only enigma in the Enneads where Plotinus gives no indication as to what
998See Stern-Gillet 2000.
999Ibid. 27-30.
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it is he is interpreting. It may be a reference to the symbolic architecture of the Hel-
lenic sanctuary (a supposition perhaps made more likely by his other ‘readings’ of
architecture and statuary, discussed 143 above). But this reading does not seem to
fit the text very well, and one suspects that, for once, Plotinus is actually referring
to some mystic saying, perhaps even a secret doctrine, which he does not share with
the reader. What is at any rate certain is that he is discussing ‘secret knowledge’ -
that is, advertising the fact that the matter under discussion is ‘a secret’. But the pas-
sage as a whole serves as a kind of invitation to the aspiring philosopher to become
the ‘wise priest’ who enters the sanctuary.
In Treatise 31 Plotinus suggests a thought-experiment which illustrates another
aspect of this religious register in action. In order to form some idea of what the
noetic world is like, the reader is asked to envision the entire sensory universe, with
all its parts intact and visible all together, as though inside a transparent sphere.
This sphere is to include absolutely everything that exists in the world. Holding
on to this image, the soul then imagines another sphere, but removes (ἄφελε) from
it mass, places, and the image of matter. The reader is not simply to construct a
smaller sphere than the first, but rather to ‘Call the god who made that whose image
you have, and pray that he come. And may he come, bringing the cosmos of himself
(τὸν αὐτοῦ κόσμον φέρων).’1000
This thought experiment contains a fascinating element of the religious: it calls
upon the student to pray to nous. This passage is often regarded as a metaphorical or
‘merely stylistic’ embellishment to Plotinus’ concern with teaching the reader some-
thing of the nature of nous through his thought experiment, but we have every reason
to believe that it is not intended metaphorically at all, but as a genuine recommen-
dation for prayer, philosophically understood.1001 Be that as it may, we should pay
attention to the way in which Plotinus’ thought experiment is never completed; hav-
ing imagined the sphere of the sensory world, and then preparing a corresponding
sphere to represent the noetic world, Plotinus abruptly changes register and calls for
1000V.8[31]9.
1001See Appendix E.
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an act, not of philosophic imagination, but of devotion. Once again, the gap between
what the discursive mind is capable of and the noetic reality is emphasised, in this
case through the abandonment of a discursive methodology before it is completed
in favour of an appeal to the divine power of the noetic god himself.
Plotinus’ treatment of the philosophic ascent is a complex locus for hiding and
revealing. As we saw in the previous chapter, the presence of nous and the one are,
from the point of view of discourse, inaccessible, because unsayable, and even un-
thinkable in any normal sense of the term. But at the same time, they are always
present, in potentia, to anyone capable of receiving them. This presence is thus de-
picted as being open, available, and, indeed, already present; at the same time, it
is depicted as being perpetually absent from the text itself. Any description of the
ineffable ascent toward the one will thus be a hiding and a revealing.
We might bring the question of philosophic silence in Plotinus’ accounts of anagôgê
down to earth in a more sociological context. Plato had laid the foundations for
a culture of philosophic elitism which was a basic ideological assumption in Pla-
tonism. This elitism in Plato is determined by an intensive and arduous process of
philosophical education through dialectical practice, the higher reaches of which are
sometimes depicted in terms drawing on mystery narrations or expressed as being
unwritable. Some reference has been made to Platonist curricula and to the step-
by-step progress toward the truth which the Platonists saw as the true path of the
ancients. We can contextualise Plotinus’ idea of the ascent within this culture of
elitism: in positing and claiming ineffable inner states, Plotinus is in fact making a
strong claim to the highest philosophic achievement.
He is also withholding access to this achievement; it is ineffable, and thus absent
from the text. The Seventh Platonic Epistle states that a certain, high matter of philo-
sophic import is ‘not sayable like other studies’; Plotinus both ‘says’ what this matter
is, i.e. the ontology and epistemology of the highest reality, but also maintains its
status as ‘not writable’. The ineffable union with the first principle, regarded from a
late antique social perspective, functions as ‘secret knowledge’ of a new type, whose
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character is determined by the new ideas of transcendence arising in the first cen-
turies CE. Unlike earlier forms of ‘secret knowledge’, it is conceived as fully immune
to being revealed. Plotinus thus in a sense raises the stakes of Platonist elitism: no
course of education, however intensive and arduous, could result in an achievement
to trump the encounter with the ineffable supreme principle, and the ineffability of
the encounter itself removes it from the field of the refutable.
Indeterminacy and Monism. The literary result which I call ‘indeterminacy’ in
Plotinus occurs when a proposition (’the one exists’, ‘nous cannot know the one di-
rectly’, ‘the soul has a lower faculty of noêsis within her’) is contradicted by another
proposition (’the one does not exist’, ‘nous knows the one directly’, ‘the soul has nev-
er descended below nous’) in such a way that neither proposition can be said to be
entirely true nor entirely false. A third, unsaid proposition hovers between the two,
an indeterminate mental space which might possibly be described through a third
proposition combining both options, but even then remains indeterminate (’the one
neither exists nor does not exist, but some third option which is perforce unstated’,
etc.). The difference between indeterminate groupings of propositions of this type
and saying nothing at all can only be that the indeterminations point the reader in
a certain direction. The elative aspect of much indeterminate negative theology is
a case in point: the reader cannot be told what God is, but he can be told that God
exceeds or transcends a number of perfectly sayable attributes: goodness, wisdom,
perfection, etc. The reader’s inner gaze is focused ‘upwards’.
Plotinus, I would argue, uses indeterminations in ways unique to him as a philoso-
pher; several of these are discussed in what follows. But what is of the greatest
interest to the present thesis is the interference between registers in these acts of un-
saying: the application of rhetorics of secrecy to statements of ineffability (hiding
the self-hidden), or the use of religious language in similar contexts (dovetailing the
inviolate secrecy of the mysteries with the inviolable secret of the ineffable) being the
most common.
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Blurring the Edges of Reality. The principal dynamics of Plotinus’ metaphysics oc-
cur at the ‘boundaries’ between the hypostases. The problem goes back to the princi-
ple of ‘like is only known by like’, which, for Plotinus, has an ontological dimension
as well. How can being arise from non-being, and how can the non-discursive con-
sciousness of nous become discursive consciousness in the lower forms of soul? The
former problem is perhaps the most philosophically serious. At the ‘borders’ be-
tween types of knowing and being, problems of incommensurability are met, and
philosophy has to deal with them.
As suggested above, Plotinus addresses these problems by ‘blurring’ the borders
between the hypostases. Hypostases do differ one from the other; but at their points
of interaction they overlap: Plotinian reality is a continuum. Plotinus’ dissection
of reality into parts is counterbalanced by a strong literary practice of reintegration,
whereby he establishes and then deconstructs the boundaries between hypostases.
The boundaries are indeterminate.
This is my global reading of the multiple accounts Plotinus gives of the relation-
ship between nous and the individual soul.1002 The undescended soul both is and
is not separate from nous. Viewed from the perspective of dianoia, the soul in some
sense possesses nous as a faculty described in various ways; viewed from the stand-
point of nous - that is, sub specie æternitatis - soul, or its highest part, simply does not
descend into time and space, and so cannot be said to be outside nous. The ongoing
interpretive debate as to whether Plotinus means to say that there is only a single
nous in which all souls that engage in noêsis participate in some manner, or whether
the ‘apex of soul’ has a subsidiary noetic principle within it should address this inde-
terminacy. We should not cease to investigate Plotinus’ explorations of this liminal
region of metaphysics, but we should be aware that he will not give a single answer
to the question ‘how does nous relate to soul?’ His multiple and conflicting accounts,
I argue, give rise to an indeterminate, unsaid - indeed, silent - account, correspond-
ing to the reality of the situation as Plotinus conceives it, but escaping discursive
formulation.
1002These are summarised 211 above.
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More problematic still is the boundary between nous and the one.1003 In the out-
line of modes of knowing in Plotinus in the previous chapter (p. 219) this region
was discussed under three different headings. 1) The question was raised of a non-
discursive mode of direct knowing of the one - i.e., a faculty or part of nous, perhaps
akin to the ‘flower of nous’ of the Chaldæan Oracles, which is able to apprehend the
first principle. Plotinus posits such a faculty or part, but its nature is indeterminate:
it ceases to be nous insofar as it apprehends the one, but it is nous when it appre-
hends an image of the one, containing multiplicity. Alternately, it may be described
as a nous which is not nous within the one itself. 2) A direct mode of unknowing was
also posited: this is generally discussed by Plotinus in the context of the individual
soul on its journey toward the one, but, when we recall that the soul will have be-
come nous, and occupied or become the apex of nous in the process, we see that this
faculty is similar or possibly identical to the first, although described differently. 3)
Some discussion was also made of the modes of knowing which Plotinus attributes
to the one itself: these are to be understood in parallel with his many denials that
the one possesses anything which might be called consciousness, and are described
with verbs of knowing from outside the normal Platonist repertoire such as ἐpiιβολή
or νεῦσις, or alternately by elative forms such as hypernoêsis.1004 They are also de-
scribed as self-directed; in other words, the one’s ‘knowing’ is always a ‘knowing’ of
itself. There is a case to be made that these modes of ‘self-unknowing’ attributed to
the one are a third way of describing the same phenomenon.1005
In each case, then, according to this reading, the same phenomenon is described
from three different registers: from the perspective of soul, the direct unknowing of
the one is the final stage in a transformative process of ascent up the levels of being
and knowing. From the perspective of nous, it is a return to its source in contempla-
tion, resulting in the loss of its identity as nous in an indeterminate, timeless moment
‘before’ it becomes nous. From the perspective of the one, there is an internal action
1003Bussanich 1988 is the best study on this problem.
1004See 224 above.
1005This is argued by Mazur 2010.
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which can sometimes be described as a mode of self-apprehension, through which
the one contemplates its own ‘contents’. We may add that, in narratives of ascent,
particularly at the end of Treatise 9, the soul and the one are described in strongly
unitary language;1006 the philosophic register may dramatically jump from the level
of soul to that of the one. As in the case of nous and the one, where there is some-
thing of nous in the one which may alternately be described as something of the one
in nous, soul possesses something of the one in itself, which may be expressed, at the
highest level of epistemology-ontology, as the one having soul within it.
The Indeterminate Self. As we have seen (p. 203 above), human identity is inde-
terminate for Plotinus. This is in fact perhaps the most undervalued fact of his phi-
losophy: its enormous implications include the fact that human beings, or at least
philosophers, can attain to godhood, not in any metaphorical sense, but in the most
concrete terms, through becoming nous, and then perhaps passing beyond even that
supreme godhead to the transcendent source of all. The indeterminacy of the indi-
vidual self is key, because there is no possible way, in a Platonist world-view, that
a limited soul, attached to matter and entrenched in time and space, could attain
to these supernal states, but a soul which is essentially identified with higher states
of being, and only accidentally associated with matter, can make the transition. In-
deed, such a soul need only realise, through its presence to higher realities, that the
transition is, as it were, already made, for it to be instantiated.
Plotinus’ writing of indeterminacy with regard to the soul and its modes of knowing-
being, then, should be seen as a means of teaching the embodied soul of its own
spiritual heritage. This, in my eyes, is the over-arching function of Plotinus’ multi-
ple, contradictory accounts of the relationships between epistemological-ontological
realms. The relationship between noêsis and discursive thought is described in a
1006At VI.9[9]11.21 the ambiguity of αὐτός makes it entirely unclear whether Plotinus is referring to
the one or to the soul. Taken in its context, one of the strongest Plotinian narratives of the union of
soul and the one, it is clear that this is an artfully expressed indetermination that uses the natural
potential for indeterminacy inherent in the Greek demonstrative for a literary-philosophical effect
quite beyond the normal range of explanatory possibilities.
INDETERMINACY AND THE OPEN SECRET 255
number of ways. All forms of cognition are denied to the one itself, but then Plotinus
sometimes attributes to it a kind of hyper-perception. In each of these cases, in order
to grasp the level above it, the lower level must in some way cease to be itself, but
in each case Plotinus leaves the exact nature of this transformation indeterminate.
I would argue that, in doing so, he wishes to militate against the reader’s supply-
ing easy, formulaic schemas to transcendental cognition, concentrating instead on
penetrating these states in their reality, which will transcend discourse.
Conclusion
The thesis of Odo Casel was that the cultural trope of silentium philosophorum in
antiquity was in large part a transference over time of religious arcana - actual doctri-
nal secrets, and the culture of secrecy surrounding them - to the idea of an ineffable
reality which could not, by its own nature, be revealed.1007 The evidence traced in
this thesis supports this analysis in many respects. There is however an important
proviso: for Casel, and most scholars after him, the late antique philosophic use
of the themes of mystic silence and other rhetorics of concealment and secrecy was
entirely metaphorical. The mystic arcanum stood for the ineffable first god.
I would argue that this is too simple, and ignores what written secrecy and writ-
ten silence have in common: they both advertise a truth to which the author is privy
and the reader is not. Throughout the history of philosophic secrecy, concealment
was rarely the main aim, but rather revealing the existence of privileged knowl-
edge on the part of the philosopher. The act of written hiding and revealing applies
equally well to the hidden arcanum which must be kept from the uninitiated and the
openly announced, but ineffable, reality.
Discussing the interference between secrecy and ineffability found in Plotinus,
Jean Pépin asks why and how one would guard against communicating the incom-
municable, and whether it makes sense to forbid the impossible.1008 It is hoped that
this thesis has posed some answers to the ‘how’ part of the question: forbidding com-
munication of the ineffable should be understood as an exercise of rhetorical hiding
and revealing, part of a long Platonist tradition of treating the highest matters of
philosophy as ‘secret knowledge’. Even in the earliest sources cited in this thesis,
such as the mysteries and the Presocratic poets, the concerns of secrecy are at least as
1007Casel 1919.
1008Pépin 1984, 32.
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much to do with identity and exclusion and with the identification of the ‘mystery’
as a mystery as with the concealment of genuine secrets. Keeping this in mind, the
seeming paradox of the Plotinian move to conceal the ineffable should become less
inexplicable. The trope of Platonist philosophic silence has its own internal logic, but
this logic only makes sense if we cease to imagine that the exercise of secrecy either
implies secrets or even necessarily requires the presumption that there are secrets.
All it requires is a textual absence, something that is referred to but not revealed, but
to which the author claims access.
The ‘why’ part of Pépin’s question leads to more treacherous ground. This thesis
has largely refrained from speculating on the motives of authors, a field of inquiry
that, like the Plotinian ineffable, is implied by the text but never present in the text
itself. In closing, however, I want to transgress somewhat against my own method-
ological boundary in this respect, and indulge in some speculation about Plotinus’
motives in his transformation of philosophic silence.
Philosophic Silence and Symbolic Capital. Plotinian philosophy is, in a sense,
a tightly ‘closed’ phenomenon. The philosopher’s initial reluctance to publish shows
a practical concern with privileging of knowledge in a concrete sense, and a genuine
belief that certain matters were not fit for public consumption. Plotinus’ approval of
Porphyry’s use of the esoteric in his poem The Sacred Marriage shows that he saw the
practice of esotericism as a suitable way of maintaining the privileged nature of high
philosophic matters. These anecdotes receive corroboration from the Enneads: the
anti-Gnostic polemic, in particular, shows Plotinus’ concern with maintaining the
educational requirements for membership in the philosophic elite, and correspond-
ing contempt of those who would ‘jump the queue’ of formal Platonist paideia in a
presumptuous claim to privileged access to the higher realities.1009 In the passage
1009The Gnostics include among their number the meanest (φαυλοτάτους) sort of people (II.9[33]18.17-
19; cf. 5.8, where even the meanest (φαυλοτάτων) of men are said to be capable of arriving at truth by
the Gnostics); cf. Athanassiadi 2006, 134. Ibid. 9.6-11 is a conservative defence of a rigidly hierarchical
society, divided into σpiουδαῖοι, who engage in philosophy, and the mass of humanity, who essentially
exist to cater to the physical needs of the former class.
CONCLUSION 258
from this treatise cited on page 245 above, the cultural prestige of the ancient lin-
eage (in this case embodied in Plato’s Allegory of the Cave, R. 514a ff.) is brought
in to defend what is, indeed, a conservative conception of philosophic education re-
served for a select few. Plotinus’ esoteric reading of his tradition served to construct
unanimity among a wide range of privileged authorities, but, by framing these au-
thorities with their a priori access to the truth in terms of an esoteric discourse, it also
reveals the degree to which Plotinus saw this kind of discourse as proper and fitting.
If the ancients wrote esoterically, then certain matters of philosophy really ought to
be hidden from the masses. The overarching hermeneutic of esoteric perennialism
should be taken into account in this context: the truth is the possession of the Tradi-
tion, but it is to some degree hidden from the masses by the criterion of education
in the proper interpretive tools. Treating it as a secret, then, is an assertion of this
possession.
Plotinian anthropology and metaphysics add additional aspects of privilege to
the basic tropes of Platonist elitism. For Plotinus, as for no previous Platonist philoso-
pher whose works survive, the loci of philosophic achievement are moved from
the admittedly difficult, but theoretically accessible realms of dialectical skill, the
ability to construct a coherent and persuasive world-view, and the knowledge of
how to deal adequately with the philosophical materials bequeathed by the school’s
founders, to inner states of spiritual power. The ability to share the truth openly as
a criterion of philosophic excellence was being replaced by the ability to persuade
others that one had the truth.
We have seen this played out in Porphyry’s Life, where he not only affirms that
Plotinus had achieved to elevated inner states, but attacks the Gnostics in Plotinus’
circle for denying that Plato himself had attained to the deepest noetic being.1010
From the preceding discussion of Plotinian anthropology on the one hand, and Sethi-
an visionary ascent treatises on the other, it will be clear that what was at stake here
was whether or not Plato had himself ‘made the ascent’, or more probably a contro-
versy about which level he had reached in his ascent. It will not have been a dispute
1010See 53 above.
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over whether he was correct in his philosophical writings. In other words, Porphyry
is countering Gnostic claims to states of spiritual power - to whose nature the ascent
narratives of the Allogenes, Zostrianos and other texts give us possible clues1011 - with
Plato’s (and by extension Plotinus’) own spiritual achievements. Viewed macroscop-
ically, this is one aspect of the broad shift away from the claim to a coherent account
of reality as a primary source of authority, and toward a model of personal spiritual
power, which we see in the later Platonist biographies and in the hagiographies of
their Christian opponents.1012
One of the most common themes in the Platonist biographies of late antiquity
is that of the astounding, or even miraculous, powers of perception, attention, and
insight attributed to philosophers;1013 Porphyry depicts Plotinus performing many
wonderful feats of perspicacity such as discovering a slave who stole a necklace by
simply reviewing the assembled slaves and indicating the culprit, correctly predict-
ing the future lives of children under his care, and once, when Porphyry was feeling
suicidal, divining the straits he was in and dissuading him from this rash course of
action.1014 He is also able to repel a magical attack by a jealous rival philosopher
called Olympius through the sheer power of his soul, according to Porphyry.1015
Porphyry also adduces two very strong corroborating witnesses to Plotinus spiritu-
al power - the Egyptian priest, whose exclamation that Plotinus’ guardian daimôn
was in fact a god gave traditional Platonist Orientalist support for this claim, and
the gods themselves, cited in the form of the Apolline oracle which Plotinus’ pupil
Amelius sought out upon the philosopher’s death, indicating that Plotinus, once a
human being, had attained to a higher state than the merely human, and now dwelt
in company with Plato and Pythagoras in a higher world.1016
1011See 184 above.
1012See especially Brown 1971a, Fowden 1982 on the late antique pagan philosopher as ‘holy man’;
Cox 1983.
1013See Cox 1983, 23-5.
1014Plot. 11. Cf. Apollonius of Tyana’s many feats of prediction and second sight, e.g. Philostr. V.A.
V.11; V.18; V.24; V.30; V.42.
1015Ibid. 10 1 ff.
1016Ibid. 22-23. On this oracle, see Goulet 1982.
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The contact of the accomplished philosopher with truth granted him wisdom,
and this wisdom is expressed, in the biographies, as powers beyond the ken of nor-
mal men. But what is especially relevant for this thesis is the fact that the states
which are the inner concomitant of this power are inaccessible, hedged about with
the language of ineffability. The philosophic anagôgê is pre-eminently the preserve
of a philosophic elite, and its ineffability acts precisely like the command of secrecy
in the mysteries, to separate the ‘initiated’ from the masses of ‘profane’.
There is a great concern with hierarchy among philosophical students in the Late
Platonist biographies, and Porphyry’s Life is no exception. It is significant that Por-
phyry, whose concern with a curricular, step-by-step approach to Platonic education
has been discussed above,1017 discusses Plotinus’ students and their relative mer-
its,1018 but attributes only to his master and himself the ultimate attainment of inef-
fable union with the first principle.1019 This gives us an insight into a process where-
by the traditional hierarchies of Platonist paideia, which might be called hierarchies
of knowledge or wisdom, were being transformed into epistemologic-ontologic hi-
erarchies, or hierarchies of spiritual power. These states were never disconnected
from the idea of wisdom, but wisdom, for Plotinus and his successors, was radically
transformed into a state of being.1020 Porphyry’s self-serving portrayal of himself
as Plotinus’ premier student and successor is apparent throughout the Life, and his
trump-card is a state of ineffable union which is not, by its nature, subject to any
scrutiny or refutation. As with the invocation of the mysteries in Plutarchian dia-
logue, or of the mysteries of philosophy by Apuleius,1021 the claim to ineffable states
of knowing and being makes an unfalsifiable claim that cannot be refuted by the
rules of dialectic. The self-hiding secret can be just as powerful as the concealed
secret.
1017116.
1018Plot. 7 distinguishes between the ἀκροαταί and ζηλοται among Plotinus’ students; see Lim 1995,
37-9; Edwards 2000, 14 n. 17. Porphyry also devotes a great deal of discussion to Amelius, his
chief rival for first place among Plotinus’ students, often subtly and not-so-subtly indicating his own
superiority (e.g. 10.33 ff; 21.18).
1019See 43 above.
1020Plotinus even calls σοφία a hypostasis (see Appendix D, 278).
1021See 117 ff.
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Plotinus’ social standing remains somewhat of a mystery; we know little of his
early life and nothing of his family, but we are told that he had the ear of at least one
emperor,1022 and claimed men of senatorial rank among his students.1023 We also
know that he enjoyed the use of various country houses and other types of patron-
age.1024 Benefits of this type seem to have been the unofficial salary of the Platon-
ist philosopher, who was prohibited by Platonic precedent from accepting payment
for teaching;1025 Plotinus was, in this sense, a very successful philosopher if these
indicators are anything to go by.
We should probably assume that Plotinus came from at least a well-off back-
ground, if not an important family, for he would otherwise not have had the leisure
to study philosophy in the first place.1026 But taking this into account, it seems very
likely that some at least of the high esteem he enjoyed should be attributed to his
mastery of the spiritual world. Like the pagan and Christian saints of his time and
succeeding centuries, he possessed the spiritual power of one who had achieved the
highest initiation, who had mastered the invisible worlds, and who had a unique
and privileged access to the truth. Platonist philosophic silence had existed since
1022Plotinus’ journey to the East in search of barbarian wisdom with the Emperor Gordian’s expe-
ditionary force (Porph. Plot. 3, 13-23) has too much of the tropological in it to be taken literally.
The quest for wisdom, the wise barbarians at whose feet Pythagoras and Plato had also studied,
and even the συμβουλητικὸς φιλόσοφος, the philosophic adviser brought along on military campaigns
(on whom see Rawson 1989), were established tropes. He doubtless accompanied the expedition,
and probably had some introduction to the emperor’s circle (see Hadot 1993, 78), but more than this
we cannot say (cf.Blumenthal 1987, 531). Plotinus’ project to found an ideal city-state based on ‘the
laws of Plato’ and to be called Platonopolis was approved by the emperor Galienus (who, along with
his wife Salonina, greatly honoured Plotinus), according to Porphyry (Plot. 12). Even taking Por-
phyry’s tendency to ‘manage’ information in the Life, I think we must assume at least some historical
connection between the philosopher and the emperor based on this anecdote.
1023Porph. Plot. 7 29 ff.
1024According to Porphyry, Plotinus received the guardianship of the children of many students ‘of
the highest rank’ at the point of their deaths, along with their property (Plot. 9.5-9). Porphyry empha-
sises that this was because the parents considered Plotinus a ‘holy and divine guardian’ (ἱερῷ τινι καὶ
θείῳ φύλακι, 9.9), and of course there is no suggestion that Plotinus made illicit use of the property so
obtained, but was rather a scrupulous and just guardian (12-16). The social capital and class accep-
tance implied by having one’s house full of the children of the upper classes is nevertheless obvious.
Plotinus made use of the country estate of his student Zethus (ibid. 7.22-3), and his needs in his final
illness were catered to partly by this estate and partly by that of Castricius Firmus (ibid. 2.20-23).
1025See Dillon 2002, 34-5.
1026Late antique philosophers, especially Platonist philosophers, seem to have come from wealthy
backgrounds (see Blumenthal 1978, 367; Fowden 1982, 48-9).
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at least the Middle Platonists, but the claims to knowledge which it supported had
increased in ambition and scope over time.
Philosophic Silence and Philosophic Openness in Plotinus
Am I then arguing that philosophic silence was entirely an exercise of social pow-
er, and that Plotinus’ philosophy of transcendence aimed solely to establish him as
a pre-eminent philosopher? The reader could be forgiven for thinking this, but it is,
emphatically, not the case. A useful parallel might be drawn with the discourse of
spiritual power developing concurrently in the Christian ecclesiastical hierarchy. It is
right to say that certain powers ascribed to the priest through his liturgical and oth-
er ritual functions - baptism, absolution, communion, and even excommunication
- were forms of symbolic capital with very concrete social ramifications. It would,
however, never be satisfactory to say that this is all these powers were. In many
cases, the fact that he was exercising a kind of social power through his divinely or-
dained priestly functions will not have crossed the mind of a pious priest, although
he will have recognised the necessity that these powers be limited to a certain class
of specialists, and for many other exclusionary practices.
We should thus be awake to the assumptions of Platonist elitism, and its extended
Late Platonist form which included a sacralised idea of philosophy and inner states
of power as elite privileges, lying behind Plotinian discourse. We should also be
aware of the exclusionary performances of public secrecy in the various forms which
they take in Plotinus’ writing. But we would not posit that these social facts entirely
account for Plotinus’ motives. Any reader of the Enneads, and of Porphyry’s Life,
will be impressed by the sense of Plotinus’ benevolence and of a genuine desire
on his part to give the gift of the truth to his hearers and readers - a quality of the
philosopher which Porphyry calls piρᾳότης and Pierre Hadot has called ‘douceur’.1027
This thesis has delved into Plotinus’ convoluted attempts to give some account
of the highest realities, and of his denials of these very attempts. Perhaps too much
weight has been placed on the strictly logical side of this apophatic discourse: there
1027Porph. Plot. 13 9; Hadot 1963, 74.
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is no doubt that, for all his protestations and hesitations, Plotinus does wish to guide
his students in a particular direction, toward a transcendent goal which he sees as
the greatest of practical goods for the human soul. We need posit no mystical states
of consciousness in order to attribute such a motive to Plotinus in his indeterminate
writing of the interactions of levels of being and knowing; his metaphysics of know-
ing and being as it were demand that such states should exist and be available to
philosophers.
It should be admitted however that, to maintain a model of Plotinus whose con-
cerns in this regard are based purely in theory, rather than in his own lived encoun-
ters with what he considered higher states of being and knowing, is a reading which
few who are deeply familiar with his texts will credit. This thesis does not deny
‘Plotinus the mystic’, whatever that may mean precisely; it seeks rather to take seri-
ously Plotinus’ own rigorous exclusion of his readers, qua readers, from the states he
describes. We need not doubt Plotinus’ extraordinary inner life, but we may, and in-
deed must, doubt our ability to come to terms with it in a philological study or even
through the discursive pursuit of Plotinian dialectic. To do otherwise is in fact to ig-
nore Plotinus’ unsaying of the first principle, the encounter therewith, and even his
own ability to write an account of that encounter, and to apply a modern, academic
‘arrogance of interpretation’ to Plotinus’ acts of written silence.1028
In a way, the self-hiding secret that is the Plotinian ineffable removes some of the
‘arrogance of interpretation’ from his own brand of Platonic silence: the author does
not reveal the truth, but one is left with a strong sense that he would have, if he felt
that he could. If one accustoms oneself to the background of Platonist elitism and
assumptions about the natural hierarchy of mankind, Plotinus comes across as the
most generous of authors, indefatigably seeking to bestow the gift of the truth on
his hearers. And it may be that, with his exceptionally intricate and developed dis-
course of indeterminacy, Plotinus goes further in the direction of truly ‘saying’ the
ineffable than any of his more conservative forbears, and, equally, than the thinkers
1028On the ‘arrogance of interpretation’ see 151 above.
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who made up his Late Platonist legacy. Iamblichus, Proclus and others are philoso-
phers who, for all their insistence on the formal rigours of apophatic language and
strict negations, never seem to be able to conjure up the kind of ungraspable men-
tal openness which Plotinus’ discourses of the transcendent create in the reader’s
mind. Damascius may come closest, with his truly vexing negative dialectics, but
his works lack the warmth, immediacy, and narrative aspects of Plotinus’ accounts
of the philosophic quest. Plotinus seeks to open a literally infinite cognitive space
capable of comprehending the incomprehensible
This ‘openness’ is actually a further paradox of Plotinian discourse. As an eso-
teric perennialist, a philosopher who praises esotericism in his students, and who
was reluctant to publish his own works at all, Plotinus would seem to have no busi-
ness broadcasting the highest secrets of the true philosophy as he does. Indeed, his
philosophic seminar is described by Porphyry as open to all comers and he encour-
aged his listeners to question him, with the result that his classes were sometimes
disorderly and ‘full of idle talk’ (Plot. 1 13; 3 35-8). While he read his philosophical
tradition as esoteric, I have yet to find any evidence that Plotinus himself exercised
esotericism.1029 He truly pursues his calling of ‘exegete’.
But this is, of course, a problem, if the truth is to be hidden, or shielded from
the eyes and ears of the unphilosophic masses. I see no straightforward way to ac-
count for this problem if it is approached in a straightforward manner. If, however,
we choose to view these matters in the context of a culture of philosophic silence,
with its own rhetorical logic that established hiding and revealing as the proper ap-
proach to expressing the highest truths, it makes sense. I feel that the contours of
the tradition of philosophic silence outlined in this thesis provided a set of norms of
deportment which had an internal logic of its own, and the questions which mod-
ern interpreters might ask concerning the propriety or otherwise of this or that act
of hiding and revealing were not the questions which the ancients asked. For them,
1029Plotinus’ reference to an undisclosed enigma cited on page 248 above is certainly an example of
esoteric reading, and may have been an instance of esotericism; alternatively, it may have referred to
a statement which was well-known to his audience and could have been supplied by them.
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spoken, written, and gestural acts of hiding and revealing were a part of the way in
which philosophy was to be conducted.
Plotinus was no passive inheritor of this tradition of philosophic silence; on the
contrary, I would argue that his transformation of the primary locus of secrecy to the
self-hiding secrets of the ineffable one and the soul’s encounter therewith marked
a radical transformation of this tradition. And the most impressive result of this
transformation is the way in which Plotinus is able to use written silence as a most
eloquent and powerful tool of expression. The powers of language are subtle and,
it seems likely, not yet fully understood. Every statement, even the most down-to-
earth, has much in it of the unsaid, many levels of meaning which occur between
the lines. It is in this very subtle, evanescent realm of communication that Plotinus’
extended unfoldings of unsaying take effect.
Appendices
Appendix A: Notes on the Classical Roots of Transcendence
Since the publication in 1928 of Dodds’ seminal ‘The Parmenides of Plato and the
Origin of the Neoplatonist One’, the dominant tendency in Classical scholarship has
been to regard the rise of the transcendent first principle in Platonism, and particu-
larly in Plotinus, as an outcome of exegesis primarily of the Platonic dialogues and
secondarily of other Greek philosophical materials, particularly of Aristotle and the
commentary tradition.1030 The intellectual history which has emerged, painted in
broad strokes, is a more or less linear progression toward an idea of a first principle
which, whether it is an intellect, a monad, or something else, surpasses being and
essence.1031 The ‘good beyond being’ of Republic 509b8-9, the ‘beautiful itself’ of Sym-
posium 210e2-211b3, the ‘one beyond being’ of Parmenides 142a3-4, and many other
passages read in the light of these, provided exegetical materials for interpreters of
Plato seeking the primordial first principle, and contributed to their setting it, in an
absolute sense, beyond.1032
Speusippus in Later Philosophy of Transcendence. Such a transcendent con-
ception may well have been taken up by by Speusippus, Plato’s immediate successor
to the leadership of the Academy; it is at any rate certain that the lack of surviving
texts by Speusippus is a significant gap in our knowledge of the development of
1030 Especially important for this thesis are Charrue 1978, Dillon 1992, 192-193, Éon 1970, Mortley
1972, 1975, 1982, 1986, Whittaker 1969b, 1971, 1973, and Festugière 1981, esp. vol. IV, all of which
refine our understanding of the intellectual genealogy of the ineffable transcendent within the history
of Platonism and Neopythagoreanism.
1031Important general approaches to this development include Dodds 1928; Dörrie 1960; Aubenque
1971; Festugière 1981, IV, 6-140, esp. 6-17; Mortley 1986, I, 125-148. Burns 2004, 44-49 presents a
succinct summary of much of the material covered in the present section.
1032See generally Festugière 1981, 79-91. For a discussion of Pl. R. with regard to the transcendent in
Middle Platonism, see Whittaker 1969a; on Smp. see Festugière 1981, IV, 79-81. On the Prm. in this
connection, see below.
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the Platonist transcendent.1033 From the extant fragments, it is clear that Speusip-
pus posits a ‘one’ which is formally beyond essence and which, in many respects,
resembles the first principles which begin to appear in the writings of first and sec-
ond century Platonists.1034 Proclus says, in a text surviving in Latin translation, that
Speusippus and the antiqui (a usage which we may take as translating piαλαιοί or
ἀρχαῖοι, and generally taken to refer here to the Old Academy) held that the one
was ‘superior to being, and that from which being [arises], and they delivered it
even from the status of being a principle.’1035 Sadly, nothing survives of Speusippus
which might give us clues as to his negative literary method.1036 Relevant in the im-
mediate context, however, is the fact that the Late Platonists knew Speusippus and
quoted him in the context of the ontology of the Parmenides as a forerunner of their
metaphysics.1037
The Ontological Reading of the Parmenides. The article of Dodds (1928) men-
tioned above generated a great deal of research activity into the exegetical results
of the Platonists’ reading of Plato’s Parmenides, which has proved very fruitful for
our understanding of the development of ideas of transcendence. The Parmenides, to
modern eyes, shows Plato at play in the fields of ontological dialectic and, whatever
it may contain in terms of doctrine, is generally seen as among the most aporetic and
inconclusive of the dialogues. Dodds’ thesis is that an essential dynamic involved
in Late Platonist philosophy of the one was a metaphysical or ontological reading
of the Parmenides as primarily a dogmatic investigation of being, which naturally
gave rise to paradoxical conclusions and an idea of reality whose nature embraced
1033On Speusippus Dillon 2003 is the essential discussion.
1034Arist. fr. 34A, E F Lang. See Merlan 1970, 31-2; Mortley 1986, I, 134.
1035In Prm. Fr.48 Tarán, preserved in the medieval Latin of William of Moerbeke: Et ut Speusippus. . .
Le unum enim melius ente putantes et a quo le ens, et ab ea que secundum principium habitudine
ipsum liberaverunt (sic). Cf. Aet. ap. Stob. I.29, who reports that Speusippus differentiated the one
from nous.
1036Mortley 1986, I, 134.
1037Only one direct quotation from Speusippus in the Enneads is noted by Henry and Schwyzer (Plot-
inus cites fr. 30 at I.2[19]6.13), but Speusippus’ doctrine of the one seems cognate to that of Plotinus
on the basis of our scanty evidence: so Dodds 1928, 129-42, esp. 140 with n. 5; Merlan 1970, 31. We
might thus speculate that other citations of Speusippus would be found in the Enneads if we possessed
Speusippus’ works.
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paradox.1038 This thesis has largely been borne out, and with further research our
understanding of Late Platonist ontology and ideas of transcendence has substan-
tially increased.1039 The idea has been put forward that a chief difference between
Middle and Neoplatonist thought is the primary reliance of the former on Plato’s
Timæus for its ontology and cosmology, and the corresponding reliance of the latter
on the Parmenides;1040 this holds true in a general way, although, as Whittaker has
shown, ontological speculation based on the Parmenides is also found in the Middle
Platonist milieu, as well as in contemporary Christian circles.1041
The question of when the metaphysical reading of the Parmenides arose could be
settled more definitely if we could date the Turin Anonymus in Parmenidem. But this
text remains one of the unsolved mysteries of modern scholarship of Platonism;1042
whether it is indeed by Porphyry, as Pierre Hadot influentially argued,1043 or instead
arose in a pre-Plotinian, Middle Platonist milieu, as some scholars maintain,1044 can-
not in my view be shown conclusively one way or the other based on the current
evidence.1045 The Anonymus denies the possibility of knowledge of the one, based
on the principle that like is known only by like;1046 it denies its predicability with
strong negative statements: ‘It is neither one nor multiple, but transcends all that
which exists through it, so as to be above not only multiplicity, but even the concept
of “the one”. For through it [arise] the one and monad.’1047
1038Dodds 1928; cf. Merlan (1970, 22). This piραγματειώδης reading was only one hermeneutic ap-
proach to this dialogue in antiquity, and, from Book I of Proclus’ Commentary on the Parmenides
630–640 and other sources, we know that a fully aporetic school, as well as several other positions,
existed (see Strange 2007, 104-5).
1039Important works include Dodds 1928; Armstrong 1967, 15-28; Jackson 1967; Whittaker 1969a,
esp. 95-100; Gadamer 1983; Mortley 1986, I 126-132, 158; Heiser 1991, 60; Strange 2007, 104-5.
1040E.g. Turner 2007, 58.
1041Whittaker 1969a.
1042For the publishing history of this text, and a short bibliography, see Turner 2007, 68, and n. 32.
1043Hadot 1968.
1044E.g. Bechtle 1999, esp. 90-91; Corrigan 2001; Mazur 2010, 24-32.
1045Cf. Dillon 1987b, xxvii–xxx.
1046Anon. in Parm. IV 19ff. I follow the edition of Bechtle (1999, 21-36) here and throughout.
1047Anon. in Parm. II 10ff.: αὐτὸς δὲ οὔτε ἓν οὔτε piλῆθος, ἀλλὰ piάντων ὑpiερούσιος τῶν δι΄ αὐτὸν ὄντων·
ὥστε οὐ piλήθους μόνου ὑpiεράνω, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς τοῦ ἕνος ἐpiινοίας· δι΄ αὐτὸν γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἓν καὶ μονάς. On
apophatic language in the Anonymus, see Hadot 1968, Vol. 2, 65 ff.
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For Plotinus, Plato’s Parmenides is a text of the utmost importance. Of most signif-
icance to this thesis is his use of the dialogue’s paradoxes as formulations expressing
ineffability and the inadequacy of discursive thought. Plotinus often cites the dia-
logue’s puzzling statement that ‘there is no λόγος of the one’;1048 the use of this and
other negative or privative loci from the dialogue have been taken by scholars as
indications that Plotinus was a rationalist rather than a mystic in his conception of
the one.1049 But the point, in terms of the philosophy of ineffability, is that the logical
gymnastics of the Parmenides, when read as metaphysical statements, lead to a state
of affairs which cannot be expressed by any of the normal modes of λόγος to which
‘rationalism’ might normally be taken to refer.
Appendix B: The Plotinian Idea of Tradition and ‘Platonism’
Plotinus’ self-definition in terms of tradition illuminates not only the particular
lineage which he envisages, which in turn sheds light on aspects of his philosophy
such as the authority of canonical sources and the role of the philosophic exegete,
but also his defensive positioning of his philosophy vis à vis other schools. This con-
struction of identity also sounds a cautionary note for modern readers of Plotinus.
Plotinus defines the true philosophic path as one descending through a chosen lin-
eage of Hellenic philosophers, a transmission paralleled by an esoteric transmission
of truth through Hellenic religious institutions. What we nowhere see is Plotinus
defining himself as a ‘Platonist’.
Setting aside self-definition for a moment, it is clear, and worth emphasising,
that Plotinus is, in fact, primarily indebted to the Platonic corpus in his philosophi-
cal project. In the index fontium to their edition of the Enneads, Henry and Schwyzer
note hundreds of references to the Platonic corpus, roughly the same number as to all
other authors taken together.1050 If the term Platonist is taken to mean ‘a philosopher
1048Pl. Prm. 142a; cited at Enn. V.4[7]1.9; VI.9[9]4.1-2, 5.31, 11.11; VI.2[19]7.22, 9.6; V.5[32]6.12;
VI.7[38]41.37-38; V.3[49]13.4, 14.2.
1049E.g. Dodds (1928), Heiser (1991, 60).
1050H + S 1 Vol. III 436-462.
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treating Plato as a dogmatic thinker and considering his own thought to be in agree-
ment with that of Plato’, Plotinus is, in terms of the history of ideas, undoubtedly a
Platonist.1051
But it is essential not to overwrite Plotinus’ understanding of his intellectual tra-
dition with our own by ignoring the complexities of self-definition found in the En-
neads. We may rightly consider him to be a Platonist, but this does not justify our
stating that Plotinus claims to be an ‘orthodox Platonist’.1052 The standard English
translation of Armstrong regularly inserts the word ‘Platonist’ into the text, while
piλατωνικός or equivalent terms never appear in the Enneads.1053 Armstrong’s transla-
tion of εἴpiερ ἄξιοι τῆς piροσηγορίας φαμὲν εἶναι (V.8[31]4.55) as ‘If we claim to be worthy
of our title [of Platonists]’ is an example of the translator overstepping the boundary
between his identification and Plotinus’ own. Other errors can arise from overex-
tending this anachronistic category. Blumenthal writes, discussing Plotinus: ‘All the
Platonists of late antiquity regarded themselves as Platonists tout simple. . . .The de-
gree of self-deception involved in this self-concept is perhaps nowhere clearer than
in their discussions of soul and intellect.’1054 To claim a self-identity for the Platon-
ists which they did not claim for themselves, and then to berate them for failing to
live up to it (in this case, mainly because of their use of Aristotelean ideas, which,
of course, was an acceptable perennialist practice, as discussed in Chapter 3 above)
is problematic to say the least, and perhaps involves a typically modern form of
self-deception.
Plotinus’ omission of ‘Platonism’ from the Enneads can be contextualised in terms
of his approach to tradition. It must firstly be taken into account that Plotinus is not
in the habit of naming either his sources or the schools of philosophy which he is
discussing: Plato himself is mentioned by name only about forty-five times in the
Enneads out of hundreds of references to the dialogues. Clearly, his name could
1051This definition of ‘Platonist’ seems to be what scholars generally mean by the term, although it is
itself rarely subjected to critical scrutiny or defined (but see n. 4 above).
1052As claimed by Merlan 1970, 14 n. 1; cf. Athanassiadi 2006, 23.
1053E.g. Armstrong 2003 V.8[31]4.55 (vol. 5 p. 252); I.4[46]3.16-18 (vol. I, p. 179) et passim.
1054Blumenthal 1996, 82.
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often be taken as understood by an educated philosophic readership; sometimes,
too, Plato is referred to simply as ‘he’, in a usage reminiscent of the Pythagorean
ipse dixit.1055 But we often find Platonic doctrines cited, not simply anonymously,
but with a positive attribution to the perennial philosophy under the name of ‘the
ancients’1056 or, in Against the Gnostics, that of ‘the Hellenes’.1057 Far from being
simply tacit references to Plato, these are ascriptions of Plato’s thought to a larger
tradition.
Plotinus, then, tends not to name his sources, even the most important, or the
schools of thought under discussion. This might seem to argue for supplying the
term ‘Platonist’ in translations of the Enneads, or at least in explanatory notes. After
all, he names neither Stoics nor Epicureans, but deals with their ideas in unmistak-
able contexts where it is justifiable to insert their names in an explanatory manner;
surely recognisably Platonist doctrines might be dealt with in the same way. To do
so, however, is to ignore the positive statements which Plotinus does make regard-
ing the tradition to which he belongs, discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis. These
statements are rarely taken seriously in scholarship. Because modern scholars do
not see the Platonist doctrines which Plotinus finds in ‘Pythagoras, Pherecydes, and
others of their school’ in early Greek philosophy, but rather in Plato, Plotinus’ con-
struction of tradition is easy to discount. Before doing so, however, we must very
carefully distinguish between Plotinus’ thought as the history of ideas sees it and his
thought as he defines it.
A comparative instance may be helpful in this connection. Reading Origen, one
might remark his deep debt to Platonist thinking, and comment that he is a Platon-
ising Christian author; but one would never argue that ‘he claims to be an orthodox
Platonist’, since his claims to be a Christian are undeniable. Extending this compari-
son, it would seem strange to argue that ‘Origen says he is a Christian, but he is really
a Platonist’, a type of argument which Blumenthal seems to be making with regard
1055Rist 1964b, 57; cf. Charrue 1978, 40 on the use of ἔφη in a similar manner.
1056E.g. III.7[45]1.13-16-7.10-17; V.1[10]8.10-14.
1057II.9[33]6 passim.
APPENDIX B: THE PLOTINIAN IDEA OF TRADITION AND ‘PLATONISM’ 272
to Platonism and Plotinus in the quotation above, in essence saying that ‘Plotinus
says he is a Platonist, but he is really some kind of hybrid Platonist-Aristotelean’.
One of the main criteria by which scholars identify membership in a school of
thought is that of self-definition, and Platonist self-definition is heterogeneous and
problematic: aside from the greater or lesser claims to an immemorial tradition of
truth made by different Middle Platonists, there is the problem of the Academy,
which some, such as Plutarch, sought to ‘steal back’ from the sceptics for the dog-
matist camp,1058 while others, such as Numenius, sought to prove its utter lack of
connection to Plato.1059 Unlike other recognised schools of philosophy of the time of
Plotinus, the hairesis which we call ‘Platonist’ actually lacked the recognised pedigree
enjoyed by the Stoic and Epicurean schools, and to a lesser degree by the Peripatet-
ic.1060 Platonism was, in fact, somewhat parvenue; we first find a Platonist school
of thought referred to as such (as piλατωνικοί/platonici) only in the second century
CE.1061 Platonism was thus a strictly post-Hellenistic movement,1062 quite modern
in Plotinus’ time, and of course had an interest in compensating for what might be
perceived as a lack of philosophic gravitas by positing a very august tradition for it-
self. In a recent book Athanassiadi has discussed the struggle for ‘orthodoxy’ among
Late Platonists;1063 we might speak as well of a struggle for identity.
1058Plutarch wrote a lost ‘On the Unity of the Academy’ (see Brittain 2001, 225-36), and defined
himself as an ‘Academic’ (ibid. 223), a label which later Platonists avoid, perhaps due to the influence
of Numenius’ attack on the Academics as betrayers of Plato.
1059See 131 above.
1060The debate over the ‘unity of the Academy’, which arose with Philo of Larissa and his pupil
Antiochus of Ascalon (see Dillon 1982, 62 ff.; Brittain 2001, 220-254), may helpfully be seen as in
part motivated by various attempts to construct such a pedigree (cf. Brittain 2001, 223). Platonism
also lacked a series of diadochoi to give it notional continuity, and even after the founding of the
official chair by Marcus Aurelius in the year 176 there seems to have been no universally recognised
succession until Proclus’ time (see Blumenthal 1978; Glucker 1978; ).
1061The term piλατωνικός/platonicus appears earlier than this in literature (i.e. Cic. N.D. 1.72-3; see
Brittain 2001, 223-4, n. 8) and in inscriptions (in first-century inscriptions from Ephesus; see Lim
1995, 32 n. 9), but Glucker persuasively argues that it does not yet refer to a philosophical hairesis
(1978, 206-225). Numenius’ reference to ‘Krantor the Platonist’ (fr. 25 ll. 12-13) is an example of the
new meaning of the term being constructed in the second century, although Numenius was, as we
have seen, concerned to identify both himself and Plato with a perennial tradition associated with
Pythagoras rather than with any ‘Platonism’.
1062It may be that members of the Early Academy were Platonists in the sense defined here; this
exception to the rule is worth noting, although it is irrelevant to the problem of self-definition under
discussion.
1063Athanassiadi 2006.
APPENDIX C: ESOTERIC HERMENEUTICS, PLATO, AND ARISTOTLE IN PLOTINUS 273
It is right, then, to discuss Platonism and Plotinus’ role in it, but wrong to say
that Plotinus defines himself as a Platonist. By claiming to belong to a Platonist
school, Plotinus would be making a fairly limited claim to authority; what he is
in fact claiming is something much greater, a lineage with the cultural authority of
Hellenism as a whole and a uniquely privileged access to truth.
Appendix C: Esoteric Hermeneutics, Plato, and Aristotle in Plotinus
Plato and the Ancients. Plato presents special hermeneutic problems for Ploti-
nus. Plotinus sees Plato as offering different opinions on the same subject at differ-
ent times;1064 while a modern reader might posit an evolution in Plato’s thought, or
aporetic rather than dogmatic aims on Plato’s part, this option is closed to a peren-
nialist Platonist.1065 As argued by Alain Éon, Plotinus’ solution to this apparent
problem lies in positing an underlying unity of thought behind apparent contra-
dictions.1066 The question then arises: if Plato’s contradictions hide an underlying
knowledge, is this an intentional hiding, an esotericism?
We will arrive at a positive answer to this question when we take into account
Plotinus’ statements that Plato, although the philosopher who excels all others in
ἀκριβεῖα, is sometimes obscure,1067 that he contradicts himself,1068 and that his com-
ments are sometimes intended to force aspiring philosophers to work for the truth
rather than simply to find it laid out for them.1069 Considered in conjunction with the
1064IV.8[31]1.27; cf. IV.4[28]22; III.5[36]8.7-11, where various contradictory Platonic treatments of
Zeus are considered, and that of the Philebus accepted as ‘the clearest’ (σαφέστερον), in that it makes
Zeus an intellect, which fits with Plotinus’ own schema.
1065There is no evidence that Plotinus saw Plato’s thought as evolving over time; see 155 above. We
have seen Plutarch theorise a difference in styles of esotericism between the early and late Plato, but
no difference in doctrine (85 above).
1066The argument at Eon 1970, 264, built on statements culled throughout the Enneads, is worth laying
out here: Plato says different things at different times (IV.8[31]1.27); he makes our aporia greater,
not less (IV.4[28]22.12); but we know he is not just talking nonsense (III.6[1]11.34); therefore, the
contradictions must be merely apparent. He has left us the task of figuring it out for ourselves, if we
are to be worthy of our title [sc. of true philosophers] (V.8[31]4.53-54).
1067Plato obscure and aporetic: II.9[33]1.23; IV.4[28]22.12.
1068See n. 1064.
1069V.8[31]4.53-54. Cf. IV.8[31]1.11-17, a discussion of Heraclitus, where the possibility is raised that
his obscurity ‘is so that we might figure it out for ourselves’, a kind of propaedeutic silence or mys-
tification; the following remarks (IV.8[31]1.21) that Empedocles is obscure, as is Pythagoras, in the
things he and his school has put in enigmas (ᾐνίττοντο), may be read in a similar light, especially as
Plato is then mentioned (24-27) as being the most clear author on the subject under investigation, and
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comments on Platonist enigma below, a decidedly esoteric Plato emerges from these
passages of the Enneads, whose works conceal deeper truths from the casual reader.
If this reconstruction of Platonist esotericism as understood by Plotinus is correct,
it bears a methodological resemblance to the esotericisms outlined by Clement of
Alexandria in the Stromateis and by Leo Strauss1070 - the truth is hidden in plain
sight by being ‘scattered’ throughout a body of work, and can be reassembled only
by the philosophically adept reader.
Scholars disagree as to how Plotinus’ relationship with Plato ought to be defined.
Some argue that Plotinus does not consider it permissible to disagree with Plato,
who is seen as basically infallible,1071 while others argue for a more complex model
of a respect tempered by Plotinus’ philosophic originality.1072 I find the view of Alain
Éon the most persuasive: Plato is authoritative but not in an absolute way, he himself
being merely an exegete (albeit the most clear exegete) of the ancient tradition.1073
As Plotinus says, ‘We have discussed our view of essence and how it might accord
with the thought of Plato.’1074
The way in which Plotinus needs from time to time to ‘manage’ awkward Pla-
tonic statements creatively in order to bring them in line with what he sees as the
truth1075 support this view: Plato is, of course, never directly contradicted, but his
personal philosophic choices are not the criterion of authority in themselves, but
insofar as they bear witness to the ancient wisdom. Plotinus sometimes gently ‘cor-
rects’ Plato, as at VI.9[9]3.43-4. Plotinus has been discussing the nature of the one,
as transcending space and time, and then cites the description of the Beautiful from
Symposium 211b1 - ‘itself by itself with a single form (μονοειδές)’ - and says, ‘but
as saying different things at different times.
1070See Appendix E, 293 ff.
1071Schwyzer, Real Encyclopædie XXI, 43 col. 550 s.v. ‘Plotinos’; cf. Armstrong 1990c, 421.
1072E.g. Rist 1961, 163; Rist 1967b, 180 ff.; Dillon 1992. Gatti 1996, 18-9 gives a convenient list of
references for various modern interpretive tendencies regarding Plotinus’ relationship with Plato.
1073Eon 1970, 263.
1074VI.3[20]1.1-2.
1075III.4 passim is an extended example of Plotinus’ harmonising multiple comments of Plato on the
soul in order to reach a Plotinian conclusion. Cf. III.6[1]19 ff. On creative contresens in Plotinus see
154 ff. above.
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rather without form’ (μᾶλλον δὲ ἀνείδεον). When considering Plotinus’ approach to
Plato, then, we must take into account the fact that Plato is read as an esoteric author,
behind whose thought lies a coherent body of doctrine, the doctrine of the Ancients.
Aristotle and the Ancients. The position of Aristotle in the Enneads is an excel-
lent illustration of the way the canonicity and strong authority of the ancients can
shape Plotinian argument and his approach to what he wishes to say. It is not un-
common for modern scholars to depict Plotinus as ‘anti-Aristotelean’.1076 But Plot-
inus is in fact very careful and measured in his treatment of Aristotle. He often
questions Aristotle’s conclusions, and often attempts to make them conform to his
own, and thus to the Ancients’, doctrines,1077 but never as far as I can see treats them
as unworthy of consideration in the way he is happy to do with Stoic or Epicurean
doctrines.1078
Our approach should be tempered by what Porphyry tells us of Peripatetic doc-
trines, especially doctrines drawn from the Metaphysics of Aristotle, interspersed
throughout the Enneads,1079 and the numerous modern scholars whose detailed in-
vestigations into Plotinus’ debt to Aristotle leave no doubt of the intrinsic impor-
tance of Aristotelean ideas in Plotinus’ thought.1080 We should also not ignore the
1076E.g. Frede 1994, 5198; Athanassiadi 2006, 94, 146-8: ‘franchement hostile’.
1077See e.g. IV.6[41]6.19-20 (with reference to De anima Γ 5.430a2-3 and 7.431a1-2) and I.54 (with
reference to Eth. Nic. VII.14.1153b10-12), where this process of negotiation is very clear. The former
passage is a comment to the effect that Aristotle is right, provided we understand his comments (in
the De anima) in precisely the opposite way to how he meant them! Logically, this is a statement that
Aristotle is wrong; rhetorically, it is something else, a more subtle and open-ended tactic of inclusion.
Cf. VI.1[42]11.23-28.
1078Ennead VI.1, the first section of the large treatise On the Kinds of Being, is a good example of this
attitude. Its first 24 chapters consist in a detailed critique of Aristotle’s theory of Categories (a critique
which sometimes aims to ‘Platonise’ the Categories rather than refuting them, as at VI.1[42]11.23-28),
and the final six in a critique of the Stoic theory of types of being. While the former is definitely seen as
problematic and in need of correction, the latter is repeatedly called ‘absurd’ (ἄτοpiος), and the more
cursory treatment it is given, justified on the grounds that there would be no point in attempting
to defeat a manifestly absurd position (28.1 ff.). Plotinus rarely considers Epicurean views worthy
of detailed consideration (e.g. III.7[45]7.15-16, where he proposes to ignore them, concentrating on
views that are ‘somewhat worthy of discussion’ (τὰ μάλιστα ἀξίως λόγου)).
1079Porph. Plot. 14, 4-7: ᾿Εμμέμικται δ΄ ἐν τοῖς συγγράμμασι καὶ τὰ Στωικὰ λανθάνοντα δόγματα καὶ
τὰ Περιpiατητικὰ· καταpiεpiύκνωται δὲ καὶ ἡ Μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ τοῦ Α᾿ριστοτέλους piραγματεία. The word
λανθάνοντα is usually taken to refer to both the Stoic and Peripatetic doctrines here, but the syntax,
and also Plotinus’ and Porphyry’s relationship with Aristotle, makes me wonder whether it is only
the Stoic doctrines which are meant to be tacitly lurking in the Enneads.
1080From an extensive literature, see, on Plotinus’ reading of Aristotle generally, Eon 1970, 267-
70; 282-8. Detailed studies of the transformation of Aristotelean materials in the Enneads include
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statement by Hierocles of Alexandria (fifth century) that Plotinus’ teacher Ammo-
nius Saccas himself had harmonised Plato and Aristotle.1081 Taking these testimonies
into account, we might ask how it would be possible to characterise Plotinus as
anti-Aristotelean at all.
The way out of this conundrum lies, firstly, in attending to the important distinc-
tion between an author’s self-definition and the influences, hidden and overt, which
readers may find in his work. Plotinus does indeed find many of Aristotle’s ideas to
be wrong; this is one point. A second point is that Plotinus is deeply indebted to as-
pects of Aristotle’s thought. Both of these points should inform a nuanced picture of
Plotinus’ debt to Aristotle. But there is a third point, often underplayed or ignored,
which is that Plotinus presents Aristotle as a member, albeit wayward, of the great
tradition, and thus as a canonical author, with certain unwritten rules governing the
way his material should be approached.
Secondly, we find in Plotinus a specific criticism of Aristotle which makes good
sense of that philosopher’s ambivalent position vis à vis ‘the tradition’; namely, his
fondness for ‘innovation’.1082 Understood in the light of Platonist perennialism, Plot-
inus’ reception of Aristotle is that of a critical thinker trying to square the teachings
of a student of Plato’s with the master’s own. On balance, Aristotle is seen by Ploti-
nus as a somewhat backward member of the αἵρεσις of the ancients, but a member all
the same.1083 The lateness of Aristotle’s contribution to philosophy, understood as a
mark of a decadence which had occurred in the transmission of the perennial wis-
dom, supports this suspicion;1084 as we have seen, Plato is seen by Plotinus as the
final contributor to the tradition in its purest phase.1085 The (much more virulent)
attack on innovation in Against the Gnostics (discussed p. 144 ff.) further elucidates
Merlan 1969; Szlezák 1979; Karamanolis 2006, 216-242; Chiaradonna 1998 provides further bibliog-
raphy. Gersh sees transformations of Aristotelean doctrines as absolutely central to Late Platonist
metaphysics (e.g. 1978, 28; 32-33; 45; 58; etc.).
1081Hierocles ap. Phot. Bibl. Cod. 214 172a; see Karamanolis 2006, 191-195.
1082See V.1[10]9.1.11. See discussion at Eon 1970, 267-270; 282-8.
1083Cf. Armstrong, discussing the long argument with Aristotle’s Categories in Enneads VI.1-3:
‘Aristotle is treated as if he were a bad and metaphysically unintelligent Platonist. . . ’ (2003, VI, 7).
1084Charrue 1978, 20-1.
1085138 above.
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this understanding of philosophic history in Plotinus.
Appendix D: Some Notes on Plotinian Metaphysics
Hypostasis. The basic unit of Plotinian reality, often referred to for convenience
as a “level”, is the hypostasis. For Plotinus, as is well known, there are three primary
hypostases: the one or good, which is transcendent and ineffable; nous or intellect,
which is the ‘first god’, the first being, and the origin of all subsequent manifestation;
and soul, the hypostasis which creates the world of bodies and the senses. This ‘three
hypostasis system’ is the position put forth forcefully in Against the Gnostics, where
Plotinus is concerned with refuting what he sees as unnecessary and wrong-headed
multiplication of intermediaries in the schema of reality.1086
But, while in this polemical context Plotinus makes a stand on the position of
‘three hypostases’, the meaning of this term in his work as a whole is more generally
‘a truly real thing’ and is not limited to the primary realities of the one, nous, and soul.
In modern terms, a hypostasis is something that ‘really exists’, rather than something
which exists only in thought or appearance.1087 The term ‘hypostasis’ also implies
eternity:1088 its nature is to exist always (although not necessarily to ‘be’ at all).1089
Additionally, Plotinian hypostases are by definition non-extended;1090 hence bodies,
with their temporal and dimensional extension, cannot by definition be hypostases.
The old philosophic usage of the English ‘substance’, following the meaning of the
scholastic Latin substantia, would have supplied the best single term of translation
1086II.9[33]1-2; many other treatises discuss the three primary hypostases (e.g. notably V.1[10]1,
V.1[10]8), but Against the Gnostics is unique in its insistence on ‘three and only three’ (Anton 1977,
258 n. 1).
1087Oosthout 1991, 18-19. Anton gives further useful characterisation of the Plotinian hypostasis
(Anton 1977, 258 n. 2).
1088The difficult problem of whether this hypostatic eternity is an eternity properly so called, a nunc
stans, or something else altogether is addressed most thoroughly by Sorabji (1983; cf. Whittaker 1971),
and must be regarded as unresolved for the purposes of this thesis. It may be said with confidence,
however, that temporal statements of eternity regarding hypostases are a use of time-bound lan-
guage for non-temporal realities, a problematic feature of language which Plotinus sees as a painful
necessity (see 202 below).
1089As discussed in Chapter Five and throughout this thesis, the ‘existence’ of the highest hypostasis
cannot be said to involve being, but it also cannot be said to be non-existent in the sense that it is
‘unreal’.
1090VI.3[20]8.35 ff; VI.9[9]6.10-12. See Rist, 1961, 161; Anton 1977, 258 n.2.
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for hypostasis, but its current usage has evolved in an opposite direction from the
Plotinian meaning, to indicate a physical ingredient or material.
The term ‘levels of reality’, while itself inadequate, is preferable to ‘levels of be-
ing’; the one or good is the primary hypostasis, but cannot be said to ‘be’, existing
ἐpiέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας.1091 In attempting to think in terms of hypostasis, it is important
to try to dissociate the concept of hypostatic reality, or even ‘truth’ understood in a
radical sense, from that of ‘existence’ or ‘being’. This is no mean mental feat, and it
is one Plotinus expends considerable energy on.
The three primary hypostases are not the only hypostases for Plotinus: light may
be described as a hypostasis, as may wisdom1092 and other things that have reality.
The verbal form ὑφίστημι is also used to express what we would call the ‘reality’ of a
thing in many contexts.1093 We can thus identify a polysemantic sphere of meanings
for hypostasis in Plotinus: the primary levels of reality are the most important and
commonly occurring instances, but other things which are truly real may be said
to be hypostases, although this does not make them basic structural components of
reality.
We should thus be careful when speaking of a ‘three-hypostasis cosmology’ in
the Enneads because the term hypostasis has a broader meaning than simply the
three primary levels of reality. We should also beware of the convenience of such a
schematised approach because the interrelations, and finally the fundamental unity,
of the hypostases militate against the idea that Plotinus saw reality as a series of
‘levels’;1094 he saw it as a structured and dynamic unity.
1091See 195 ff. above.
1092IV.5[29]6.4 ff. (light); I.4[46]9.18 (wisdom). As noted by Oosthout 1991, 18-19.
1093See Sleeman and Pollet 1980 s.v.
1094Oosthout 1991, 17-19, following Deck 1967, 9 n. 5, points out that the usage of hypostasis primar-
ily to indicate a ‘metaphysical system’ in Plotinus may owe something to the titles given to certain
treatises rather than to Plotinus’ writings themselves, notably those of Enneads V.1, Περὶ τῶν τρίων
ἀρχικῶν ὑpiοστασέων and V.3, Περὶ τῶν γνωριστικῶν ὑpiοστασέων καὶ τοῦ ἐpiέκεινα. These titles, as was
common in antiquity, were really short descriptions originating with the reading public rather than
with the author, and Porphyry tells us that his choices of title were determined by which title had
gained the most currency (Plot. 4). They may thus preserve late antique oversimplifications similar
to those used by modern interpreters; we have no reason to think that Plotinus did not know of and
approve these titles (Heiser 1991, 42 n. 11), but the presentation of reality as a series of three ‘levels’
is atypical of the Enneads as a whole.
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We should also use caution when speaking of the one as a hypostasis. Plotinus
calls it ‘hypostasis’ at VI.8[39]15.30; cf. 20.11, but in a context where he has already
stated that he is ‘not speaking properly’ (οὐκ ὀρθῶς, VI.8[39]13.1-5); elsewhere he
states that it is a ‘quasi-hypostasis’ (VI.8[39]7.47, term coined by Deck 1967, 9 n.
5), that it precedes hypostasis (VI.8[39]10.37: piρὸ ὑpiοστάσεως), or otherwise ‘has’
hypostasis (V.6[24]3.11; VI.8[39]13.43-4). As with all attributes, ‘hypostasis’ can only
be applied to the one provisionally or metaphorically (see 194 ff.). Anton (1977, 261-
4) argues against this position, stating that the one must be a full hypostasis with
all that this entails; his argument, however, rests on the unsupported statement that
‘Plotinus believes that it is impossible that contradictory statements are forthcoming
when we speak correctly about the One’ (ibid. 259). As argued in Chapter Seven,
Plotinus makes many references to speaking ‘incorrectly’ about the one, but I find
none whatever to speaking ‘correctly’; kataphatic statements are always to be read
as ‘improper speech’, and even the negative statements which Plotinus is sometimes
content to make in the context of the transcendent first reality are denied the status
of true statements.
The ‘Law of Undiminished Giving’ of Hypostasis. An important characteristic of the
Plotinian hypostasis is its productive quality. A logical axiom running through Plot-
inus’ work is that simpler and more perfect realities give rise to more complex and
less perfect realities; a complementary doctrine is that a producer must be, by defi-
nition, greater than its product.1095 Because it is good, every hypostasis has a kind
of integral, overflowing plenitude which automatically produces images of its good-
ness. This ‘giving rise to’ is an unwilled process akin to ‘generation’ in the mod-
ern sense of the term; the hypostasis remains unaffected by what it produces,1096
and does not know anything about the lower ontological realities to which it gives
rise.1097
1095E.g. III.8[51]8.46-8, 9.43, 10.1-19. See Wallis 1972, 61; Anton 1977, 258 n. 2; Mortley 1986, II, 47.
1096III.8[51]8 46-48 and 10.1-19.
1097See Anton 1977, 258 n. 2: the one is beyond knowing altogether (VI.7[38]39.19-33), but even the
‘knowing hypostases’ (αἱ γνωριστικαὶ ὑpiοστάσεις) intellect and soul know only the causal principles
(logoi) they contain within themselves, rather than the products of these principles (IV.4[28]9.16-18;
V.8[31]3.26-27). This doctrine stems most directly from Plotinus’ conviction that true knowledge must
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Hypostasis thus generates or produces through its own nature. A favourite im-
age in this context for Plotinus is that of light: light is not diminished by illuminating,
but continues to be simply light, whatever its apparent extent in space.1098 Whether
Plotinus intends this as a metaphor for the undiminished giving of hypostasis, like
his images of radiating heat and cold,1099 or rather as a concrete example1100 (since
light, as discussed above, can be described as a hypostasis),1101 it is the philoso-
pher’s favourite image for the productive action of hypostasis, hence the common
metaphor of ‘emanation’ to describe this activity.
Logos. Plotinus recognises two basic meanings of logos. The first is the logos fa-
miliar to all students of Hellenic culture, a complex term including in its semantic
sphere the concepts ‘speech’, ‘argument’, ‘rational account’, and ‘definition’.1102 The
second type of logos in Plotinus is an immaterial metaphysical principle responsible
for the formation of the universe as it is; Armstrong translates ‘rational formative
principle’, which gives something of the flavour of what is meant.1103
Stoicism had been the first philosophic movement to elevate logos to a principle
of physical reality, making spoken logos into logos prophorikos, an outward expression
of an innate rational principle.1104 The Stoic logos is of course a material principle.
Plotinus is the first philosophic proponent of a logos transformed into an immaterial
be self-knowledge, and so there can be no true knowledge of that which is external. It remains con-
troversial whether Plotinus sees the soul as generating matter itself, as opposed to the matter-Form
composite which constitutes bodies: O’Brien 1981, Gerson 1994, 263-4 n. 23 argue for, Corrigan 1986
against the thesis that he does.
1098E.g. V.4[7]1.23-41; V.1[10]6.28-40; V.3[49]12.39-44. See above all Beierwaltes 1961; cf. Wallis 1972,
61; Armstrong 1967, 54-8.
1099See Wallis 1972, 61.
1100As argued by Beierwaltes 1961; cf. Mortley 1975, 370-1.
1101I.6[1]3.18-19; IV.5[29]7.41; II.1[53]7.26-8.
1102On the historical and etymological development of this term from Homer onwards, with an em-
phasis on philosophy, see Mortley 1986, I, 11 ff. On the Plotinian logos generally, see Deck 1967,
56-63.
1103Cf. Deck 1967, 56-63.
1104Mortley (1986, I, 16-39) discusses possible earlier appearances of logos as a philosophic ἀρχή, con-
cluding that Aristotle’s use of the term was especially influential in the transfer between the older
Hellenic idea of logos as primarily an activity of speech and mind and the later idea of logos as a
cosmic principle (see list of Aristotelean passages ibid. 26-7).
APPENDIX D: SOME NOTES ON PLOTINIAN METAPHYSICS 281
principle,1105 and, in terms of the history of philosophic ideas, his use of logos is gen-
erally seen as a development of the Stoic idea in a Platonist context,1106 with Philo of
Alexandria, as often, occupying an ill-defined place in the chain of development of
the idea.1107 It may be that we should also take into account the influence of contem-
porary religious movements on Plotinus in this connection, as the widespread use
of logos as a term for a divine entity across a broad range of Græco-Roman religious
movements was already well-established by Plotinus’ time. 1108
There is no doubt that logos is a creative or ordering principle: Plotinus makes
this abundantly clear.1109 The Plotinian logoi in a seed are what make it grow into
a particular plant; the logoi in nous make reality ‘grow’ into just such a reality as it
is.1110 But logos is sometimes given an almost independent existence in the scheme
of things, to the point that Armstrong was tempted to accord it the status of hy-
postasis,1111 while at other times it seems to be a synonym for ‘that which makes,
inasmuch as it makes’: thus, soul is a logos in its function of making the cosmos.1112
For the purposes of this thesis the problematic nature of the metaphysical logos in
Plotinus may stand as an unanswered question. Its function, however, is fairly clear:
the logos is an immaterial presence of some kind latent within a reality which causes
it to flower forth in a certain way into manifestation. It is the mechanism by which
the undiminished giving of hypostasis takes place.
1105Witt 1931, 104-5; Cf. Deck 1967, 56. As Witt notes, the logos had already been ‘dematerialised’ in
some Neopythagorean speculations (citing Syrian. in Metaph. XIII.6, where the logoi of the monad give
rise to number), but it is with Plotinus that we see the logos come into its own as a key metaphysical
concept (ibid.).
1106E.g. Deck 1967, 56.
1107See Witt 1931.
1108E.g. the opening lines of the Book of John; possibly in the Chaldæan Oracles (fr. 186 bis; this may
however be an importation of Platonist ideas by Olympiodorus; see note Majercik 1989, 210). Philo’s
development of the concept of logos is an example of the interaction of religious and philosophic
tropes which was, if anything, typical of the Alexandrian milieu where Plotinus studied, and which
had only increased in the intervening years between the two thinkers.
1109At II.7[54]3 Plotinus differentiates between the two types of logos, the first being a clarifying def-
inition which tells what a thing is, and the second actually making a thing: Δεῖ δὲ τὸν λόγον τούτον,
εἰ μή ἐστιν ἄλλως ὥσpiερ ὁρισμὸς δηλωτικὸς τοῦ τί ἐστι τὸ piράγμα, ἀλλὰ λόγος piοιῶν piρᾶγμα, κτλ.
1110III.2[19]2.18 ff.
1111Armstrong 1967, 98-108. See critique at Deck 1967, 63 n. 7.
1112IV.3[49]5.
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Appendix E: Philosophic Silence and Plotinian Religion
The Problem of Religion and the ‘Underworld of Platonism’. A majority of
scholars now see the rise of the transcendent absolute in late antique philosophy
as primarily the result of exegesis of the Platonist tradition, often incorporating the
more difficult-to-define Neopythagorean tradition. Whittaker traces the origin of
ideas of the transcendent absolute in putative Neopythagorean sources (which most-
ly do not survive);1113 most take a view which combines the two streams, Platonist
and (Neo)Pythagorean.1114 While other scholars emphasise the importance of reli-
gious movements in this connection, especially of Gnosticism, but of course of others
as well,1115 there is a curious reluctance to consider the influence of religions on phi-
losophy in the same way that philosophy is universally agreed to have influenced
religions of the period.
However, the a priori grounds for such a model of one-way borrowing are lack-
ing, and it often strains the evidence to posit such a one-way movement of influence;
as the materials discussed in this thesis illustrate, the parallels between Plotinus’ ac-
counts of philosophic ascent and Gnostic tropes are striking, while the simple doctri-
nal belief in the first principle’s ineffability seems often to be the only feature held in
common with Middle Platonist philosophy. While the philosophical methodology,
especially as regards dialectic, seems to differentiate philosophy proper very clear-
ly from religious movements, in practice there is much blurring at the edges.1116 I
argue not only the fairly obvious point that religious concerns cannot be separated
1113Whittaker 1973.
1114E.g. Festugière’s basic model, that of a twofold rise in ideas of transcendence stemming from
1. Plato, the Old Academy, and Pythagorean speculations about the monad, and 2: Neoplatonist
exegesis of the dialogues (Festugière 1981, IV, 5).
1115The influence of Gnosticism on Plotinus has been and continues to be hotly debated; see Mazur
2010, 17-25 for a recent history of the debates. Festugière (1981) presents a detailed exposition of
the Hermetic texts which shows their inseparability from Middle Platonism as a broad milieu, and
specifically as part of the rise of the ineffable transcendent (esp. Vol. IV), but for the most part
prudently restrains himself from ambitious statements regarding who took what from whom. For
Hellenistic Judaism as a source for Middle Platonist negation and negative theologic textual practice
see Palmer 1983, n.11; cf. Daniélou 1973, 323-8.
1116Cf. generally Burns 2004, 43; see with regard to Gnosticism Mazur 2010, 14-21 et passim.
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from philosophic concerns in Middle Platonism, and certainly not in Plotinus, but al-
so that the popular model of the rise of ideas of transcendence in Middle Platonism
as strictly a working-out of philosophical ideologies within philosophy sensu stricto
is untenable.1117 A model of pluralistic borrowing across the (somewhat anachronis-
tic) borders between religion and philosophy seems to fit the historical reality better
than the one-way model in which the ‘underworld of Platonism’,1118 also known as
‘proletarian Platonism’,1119 stole its ideas from its intellectual betters.
Philosophic Religion in Plotinus. As discussed in Chapter 4, Plotinus believes
in an ancient wisdom which is by nature religious - that is, that religious institutions
are informed by the same principles of truth as philosophy, and that their founders,
while not philosophers, were privy to the same truths arrived at by philosophy. This
thesis also discusses Plotinus’ widespread invocation of religious imagery (the tem-
ple, the hierophant, prayer, purification) in the context of the philosophic ascent to-
ward the higher realities. Some mention should be made here of the ongoing debate
over Plotinus’ religious views.
This debate has engaged especially with the passage in Porphyry’s Life where, in-
vited by his student Amelius to attend the sacrificial ceremonies honouring the new
moon, Plotinus refused with the cryptic remark: ‘They ought to come to me, not I to
them.’1120 The identity of the ‘they’ in question is unclear, and Porphyry transmits
the anecdote in a fashion which seems intended to emphasise the mysterious nature
of Plotinus’ comment: ‘We wondered at this piece of grandiloquence, but none of
us dared to ask what he meant.’1121 Plotinus’ remark clearly shows that the philoso-
pher does not believe it necessary that he attend the cultic ritual in question; beyond
this, it becomes difficult to interpret. Is Plotinus saying that ‘they’ are daimones, and
1117Cf. Burns 2004, 62.
1118Cf. Von Stuckrad 2000, 8-9. The term ‘underworld of Platonism’, coined by Dillon (1977, 384)
and typologically refined by Majercik (Majercik 1989, 3-5) and Burns (2004, 59-62), was an attempt to
group the Platonising religious movements of the imperial period under a single banner for purposes
of discussion.
1119Dodds 1960a, 4.
1120Porph. Plot. 10.35-6: ἐκείνους δεῖ piρὸς ἐμὲ ἔρχεσθαι, οὐκ ἐμὲ piρὸς ἐκείνους.
1121Ibid. 36-8.
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as such ontologically inferior to the soul of the philosopher and unworthy of wor-
ship?1122 Or, as has been more recently argued, is it unnecessary for the philosopher
to attend special ceremonial occasions, since his presence to nous gives him ready
access to the divine at all times and in all places, thus allowing ‘them’ to come to
him?1123
These are not the questions which this thesis needs to answer, but the uncer-
tainty about Plotinus’ relationship to traditional cult should be addressed. Plotinus
does not pay much attention to the trappings of religion in the Enneads, nor does he
counsel traditional piety, concerning himself rather with the philosophic progress of
the individual Platonist aspirant.1124 At the same time, Plotinus’ use of traditional
religious materials such as myths and mysteries represents not a denial of religion,
but its philosophical transposition,1125 as documented in Chapter Three in the case
of the Middle Platonists. Plotinus invokes piety in many contexts. On the level of
cultural norms, he attacks the Gnostics for their rejection of the traditional ances-
tral gods;1126 the whole context of this passage makes it clear that Plotinus, far from
rejecting traditional practices, feels that they are a vehicle for the transmission of
truth to mankind through the oracles of the gods, and that it is right to show the
proper dignity (σεμνὸν δεῖ εἰς μέτρον, contrasted with the Gnostics’ σεμύνεις σαυτόν,
‘giving yourself airs’) and to lack boorishness in religious matters.1127 This mention
of oracles (ibid. 40-2) should not be downplayed; while Plotinus is not particularly
concerned with oracles, they do present a means by which the gods communicate
with mankind, and thus serve an important function for the unphilosophic masses,
who are without direct access to the noetic truths and the noetic gods.
Other passages show what can only be described as Plotinus’ own reverence or
1122This was the influential view of Armstrong (1955).
1123Argued by Berg 1999.
1124Cf. Armstrong 1955; Janowitz 2002, 15.
1125Cf. Berg 1999, 355.
1126II.9[33]9.58.
1127Ibid. 40-42; 46. Porphyry’s description of Amelius as φιλοθύτου γεγονότος, ‘having waxed rit-
ualistic’, in the passage cited above, while it may not represent Plotinus’ opinion, still points in the
direction of a consensus in the school that religious expressions should be kept within due bounds.
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piety. VI.8 repeatedly uses the term θεμιτόν in an apophatic context, a term which
typically refers to ‘rightness’ in a religious, rather than a dialectical sense. It could
not be θεμιτόν to associate premises with the one, and, in the context of the one’s
freedom from any constraint, Plotinus asks, ‘To what could it be a slave, if it is even
in any way permitted (θεμιτόν) to utter this word?’1128 It is not permitted (θεμιτόν)
to consider that anything of god is other than whole and all.1129 These and other
appearances of the term1130 should neither be insisted upon too much nor too little;
there is undoubtedly a certain philosophic piety at work here, but it is not a ritualistic
piety.
Several anecdotes from Porphyry’s life help fill in the blanks left by the Enneads’
general avoidance of the topic of cult. The famous incident of the ‘séance in the
Isæum’1131 is the most striking example: when an Egyptian priest was in Rome and
offered to summon Plotinus’ guardian daimôn to visible appearance, Plotinus ‘read-
ily assented’, and the proper rituals were duly carried out in the temple of Isis, the
only ritually pure spot which the priest claimed could be found at Rome. The ritual
is reported as a success: the appearance of Plotinus’ allotted guardian caused one
member of the assembly to bring an end to the manifestation (because he was either
afraid or jealous, according to Porphyry) through an obscure magical operation in-
volving killing birds. The priest, on the other hand, was greatly impressed, saying:
‘Blessed are you, who have a god as your daimôn rather than a companion of a lesser
order’.
Plotinus’ ready participation in what was clearly a ceremonial operation means,
at the very least, that he did not reject ritual cult out of hand.1132 Porphyry’s esoteric
recitation at the feast of Plato, discussed in Chapter Two (p. 51), is also relevant
here. Assuming that this anecdote, despite its self-congratulatory tone, records the
event more or less as it occurred, it shows Plotinus approving of the use of religious
112811.10-13; 12.19-20.
1129VI.7[38]1.
1130See Sleeman and Pollet 1980 s.v.
1131Porph. Plot. 10. 15-33. Thus immortalised by E.R. Dodds in 1968.
1132Cf. Berg 1999, 348-9.
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materials in a philosophic poem (the phrase τὸ μυστικῶς piολλὰ μετ΄ ἐνθουσιασμοῦ
ἐpiικεκρυμμένως implies not only an esoteric veiling of knowledge, but its veiling in
terms drawn from the religious sphere) and also comparing the philosopher to a
religious specialist, a hierophant.
This evidence should be balanced with passages in the Enneads which limit or
attack ritual practice. Plotinus attacks what he sees as the outlandish ritual practices
of the Gnostics.1133 And, of course, the soul of the philosopher, aiming at noetic
union and even union with the first principle itself, is engaged always in an exercise
in detachment from the world of bodies; thus, while magic, the influences of the
stars, and ritual prayers are effective, they are effective only at the sublunary level of
causation, a level which cannot truly have an effect on the purified philosopher.1134
It has been argued, mainly based on this last evidence, that Plotinus rejected tra-
ditional cult and ritual altogether, a view often contrasted with with the embracing of
theurgic ritual by later Platonists.1135 The debate over Plotinus’ view of ritual, since
Merlan’s (1953) influential article and Armstrong’s (1955) influential response, large-
ly revolved until recently around the question of whether Plotinus was a ‘magician’
or not. More recently the question has been reoriented through deconstruction of
some anachronistic categories (such as the sharp divide between late antique “mag-
ic” and “religion”)1136 and greater understanding of the phenomenon of theurgy,1137
considering Plotinus’ approach to ritual practice as a question of practical philoso-
phy. We may add to previous arguments the evidence that Plotinus viewed religion
as encoding hidden truths. Filling in the blanks somewhat, we may suppose that
for Plotinus, as for Plutarch, superstition and silliness had infected religion, and the
philosopher’s duty was to discover the hidden kernel of truth beneath this dross.
1133II.9[33]14.
1134See 203 above.
1135E.g. Dodds 1947, 58; Majercik 1989, 39; Janowitz 2002, 15.
1136E.g. Shaw 1999, 134-5 with n. 31.
1137Out of an extensive literature, notable trends include the reassessment of such authors as
Iamblichus (see e.g. Dillon 1987a; Dodds in Proclus 1963, xix; Finnamore 1985) and Proclus (see
e.g. Dodds in Proclus 1963), often previously derided or ignored on account of their defence of theur-
gic ritual (e.g. by Dodds in Proclus 1963, xxiv. See Kingsley 1995, 301-2; Liefferinge 1999, 15). There
has been a great amount of work done on the topic of theurgy in recent years, with several important
articles and book-length treatments (Lewy 1978; Shaw 1985, 1995; Majercik 1989; Liefferinge 1999).
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Plotinus’ attack on the Gnostics supports such a supposition: as we have seen, while
attacking their ritual practices, which he deems ridiculous, Plotinus also argues, at
least indirectly, for traditional ritual cult.1138 He is, in fact, not attacking ritual, but
attacking specific, bad rituals.
Chapter 4 has shown that Plotinus thought religion, as a cultural institution, con-
tained esoteric truths. Taking into account Plotinus’ ideas on the decline of humanity
over time, and the evidence from the Middle Platonists discussed in Chapter Three,
it is likely that these inner significations were seen as hidden under accretions of su-
perstition and false belief which had been superadded by the ignorant in the course
of time. Such an assumption explains Plotinus’ sometimes scornful stance toward
participation in cult practices alongside his ready participation in at least one such
occasion (notably a private ritual conducted by a member of the Egyptian priestly
class, a group uniquely privileged by Plotinus among barbarians as proponents of
the ancient wisdom). The collected evidence for Plotinus’ esoteric reading of the
mysteries also sheds light on his acclamation of Porphyry’s poem: Plotinus’ public
stance is that neither the esotericism or the mystic language used by Porphyry are el-
ements extraneous to philosophy, but valid philosophic methodologies. For Plotinus
the philosopher, the poet, and the hierophant can truly be one. The balanced posi-
tion, then, is that Plotinus views ritual cult as a low-level phenomenon, but not one
which should be rejected by philosophers, but rather correctly understood and criti-
cally sieved for its truth-content on the one hand, and, on the other, having practical,
sublunary benefits, which should however not overly concern the philosopher.
Plotinus makes no reference to sacrifice, but it is not improbable that he rejected
this practice; its rejection was widespread, not only in ‘Pythagorean’ circles, whose
vegetarian diet Plotinus shared,1139 but in many Late Antique religious and philo-
sophic movements more generally. To some thinkers and movements, the thought
1138As noted by Berg 1999.
1139Porph. Plot. 2 4-6.
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that the noetic god or gods would find material blood a pleasing sacrifice was ab-
surd.1140 We know that Plotinus accepted the efficacy of prayer, which, in an ancient
Hellenic context, meant ritual prayer.1141 There remains however the question of two
references in the Enneads to a kind of noetic prayer, discussed in Chapter Seven.1142
The idea of a silent form of prayer becomes widespread in our period: λογικὴ θυσία
is enjoined by the Hermetica,1143 and associated with Apollonius of Tyana.1144 Read
in this context, we should not take Plotinus’ calls to prayer as anything but literal,
as non-ritualistic expressions of true, philosophic piety, and expressions, moreover,
which are expected to have practical effectiveness. As with previous Platonists, and
Plato himself, Plotinus’ concern is not to reject piety as such, but to transfer it to
worthy objects (the highest realities) through worthy means (immaterial forms of
worship), and with the inessential or superstitious dross stripped away. His is a
largely unritualistic philosophical religion.
Appendix F: Modern Theories of Philosophic Silence
The Tübingenschule and the (Anti-)Esotericist Debate. The name ‘Tübingen School’1145
mainly refers to a scholarly approach to Plato, rather than to later Platonists, but it
is in some senses a revival of Late Platonist hermeneutics of Plato in a thoroughly
modern guise, and significant for this reason to the study of Platonist philosophic
silence more generally. The Tübingen reading of Plato is further significant in the
context of ancient philosophic silence because it is an esotericist reading of Plato -
that is to say, these scholars read Plato as though he did indeed write according to
the more Platonico,1146 hiding at least some of his true doctines - and is thus embroiled
1140See Edwards 2000, 21, n. 114. Cf. Fowden 1986, 122.
1141IV.4[28]26.1-3, 14-16; 30.1-8, 31-42 discuss the efficacy of prayer and how it functions through
universal sympatheia.
1142V.1[10]6.8-11 and V.8[31]9.11 both enjoin prayer upon the reader in a non-ritualistic, internalised
context; discussed 249 above.
1143Casel 1919, 98-9. See 179 above.
1144Casel 1919, 70-1.
1145Tigerstedt 1977 gives a summary of the development of the Tübingen position from a strongly
opposed viewpoint. Gaiser 1980, 7-8 gives a summary of the ‘Tübingen project’ from the perspective
of one of its supporters. For a fairly broad summary of the debate from neither ‘side’, see Müller 1993.
1146See 35 above.
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in the problematics of the self-hiding secret, one of the major interpretive difficulties
when dealing with Platonist philosophic silence.
As mentioned above, the idea that Plato wrote in this way, hiding his true doc-
trine in some fashion, has been an assumption of many, or even most readers since
late antiquity until the eighteenth century,1147 and it has only been with the advent of
the modern analytical approach that this reading has been widely called into ques-
tion. Harold Cherniss took an influential reductionist stance on which sources of ev-
idence are admissible in attempting to discern what Plato meant to say:1148 Cherniss
maintains, essentially, that only the dialogues themselves should be considered as
evidence of Plato’s views. The ‘Esoterics’, on the other hand, argue that the strong
testimony of Aristotle and others that the lecture ‘On the Good’ presented an oral
component of Plato’s teaching cannot be ignored.1149 Insofar as regards the history
of Platonist interpretation, this is certainly true; as this thesis emphasises in Chap-
ter Two, the Platonic ‘oral teaching’ had a long interpretive life in later Platonist
metaphysics, and served as a thematic locus for the theory of Platonist silence.
It is impossible to say with precision when the reputation of Plato as an author
with a secret teaching arose. Tigerstedt has correctly pointed out that there is no di-
rect evidence for the idea of a secret Platonic doctrine before the imperial period,1150
a fact which he adduces to a thoroughgoing argument against a secret Platonic doc-
trine. Ignoring the question of the historicity of the secret doctrines, however, it is
tempting to date the idea that Plato had such a secret teaching to at least the Hellenis-
tic period; the reductionist view of the evidence may be questioned on a number of
points, none of which is individually conclusive, but which may cumulatively lead
one to doubt Tigerstedt’s late dating for the idea of the secret doctrines.
1147See previous note. Cf. Tigerstedt 1974, 57 ff.
1148Cherniss 1945, in Part One: ‘Plato’s Lectures: A Hypothesis for an Enigma’ (1-30); notable expan-
sions of and supporting arguments for Cherniss’ basic position are Vlastos 1963; Tigerstedt 1977. The
enterprise of separating Plato from his interpreters, and from the evidence for unwritten doctrines,
can be traced back to Schleiermacher.
1149For major contributions to this interpretive stance see especially Krämer 1959; Gaiser 1963;
Szlezák 1978a.
1150Tigerstedt 1977, 64-5. Cf. Boas 1953. Both scholars make the point that the ἄγραφα δόγματα
referred to by Aristotle (see n. 242 above) need not have been secret doctrines merely because they
were unwritten doctrines.
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Firstly, of course, the Platonic materials surveyed in Chapter Two above undoubt-
edly evoke the idea of hidden teachings, and of philosophy as an initiatory matter
between teacher and student; this may or may not mean that Plato had his own se-
cret teachings which he taught orally in the Academy, but it makes it difficult to see
how the idea that Plato had a secret doctrine could not have arisen almost immedi-
ately. Another problem with the absolute denial of an early date for the idea of the
Platonic secret teaching is that it supposes that it sprang fully formed, like Athena,
from the heads of such authors as Cicero (1st C. BCE)1151 and Josephus (1st C. CE),1152
with little or no historical evolution beforehand.
We also have fairly early testimony to the intriguing tradition, which had a long
life in antiquity, that the sceptical Academy had a hidden Platonic doctrine at its
core. This idea was maintained by one Diocles of Cnidus (3rd C. BCE), who claimed
that Arcesilaus, the founder of the sceptical Academy, imparted the doctrines of Pla-
to to an inner circle while hiding behind a false front of ‘suspension of belief’,1153 an
idea also familiar to Numenius, who doubts it in the case of Arcesilaus, but seems
to accept it in the case of Carneades.1154 This idea also appears in a different form
as late as Augustine, who saw the esoteric teaching of the Sceptical Academy as a
relatively praiseworthy affair, allowing for the doctrine of immaterial substances to
1151Cicero (Rep. I.10) has Scipio recount a tradition of the influences at work in Plato’s philosophy:
Itaque cum Socratem unice dilexisset eique omnia tribuere voluisset; leporem socraticum subtilitatemque sermo-
nis cum obscuritate Pythagorae et cum plurimarum artium gravitate contexuit. The Pythagorean obscuritas
referred to could mean ‘obscurity’, but could also have the sense of intentional secretiveness; obscurus
may mean not only ‘obscure’ but also ‘closed, secret, reserved’ (see n. 127 above). See Bremmer 1995,
70.
1152Ap. 2. 224-5: Plato hid the truth about god for fear of the mob.
1153S.E. P. 1.234.
1154See Num. fr. 25 ll. 62-8. Numenius cites Diocles on Arcesilaus the Academic scholarch, but thinks
that Arcesilaus was actually what he claimed to be, a detestable (in Numenius’ eyes) sceptic with no
doctrines. In fr. 27.56-9, Numenius says of Carneades: ‘Carneades, in forming a philosophy from
diametrically opposed principles, as it were, adorned himself with lies and concealed the truth with
them. Thus he used the lies as curtains and spoke the truth within unnoticed, in a rather mercenary
fashion.’ It would seem that Numenius regards Carneades as genuinely possessing an esoteric hidden
doctrine, but that this doctrine, although ‘true’, is somehow worthless. The humorous and allusive
style of the work from which this passage is taken, On the Academy’s Abandonment of Plato (see 131
above), makes it difficult to judge just how we are to construe this take on Carneades, but Numenius
is certainly arguing for some kind of esoteric doctrine.
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be transmitted underground during the ascendency of Stoic materialism, later to re-
emerge into the light of day.1155 The idea of a secret Academic tradition, which we
can trace back to the heyday of the sceptical Academy itself, must have arisen from
somewhere; the two most obvious places are 1: from the Academy itself (i.e., that
the sceptics really were secret Platonists avant la lettre), or 2: as an extrapolation from
the esoteric materials in Plato’s own works (i.e., through a conviction that any tra-
dition stemming from Plato must have a secret teaching, whatever its protestations
of sceptical suspension of judgement). I think the second option is the more plausi-
ble, which would again support the likelihood of an early belief in a secret Platonic
teaching - a belief, in fact, in a secret Platonist tradition.
The tangled weighing of complex evidence which underlies these discussions vis
à vis Plato himself is not of direct relevance to the present thesis (and probably can-
not be settled in a way that will convince a majority of scholars),1156 but two main
points of this debate are germane to philosophic silence: Plato’s own statements that
his true doctrine was not suitable for writing down (expressed most strongly in Ep.
VII, which may or may not be genuine,1157 but consonant with many passages in the
dialogues emphasising the need for long training between a teacher and student be-
fore the higher truths of philosophy are broached),1158 and the problematic issue of
the Platonic lecture ‘On the Good’. The contemporary or near-contemporary reports
of this lecture seem to contradict the esoteric principles derived from the Platonic
Epistles and dialogues mentioned above; the ‘riddle’ of the lecture itself, as to why
Plato’s innermost doctrines could be unsuitable to be written down, but could ap-
propriately be delivered to a random and sometimes unfriendly audience, presents,
in terms of Late Platonist reading, a structural paradox of hiding and revealing.1159
This debate is interesting to the historian of philosophic silence for a number of
reasons. While the foregoing condensed survey might give the impression that the
1155Contr. Ac. 3.37-43.
1156Cf. Müller 1993, 117; 127; for a discussion of ‘ways forward’ given the divided status quæstionis,
see Gill 1993.
1157See n. 233 above.
1158See 74 ff. above.
1159Cf. Guthrie 1975, 424-426; Gaiser 1980, 6-7.
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Esotericist school supports a reading of Plato similar to that propounded by Plotinus
and the Late Platonists, the interpretations of this school are in fact fully within the
fold of modern source-critical philosophy, and, if anything, strive more strenuously
than the anti-Esotericists to free Plato of the charge of having propounded the idea
that his teaching might be ἀpiόρρητον in the sense of ‘ineffable’. There is sometimes
even an ironic inversion of what might be the expected interpretive stance; the Es-
otericist position tends to read the Seventh Epistle as having no reference to ideas
of ineffability, and may even accuse the anti-Esotericist of propounding a ‘mystical’
and thoroughly outmoded Plato who spoke of an ineffable truth.1160
Tigerstedt’s polemical claim that the Esotericists are ‘. . . essentially identical with
Neoplatonism’ in their reading of Plato ignores the details of their respective read-
ings.1161 Plato’s secrecy, for the Tübingen scholars, is firmly the elitist secrecy of a
knowledge which is useless or dangerous in the wrong hands, rather than a knowl-
edge which cannot by its nature be expressed in words.1162 It is, more importantly,
an open secret; the Esotericists claim to see behind the screen of Plato’s secrecy an
ontological doctrine, one which can be expressed in fairly straightforward terms;
they thus present themselves as penetrating the rhetoric of secrecy and presenting,
in an open way, Plato’s true doctrine,1163 while, for Plotinus and the late antique Pla-
tonists, this doctrine is simply not susceptible to such presentation, being a doctrine
of transcendence, and thus self-hiding. The Esotericists thus actually share the read-
ing of the late antique Platonists only insofar that they insist that Plato was hiding
something.
The implications of the rhetorics of secrecy present in Plato’s text will not leave
matters this simple, however. We may note that, in presenting Plato’s inner teaching,
1160Gaiser 1980, 27, and n. 81, against Cherniss 1945, 13. Cherniss does not, pace Gaiser, propound
such a Plato in this passage but he does state that the Seventh Epistle, if taken literally, would logically
lead one to abandon the quest for an open doctrine to be found in Plato’s works.
1161Tigerstedt 1977, 63.
1162See e.g. Krämer 1959, 25ff; 401; 457; Gaiser 1980, 14, and n. 31; 27.
1163See, e.g. Gaiser 1980, 8: ‘We hold the view that Plato intended a systematic synthesis and
grounding of his entire thought with this theory of first principles, which is only hinted at in the
dialogues.’
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the Tübingen scholars presumably make one of two judgements: either the judge-
ment that modern audiences are somehow more ready to receive the Platonist doc-
trines than ancient ones were (the ‘arrogance of interpretation’),1164 or that Plato was
wrong to hide his doctrine from the masses. Either way, we can see the dialectic of
hiding and revealing at work even in the Tübingen discourse which seeks nominal-
ly to free Plato’s ‘Esotericism’ from charges of ‘esotericism’, for these scholars are
themselves breaking the silence which Plato saw fit to establish, much as Plotinus,
in evoking the enigmatic meaning of the mystery injunction to silence and then re-
vealing its true nature as a philosophic doctrine, betrays the mysteries even as he
invokes their authority.1165
Straussian Esotericism (and Exotericism). In an article written in the nineteen-
twenties, but not published until nineteen eighty-six, the critic and political philoso-
pher Leo Strauss outlined the theory of what he called ‘exoteric writing’, based on
the work of Gotthold Ephraim Lessing.1166 This was a practice of esoteric (by the
working definition outlined p. 27 above) discourse whereby a philosopher wrote
a public text, but hid uncomfortable truths within that text to avoid persecution
by the unphilosophic masses, a practice of ‘writing between the lines’.1167 Strauss
gives Plato as an example: in the Gorgias (160) Socrates expresses a belief in post-
mortem punishments for those who have acted badly during their lives, a belief
which Strauss considers Plato did not hold.1168 He further outlined this theory in
the book Persecution and the Art of Writing (1988), in which he gives concrete exam-
ples of how this esotericism is supposed to work, using Maimonides’ Guide for the
Perplexed as his source: a writer will signal his hidden subtext through the deliberate
use of contradiction of various kinds (70-1), the exploitation of ambiguities (71-3),
and, sometimes, by methodological statements.1169 Strauss finds such statements in
1164See 151 above.
1165See 14 ff. above.
1166Strauss 1986.
1167Ibid. 52.
1168Ibid. 54.
1169Cf. 1986, 54, where Strauss outlines seven methodological points of ‘exoteric’ writing.
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Lessing1170 and Spinoza, who differentiates between pia dogmata and vera dogmata,
the former leading to obedience in the many and the latter expressing the truth to
the few.1171
A passage from Clement of Alexandria seems to provide us with an example of a
‘Straussian’ method of writing in action.1172 In the Stromateis, a work conspicuously
lacking in method and organisation, Clement tells us that his style is deliberately
unsystematic:
Some [matters] I am deliberately putting to one side, making my
selection scientifically out of fear of writing what I have refrained
from speaking - not in a spirit of grudging (that would be wrong),
but in fear that my companions might misunderstand them and go
astray and that I might be found offering a dagger to a child.1173
All of the elements of Strauss’ theory seem to be present here: the author’s advise
to the attentive reader that there is a hidden, scattered subtext to his work, and the
belief on the author’s part that certain matters may do more harm than good in
the hands of the unprepared or unphilosophic reader. While not seemingly in fear
of persecution, Clement certainly wrote in an environment where the strictures of
competing claims to ‘orthodoxy’ were increasingly colouring the intellectual climate;
a certain care in expressing one’s ideas was the order of the day.
The model of an esotericism practised through the ‘scattering’ of statements of
truth throughout a text, to be unearthed by the attentive reader with the proper
hermeneutic keys, is found by Stroumsa in a range of Patristic writings as well as
Maimonides, and informs, according to his analysis, the readings of scripture prac-
tised by these authors. Although Stroumsa does not reference Strauss, the method-
ologies outlined are similar.1174
11701986, 52: ‘In short, Lessing was the last writer who revealed, while hiding them, the reasons
compelling wise men to hide the truth: he wrote between the lines about the art of writing between
the lines.’
1171Tractatus Theologico-Politicus Cap. 14 para. 20 Bruder, cited at Strauss 1986, 59.
1172Cf. Mortley 1986, II, 37; Hägg 2006, 124-5, who does not mention Strauss, but discusses a similar
methodology of ‘scattering’ the truth in Clement’s Stromateis.
1173Strom. I.14.3, trans. Hägg 2006, 69.
11741996a, 114-117; 124-126, discussing Clement of Alexandria (114-117), Origen (124-6), and
Maimonides (125).
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As this thesis argues, this kind of esotericism is not referred to explicitly in the
Platonist tradition before Numenius, who himself attributes it to Plato (see 84 above).
But in the case of Plato we run up against the major drawback of Strauss’ theory: in
lieu of a methodological statement on the author’s part such as we have in Clement,
the claim that an author used Strauss’ art of esoteric writing is unfalsifiable. In Pla-
to’s case, the debates of the Esotericist and anti-Esotericist camps have shown the
degree to which, in such questions of interpretation, universally convincing find-
ings are simply out of the question; it is up to the judgement of the reader to decide
whether an author is using contradictions and ambiguities to reveal to the attentive
reader a hidden subtext.
Jacques Derrida and the Post-modern Rise of Apophaticism. There are certain
modern thinkers for whom the nature of language is itself intrinsically apophatic, in
that the actual meaning or bedrock of signification can never be found in any giv-
en word except by means of further words.1175 Jacques Derrida’s work is the most
prominent example of this stance, and his essay, Comment ne pas parler? Dénéga-
tions,1176 which addresses the apophatic tradition specifically and constitutes one of
the most penetrating and challenging treatments of the genre, has sparked a great in-
terest in this type of writing. The deconstructionist literature pioneered by Derrida,
like apophatic language, is painfully self-referential and recursive; it is continually
distrustful of its own truth-value, and so seeks constantly to revise its own state-
ments as soon as they are made. Such an approach serves as a structural reminder to
the reader that statements are tentative, and never, by their nature, able to pin down
any meaning-event in a conclusive way.
This would seem at first glance to be a possible way around the problem noted
by Sells,1177 that the commentator on apophatic texts is always faced with the same
problems which the original text contains, namely the prohibition of normal pred-
icates. With Derrida we see a repositioning of this problem as, in fact, a salutary
1175See Franke 2005.
1176Derrida 1987; published in English as ‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials’ (1992).
1177See 92 above.
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characteristic of apophatic text which bears imitating; deconstruction wholehearted-
ly imports these problems into scholarly discourse, and in fact expands their scope
to the whole gamut of the linguistic field. The problem is thus no longer: How does
one ‘translate’ apophatic statements into normal, scholarly discursive writing? It be-
comes instead: How does one make sense of the scholarly writing, or any writing,
itself?
This intentional unintelligibility is a problem; not one, but several book-length
treatments of this single, relatively short, essay of Derrida’s have appeared, attempt-
ing to contextualise the work in Derrida’s oeuvre as a whole, to flesh out its dis-
cussions with other references to the apophatic tradition, but, most basically, to ex-
plain what the essay means.1178 Derrida does not elucidate the meaning of apophatic
texts, but supplies a proxy text (an intertext, in his own terminology) through which
modern readers may choose to approach the original text (in the same way as he
approaches Late Platonism via the intertextual route of Saussure, Heidegger, et al.),
removing analysis a whole step from its subject, but bringing that subject no closer
to analysis. This makes his work problematic for use in traditional humanistic schol-
arship, but it is at the same time clear that this work represents a genuine advance
toward appreciating apophatic language, which can only be addressed to a certain
extent through an analytical approach.
Read as performative text, the negations of the theologians in Derrida are viewed
from a radically contrasting direction from the analytical approach common in the
study of Classical philosophy ; their propositional value, or their coherence vis à
vis chains of reasoning which are to be found in the history of philosophical debate,
are an accidental characteristic relative to their defining attribute of being speech-
acts which exist only inasmuch as they are read. While maintaining a standpoint of
descriptive historicism which Derrida might have rejected as false, this thesis inte-
grates some of his intimations of apophatic locutions as lived, performed elements
of discourse which provide a means of entry to conceptual spaces generated by the
1178E.g. Coward and Foshay 1992; Sneller 1998. See Gersh 2010, 106-116 for a relatively
straightforward interpretation of Derrida’s ‘arguments’ with regard to negative theology.
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